Uncivil War: The British Army and the Troubles, 1966–1975

Cambridge Military Histories

by Huw Bennett

When Operation Banner was launched in 1969 civil war threatened to break out in Northern Ireland and spread over the Irish Sea. Uncivil War reveals the full story of how the British army acted to save Great Britain from disaster during the most violent phase of the Troubles but, in so doing, condemned the people of Northern Ireland to protracted, grinding conflict. Huw Bennett shows how the army's ambivalent response to loyalist violence undermined the prospects for peace and heightened Catholic distrust in the state. British strategy consistently underestimated community defence as a reason for people joining or supporting the IRA whilst senior commanders allowed the army to turn in on itself, hardening soldiers to the suffering of ordinary people. By 1975 military strategists considered the conflict the army could not convince Catholics or Protestants that it was there to protect them and settled instead for an unending war.

Genres: Ireland, History

382 pages, Hardcover

First published October 31, 2023

About the author

Huw Bennett is a Lecturer in Defence Studies at King's College London, teaching at the British Joint Services Command and Staff College.

Reviews

[Houdi McCabe · Rating 4 out of 5]

The 284 pages of this book, printed in small font, is heavy reading and best digested in piecemeal as it reads like a textbook. It is extremely well researched as evidenced by its 46 pages of primary sources and bibliography in tandem with 95 pages of notes on its eight chapters and conclusion. A footnote to the book also elucidates the obstacles the author had to overcome (or didn’t) from the military establishment in achieving his content.

It covers the honeymoon period when the troops first arrived and how events changed the landscape in a nine year period. It’s not an attack on the army but by and large describes how it was the meat in the sandwich between the violent actors and the MOD/NIO. It does strenuously emphasise that a decision was taken in London that the army could not fight a war on two fronts and the core objective was to keep loyalists onside whilst defeating the Republican Movement - but most of all to avoid an internecine civil war. Such a decision was driven mainly by constraints on army numbers to be deployed in NI as Britain had to adhere to commitments under NATO in Europe, the miners strike on the mainland, domestic inflation at 19% and Britain’s entry into the EEC.

Overall it’s an impartial dissertation on the Irish conflict and I think anyone interested in the subject should read it immediately and I would state that after doing so the reader will be a lot more informed despite his/her political affiliation.

[Tiarnán · Rating 4 out of 5]

A good critical overview of the (mis)conduct of the British Army in Northern Ireland from its initial deployment in August 1969 until 1975, when the PIRA's first major ceasefire went into effect. At times exposes the author's naiveté towards internal army claims of their conduct and the reception thereof. This flaw could have been rectified with a greater reliance on oral testimony and sources from those - overwhelmingly Catholic - communities in which the Army was deployed, e.g. the large scale archive of witness affidavits collected by voluntary civil rights groups like the Association for Legal Justice.

[Reader · Rating 5 out of 5]

A very well researched and well written book. This breaches the gap between mainstream and academic reading. Highly recommended.

[Tom M (London) · Rating 1 out of 5]

Very flat and so badly written as to be unreadable. I thought it was going to reveal secrets about the behaviour of the British Army in Ireland. It reveals nothing.