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War at the End of the World: Douglas MacArthur and the Forgotten Fight for New Guinea, 1942-1945
A harrowing account of an epic, yet nearly forgotten, battle of World War II—General Douglas MacArthur's four-year assault on the Pacific War's most hostile the mountainous, jungle-cloaked island of New Guinea.
“A meaty, engrossing narrative history… This will likely stand as the definitive account of the New Guinea campaign.” —The Christian Science Monitor
One American soldier called it “a green hell on earth.” Monsoon-soaked wilderness, debilitating heat, impassable mountains, torrential rivers, and disease-infested swamps—New Guinea was a battleground far more deadly than the most fanatical of enemy troops. Japanese forces numbering some 600,000 men began landing in January 1942, determined to seize the island as a cornerstone of the Empire’s strategy to knock Australia out of the war. Allied Commander-in-Chief General Douglas MacArthur committed 340,000 Americans, as well as tens of thousands of Australian, Dutch, and New Guinea troops, to retake New Guinea at all costs.
What followed was a four-year campaign that involved some of the most horrific warfare in history. At first emboldened by easy victories throughout the Pacific, the Japanese soon encountered in New Guinea a roadblock akin to the Germans’ disastrous attempt to take Moscow, a catastrophic setback to their war machine. For the Americans, victory in New Guinea was the first essential step in the long march towards the Japanese home islands and the ultimate destruction of Hirohito’s empire. Winning the war in New Guinea was of critical importance to MacArthur. His avowed “I shall return” to the Philippines could only be accomplished after taking the island.
In this gripping narrative, historian James P. Duffy chronicles the most ruthless combat of the Pacific War, a fight complicated by rampant tropical disease, violent rainstorms, and unforgiving terrain that punished both Axis and Allied forces alike. Drawing on primary sources, War at the End of the World fills in a crucial gap in the history of World War II while offering readers a narrative of the first rank.
“A meaty, engrossing narrative history… This will likely stand as the definitive account of the New Guinea campaign.” —The Christian Science Monitor
One American soldier called it “a green hell on earth.” Monsoon-soaked wilderness, debilitating heat, impassable mountains, torrential rivers, and disease-infested swamps—New Guinea was a battleground far more deadly than the most fanatical of enemy troops. Japanese forces numbering some 600,000 men began landing in January 1942, determined to seize the island as a cornerstone of the Empire’s strategy to knock Australia out of the war. Allied Commander-in-Chief General Douglas MacArthur committed 340,000 Americans, as well as tens of thousands of Australian, Dutch, and New Guinea troops, to retake New Guinea at all costs.
What followed was a four-year campaign that involved some of the most horrific warfare in history. At first emboldened by easy victories throughout the Pacific, the Japanese soon encountered in New Guinea a roadblock akin to the Germans’ disastrous attempt to take Moscow, a catastrophic setback to their war machine. For the Americans, victory in New Guinea was the first essential step in the long march towards the Japanese home islands and the ultimate destruction of Hirohito’s empire. Winning the war in New Guinea was of critical importance to MacArthur. His avowed “I shall return” to the Philippines could only be accomplished after taking the island.
In this gripping narrative, historian James P. Duffy chronicles the most ruthless combat of the Pacific War, a fight complicated by rampant tropical disease, violent rainstorms, and unforgiving terrain that punished both Axis and Allied forces alike. Drawing on primary sources, War at the End of the World fills in a crucial gap in the history of World War II while offering readers a narrative of the first rank.
464 pages, Paperback
First published January 5, 2016
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September 27, 2019
I was totally entranced by this book about the battle for New Guinea. The Allied powers made the decision that it was "Europe first and the Pacific second", therefore the subject matter of this history is not as well known as those battles on the European continent. No one knew the names of the hundreds of small islands that made up the Pacific and were being used by Japan as stepping stones to the Hawaiian Islands. However, there were two very important land masses that were crucial to the Allies.....New Guinea and Australia (the Philippines had already fallen).
MacArthur was driven from the Philippines to the shelter of Australia and had sworn that he would return. The Japanese were just as determined that he would not and began their assault on New Guinea (and its smaller sister island New Britain) with Australia as their ultimate prize. It turned into one of the most harrowing battles of the Pacific theater as the armies fought not only each other but intense temperatures, constant rain, swamps, and rampant disease. For those running out of supplies, the land didn't offer much edible vegetation and many died of starvation. The battle raged for three years and the Japanese were finally forced off of New Guinea, partially because they were losing the war and needed troops elsewhere and partially because the troops of the US, Australia and the indigenous troops of New Guinea fought like tigers to protect this gateway to Australia. MacArthur, although he was a supreme egotist, was particularly effective in his leadership and planning and indeed, did get to wade ashore in the Philippines on his reputed return.
I have to admit that I was not as familiar with the New Guinea battle as I should have been and this book was the perfect window into one of the most hard fought and hellish encounters of WWII. Highly recommended.
MacArthur was driven from the Philippines to the shelter of Australia and had sworn that he would return. The Japanese were just as determined that he would not and began their assault on New Guinea (and its smaller sister island New Britain) with Australia as their ultimate prize. It turned into one of the most harrowing battles of the Pacific theater as the armies fought not only each other but intense temperatures, constant rain, swamps, and rampant disease. For those running out of supplies, the land didn't offer much edible vegetation and many died of starvation. The battle raged for three years and the Japanese were finally forced off of New Guinea, partially because they were losing the war and needed troops elsewhere and partially because the troops of the US, Australia and the indigenous troops of New Guinea fought like tigers to protect this gateway to Australia. MacArthur, although he was a supreme egotist, was particularly effective in his leadership and planning and indeed, did get to wade ashore in the Philippines on his reputed return.
I have to admit that I was not as familiar with the New Guinea battle as I should have been and this book was the perfect window into one of the most hard fought and hellish encounters of WWII. Highly recommended.
January 13, 2024
By May 1942 Japan had accomplished all of its initial objectives, ahead of schedule and at a lower than expected cost in men and material. Their empire stretched from China across to the Philippines and northern New Guinea, then up to Burma. They had the luxury of being able to strike wherever they wanted: west to India, south to Australia, or east to Hawaii. They just had to agree on what their next objective would be, and that would not be easy. The Japanese military had nothing like a Joint Chiefs of Staff to coordinate overall direction and policy for the war effort; it would have been an unbearable loss of face for an Army general to take orders from a Navy admiral or vice versa. Even Hideki Tojo, the prime minister and former Army general, did not feel he could give orders to the Navy. As a result, any cooperation between the services required extensive negotiations, and one or the other could always refuse to cooperate.
The Navy wanted to invade Australia to knock it out of the war. The Army, which felt its troops were already overextended, disagreed, so a compromise was worked out where the Army would invade Port Moresby on the southern coast of New Guinea, which would put all of northeastern Australia within range of land based bombers. The Navy agreed to provide ships to escort the invasion forces, including aircraft carriers to prevent Allied counterattacks.
The U.S. Navy was already starting to have success reading the Japanese codes, and knew an attack was coming, so they sent out ships of their own. The result was the Battle of the Coral Sea 4-8 May. It was a tactical victory for Japan, because at the cost of one light carrier they had sunk the USS Lexington, one of the United States’s only carriers in the Pacific. However, strategically it was a victory for the U.S., because the invasion fleet turned back, and two other Japanese carriers that had been damaged were sent back to Japan, which meant they were unavailable for the Battle of Midway the following month, where their presence could have been decisive.
Frustrated in his attempt to neutralize Australia, Admiral Yamamoto turned his attention east, toward Hawaii. It is well known that Midway was a turning point of the war, with the Japanese losing four fleet aircraft carriers to the Americans’ one, but many people do not understand how much was riding on that victory, made possible by code breaking and Admiral Nimitz’s decision to attack aggressively. In John Winton’s Ultra in the Pacific, he does a good job describing just how high the stakes were:
During their initial push south after capturing the Philippines, the Japanese brushed aside the forces defending the ports of Truk and Rabaul, gaining access to two of finest harbors in the Pacific, along with airfields that could support the Army’s continuing advance. Port Moresby remained the objective, and if it could not be taken by seaborne invasion, the Japanese would conquer it by land, following the Kokoda Trail over the Owen Stanley mountains. Their intelligence badly misinterpreted the terrain, reporting that the trail was passable its entire way by vehicles. In fact it could barely be crossed on foot, a narrow track over steep mountains and across rushing rivers, and plagued with insects carrying malaria, dengue fever, and other diseases.
By this time Douglas MacArthur had been appointed to command the South West Pacific Area, which included New Guinea. He had few American troops at his disposal, and sent the Australians up the Kokoda Trail from the Port Moresby end to fight in a place where the forest was so thick that visibility was almost zero and encounters were often hand to hand. The Japanese continued to push forward until they reached a plateau where they could look down on the lights of Port Moresby and the ocean beyond, less that twenty miles away. But, like the Germans who penetrated right into the outskirts of Moscow before being driven back, the Imperial troops would go no farther. By this time their supply lines had broken down entirely, so they were forced to scavenge whatever food they could find, and many of them were incapacitated by disease. When the Australians pushed fresh battalions forward and the Americans landed 20,000 troops in Port Moresby the Japanese had no choice but to painfully retrace their steps back to their starting point.
The first battle in MacArthur’s plan to recapture New Guinea would take place at Buna, on the shores of the Solomon Sea. The Japanese had built disguised bunkers with overlapping fields of fire, and at the time the Americans and Australians had no tanks or heavy artillery available. The battle was a slow, bloody slog lasting from November 1942 to January 1943 which cost the Allies almost 2,000 killed and over 12,000 wounded, injured, or sick. The Japanese losses were estimated at 7,000 dead (4,000 in combat and the rest from disease). MacArthur knew the Japanese had similarly defended positions all along the northern coast of New Guinea, and decided that a new strategy was needed to avoid a protracted war of attrition.
In early 1943 America’s industrial capacity was started to make a crucial difference. More ships, more planes, more tanks and war material of all kinds, plus trained soldiers, sailors, and airmen to use them. The Japanese contested the air and sea with their assets at Rabaul, but the American might was overwhelming, and once control had been wrested away the Allies could strike whenever and wherever they wanted.
MacArthur adopted an amphibious strategy in which he would bypass heavily defended areas and attack positions farther up the coast. He would prevent the Japanese from being able to move troops and equipment, as well as food and ammunition, to areas under attack by using constant pressure from aircraft bombing and strafing anything that moved, and PT boats offshore to intercept any attempts to resupply by water. By 1944 Japanese troops were starving and dying of diseases, and some of their attacks were launched just to try to capture American food supplies.
The drawback to MacArthur’s strategy was that it quickly became clear to the Japanese where he would be heading next, and they reinforced their strongholds ahead of the expected invasions. The fighting was brutal and bloody, with Japanese fighting from coral caves and in the dense jungle, but in every case the weight of Allied troops, aircraft, tanks, and ship bombardments pushed the them back. More started to surrender, but even so these were never more than a few percent of the total, and most fought to the death.
Each leap forward was another stepping stone in MacArthur’s ultimate plan: the liberation of the Philippines, which began in October 1944.
New Guinea was never a primary objective for the Allies. It was intended at first to protect Australia and later seen as a way to approach the Philippines and to get heavy bombers in range of Burma and Indochina to disrupt oil and rubber production. This book is a good introduction to the campaign, and gives the reader an appreciation of the strategies, the leaders, the terrain, and the brutality of the fighting.
My only complaint is that it goes way too easy on MacArthur. His raging megalomania is only hinted at by references to senior officers and politicians who despised him for his ego and self-aggrandizement. In fairness to him, he chose a good strategy for recapturing New Guinea, and picked competent generals and admirals to carry it out, but his personal behavior was outrageous. For example, he reviewed photographs of himself every day to decide which ones to include in the news releases, and no one other than himself could be mentioned in the daily dispatches without his personal approval. In one particularly egregious incident (not in this book), he told a battalion commander that he could get his name in the dispatches if he carried out a near suicide mission that was sure to get most of his men killed. The officer was appalled at such a casual disregard of lives, but MacArthur never saw a problem since he himself would have jumped at any chance to get his name in the papers.
He also chose his staff based on their personal loyalty rather than their competence. His intelligence chief, Major General Charles Willoughby was born in Germany but emigrated to the United States as a teenager. He lied about having attended college in Europe, including the Sorbonne, to get a college degree, and then made a career in the Army. If MacArthur expressed an opinion about enemy troop strengths and intentions, Willoughby was sure to tailor his reports to reflect what the boss wanted to hear. This had disastrous consequences during the liberation of the Philippines, and continued into the Korean War. When MacArthur wanted to believe that the Chinese would not intervene, despite clear evidence of massive troop buildups just across the Yalu river, Willoughby provided intelligence reports that were in full agreement, and everyone acted surprised when 300,000 Chinese troops poured over the border several days later.
The Navy wanted to invade Australia to knock it out of the war. The Army, which felt its troops were already overextended, disagreed, so a compromise was worked out where the Army would invade Port Moresby on the southern coast of New Guinea, which would put all of northeastern Australia within range of land based bombers. The Navy agreed to provide ships to escort the invasion forces, including aircraft carriers to prevent Allied counterattacks.
The U.S. Navy was already starting to have success reading the Japanese codes, and knew an attack was coming, so they sent out ships of their own. The result was the Battle of the Coral Sea 4-8 May. It was a tactical victory for Japan, because at the cost of one light carrier they had sunk the USS Lexington, one of the United States’s only carriers in the Pacific. However, strategically it was a victory for the U.S., because the invasion fleet turned back, and two other Japanese carriers that had been damaged were sent back to Japan, which meant they were unavailable for the Battle of Midway the following month, where their presence could have been decisive.
Frustrated in his attempt to neutralize Australia, Admiral Yamamoto turned his attention east, toward Hawaii. It is well known that Midway was a turning point of the war, with the Japanese losing four fleet aircraft carriers to the Americans’ one, but many people do not understand how much was riding on that victory, made possible by code breaking and Admiral Nimitz’s decision to attack aggressively. In John Winton’s Ultra in the Pacific, he does a good job describing just how high the stakes were:
If the American fleet were decisively defeated, Hawaii would fall and the Japanese would be able to roll back the war to the shores of America, which were very inadequately defended. In such circumstances the American people would hardly have agreed to concentrate upon the defeat of Germany first – not with a treacherous enemy of their own off their western coast. A Second Front could not then have been mounted until the United States had settled with Japan, by which time Russia might have defeated Germany on her own, with such assistance as Great Britain and the United States could afford. The Iron Curtain would not then have dropped at the Elbe, but at the Rhine, possibly even at Calais. (p. 50)
During their initial push south after capturing the Philippines, the Japanese brushed aside the forces defending the ports of Truk and Rabaul, gaining access to two of finest harbors in the Pacific, along with airfields that could support the Army’s continuing advance. Port Moresby remained the objective, and if it could not be taken by seaborne invasion, the Japanese would conquer it by land, following the Kokoda Trail over the Owen Stanley mountains. Their intelligence badly misinterpreted the terrain, reporting that the trail was passable its entire way by vehicles. In fact it could barely be crossed on foot, a narrow track over steep mountains and across rushing rivers, and plagued with insects carrying malaria, dengue fever, and other diseases.
By this time Douglas MacArthur had been appointed to command the South West Pacific Area, which included New Guinea. He had few American troops at his disposal, and sent the Australians up the Kokoda Trail from the Port Moresby end to fight in a place where the forest was so thick that visibility was almost zero and encounters were often hand to hand. The Japanese continued to push forward until they reached a plateau where they could look down on the lights of Port Moresby and the ocean beyond, less that twenty miles away. But, like the Germans who penetrated right into the outskirts of Moscow before being driven back, the Imperial troops would go no farther. By this time their supply lines had broken down entirely, so they were forced to scavenge whatever food they could find, and many of them were incapacitated by disease. When the Australians pushed fresh battalions forward and the Americans landed 20,000 troops in Port Moresby the Japanese had no choice but to painfully retrace their steps back to their starting point.
The first battle in MacArthur’s plan to recapture New Guinea would take place at Buna, on the shores of the Solomon Sea. The Japanese had built disguised bunkers with overlapping fields of fire, and at the time the Americans and Australians had no tanks or heavy artillery available. The battle was a slow, bloody slog lasting from November 1942 to January 1943 which cost the Allies almost 2,000 killed and over 12,000 wounded, injured, or sick. The Japanese losses were estimated at 7,000 dead (4,000 in combat and the rest from disease). MacArthur knew the Japanese had similarly defended positions all along the northern coast of New Guinea, and decided that a new strategy was needed to avoid a protracted war of attrition.
In early 1943 America’s industrial capacity was started to make a crucial difference. More ships, more planes, more tanks and war material of all kinds, plus trained soldiers, sailors, and airmen to use them. The Japanese contested the air and sea with their assets at Rabaul, but the American might was overwhelming, and once control had been wrested away the Allies could strike whenever and wherever they wanted.
MacArthur adopted an amphibious strategy in which he would bypass heavily defended areas and attack positions farther up the coast. He would prevent the Japanese from being able to move troops and equipment, as well as food and ammunition, to areas under attack by using constant pressure from aircraft bombing and strafing anything that moved, and PT boats offshore to intercept any attempts to resupply by water. By 1944 Japanese troops were starving and dying of diseases, and some of their attacks were launched just to try to capture American food supplies.
The drawback to MacArthur’s strategy was that it quickly became clear to the Japanese where he would be heading next, and they reinforced their strongholds ahead of the expected invasions. The fighting was brutal and bloody, with Japanese fighting from coral caves and in the dense jungle, but in every case the weight of Allied troops, aircraft, tanks, and ship bombardments pushed the them back. More started to surrender, but even so these were never more than a few percent of the total, and most fought to the death.
Each leap forward was another stepping stone in MacArthur’s ultimate plan: the liberation of the Philippines, which began in October 1944.
New Guinea was never a primary objective for the Allies. It was intended at first to protect Australia and later seen as a way to approach the Philippines and to get heavy bombers in range of Burma and Indochina to disrupt oil and rubber production. This book is a good introduction to the campaign, and gives the reader an appreciation of the strategies, the leaders, the terrain, and the brutality of the fighting.
My only complaint is that it goes way too easy on MacArthur. His raging megalomania is only hinted at by references to senior officers and politicians who despised him for his ego and self-aggrandizement. In fairness to him, he chose a good strategy for recapturing New Guinea, and picked competent generals and admirals to carry it out, but his personal behavior was outrageous. For example, he reviewed photographs of himself every day to decide which ones to include in the news releases, and no one other than himself could be mentioned in the daily dispatches without his personal approval. In one particularly egregious incident (not in this book), he told a battalion commander that he could get his name in the dispatches if he carried out a near suicide mission that was sure to get most of his men killed. The officer was appalled at such a casual disregard of lives, but MacArthur never saw a problem since he himself would have jumped at any chance to get his name in the papers.
He also chose his staff based on their personal loyalty rather than their competence. His intelligence chief, Major General Charles Willoughby was born in Germany but emigrated to the United States as a teenager. He lied about having attended college in Europe, including the Sorbonne, to get a college degree, and then made a career in the Army. If MacArthur expressed an opinion about enemy troop strengths and intentions, Willoughby was sure to tailor his reports to reflect what the boss wanted to hear. This had disastrous consequences during the liberation of the Philippines, and continued into the Korean War. When MacArthur wanted to believe that the Chinese would not intervene, despite clear evidence of massive troop buildups just across the Yalu river, Willoughby provided intelligence reports that were in full agreement, and everyone acted surprised when 300,000 Chinese troops poured over the border several days later.
April 24, 2023
War at the End of the World: Douglas MacArthur and the Forgotten Fight For New Guinea, 1942-1945 (Hardcover)by James P. Duffy is two books. One Is very informative the other too opinionated. Douglas MacArthur became the theater commander for the South Pacific during World War II. He fought a shoestring war almost entirely over one large Island and ultimately did very well at it.
This book follows the war on the ground from The Generals (caps deliberate) ordered withdrawal from the failing campaign for The Philippines to his triumphal return.
A few points about his war.
According to this book the South Pacific war was little more that the Campaign for New Guinea. A large island near Australia and made strategically important by the Japanese occupation of Rabaul. The Japanese were not going to be defeated by anything that happened on this Island. Conduct of the balance of the Pacific war would be that much harder and longer if the Japanese had uncontested use of these same Island. The threat of Japan using New Guinea as a launching place to occupy some or all of Australia was real threat and for political reason the allies owed Australia a major military commitment. In the early months after the attack on Pearl Harbor and with the defeat of among others, American ground forces in the Philippines, The US could offer little more than symbolic support to this remote challenge.
The US had long made the decision that Europe was to receive the bulk of war fighting assets. Other Theaters had legitimate, priority demands on ships, planes and people. No decision maker was going to place New Guinea in front of The European Theater, which included Africa, Th China Burma Theater, which included India and the war winning goal of the Central Pacific, which could only ever be Japan. A look at any map will tell you that Mac’s war had to be a small one. Duffy would argue that Mac could have managed both theaters. Maybe he could. He did not have too. Further his blind all-consuming “I shall return” promise would have needlessly slowed the war in the Central Pacific. One can just as easily argue that Nimitz could have fought both theaters in several way he did, but doing so without The General being a huge pain, would have made life needlessly complicated for Nimitz. Mac got his theater and the rest is speculations on counter factual.
Much is made in the way of speculation and argument beyond the evidence that Roosevelt , for purely political reasons held The General back, hampered the South Pacific Theater and placed politics in front of war fighting. To the degree this may be true. I am not that sure I care. Lincoln had to deal with politically minded General McClellan, who also wanted to be president. In fact, there is only one president, and a general wanting to take that spot is honor bound to give up his stars and leave the front. Any political move by a serving General, means accepting that you and yours will have to take whatever whatever is backlash metered out. Your troops will pay for your lack of loyalty. IMHO the real political future for The General was never going to lead to the White House. General, later President Eisenhower would do it the right way and with a lot more class.
Bottom line is that Duffy has too many excuses for The General, gives him a few too many passes, fails to provide any meaningful large scale analysis how The General’s war fit into the larger war with Japan and never a meaningful thought about the New Guinea campaign in the context of the World War. To his credit, Duffy rightly praises The General for fighting a tough war, initially with next to nothing in hand and scaling up to larger, properly supported military actions.
And so to the war on the ground. The early years of the New Guinea campaign is primarily the story of Australia’s soldiers. Shortest answer: About Time! A mix of new draftees units and units rushed from the European Theater, these soldiers never got the recognition they fought and bled to deserve. Perhaps they wenst from ‘Under Eisenhower’ (not exactly) to under MacArthur, but they delivered. We could have used a little more about native troop, often enough little more or better equipped than local constabulary and not professional soldier, but throughout they harried and slowed the Japanese by fighting above their weight and provided critical local knowledge and connections as the allies moved into commanding offensive weight.
A for MacArthur’s Navy: for the early years there was not much nor would there be much until the invasion of the Philippines. I am not sure I agree with Duffy on the subject of Admiral Halsey. Halsey was on occasion lent to the South Pacific but he was primarily a fleet commander in the Central Pacific. That the 5th and 7 the fleet were basically two command structures trading the same ships is something Duffy never considers. What most struck me was the total absence of any reference to Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, Commander Amphibious Forces, South Pacific Forces. Perhaps there is a reason for this, but to me it is a glaring mistake.
About the Japanese. Duffy gives us some insight into the thinking of the Island commanders, increasing faced with a no win, no longer maintained failing logistical reality. There are several first-person accounts of how life for the Japanese soldier swiftly converted from the arrogance of an unstoppable occupying army to starved, force marched rear guard warfare. For them there was a narrow window were they could turn regular tactical victories into at most an expensive holding operation, but the facts of the larger war was that Japan never had much of a chance and by 1943, these soldiers were only fighting to die honorably. In the Japanese Bushido philosophy, there is a concept the honorable nature of taking up and unwinnable fight. We have something like it in the West. But prior to WWII Japanese militarist had severely twisted this code making fight to the death a sacred duty to the godhead emperor This is a topic rarely addressed by WWII historians, and not properly analyzed by Duffy.
In case this review is unclear. James P. Duffy has written a well-researched, accessible relatively detailed account of The New Guinea campaign. It begins with MacArthur having to achieve much from as near to nothing as can be imagined. By being a superior and imaginative leader, he stabilized a deteriorating situation and as his assets grew so did his military boldness. He was we are told very good at leaving subordinate leaders to lead, and changing them as necessary. While the book focuses on the war fighting there is much for a reader to learn. In terms of understanding the large strategic importance of this campaign, much could have been achieved by the addition of a few maps placing this one island in the context of the larger war.
This book follows the war on the ground from The Generals (caps deliberate) ordered withdrawal from the failing campaign for The Philippines to his triumphal return.
A few points about his war.
According to this book the South Pacific war was little more that the Campaign for New Guinea. A large island near Australia and made strategically important by the Japanese occupation of Rabaul. The Japanese were not going to be defeated by anything that happened on this Island. Conduct of the balance of the Pacific war would be that much harder and longer if the Japanese had uncontested use of these same Island. The threat of Japan using New Guinea as a launching place to occupy some or all of Australia was real threat and for political reason the allies owed Australia a major military commitment. In the early months after the attack on Pearl Harbor and with the defeat of among others, American ground forces in the Philippines, The US could offer little more than symbolic support to this remote challenge.
The US had long made the decision that Europe was to receive the bulk of war fighting assets. Other Theaters had legitimate, priority demands on ships, planes and people. No decision maker was going to place New Guinea in front of The European Theater, which included Africa, Th China Burma Theater, which included India and the war winning goal of the Central Pacific, which could only ever be Japan. A look at any map will tell you that Mac’s war had to be a small one. Duffy would argue that Mac could have managed both theaters. Maybe he could. He did not have too. Further his blind all-consuming “I shall return” promise would have needlessly slowed the war in the Central Pacific. One can just as easily argue that Nimitz could have fought both theaters in several way he did, but doing so without The General being a huge pain, would have made life needlessly complicated for Nimitz. Mac got his theater and the rest is speculations on counter factual.
Much is made in the way of speculation and argument beyond the evidence that Roosevelt , for purely political reasons held The General back, hampered the South Pacific Theater and placed politics in front of war fighting. To the degree this may be true. I am not that sure I care. Lincoln had to deal with politically minded General McClellan, who also wanted to be president. In fact, there is only one president, and a general wanting to take that spot is honor bound to give up his stars and leave the front. Any political move by a serving General, means accepting that you and yours will have to take whatever whatever is backlash metered out. Your troops will pay for your lack of loyalty. IMHO the real political future for The General was never going to lead to the White House. General, later President Eisenhower would do it the right way and with a lot more class.
Bottom line is that Duffy has too many excuses for The General, gives him a few too many passes, fails to provide any meaningful large scale analysis how The General’s war fit into the larger war with Japan and never a meaningful thought about the New Guinea campaign in the context of the World War. To his credit, Duffy rightly praises The General for fighting a tough war, initially with next to nothing in hand and scaling up to larger, properly supported military actions.
And so to the war on the ground. The early years of the New Guinea campaign is primarily the story of Australia’s soldiers. Shortest answer: About Time! A mix of new draftees units and units rushed from the European Theater, these soldiers never got the recognition they fought and bled to deserve. Perhaps they wenst from ‘Under Eisenhower’ (not exactly) to under MacArthur, but they delivered. We could have used a little more about native troop, often enough little more or better equipped than local constabulary and not professional soldier, but throughout they harried and slowed the Japanese by fighting above their weight and provided critical local knowledge and connections as the allies moved into commanding offensive weight.
A for MacArthur’s Navy: for the early years there was not much nor would there be much until the invasion of the Philippines. I am not sure I agree with Duffy on the subject of Admiral Halsey. Halsey was on occasion lent to the South Pacific but he was primarily a fleet commander in the Central Pacific. That the 5th and 7 the fleet were basically two command structures trading the same ships is something Duffy never considers. What most struck me was the total absence of any reference to Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, Commander Amphibious Forces, South Pacific Forces. Perhaps there is a reason for this, but to me it is a glaring mistake.
About the Japanese. Duffy gives us some insight into the thinking of the Island commanders, increasing faced with a no win, no longer maintained failing logistical reality. There are several first-person accounts of how life for the Japanese soldier swiftly converted from the arrogance of an unstoppable occupying army to starved, force marched rear guard warfare. For them there was a narrow window were they could turn regular tactical victories into at most an expensive holding operation, but the facts of the larger war was that Japan never had much of a chance and by 1943, these soldiers were only fighting to die honorably. In the Japanese Bushido philosophy, there is a concept the honorable nature of taking up and unwinnable fight. We have something like it in the West. But prior to WWII Japanese militarist had severely twisted this code making fight to the death a sacred duty to the godhead emperor This is a topic rarely addressed by WWII historians, and not properly analyzed by Duffy.
In case this review is unclear. James P. Duffy has written a well-researched, accessible relatively detailed account of The New Guinea campaign. It begins with MacArthur having to achieve much from as near to nothing as can be imagined. By being a superior and imaginative leader, he stabilized a deteriorating situation and as his assets grew so did his military boldness. He was we are told very good at leaving subordinate leaders to lead, and changing them as necessary. While the book focuses on the war fighting there is much for a reader to learn. In terms of understanding the large strategic importance of this campaign, much could have been achieved by the addition of a few maps placing this one island in the context of the larger war.
April 20, 2018
This is an excellent narrative history of the least studied aspect of the Second World War: the New Guinea/South-West Pacific theater.
Following their amazing string of victories farther north in the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia, the Japanese cast their gaze towards the islands of New Britain and New Guinea. One of the war aims of the Japanese was to knock Australia out of the war, and establishing strong bases in those two islands north of the continent would in effect outflank Australia's northern defenses and leave her ripe for invasion.
When the Japanese invaded in early 1942, they managed to rapidly transform the port city of Rabaul into a veritable naval fortress, while at the same time they began to push the small Australian forces on New Guinea i to retreat. The arrival of General Douglas MacArthur, whisked away by the US Navy on order of Roosevelt as the final American/Filipino defenses on Bataan collapsed, gave considerable heart to the Aussies even though, initially, MacArthur could offer precious little in the way of direct American aid.
Duffy has written a book that is incredibly laudatory to MacArthur. Mac is a bit of a tough general to come to grips with. Easily seen as both a martinet and a brilliant strategist, many historians have made the case for both. In the pages of his book, Duffy makes a strong case that MacArthur waged a brilliant campaign, and his methods of avoiding Japanese strength negated American and Aussie losses, while maximizing those of the Japanese.
Part of the remarkable nature of how MacArthur and the Amero-Austrialian forces on New Guinea turned the tide against the Japanese was just how outgunned and outnumbered the Allied forces were for several months.
The Pacific theater was always the step child to the European theater, second place for troops, equipment, transportation and logistics. MacArthur tried repeatedly to pressure Washington and the Joint Chiefs for more of, well, everything. Rarely was he told yes.
It didn't help matters that MacArthur had a strong dislike (possibly too lite a word) for the Navy and vice versa. Admiral King, in command of the entirety of the US Navy, utterly disdained MacArthur and often did what he could to see to it that resources went to other commanders in other regions. Luckily for MacArthur and the Australian forces, MacArthur managed to form a close working relationship with Admiral Nimitz, in command of the Navy/Marines offensive into and through the Central Pacific.
It was largely this cordial working relationship that allowed MacArthur to wage the kind of free flowing operational campaign against the Japanese that he intended.
As more became available to the Allies in New Guinea, MacArthur established his own doctrine of using amphibious landings to work his way around the periphery of the Japanese positions, all the while ensuring that he at least maintained local air supremacy. In so doing MacArthur and the American Army and Australian Army units managed to inflict considerably heavier losses on a foe who was never a slouch, and who had access to naval and air support.
While there were some truly bloody, horrifically tough battles to win: Buna, Munda, Biak among many others, for the most part the Allies under MacArthur's overall direction dominated the Japanese. By the time the fighting in New Guinea had largely come to a close (mid summer 1944, though mopping up operations carried on for the rest of the war) the Japanese had lost nearly 200,000 men. American and Australian losses were remarkably similar with each side losing roughly 7,000 men on a permanent basis.
As it turns out, one can make the case that the invasion of New Guinea was one of the major turning points against the Japanese Empire in the Great Asian War.
New Guinea fatally overstretched the Japanese, especially logistically, even as they had failed to fully consolidate what they had already seized (and they never would). Rabaul, built up into one of the greatest naval bases in history, was merely isolated, left to starve and wither on the vine as MacArthur, Nimitz and the Aussies all agreed that assaulting it would be far too costly. And the considerable resources both material and human the Japanese lavished on Rabaul largely went to waste.
While the author doesn't spend all too much time or page space on analysis, he makes the point clear through the course of the historical narrative that New Guinea, and the South-West Pacific Area in general was the turning point against the Japanese during the Pacific War.
And that MacArthur deserves to have his reputation at least reexamined.
All in all, this is a wonderful read, highly engaging and enjoyable to pour over, and one that I can very highly recommend.
Following their amazing string of victories farther north in the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia, the Japanese cast their gaze towards the islands of New Britain and New Guinea. One of the war aims of the Japanese was to knock Australia out of the war, and establishing strong bases in those two islands north of the continent would in effect outflank Australia's northern defenses and leave her ripe for invasion.
When the Japanese invaded in early 1942, they managed to rapidly transform the port city of Rabaul into a veritable naval fortress, while at the same time they began to push the small Australian forces on New Guinea i to retreat. The arrival of General Douglas MacArthur, whisked away by the US Navy on order of Roosevelt as the final American/Filipino defenses on Bataan collapsed, gave considerable heart to the Aussies even though, initially, MacArthur could offer precious little in the way of direct American aid.
Duffy has written a book that is incredibly laudatory to MacArthur. Mac is a bit of a tough general to come to grips with. Easily seen as both a martinet and a brilliant strategist, many historians have made the case for both. In the pages of his book, Duffy makes a strong case that MacArthur waged a brilliant campaign, and his methods of avoiding Japanese strength negated American and Aussie losses, while maximizing those of the Japanese.
Part of the remarkable nature of how MacArthur and the Amero-Austrialian forces on New Guinea turned the tide against the Japanese was just how outgunned and outnumbered the Allied forces were for several months.
The Pacific theater was always the step child to the European theater, second place for troops, equipment, transportation and logistics. MacArthur tried repeatedly to pressure Washington and the Joint Chiefs for more of, well, everything. Rarely was he told yes.
It didn't help matters that MacArthur had a strong dislike (possibly too lite a word) for the Navy and vice versa. Admiral King, in command of the entirety of the US Navy, utterly disdained MacArthur and often did what he could to see to it that resources went to other commanders in other regions. Luckily for MacArthur and the Australian forces, MacArthur managed to form a close working relationship with Admiral Nimitz, in command of the Navy/Marines offensive into and through the Central Pacific.
It was largely this cordial working relationship that allowed MacArthur to wage the kind of free flowing operational campaign against the Japanese that he intended.
As more became available to the Allies in New Guinea, MacArthur established his own doctrine of using amphibious landings to work his way around the periphery of the Japanese positions, all the while ensuring that he at least maintained local air supremacy. In so doing MacArthur and the American Army and Australian Army units managed to inflict considerably heavier losses on a foe who was never a slouch, and who had access to naval and air support.
While there were some truly bloody, horrifically tough battles to win: Buna, Munda, Biak among many others, for the most part the Allies under MacArthur's overall direction dominated the Japanese. By the time the fighting in New Guinea had largely come to a close (mid summer 1944, though mopping up operations carried on for the rest of the war) the Japanese had lost nearly 200,000 men. American and Australian losses were remarkably similar with each side losing roughly 7,000 men on a permanent basis.
As it turns out, one can make the case that the invasion of New Guinea was one of the major turning points against the Japanese Empire in the Great Asian War.
New Guinea fatally overstretched the Japanese, especially logistically, even as they had failed to fully consolidate what they had already seized (and they never would). Rabaul, built up into one of the greatest naval bases in history, was merely isolated, left to starve and wither on the vine as MacArthur, Nimitz and the Aussies all agreed that assaulting it would be far too costly. And the considerable resources both material and human the Japanese lavished on Rabaul largely went to waste.
While the author doesn't spend all too much time or page space on analysis, he makes the point clear through the course of the historical narrative that New Guinea, and the South-West Pacific Area in general was the turning point against the Japanese during the Pacific War.
And that MacArthur deserves to have his reputation at least reexamined.
All in all, this is a wonderful read, highly engaging and enjoyable to pour over, and one that I can very highly recommend.
May 17, 2016
Patrick Duffy does an admirable job of keeping the momentum of his book going while detailing a campaign where it was easy for both sides to get bogged down. Duffy seems to do this by paying a great deal of attention to air and sea operations as well as land battles.
This is not without its downside. Some major land engagements, such as the battles at Buna, Wua, and Finschhafen, lacked sufficient detail, while other engagements such as Biak, and Wakde Island were well described.
Despite these issues, I still highly recommend this book to WWII history buffs.
This is not without its downside. Some major land engagements, such as the battles at Buna, Wua, and Finschhafen, lacked sufficient detail, while other engagements such as Biak, and Wakde Island were well described.
Despite these issues, I still highly recommend this book to WWII history buffs.
November 9, 2017
Interesting book about a campaign that few Americans know about, but every Australian does. So, to that extent, it is not forgotten by my Aussie friends and relations. War fought in some of the most inhospitable terrain in the world, described by one American Soldier as, "Green hell on earth."
I enjoyed it thoroughly and recommend it highly. If warfare in strange and distant lands is your cup of tea, I recommend this book and Brian Garfield's, "The Thousand-Mile War: World War II in Alaska and the Aleutians." Another campaign where terrain and weather were as much enemies as the Japanese.
One further note: General Douglas MacArthur is a very controversial figure, but no one can deny that he fought this campaign in a way that caused the least amount of casualties. He bypassed many Japanese strongpoints, allowing the jungle and starvation to be his allies.
I enjoyed it thoroughly and recommend it highly. If warfare in strange and distant lands is your cup of tea, I recommend this book and Brian Garfield's, "The Thousand-Mile War: World War II in Alaska and the Aleutians." Another campaign where terrain and weather were as much enemies as the Japanese.
One further note: General Douglas MacArthur is a very controversial figure, but no one can deny that he fought this campaign in a way that caused the least amount of casualties. He bypassed many Japanese strongpoints, allowing the jungle and starvation to be his allies.
March 6, 2016
One of the very few WWII campaigns I know very little about, and considering my burgeoning interest in Papua New Guinea in general I pretty much had to snatch this book up the day it was released.
This book does a great job at showing MacArthur at his best, as opposed to the MacArthur at his worst I am more familiar with. The low cost to friendlies and high cost to the enemy campaign (on a similar scale of disproportion to Yamashita's conquest of Malaysia and Singapore) is truly remarkable and this is the strategic accounting that such a campaign deserves.
That being said, considering the massive importance of geography in this little known region, better and more frequent maps could have been helpful.
This book does a great job at showing MacArthur at his best, as opposed to the MacArthur at his worst I am more familiar with. The low cost to friendlies and high cost to the enemy campaign (on a similar scale of disproportion to Yamashita's conquest of Malaysia and Singapore) is truly remarkable and this is the strategic accounting that such a campaign deserves.
That being said, considering the massive importance of geography in this little known region, better and more frequent maps could have been helpful.
May 24, 2020
The various campaigns of World War II in and around New Guinea are relatively lightly covered, though "relatively" is doing alot of heavy lifting here. The battles of Coral Sea, Kokoda and Buna still stand out, but the occupation of New Britain by Japan and MacArthur's amphibious operations are not well known. So, you can probably justify publication of this book on the campaigns from 1942 to 1944.
However, it's pretty dry, with significant variations in tone and structure according to what source the author was relying upon for the particular chapter (and hinted as much in the Afterword). 80 odd years later, we probably need a bit more, particularly as a number of these points are hinted at in the narrative.
- How was the native population exploited by both sides?
- Why were Japanese forces running on empty so early in the war? Despite committing large numbers of men to the theatre, they appeared to have barely able to launch an assault over Owen Stanley Mountains (the Diggers facing them would reasonably take issue with the word "barely").
- Why were Japanese casualties so high even when experienced forces were on the defensive, and even when abandoning banzai charges. We are told they were defensive geniuses, but it seems to have sure cost them.
It was an enlightening read, just to get more notice, it needs to be a bit more.
However, it's pretty dry, with significant variations in tone and structure according to what source the author was relying upon for the particular chapter (and hinted as much in the Afterword). 80 odd years later, we probably need a bit more, particularly as a number of these points are hinted at in the narrative.
- How was the native population exploited by both sides?
- Why were Japanese forces running on empty so early in the war? Despite committing large numbers of men to the theatre, they appeared to have barely able to launch an assault over Owen Stanley Mountains (the Diggers facing them would reasonably take issue with the word "barely").
- Why were Japanese casualties so high even when experienced forces were on the defensive, and even when abandoning banzai charges. We are told they were defensive geniuses, but it seems to have sure cost them.
It was an enlightening read, just to get more notice, it needs to be a bit more.
February 23, 2016
An excellent account of the Allies war in New Guinea. Strategically, it kept the Japanese from invading part or all of Australia and kept supply lines open to Australia and New Zealand. The commander of the theater was Gen. Douglas MacArthur, who also used it as a springboard to returning to the Phillipines, as he'd promised.
Many post-war accounts have highlighted the outsized ego of MacArthur but James P. Duffy believes that this campaign showed his genius, in selecting targets, in skipping past Japanese strongpoints, and in selecting military leaders to run his campaigns. The Japanese "encountered in New Guinea a roadblock akin to the Germans' disastrous attempt to take Moscow, a catastrophic setback to their war machine." Duffy writes, "The more resources they committed, the more important the campaign became to the Imperial General Staff. Similarities between the events in Russia and those in New Guinea are striking."
It is a detailed book with the perspective of 70 years of history that's also a dramatic read. When possible, Duffy has the perspective of Japanese commanders. Sometimes the perspective of the local commander isn't available because they disappeared in the jungle warfare.
There's only one complaint about the book: the maps in the book are located haphazardly, rather than at the beginning of the relevant chapter. Also, the drawings suffer from frequent typos.
Many post-war accounts have highlighted the outsized ego of MacArthur but James P. Duffy believes that this campaign showed his genius, in selecting targets, in skipping past Japanese strongpoints, and in selecting military leaders to run his campaigns. The Japanese "encountered in New Guinea a roadblock akin to the Germans' disastrous attempt to take Moscow, a catastrophic setback to their war machine." Duffy writes, "The more resources they committed, the more important the campaign became to the Imperial General Staff. Similarities between the events in Russia and those in New Guinea are striking."
It is a detailed book with the perspective of 70 years of history that's also a dramatic read. When possible, Duffy has the perspective of Japanese commanders. Sometimes the perspective of the local commander isn't available because they disappeared in the jungle warfare.
There's only one complaint about the book: the maps in the book are located haphazardly, rather than at the beginning of the relevant chapter. Also, the drawings suffer from frequent typos.
March 13, 2016
I read a lot of histories of all types, what I like are those that take a subject that perhaps everyone knows a bit about and then expands it to show the importance of the event. History is full of little canyons of events that have not been fully explored or with the aid of modern scholarship can be made more relevant. War at the end of the World is such a book. Those with a knowledge of WWII in the Pacific will find Duffy's history of the New Guinea campaign illuminating.
It is a story of unbelievable hardship on both the Allies and Japanese side, it is a story of both successful and unsuccessful leadership, of near run things which if they had gone the other way than they did could have changed the course of history.
Duffy's narrative doesn't lose the non military reader in the endless jargon and minatue than can bog down many histories.
He takes an even handed view of the such controversial leaders as MacArthur who for many people is defined by his relief of command in Korea. New Guinea and Australia where the unwelcome step child of the war planners yet the possession of the island was critical to the final effort to defeat Japan.
As a veteran of Vietnam I dealt with some pretty tough terrain and weather conditions but when you read of the conditions facing the soldiers in this battle you will be filled with nothing but admiration for their toughness and sacrifice.
It is a story of unbelievable hardship on both the Allies and Japanese side, it is a story of both successful and unsuccessful leadership, of near run things which if they had gone the other way than they did could have changed the course of history.
Duffy's narrative doesn't lose the non military reader in the endless jargon and minatue than can bog down many histories.
He takes an even handed view of the such controversial leaders as MacArthur who for many people is defined by his relief of command in Korea. New Guinea and Australia where the unwelcome step child of the war planners yet the possession of the island was critical to the final effort to defeat Japan.
As a veteran of Vietnam I dealt with some pretty tough terrain and weather conditions but when you read of the conditions facing the soldiers in this battle you will be filled with nothing but admiration for their toughness and sacrifice.
July 4, 2022
This is a good book. There is new information I did not know about. The Japanese evacuated Sio but buried the code books. The Australians dug them up. The Allies then had the four digit Japanese Army codes- what a windfall- and an impact that would be felt for years. I have read alot about code breaking and did not know this. Australia should get more credit for this and since the author clearly likes to list heroes, the trooper who dug these up should have been listed.
Also new, to me, was that US brought in a rocket system for the Battle of Sattelberg. I thought they were going to describe a bazooka but it wasn't. It was a vehicle mounted rocket pod (rockets weighing 30 lbs each) that killed quite a few Japanese. The concussion killed them, leaving them dead without a scratch on their bodies.... interesting.
One serious issue with the book, and this is more than a quibble is the presentation of maps. For example the Battle for Sattelberg. The book shows a map of the Huon Peninsula and just below it they describe the next battle- Sattelberg. But nowhere on the map is Sattelberg. Quite challenging for the reader. This example is common throughout the book. I mean REALLY COMMON especially when describing villages where airfields were installed.
As far as heroism goes, the book explains quite a few situations of individual efforts. I am happy that those soldiers got their due. But I might consider the author in the camp of "hero worshipper" of MacArthur. I am not in that camp. Without a doubt Doug was a military genius but by the time Korea came along his head was too big for his shoulders or he was in mental decline. I find it ironic in this book that the author quotes Doug that "he wants to be close to his troops". Hah, what a laugh. First of all I can assure you there was a camera and microphone around when he said it. Secondly, Doug NEVER ONCE SPENT A NIGHT IN KOREA DURING THE WHOLE WAR. Another thing about the hero worship was did he salute FDR in Hawaii? That little tidbit (whether he did or didn't) would certainly play a role in history. My Dad fought for Dugout Doug in the Philippines. He didn't have anything bad to say about him, but nothing good either. To get my Dad to say that much about the war was saying a lot. He was transported thru New Guinea enroute to battle.
Finally- and this is an extremely important point. This can be said of all books about the war in the Pacific. Think of Frodo Baggins and THE RING. The ring has be written and it is called: Shattered Sword The Battle of Midway. It refutes everything we assumed was true about the Battle of Midway. We learned about the Japanese from a book written by a retired Japanese admiral. Turns out much of that is untrue. This brings us to War at the End of the World where the author parrots all the misinformation about the Japanese. He said the Japanese pilots were largely killed in the Battle of Midway. This is untrue. Many pilots were saved, it was the aircraft repair crews, munitions loaders and ships engineers that were killed. He said that Aleutians was a diversion attack. It wasn't. It was to take place the same day as the invasion of Midway. How can it be a diversion? There is more misinformation about Midway in this book, but it is not the authors fault.
One final point on hero worship, which the author practiced. The American P-38 was one hell of an aircraft. The author leaves out most of the air force details other than to report numbers. It is interesting that he failed to report Charles Lindbergh flying the P-38 in New Guinea. It is an interesting tale. Lindbergh had instructed pilots on how to increase the range of their aircraft by maintaining high manifold pressure and reducing rpms. He extended the range of the P-38 from about 350 miles to 650 miles! But because he was a civilian and a lone wolf he was asked to leave the area by the army. Instead he went to fly Corsairs with the Marine Corps. I would have thought Lindbergh would have rated a sentence in this book.
Also new, to me, was that US brought in a rocket system for the Battle of Sattelberg. I thought they were going to describe a bazooka but it wasn't. It was a vehicle mounted rocket pod (rockets weighing 30 lbs each) that killed quite a few Japanese. The concussion killed them, leaving them dead without a scratch on their bodies.... interesting.
One serious issue with the book, and this is more than a quibble is the presentation of maps. For example the Battle for Sattelberg. The book shows a map of the Huon Peninsula and just below it they describe the next battle- Sattelberg. But nowhere on the map is Sattelberg. Quite challenging for the reader. This example is common throughout the book. I mean REALLY COMMON especially when describing villages where airfields were installed.
As far as heroism goes, the book explains quite a few situations of individual efforts. I am happy that those soldiers got their due. But I might consider the author in the camp of "hero worshipper" of MacArthur. I am not in that camp. Without a doubt Doug was a military genius but by the time Korea came along his head was too big for his shoulders or he was in mental decline. I find it ironic in this book that the author quotes Doug that "he wants to be close to his troops". Hah, what a laugh. First of all I can assure you there was a camera and microphone around when he said it. Secondly, Doug NEVER ONCE SPENT A NIGHT IN KOREA DURING THE WHOLE WAR. Another thing about the hero worship was did he salute FDR in Hawaii? That little tidbit (whether he did or didn't) would certainly play a role in history. My Dad fought for Dugout Doug in the Philippines. He didn't have anything bad to say about him, but nothing good either. To get my Dad to say that much about the war was saying a lot. He was transported thru New Guinea enroute to battle.
Finally- and this is an extremely important point. This can be said of all books about the war in the Pacific. Think of Frodo Baggins and THE RING. The ring has be written and it is called: Shattered Sword The Battle of Midway. It refutes everything we assumed was true about the Battle of Midway. We learned about the Japanese from a book written by a retired Japanese admiral. Turns out much of that is untrue. This brings us to War at the End of the World where the author parrots all the misinformation about the Japanese. He said the Japanese pilots were largely killed in the Battle of Midway. This is untrue. Many pilots were saved, it was the aircraft repair crews, munitions loaders and ships engineers that were killed. He said that Aleutians was a diversion attack. It wasn't. It was to take place the same day as the invasion of Midway. How can it be a diversion? There is more misinformation about Midway in this book, but it is not the authors fault.
One final point on hero worship, which the author practiced. The American P-38 was one hell of an aircraft. The author leaves out most of the air force details other than to report numbers. It is interesting that he failed to report Charles Lindbergh flying the P-38 in New Guinea. It is an interesting tale. Lindbergh had instructed pilots on how to increase the range of their aircraft by maintaining high manifold pressure and reducing rpms. He extended the range of the P-38 from about 350 miles to 650 miles! But because he was a civilian and a lone wolf he was asked to leave the area by the army. Instead he went to fly Corsairs with the Marine Corps. I would have thought Lindbergh would have rated a sentence in this book.
January 11, 2020
A friend recommended this book. I really like recommendations, even though I do not read non-fiction. The chance was a great one: this book is fantastic! The author does not paint the entire war in the Pacific, but selects a slice of tactics which would, perhaps, have changed the course of the war. New Guinea was the target of Japan's efforts in 1942. As the gateway to Australia and to the control of the entire Pacific, Japan and the U.S. fought for this territory from '42 to '45!!
But, history aside, the author is impressive because of his research. For example, notice the detail in this excerpt:
"(the Japanese fleet) had their rendezvous according to plan, and more than one hundred aircraft took off from the decks of the four carriers under the command of Japan's top pilot, Commander Mitsuo Fuchida, the commanding officer of the squadrons that had attached Pearl Harbor. Once all aircraft were airborne, they separated into three formations. Based on the plan prepared by Fuchida, they were to approach from three directions, east, west, and north" Page in Kindle: 444
and:
"...fifty two fighters and dive=bombers lifted off the decks of the Japanese aircraft carriers Kaga and Akagi on January 21. Seventy five planes from the carriers Zuikaku and Shokaku attacked Australian positions on the coast of New Guinea at Lae, Salamaua, Bulolo and Madang. " Kindle 522
The author gives detailed numbers: "fifty two dive-bombers", "three formations", "more than one hundred aircraft." Not only does he give statistical information, but he uses all the buzzwords. "Bren light machine guns", "PBY Catalina Bombers", "Wirraway planes", 'Hudson bombers" which sent this reader happily to look up the definitions via Kindle. The footnotes are everywhere, and gives the reader the opportunity to explore many sources on the subject.
The author follows strategic plans and tactics throughout the book, and gives the struggle for this slice of territory heroic and gigantic proportions. Together with maps and photos of the minds behind the tactics, this is an atlas to the battle of New Guinea, which, after this excellent tribute, every reader will be an expert. Thank you for the wonderful research and the dramatic prose!! Five Stars!
But, history aside, the author is impressive because of his research. For example, notice the detail in this excerpt:
"(the Japanese fleet) had their rendezvous according to plan, and more than one hundred aircraft took off from the decks of the four carriers under the command of Japan's top pilot, Commander Mitsuo Fuchida, the commanding officer of the squadrons that had attached Pearl Harbor. Once all aircraft were airborne, they separated into three formations. Based on the plan prepared by Fuchida, they were to approach from three directions, east, west, and north" Page in Kindle: 444
and:
"...fifty two fighters and dive=bombers lifted off the decks of the Japanese aircraft carriers Kaga and Akagi on January 21. Seventy five planes from the carriers Zuikaku and Shokaku attacked Australian positions on the coast of New Guinea at Lae, Salamaua, Bulolo and Madang. " Kindle 522
The author gives detailed numbers: "fifty two dive-bombers", "three formations", "more than one hundred aircraft." Not only does he give statistical information, but he uses all the buzzwords. "Bren light machine guns", "PBY Catalina Bombers", "Wirraway planes", 'Hudson bombers" which sent this reader happily to look up the definitions via Kindle. The footnotes are everywhere, and gives the reader the opportunity to explore many sources on the subject.
The author follows strategic plans and tactics throughout the book, and gives the struggle for this slice of territory heroic and gigantic proportions. Together with maps and photos of the minds behind the tactics, this is an atlas to the battle of New Guinea, which, after this excellent tribute, every reader will be an expert. Thank you for the wonderful research and the dramatic prose!! Five Stars!
February 11, 2021
I wanted to like this book. It is about a part of World War II I have studied little. It is written from an overview perspective, so one should be able to get a good understanding of the theatre. But it was a disaster.
From simple factual errors (p. 88 the Mitchell bomber has only TWO engines), to a clear
misunderstanding of military units (p. 146 where the 7th Division is described as having only 2 battalions - a full division has between 6 and 12 battalions plus various other formations), to maps that have none of the locations mentioned in the text they are accompanying, to inconsistency from one paragraph to the next (pp. 101-2 where 75 bombers become 93, unless it was really 108, just a few paragraphs later) Duffy is all over the place.
Unfortunately, he is no better with the people. He gives brief biographies of the players - leaders mostly but some common soldiers too - and they sound good, until they don't. One general is noted as having been commissioned in 1923 but only two pages later to have distinguished himself in World War One when he was but a teen, though no further mention is given.
To round it out, Duffy's descriptions of terrain are also challenged. In one chapter he tells how the Allies decide to build three large airfields in a place which, just two pages before, he has described as having rough mountains marching to within a hundred meters of a mangrove jungle lined shore. Doesn't sound like any place for a large flat airfield!
I'll continue to look for a good history of the Second World War in New Guinea. This is not it.
From simple factual errors (p. 88 the Mitchell bomber has only TWO engines), to a clear
misunderstanding of military units (p. 146 where the 7th Division is described as having only 2 battalions - a full division has between 6 and 12 battalions plus various other formations), to maps that have none of the locations mentioned in the text they are accompanying, to inconsistency from one paragraph to the next (pp. 101-2 where 75 bombers become 93, unless it was really 108, just a few paragraphs later) Duffy is all over the place.
Unfortunately, he is no better with the people. He gives brief biographies of the players - leaders mostly but some common soldiers too - and they sound good, until they don't. One general is noted as having been commissioned in 1923 but only two pages later to have distinguished himself in World War One when he was but a teen, though no further mention is given.
To round it out, Duffy's descriptions of terrain are also challenged. In one chapter he tells how the Allies decide to build three large airfields in a place which, just two pages before, he has described as having rough mountains marching to within a hundred meters of a mangrove jungle lined shore. Doesn't sound like any place for a large flat airfield!
I'll continue to look for a good history of the Second World War in New Guinea. This is not it.
January 24, 2020
Good Overview of a Lesser-known campaign.
When Americans think about the war against Japan, they remember Pearl Harbor, Midway, maybe Guadalcanal, lwo Jima and Okinawa. The long hard slog of U.S. and Australian forces against the Japanese in Papua New Guinea gets left out of popular images of the war. when we think of amphibious warfare, He think of Marines at Tarawa or Saipan, not the U.S. Army at Biak. Duffy's well-written account provides a solid, straightforward narrative of Mc Arthur's land, sea, and air campaign, one that was every bit as complex and difficult as the Navy's better known drive across the Central Pacific. The book would have benefitted from greater attention to Japanese perspectives- it was never clear, for example, why the Japanese never came up with a successful counter strategy. Duffy's account also makes clear that by mid_1944, the U.S. Army's infantry units had developed a remarkable tactical effectiveness against dug - in Japanese defenders, winning most battles with badly lopsided kill ratios. But how they managed this so consistently is not really explained. So, four stars.
When Americans think about the war against Japan, they remember Pearl Harbor, Midway, maybe Guadalcanal, lwo Jima and Okinawa. The long hard slog of U.S. and Australian forces against the Japanese in Papua New Guinea gets left out of popular images of the war. when we think of amphibious warfare, He think of Marines at Tarawa or Saipan, not the U.S. Army at Biak. Duffy's well-written account provides a solid, straightforward narrative of Mc Arthur's land, sea, and air campaign, one that was every bit as complex and difficult as the Navy's better known drive across the Central Pacific. The book would have benefitted from greater attention to Japanese perspectives- it was never clear, for example, why the Japanese never came up with a successful counter strategy. Duffy's account also makes clear that by mid_1944, the U.S. Army's infantry units had developed a remarkable tactical effectiveness against dug - in Japanese defenders, winning most battles with badly lopsided kill ratios. But how they managed this so consistently is not really explained. So, four stars.
December 10, 2017
An excellent book that provides an overview of the New Guinea campaign in World War II. What I enjoyed most about the book was that the author largely stayed above tactical trivialities, and focused on the operational issues and battle process that drove MacArthur's operations. That is not to say that there are not episodes of courage and derring-do, but the emphasis of the narrative is on the strategic objective and the means by which MacArthur achieves it. Most impressively, the author points out that MacArthur's SWPA was a far safer place to be in the infantry than the Central Pacific theater, as his total allied dead by the end of the campaign was less than the losses on Iwo Jima alone. The only part of the book I would have liked to have seen improved was the maps... they were usually in the wrong place for ease of reference, and I never felt that the "right" maps were available... too often only some locations in a section would appear on the nearest map, but not others.
May 16, 2024
Wow. Amazing book about a little corner of the global war. This is a must read for WWII history buffs. I learned so much, but also gained a renewed appreciation for the brilliance of Gen Douglas MacArthur. I k ow he has his detractors but the man was brilliant. Over 200,000 Japanese casualties to only about 7,000 combined US and Australian. He used new technology to great gain, understood Joint operations and was a true Soldier’s Soldier. He truly cared. This well researched book reads like a novel with lots of detail of the Mew Guinea campaign and tons of insight on global politics and the machinations of senior leaders military and political. Great bookend to last summer’s Road to Surrender about the nuance of the Japanese mindset during the war.
September 1, 2017
A comprehensive an engaging history of one of America's Important, though relatively unheralded, campaigns
A wonderful history of a courageous and pivotal campaign in the Pacific. I learned many new facts about the the SWPA theater, despite being an avid reader of military history. It certainly confirmed for me the genius of General MacArther and his well earned reputation as one of the finest military leaders of the war. I highly recommend this history.
A wonderful history of a courageous and pivotal campaign in the Pacific. I learned many new facts about the the SWPA theater, despite being an avid reader of military history. It certainly confirmed for me the genius of General MacArther and his well earned reputation as one of the finest military leaders of the war. I highly recommend this history.
May 13, 2021
A Thorough, Readable, Fascinating History of MacArthur and his New Guinea campaign
I've read many accounts of various portions or phases of the New Guinea campaign prior to reading this account. Duffy has taken on the task of reviewing the entire campaign, and has included at least some information specific to the Japanese side of each segment. This is a well researched, logically put together, nicely written and edited survey of this entire three year campaign.
I've read many accounts of various portions or phases of the New Guinea campaign prior to reading this account. Duffy has taken on the task of reviewing the entire campaign, and has included at least some information specific to the Japanese side of each segment. This is a well researched, logically put together, nicely written and edited survey of this entire three year campaign.
June 3, 2022
This is a solid history of a perhaps under told chapter in World War II. MacArthur -- yes -- but the daring, fights, impossible conditions and strong US-Australia-NZ bonds no. Paratroops jumping into jungle islands, an assassination, cannibalism -- it has it all.
It felt a bit ponderous at times, especially toward the end, as if the author was losing his dramatic flair. The book could also use more maps, or at least have them situated earlier in the chapters about various moves.
It felt a bit ponderous at times, especially toward the end, as if the author was losing his dramatic flair. The book could also use more maps, or at least have them situated earlier in the chapters about various moves.
December 22, 2020
Brilliant Military History
An excellent, in-depth analysis of the strategy and tactics in the SW Pacific Theater of World War. Sheds new light on the sometimes criticized General Douglas MacArthur, who killed two hundred thousand Japanese, while losing only seven thousand American, and about seven thousand brave Australian soldiers in New Guinea and surrounding islands.
An excellent, in-depth analysis of the strategy and tactics in the SW Pacific Theater of World War. Sheds new light on the sometimes criticized General Douglas MacArthur, who killed two hundred thousand Japanese, while losing only seven thousand American, and about seven thousand brave Australian soldiers in New Guinea and surrounding islands.
March 4, 2021
A superb rendering of a campaign little known or understood even among readers who
are interested in World War II. The book vividly describes the incredible difficulties of both climate and terrain involved in fighting in New Guinea. The book also clearly illustrates the military genius of Douglas MacArthur.
are interested in World War II. The book vividly describes the incredible difficulties of both climate and terrain involved in fighting in New Guinea. The book also clearly illustrates the military genius of Douglas MacArthur.
May 6, 2018
War at the End of the World is a fantastic narrative account of the Allies' often overlooked campaign in New Guinea during World War II. While not decisive in deciding the war, it help set the board elsewhere for the Allies to defeat the Axis.
August 21, 2019
Very detailed when it comes to unit dispositions and the exact number of soldiers or planes involved in every action, yet strangelt fails to capture anything of the difficulty involved in this treacherous campaign.
November 19, 2019
Very good overview of the fight for New Guinea, it had just enough detail to keep it interesting without bogging down the narrative. The only thing I would improve would be the number and quality of the maps contained in the book.
December 17, 2017
An excellent account of the New Guinea campaign.
June 6, 2018
One of the best I've read about the war in the pacific, very detailed about the battles for
New Guinea.
New Guinea.
January 22, 2020
Excellent introduction about a campaign I did not know much about... I plan to read more about this campaign.
May 19, 2020
Very good. Enjoyed the listen. It complimented well other books I am reading, such as Bruce Gamble's Rabaul Trilogy.
November 22, 2020
Chronicle of the amazing results MacArthur accomplished with small army, air and navy/marine forces in New Guinea. He bypassed major Japanese positions while capturing and repairing airfields.
May 5, 2022
Best job of portraying MacArthur's good qualities that I've ever read.
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