The Origins of Victory: How Disruptive Military Innovation Determines the Fates of Great Powers

by Andrew F. Krepinevich

How the character of war is changing and how militaries can successfully adapt to meet the challenge
 
This book by military strategist Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., is the definitive take on the race for military dominance in the twenty-first century. It shows how militaries that successfully pursue disruptive innovation can gain a major advantage over their rivals, while those that fail to do so risk exposing their countries to great danger.
 
The Precision Warfare Revolution introduced by the U.S. military in the First Gulf War found the United States enjoying a near monopoly in this form of warfare for several decades. But now other powers have these capabilities. The U.S. military also confronts an emerging military revolution driven by advances across a wide range of technologies—from artificial intelligence and synthetic biology to quantum computing and additive manufacturing.
 
To stay competitive, the U.S. military must pursue disruptive innovation in a race with other militaries to exploit war’s changing character. Clues exist as to the winner’s identity. They are revealed by militaries that went beyond the bounds of mere innovation to overturn the existing forms of warfare, changing the course of history and the fate of nations. Through exploring their experiences, Krepinevich shows how the U.S. military can win the race to identify and exploit the “next big thing” in warfare.

Genres: Military Fiction, History, War, Nonfiction, Technology, Audiobook, Military History

774 pages, Kindle Edition

Published March 21, 2023

Reviews

[Patrick · Rating 3 out of 5]

So much potential that clearly demonstrates a lot of research and thought, but sadly falls short in providing new ideas. Part I (five chapters or so) is maybe where the real value is, in so far as Krepinevich lays out an interesting case for the trajectory of precision warfare as it has matured. But so much of the book starting in the fifth chapter through to its conclusion is introductory including with four historical chapters in the second part that don’t add much to the general scholarship on the issues. Another chapter on British pre-WWI naval modernization? Bleh.

It also struck me as curious that a 2023 pub had zero references to Nagorno-Karabakh and little of any reference to Russia-Ukraine. But predictably there are passages on China’s military thinking that lacks nuance…or much analysis.

I’d pass this one in favor of something else.

[Chad Manske · Rating 4 out of 5]

Former acolyte to DoD Office of Net Assessment's Andrew Marshall, and former president of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments Andrew F. Krepinevich's groundbreaking book, "The Origins of Victory: How Disruptive Military Innovation Determines the Fates of Great Powers," is a masterful exploration into the pivotal role of military innovation in shaping the destinies of great powers throughout history. Through meticulous research and insightful analysis, Krepinevich offers readers a compelling narrative that sheds light on the key factors that have contributed to military success and failure, challenging conventional wisdom and providing valuable lessons for policymakers and military strategists alike. One of the book's major strengths is how it renders complex historical events and military concepts accessible to a wide readership. Krepinevich takes readers on a journey through the annals of history, examining iconic battles, wars, and geopolitical rivalries to demonstrate how disruptive military innovations have determined the rise and fall of great powers. By skillfully blending historical case studies with theoretical frameworks, the author brings coherence to a vast and multifaceted subject. Krepinevich deftly introduces readers to the notion of "disruptive military innovation" and convincingly argues that successful great powers have consistently been early adopters of such innovations. He demonstrates that these innovations often arise from unexpected sources, challenging prevailing notions of military superiority and upending the status quo. Whether it be the adoption of new technologies, the development of revolutionary tactics, or the rethinking of military organization, Krepinevich meticulously dissects the ingredients of military innovation and its role in reshaping global power dynamics. One of the book's most compelling aspects is the author's ability to draw relevant lessons for contemporary times. While exploring historical examples, Krepinevich frequently ties his analysis to modern-day challenges, offering readers insights into how nations today can leverage disruptive military innovation to their advantage or avoid stagnation and decline. This connection to current events ensures the book remains not only historically enlightening but also practically relevant. While the book convincingly presents disruptive military innovation as a central factor, it does not discount the importance of other elements such as economic power, political will, and social factors, which could be complementary to the discussed thesis. This book is a compelling and indispensable addition to the canon of military literature!

[Brian Thorson · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is an interesting book by an author with impressive credentials. It explores the crucial role of military innovation in shaping the destinies of great powers throughout history. The author skillfully examines the origins, development, and impact of innovative military strategies and technologies, shedding light on the key factors that have influenced the outcomes of conflicts and shaped the balance of power.

Ultimately, success typically came down to whose adaptability was superior, strategic thinking accounted for changes in the character of warfare, and producing and integrating technological advancements in achieving victory on the battlefield.

It is a thought-provoking and informative read that offers valuable lessons for understanding the historic dynamics of military success to bring those lessons forward to make our military adaptive to current changes in the character of warfare.

[Grouchy Historian · Rating 5 out of 5]

Really quite good. Much more analysis than the usual “revolution in military affairs” book that military historians love.

[Nate · Rating 4 out of 5]

Took me a minute to get on board with the structure but I liked it in the end.
Only important for defense practitioners but interesting for those that are.
Lots of stuff you’d (professional) would already know but an interesting take on the development of future capabilities from past successes and failures.

[Jackie Oruci · Rating 4 out of 5]

Really good historical evidence used and analysis of Great Powers’ militaries

[Jonathan Jeckell · Rating 4 out of 5]

Starts off with changes in the technological landscape and potential impacts on warfare. While this is mostly on point, some of the tech info was a little hyped or had shallow predictions for the scope and depth of their potential impact. It also hit one of my pet peeves by talking about "combination of AI and machine learning" (the latter is a subset of the former). The additive manufacturing (aka 3D printing part) also was a little hyped. But overall it was pretty good.

Then the book covered four military transformations. Some of it was a little fluffed up with every little scuffle the innovators faced by some random officer or politician on the path to transformation, but otherwise those were good too. Some of the examples are well treaded paths though. Millet and Murray (among many others) used the German transformation to Blitzkreig for a case study and that was mandatory study at the Army Command and General Staff College in 2005. I've also seen several good case studies of the US transition to carriers. I've seen case studies on the British Dreadnaught transformation (which really led to destroyers and subs) but this had new wrinkles. The only one that was mostly new to me was the transformation of the USAF from a pedantic bomber force to the modern air power we see today.

The biggest value came from discussing the when the second mover, rather than the first mover enjoys the advantage in transformation, and time-based competition as the key. The British were able to let its rivals start a major shipbuilding plan, and the British were able to study them and develop a counter in mass that hit the water while the first mover was still building. So German/French shipbuilding projects sunk huge resources that were obsolete before they hit the water. The author doesn't make this connection that I saw, but China has vastly more industrial capacity and capability than the US, so this suggests China could do the same to the US and that should really concern everyone. Worse, the author points out that this ability allows the second mover to avoid sunk costs in rapidly depreciating equipment and get the same security from a smaller force because they can scale when needed, which is especially important when technology is rapidly advancing. Again, the US is stuck here because daily demands on our military force the US to maintain a huge force structure of existing equipment. It's not just the competition for resources that prevents us from transforming our military, it's also the daily demand to keep using it (we can't take a time-out to do deep transformation with something that is continuously stressed to the limit in use).

He also made a key point I've seen other places before on why some of these innovations succeed and why others fail: you need to change the measures of effectiveness (or the control of resources, the processes, and values/incentives) of the organization for a transformation, especially a truly disruptive transformation to succeed. Otherwise the traditional metrics will kill the changes and all of the people who worked on it. Another author used a case study about ADM Zumwalt to make this point. All of his acolytes working on his transformation had been out of their career path to help him and thus ended up not getting promoted when he left.

I did not like some of his conclusions at the end. He railed against systemic promotion and advancement in the services and almost nakedly called for GO/FO to pick their anointed acolytes to succeed them. The problem is that a bad officer who rises to the top is equally likely to surround themselves with their sycophants and drive a service into the ground as a good one is to achieve one of these transformations that work out well. This is also an environment where charismatic sociopaths thrive by convincing and mimicking competence and getting people in power to like them. This kind of environment also breeds cynicism and nihilism because there is more truth to the remark "It's who you know, not what you know." This problem extends beyond the military promotion system to the civil service and political appointees that sponsor these transformations. In at least one case, it was these that foisted transformation on the USAF who initially received PGMs and stealth kicking and screaming. But there is also plentiful fodder where harmful changes were wrought this way. Francis Fukuyama's "Political Order and Political Decay" describes the relative merits and problems with a professional bureaucracy vs appointees and this would be rich fodder for this discussion. The former usually know more about what they are talking about, but have their institutional biases. The latter can be incompetent or biased because they only got their job due to patronage. Eliot Cohen's "Supreme Command" also looks at the unequal dialogue between the services and the political leadership, including case studies where various leaders punctured the poor status quo in their military organizations with probing questions and outright direct guidance. That could also be a double-edged sword worth exploring further as a bad leader can also do a lot of damage that way.

In parting, the last chapter also seemed to have some spite for contemporary military concepts used to drive transformation. I'd agree that a lot of the names, and how frequently they are changing, make them easy to lampoon but I disagreed with a lot of what he said there. For starters, the US does not have the luxury of optimizing force design on *either* Russia *or* China the way AirLand Battle was in the 1970s. He also said our concepts are now based on abstract domains and not real adversaries, and even cited the National Security Strategy, which...has been naming our principle rivals. But, there were political reasons since the 1990s why we were quieter about these potential rivals. Naive or not, leaders from both parties hoped we could improve relations with diplomacy during that period and that led to much of the abstraction. But that doesn't mean that the characteristics of what we would be facing in a peer rival was purely made up or abstracted away. The main valid point from this part was that our boondoggles chasing terrorists allowed the Russians and the Chinese to observe and build counters to our advantages, and even now we are saddled with worldwide requirements that keep us from expending the resources and taking forces offline to holistically understand the transformation we need and to execute it. Fortunately, the Russians seem well on their way to removing themselves from the equation.

[Paul · Rating 5 out of 5]

A book that was a challenging read meaning one had to have a very slow pace. This is master’s degree level thought (if not higher), thus not an easy read for a beginner. The first couple hundred pages were a challenge as one could spend lots of time thinking about each page, but the pace of the book picked up once the four examples of radical military transformation were described. Probably the best part of the book is the extensive citation section. Without question, the author is a professional who does his research. So many excerpts of value, but the below were some of the highlights.

- Yet in many respects, the American Revolution, like the French revolutions of 1830 and 1848, left property relations relatively intact. Moreover, much of the established local political leadership and government structures (state legislative bodies, for example) remained in place after the revolution. P14. PJK: This type of revolution is not absolute, thus it’s a faster way to get the “new” county up and running. If the revolution is absolute, there is a lengthy period of adjustment.
- Marshall realized that his office’s work was never more important than when the military competition was entering a period of disruptive change. Such periods magnify the importance of identifying new sources of advantage and developing them quicker than the United states is rivals. P17.
- Germany’s mechanized air land blitzkrieg force that's flipped over much of Europe between 1939 and 1942 was matched, to a greater or lesser extent, by the US, British, and Russian militaries by 1944. The US monopoly and nuclear weapons lasted barely four years before the Soviet Union successful atomic test in August 1949. P17.
- If the US military's advantage was likely to be fleeing, senior defense policymakers needed to have some idea of how the United States might best extend its lead and what options existed for developing new sources of advantage once other militaries caught up. P17.
- The telegraph enabled Great Britain to lead the way in constructing a global communications network via underseas cables. P28. PJK: we think of global communications as being something new. Great Britain had it in the later 1800s.
- … the first Gulf War confirmed armor’s vulnerability in the absence of effective air cover. P40.
- Horizontal escalation, or shifting the conflict’s focus to a different geographic region, offers another perspective means of compelling the enemy to risk and expend its long range scouting and strike forces. P65.
- If a general war were to extend over a protracted period, say, several years or so, economic warfare in the form of blockade may prove an effective means of horizontal escalation. P66.
- The combination of AI and sensor fusion can assist in determining those attackers that should be engaged, in what sequence, and the best interceptors to employ. A precursor of this algorithmic warfare occurred during the rocket attacks on Israel from Gaza in 2021… When the rocket attacks came in large salvos - a “downpour” of rockets - an AI-directed computer determined when and where to fire Israeli interceptors. P93. PJK. Without question, machines are needed to respond to a mass projectile attack. Most people think AI is new, but in fact it’s been used many times already in history.
- A clever enemy will try to corrupt the data set being used to train AI…. Even more worrisome, an enemy military or intelligence organization that has penetrated the database may be able to feed its rival false data in an attempt to “turn” its AI to learn the reality that the enemy wants it to know. P105.
- Deterrence, in its simplest form, involves efforts to prevent a rival (the target) from pursuing a proscribed action…. Assuming a rational opponent - one that acts to maximize its overall anticipated gains and minimize anticipated costs - deterrence succeeds by convincing the target that it has an unacceptably low probability of achieving its goals or that the costs involved in pursuing the proscribed action will exceed any benefits derived. P143.
- Human beings cannot be counted on to act rationally in making decisions involving risk. P154. PJK: Interesting. More time needed to think about this statement.
- Simply put, the United States was not to be included in calculations pertaining to the two power standard. P194. PJK. Statistics can always be manipulated. :)
- When war between Japan and Russia broke out in February 1904, both the French and the British feared being drawn into the conflict on the side of their allies while Germany stood on the sidelines enjoying the spectacle. To allay these fears, London and Paris negotiated a series of agreements signed in April 1904 resolving their differences in Asia, Africa, and the Americas. The British viewed this on Entente Cordiale as enabling both powers to better address the German threat. Over time, however, it would blossom into the alliance that sustained the two ancient rivals through the Great War. P197. PJK: Interesting how the war between Russia and Japan led to the UK and France mending their relationship to the point that it proved critical to both WWI and WWII.
- Britain possessed the world's largest, best equipped, and most technically advanced warship industry. It allowed Britain to build warships of cutting edge design, faster and in greater numbers than its rivals. This enabled the Admiralty to pursue a strategy of the “second move advantage”…. P218.
- By 1940, however, Germany had progressed sufficiently to conduct an enhanced form of blitzkrieg operations and on a scale sufficient to defeat the allied forces on the Western Front. The Wehrmacht Hey beautiful, however, never achieved the necessary scale in its mechanized airland forces to defeat Soviet Russia in a short campaign, as it had against Poland and France. P295. PJK: Interesting assessment. But Hitler very nearly captured Moscow… but if he did, for how long would he have been able to hold it?
- Professional analysis, simulations, and war games, although important in their own right, can only go so far.…. They lack the detailed level of resolution (and “friction”) realized from well designed and executed field exercises and fleet maneuvers. This is critical because, in war, the devil is often in the details, and Murphy's law is often the order of the day. P410. PJK: So true. Many lessons to be learned during field exercises; the key to success in combat.

[Manraj Sohi · Rating 3 out of 5]

Good Book. Well researched. Makes useful suggestions to US on how to stay ahead in game. Analysis submarine, CTF, Blitzkrieg & precision strike to arrive at likely reasons of this disruptive shifts. Discuss AI, Quantum tech, Additive manufacturing, Gene editing tech, HPM, cyber….how it has the potential to become new RMA in PS/RSC game. Chapter on deterrence is amazing

[Nick · Rating 3 out of 5]

Krepinevich consolidates the idea of a revolution in military affairs, or military technical revolution, in The Origins of Victory, which describes how a military can take advantage of new technology to gain an overwhelming advantage against an adversary. The book examines each of the military services and the major developments that led to the current force structure.

While Krepinevich's book is excellent, it has several flaws that, if addressed, could have made it a much more valuable work. Krepinevich's criticism of the bomber pilots leading the U.S. Air Force in Vietnam for being risk averse in training and unprepared for war was compelling. However, the "fighter pilot mafia" that led the Air Force out of Vietnam eventually fell victim to the same pitfalls in Iraq and Afghanistan when Secretary of Defense Gates and other senior leaders had to order the Air Force to increase intelligence support to the counterinsurgency fight. The Government Accountability Office published several reports on how the Air Force failed to retain enough pilots to fill requirements or support the careers of drone (UAV, RPA, take your pick) pilots accruing combat hours and medals. Krepinevich missed the opportunity to spend less time telling the well-known story of Red Flag and the Aggressor Squadrons, and update his assessment based on reports and new research. Krepinevich's ideas would have been invaluable in this regard in considering whether manned stealth fighters have a future, or if the next revolution will be in drones. Any country behind the U.S. in fifth generation stealth fighters has an incentive to eliminate the pilot from the fighter plane and gain the advantages of maneuverability and lack of life support systems to challenge the F-35 and F-22's advantages.

Likewise, it would have been interesting to consider what technology will help the U.S. Navy operate in an anti-access, area denial environment. Is there some utility to focusing on the numbers of ships, or will a smaller number with the right technology offer the advantage? In short, is the F-35 good enough to build the fleet around, or do we need new capabilities that are as of yet unfielded?

Krepenivich does a good job highlighting the space domain, but only touches on the cyber domain. Considering Krepenivich's great discussions of how the U.S. Navy shifted to aviation and the U.S. Air Force broke from the U.S. Army, it would have been interesting for him to consider whether space and cyber forces should be independent, or if they belong tied to the services. The creation of the U.S. Space Force offers the opportunity to have this discussion.

Given Krepinevich's criticism of whether the Department of Defense has the ability to focus on transformation and the issues mentioned above, there is a lingering question of whether the U.S. military is prepared to fight the types of wars it will face in the future. Can a generation of servicemembers promoted based on their service in Iraq and Afghanistan refocus to fight China and Russia? Will China, or Russia, be the country to identify the next military technical revolution? How can the U.S. military stay nimble enough to respond to any developments from our adversaries that outpaces the U.S.? The U.S. still has the advantage against China, for example, in that China appears to be simply trying to close the gap in capability compared to the U.S., but there is still a powerful incentive to leap beyond that gap, even if in limited ways at first.

Krepinevich's book is excellent as part of a reading list that includes books that fill the gap, or as part of an effort to examine this book's shortfalls to consider lessons for the future. Krepinevich's point that countries that can anticipate change and invest in the right technology can secure an overwhelming advantage is well-taken, but he missed the opportunity to examine current debates and apply his insight into examining the full range of challenges and dilemmas facing current planners.

[Daniel · Rating 5 out of 5]

Disruptive technology wins. However, it requires people with vision for how the next war will be fought, to prepare the hardware, and train the soldiers, build the infrastructure, and playing war games to find the best strategy. And they need to convince their critics and the ‘old force people’. 4 outstanding examples were detailed in the book:

1. British Admiral John Fisher saw the importance of torpedoes and submarines which require a flotilla of destroyers to protect the battleships. Also the importance of the new turbine engine over coal one’s. Between armor, firepower, range and speed, he empathised range and speed: so more fast cruisers with long range guns then big slow Dreadnoughts. ‘Hit them first, hit them hard and then hit them again and again’. This enables the British Royal navy to be the supreme navy during the First World War.

2. Nazi General Hans von Seeckt realized the importance of speed and range, and not armor in Blitzkrieg. Also air support is needed to protect the flanks as infantry cannot keep up with the Panzers. And radios in the tanks to communicate. The French tanks were heavily armoured and slow, meant to fight the last war. So Germany crushed Poland and French armies in weeks.
3. American Admiral Billy Mitchell foresaw the importance of fighter planes and thus aircraft carriers over battleships. And the importance of radar so first strikes were important. And speed over armor so aircraft carriers have unarmored decks. So America crushed Japan in Midway and eventually the war.
4. American General Bill Creech realized the importance of precision guided missiles, laser and subsequent GPS enabled ones which hit their targets much more, from a range that is beyond visual. Together with GPS network, jamming and strath technology, the US Air Force crushed Iraqi’s sophisticated air defence consisting of SAMs and defence networks. One trick they did was to use drones to fly near air defence, so they switch on their radar, exposing their position. Then those defences were attacked.
5. How will the next war be fought? America had focused on fighting against non-state enemies after 9-11. Now it has to deal with China and Russian, both of which have their own GPS, guided missiles, supersonic missiles and nuclear weapons. It will involve war in space (satellites), cyberspace (hacking of internet), supersonic weapons firing at forward bases and aircraft carriers (sitting ducks) etc. It will be terrible. And the author is not convinced that America is ready.
One nugget from the book: Singapore is considered one of the forward bases of America… even though we have no formal treaty…

[Kenneth · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is an in depth and fascinating work by a true expert in the field who I have been unwittingly reading since he wrote the assessment of the US-Soviet military balance in 1989 that has been sitting on my shelf for 36 years and later assessments of the Gulf War, counter-insurgency in Iraq and the Sea-Air battle operational theory for the US and allies in the Western Pacific. The book is a description of the current series of revolutions and corresponding competition among great powers in military technology and doctrine. It's followed by four case studies of prior successes in revolutionizing military innovations: the British navy's adoption of the dreadnought class and destroyer screens, the German Army's adoption of Blitzkrieg, the American Navy's adoption of fast carrier task forces, and the American military's adoption of precision recon-strike warfare in the late 1980s to counter Soviet numerical superiority. The book ends with a devastating critique of the current American defense planning process. An excellent work.

[Mary Agnes Joens · Rating 4 out of 5]

This was really interesting & makes a compelling case both for the importance of disruptive innovations in determining military success and for concern that the current U.S. military is not in a position to lead in or take advantage of coming innovations. I found the first half to be more comprehensible and also more tightly written than the second. The first half is a detailed and often sobering overview of currently maturing technologies which have the potential to radically change the nature of warfare and military competition. The second half, on the other hand, consists of interesting accounts of historical disruptive innovations that become unwieldy very quickly (though maybe someone better versed in military history would have found that section easier to get through). These accounts do serve their intended purpose of illustrating why 'disruptive innovation' is so important, but I feel they could have done so in about 2/3 the page count.

[Jake Powers · Rating 4 out of 5]

Very illustrative dive on how military innovation drives the ability to succeed in the next conflict, or one that is ongoing. The process often or even exclusively revolves around dissenting from the common the narrative, a history that should worry any national security minded individual. The author makes one thing painfully clear, we are not being aimed definitively, nor are we keeping a large enough technological gap over our adversaries to remain comfortable.

One quote in particular the author placed before a chapter I found particular liking to, illustrating we don’t always have to play the defense to keep our nation safe.

“You go into Battle to hit the other fellow in the eye first so that he can’t see you! Yes! You hit him first, you hit him hard and you keep on hitting. That’s your safety! You don’t get hit back!” - Admiral Jackie Fisher.

[Wells Benjamin · Rating 5 out of 5]

Absolutely essential reading for anyone interested in military affairs, military history, or institutional innovation. The author expertly weaves together historical case studies with contemporary trends to form the type of analysis that shines with decades of experience. The chapters on Admiral Fisher and emerging technologies both stand as truly exceptional pieces of writing in this field. Despite the bleak nature of the final paragraph, the author does more to solve critical problems in our military than any ideologue could, simply by identifying them. I picked this up after hearing him talk on a podcast (defense and aerospace report), and was not disappointed. While dense at times, and occasionally redundant with its arguments, “The Origins of Victory” is a masterful overview of how defense innovation happens, why it matters, and how badly we need it.

[Lor · Rating 4 out of 5]

Favorite Excerpt:
For roughly three-quarters of a century, U.S. defense strategy has relied on deterrence to avoid the horrors of a third great-power war. The absence of such a war and the period of U.S. military dominance in the two decades following the Cold War appear to have convinced a generation of U.S. policy makers that deterrence is assured. But recent dramatic geopolitical shifts, especially the rise of revisionist great powers, combined with a maturing precision-warfare regime and the emergence of potent new military capabilities, are radically shifting the conditions under which deterrence strategies are constructed. Finally, human frailties cannot be ignored. As President Eisenhower came to understand, “It is remarkable how little concern men seem to have for logic, statistics, and even, indeed, survival: we live by emotion, prejudice, and pride.” (p.159)

[Scripps Wilkinson · Rating 4 out of 5]

Dense book. Thesis is essentially precision guided munitions have been democratized and therefore the US has lost the military advantage it has since 1990. If that’s true, we’re entering a new military era and the key technology isn’t evident yet.

His arguments for how a present day conflict would unfold are compelling. Due to, at the start of a conflict all space based assets are active and intelligence is accurate, the opening salvo would be viewed as critical. A comparison could be made to WWI mobilization timetables where once things were in motion, they could not be stopped. In today’s age, that time is single digit days if not hours which is scary.

I found the section on the development of torpedoes and submarines also interesting, lots of parallels to today’s drone tech advancement.

[Dale · Rating 4 out of 5]

Book starts off with an update on the current trends and tech in warfare. Next parts are case studies of innovation in warfare since British pre-world war I naval advanced under Fisher, through the German blitzkrieg model, American aircraft carriers in World War II, na then into American air advancements Cold War and Vietnam. Overall interesting and a good one stop shop for a discussion on revolutions in military affairs. Cannot help but feel as if we have been here before with hunter killer and sensor shooter discussions.

[Jeff · Rating 5 out of 5]

Equal parts academic treaties and mass market history. The author (maybe selectively?) chooses some interesting historical case studies to extrapolate common characteristics of militaries that successfully innovate their way through military technology revolutions. He is willing to challenge some established orthodoxies (eg the sometimes utility of being a second mover). He also sometimes gets tied down in seeking minutiae. But, overall, a first rate and throughly researched effort regarding how disruptive innovation impacts militaries and, in turn, the great powers they serve.

[Alex Courtney · Rating 3 out of 5]

If this book were the first section and the last bit of analysis it would be a worthy 4-star read. As is, it's two great essays sandwiching four uninspired history reports about well-covered military innovations resulting in a weak 3-star performance. Yes, the conclusions reference the case studies, but the cases themselves are covered in details beyond significance for the promised topic.

Mostly good conclusions (e.g. org choices like command tour length dictate what kind of innovation can happen) but I'd assign this in sections rather than recommend the book in its entirety.

[Yannick M · Rating 4 out of 5]

This books has a lot of interesting and great details, but it often gets lost in them. It spends most of its time on four case studies. Those are interesting, but the it sometimes feel like they are a bit isolated and he doesn't really use them to support his overall argument. But it's also not super clear what his overall argument even is.

But if you are interested in the history of military innovation this is exactly the book for you.

[Ian Oberndorfer · Rating 3 out of 5]

This book has useful insights and ideas but the presentation is muddled and not well executed. The histories while important to the expression of the concepts, big down the flow and cause the central philosophies to be lost until touched on at the end again. Better intermixing of the concepts and the history would have helped to highlight their use in the past and solidify their importance in the now.

[Paul · Rating 5 out of 5]

B: Outstanding analysis of our current quandary in the future defense of this nation. Drawing from history, Mr. Krepinevich shows how nations adapted in the past to eras of technological challenge. He points to the need to clearly define objectives when building a force while also keeping in view the ends and means disconnect growing due to national debt, and excessive decisive internal focus.

[Dave · Rating 4 out of 5]

Thoroughly researched. Great case studies.
The introduction struck me as a little sensationalist (awe-struck?) when speaking about emerging technologies. Some of the language developed there was never really applied later, which slightly detracted from its coherence. Moving through that, it was a deeply engaging read.

[Taylor Atkinson · Rating 4 out of 5]

The first quarter felt so academic and technical as to leave me feeling lost. The rest of the book felt like a gem because the author used clear, easy-to-understand, and real-world examples of how disruptive technologies and strategies changed or set global history.

[Filip Kocian · Rating 1 out of 5]

Insufferably bad.

Probably the worst book I ever opened. If you would take some superficial timeline of defense technologies, input Wikipedia and chat gpt and make it really boring, this would be the outcome.

[Turgut · Rating 5 out of 5]

What a book! By far the best book I've read on the topic.

[Tony · Rating 4 out of 5]

Great insight, enjoy the conclusions. Beginning 6 chapters great, last chapter great. Could skip the middle unless you want a history lesson.

[Jordan Schneider · Rating 5 out of 5]

second half was excellent, easily worth the price of admission

[Gregg · Rating 4 out of 5]

It’s good to revisit the evolution of warfare from time to time. This is a good overview. It didn’t break any new ground but it was well done.