Counterstrike

by Eric Schmitt, Thom Shanker

Inside the Pentagon's secretive and revolutionary new strategy to fight terrorism--and its game-changing effects in the Middle East and at homeIn the years following the 9/11 attacks, the United States waged a "war on terror" that sought to defeat Al Qaeda through brute force. But it soon became clear that this strategy was not working, and by 2005 the Pentagon began looking for a new way.In Counterstrike, Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker of The New York Times tell the story of how a group of analysts within the military, at spy agencies, and in law enforcement has fashioned an innovative and effective new strategy to fight terrorism, unbeknownst to most Americans and in sharp contrast to the cowboy slogans that characterized the U.S. government's public posture. Adapting themes from classic Cold War deterrence theory, these strategists have expanded the field of battle in order to disrupt jihadist networks in ever more creative ways.Schmitt and Shanker take readers deep into this theater of war, as ground troops, intelligence operatives, and top executive branch officials have worked together to redefine and restrict the geography available for Al Qaeda to operate in. They also show how these new counterterrorism strategies, adopted under George W. Bush and expanded under Barack Obama, were successfully employed in planning and carrying out the dramatic May 2011 raid in which Osama bin Laden was killed.Filled with startling revelations about how our national security is being managed, Counterstrike will change the way Americans think about the ongoing struggle with violent radical extremism.

Genres: Nonfiction, History, Terrorism, Military Fiction, War, Politics, Middle East

336 pages, Kindle Edition

First published August 16, 2011

Reviews

[Jerome Otte · Rating 4 out of 5]

Counterstrike tells a brief but fast-paced and mildly optimistic story of how US counterterrorism policies, strategies, and tactics evolved after 9/11 up to the killing of bin Laden. The authors argue that such a quick,smooth surgical in-and-out operation could not have been carried out ten years ago.

It mainly focuses on a group of intelligence, law enforcement and military officials and how they devised a new counterterrorism strategy.. It is also an interesting case study of how to apply "deterrance" to counterterrorism policies,a concept I had found absurd because we are fighting Islamist that think it is their God-given duty to kill us all. This strategy, I learned, also includes propaganda on how to portray Islamist extremists negatively in such a way as to gain traction in the Muslim world, which was fairly interesting. It also explores the military's "Cyber Command", which aims to counter Islamist websites and Internet propaganda. It also briefly describes the military's and CIA's UAV programs, as well as US Special Operations Forces operating in Pakistan.

The principal theme of Counterstrike is how in the course of the past decade "the government's force of professional counterterrorism analysts has grown from a group small enough to know each other's phone numbers to a vast army linked by supercomputers processing thousands of bits of data in nanoseconds." And, by no means incidentally, spending tens of billions of dollars in the process.

Schmitt and Shanker reveal without editorial comment the strong contrast between the management styles of our last two Presidents: "While Bush showed an apetite for tactical and operational details -- [for example,] the number of spies working against Al Qaeda in Pakistan . . . -- Obama wanted to understand the strategic nature of the threat and demanded to know when his personal orders were required to break through resistance across the intelligence and security community to make things work at the tactical and operational level." The bureaucratic squabbles, most notably during the tenure of Secretary of Defense Runsfeld, are another theme that stands out.

However, the overarching theme of Counterstrike is the gradual maturation of American counter-terrorist policy in the opening decade of the 21st Century, shifting gradually from one bent simply on using brute force to kill or capture terrorists to a much more sophisticated and broad-based policy of deterrence drawn from the playbook of the Cold War. As Scmitt and Shanker report, "Deterrence -- updated, expanded, even redefined -- is now official American policy for countering Al Qaeda and its affiliated terrorist organizations."

At first blush, deterrence might seem futile against an enemy willing, even eager, to die for his beliefs. However, as Schmitt and Shanker reveal, there is a wide range of tactics available to delay or prevent terrorist attacks. Among these are multifaceted techniques such as cyber-warfare to disrupt the communications and financial transactions of the Al Qaeda network and creative actions by local CIA or military officers. (In the most amusing of the latter, American officers first set high bounty prices on Al Qaeda commanders, then lowered them to imply that the terrorists' importance had declined; soon, to prove their continuing importance, the terrorists revealed their locations by striking out against the Americans in impulsive and foolhardy ways. The result, of course, is that they were then either killed or captured.)

So, there is considerable substance in Counterstrike. The discussion of how deterrence policy evolved into the U.S. strategy against Al Qaeda is especially illuminating. Unfortunately, the structure and writing style don't enhance the reader's experience. The book is slow going, consisting largely of one long expository paragraph after another, relieved only by lengthy quotes from some of the hundreds of individuals the authors interviewed. Schmitt and Shanker might have benefited from a few lessons in nonfiction writing by a master of the craft such as Tracy Kidder, Erik Larson, or even Bob Woodward.

The book shows how these novel, unconventional strategies were employed in planning and carrying out the raid that got bin Laden.

This is a brief read; check it out. It's fairly interesting, and won't take you all that long.

[Owen · Rating 4 out of 5]

It is rare that I rate a book higher than the general population. I will tell you, having been in Aghanistan, having trained Afghans as a Marine and worked within the intelligence cycle, this is a fantastic book. The general population is missing the boat on this one. This was an exceptional book, recommended to me by a former intel operative. The concept of the evolution of deterrance fascinated me, as did the speed with which intelligence could be transferred up and down the chain (shown relatively well in the Act of Valor movie, actually. Ignore the acting and watch the tactics- they're gorgeous). These are the people you want defending your freedom, trust me. I saw them work and you can read about them in this book. Any complete picture of our current geopolitical world and the way we interract needs this book.

-Owen Gardner Finnegan

[Tech Historian · Rating 4 out of 5]

Must read, but suffers from short story-itis.

This is an invaluable book for anyone seriously trying to understand the war on terror over the last decade. Kudos to the authors. The other 5 star reviews tell you why this book is worth reading.

My only gripe: The authors did a ton of first hand interviews and have assembled a series of vignettes that when stitched together paint the picture of our evolving war. The problem is that the reader has to do the stitching - the authors strength at writing short NY Times stories is the books weakness. There is laundry list of agencies, names, players, programs and somehow the authors expect you to know who they are. An org chart, glossary or someway to connect the dots (both visually and in the text would have been extremely helpful.)

[Jeff · Rating 3 out of 5]

There were some interesting tidbits and details regarding GWOT. But, like my review of many of these compendium type books, it felt more like a series of articles the authors attempted to stitch together instead of a well organized thought-out book.

[Jock Mcclees · Rating 4 out of 5]

I couldn't decide between 3 and 4 stars. A bit dry and textbook like. Some things seemed to repeat in different sections of the book. But all the same, an interesting insight into how completely unprepared we were before and immediately after and all that has been done to improve the intelligence coming in and the coordination between the different branches of the government and military.

It was interesting all the information that they could glean from the different sources of information, from people to cell phones, to laptops or drives they found on raids to a variety of other ways to piece together what was going on and who they should worry about.

It was also interesting how a large part became a PR contest between Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups and the US. Also, that different people in the terrorist networks had different motivations and therefore different things could be used to change their behavior. Some were just gun runners and looking to make a buck. Some were ideologists and harder to sway. Some were money men, also looking to make a buck. If you made it hard for the money men and they found it easier to make money elsewhere, that hurts the terrorists because they can't fund their operations.

There was a section on the mission that killed Osama bin Laden. The details about how he was found and the planning that went into the raid was intriguing.

Wish I had written this sooner after I finished it last month because there were other interesting insights that I can't remember.

[Sameer · Rating 3 out of 5]

This book follows at high level policy path following 9-11. It charts the mindset shift from cold war deterrence of MAD doctrine to decisive Countering asymmetrical warfare as the guerilla terror attacks are referred to now.

The book is candid enough to discuss, analyze and dissect the on the job learning through mistakes and cultural issues during the two administrations from 2001 through 2012. It ends with the raid on the compound in Abbotabad Pakistan. It has an excellent analysis of how the inter-agency conflicts led to compartmentalization and reticence on information sharing. It also covers how National Counter Terrorism Center came into its own.

Having said that, the book appears to be exclusively written with the author based stateside. It lacks field experiences, on the ground interviews and takeaways. Unless they came from a 3 star general or cabinet level staffer. In short, the focus is on political end of the policy making with some coverage of military decision making. The book completely skimps on the Iraq detour while en-route to Afghanistan. It completely skips special forces initial response that was covered in 12 Strong: The Declassified True Story of the Horse Soldiers12 Strong: The Declassified True Story of the Horse Soldiers. It also does not cover Hamid Karzai coming to power.

[Taylor Jackson · Rating 3 out of 5]

This book was okay
It gets dragged out on times
But there is a lot of information about the USA war with alQadea
I found some chapters more interesting than others
The author put in a lot of work writing this book and should be applauded for that a lot of history and research
Not a bad book at all!

[Seth J. Vogelman · Rating 3 out of 5]

Though it began with a fast paced and engaging narrative, about half way through it felt like the authors themselves lost their way or could find no way to liven up their description of US measures against terror. It was a dissapointing end to a promising beginning.

[Antonio · Rating 4 out of 5]

The authors explain in detail the US counterterrorism measures.
The narrative makes you feel safe, but at the same time aware that we are constantly at risk of a possible attack.
In my opinion the book gives information that can be used by terrorists in order to avoid detection.

[Eric · Rating 3 out of 5]

I am quite sure that I listened to this once before, very close to the time it was published. It has now become a bit dated, but still fairly relevant. The saddest bit of relevance came in the opening pages, harkening to the recent abandonment of Afghanistan by the Biden administration. The authors make a persuasive argument that one of the greatest problems that states of the Middle East contend with is the lack of constancy by American allies - we seem incapable of maintaining a relationship. Most of the narrative captures the growth of understanding post 9/11, but also captures many of the hiccups along the way.

[Jimmy · Rating 4 out of 5]

Radical Islam isn’t going away anytime soon so this book definitely has its place. This is the story of the United States’ effort in Counter-Terrorism following September 11th. It is the incredible story of how various parts of the Government matured in their fight against Al Qaeda. The book focuses not only the frontline agencies against terrorism such as the State Department, the CIA, the FBI and the military but also certain key individuals that have shaped the policies in their respective agencies. We read in the book the story of the early days after September 11th in which the government was struggling to know who their enemy was. The book does not cover up the embarrassing extent of the ignorance of various officials in the government concerning Al Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden. But as the government kept moving forward in its war against Al Qaeda we find that certain men eventually shaped institutional changes to their agency in order to adapt to the stateless terrorist threat of Al Qaeda. For example, the book talks about how the intelligence community at first collected everything as potential data but this led to an ineffective process of sorting out and producing good intelligence analysis. Soon “intelligence triage” was developed in order to better handle incoming potential intelligence data along with directing it at the right analysts. The academic world also had a place in the war on terror in which the intelligence community wisely saw that the academic world can better analyze certain data especially those that weren’t urgent actionable intelligence; this led to the founding of the Combating Terrorism Center based at West Point.
I appreciated how the authors described various elements of the government starting to work together in order to defeat Al Qaeda. This was dramatically different compared to the pre-9/11 world where government agencies’ jealousy meant an agency become territorial with what they were willing to share and do. Before 9/11 communications between the FBI and CIA faced many difficulties; the FBI’s computer network system was out of date and incompatible with the other government agencies. That would eventually change. We also read in the book of how the military and the intelligence community grew to become better reliant with each other. The military improved their ways of gathering information and intelligence and also improved on how this was shared to the intelligence community. In turn the intelligence community enhanced their evaluation and analysis in order to hand over to the military “actionable intelligence.” I love the example of how a platoon of US Army soldiers unknowingly stumbled upon an intelligence treasure trove in Sinjar, Iraq that was then properly exploited by the intelligence community that helped the military to operationally downgrade Al Qaeda in Iraq. There is also the story of the book of how the NSA would also have people sent to Iraq to better assist the military.
The book also had a discussion throughout the book about deterrence theory against Al Qaeda. We see a whole chapter devoted to the discussion about Cold War deterrence theory and the problem with it in relations to Al Qaeda. Obviously, it is difficult to get someone to back down when they are willing to martyr themselves in the attempt to destroy the West. However I think the book makes a good point that there is a role of deterrence as a tool against Al Qaeda and other Islamic extremists once we understand the network nature of Al Qaeda and other radical terrorist groups. This new deterrence theory recognizes that in order for Al Qaeda to function there is the need for a terrorist network that is able to provide logistical needs. Not everyone in this network is a suicide bomber since a suicide bomber himself would need someone who is a recruiter, a financier, trainer, etc. This new deterrence theory is not necessarily directed towards the bombers and fighters themselves but towards those supporters who have much more to lose since they are still committed to being of the world (so to speak) and attached to certain things that allow the US leverage. Recognition of this also means that our tools against Al Qaeda isn’t just military but also other means such as legal, financial and cyber capabilities. As the book mentioned, “it takes a network to fight a network.”
The book also talked about the problematic and at times ironic relationship the US has with Pakistan in the War on Terror. I also found it informative that the authors discussed the threat of the loan wolf home grown terrorists inspired by Al Qaeda.
While the book was published before the current geopolitical threat of ISIS, I think readers will find this book informative as to the historical development in the long war against Islamic terrorism. Highly recommended work.

[Johnny · Rating 3 out of 5]

This book provides the narrative for a major shift in dealing with terrorism, a shift which began (surprisingly to me) in the administration of George W. Bush. Counterstrike: The Untold Story of America’s Secret Campaign Against Al Qaeda is the story of an attempt to apply the principles of nuclear deterrence as applied during the Cold War to the War on Terror. At first, this approach to counterterrorism seems counterintuitive. During the Cold War, MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction) assumed that if one superpower destroyed population centers in another superpower that the victim superpower had sufficient resources to exact equal or greater destruction on the population centers of the aggressive superpower. Terrorists don’t really have population centers or even territories, for that matter. So, how does one apply this principle.

General James E. Cartwright, one of the architects of this policy explained the idea of deterrence for missiles as, “In missile defense, you hope to inject a high level of doubt into the mind of a potential attacker that a first strike will be successful and certainty that it will provoke retaliation. Ditto with deterrence and terrorism. ‘If you can remove a certainty of success in striking an objective, if you make the price too high, then you increase the opportunity the adversary will not strike, …’” (p. 55). The problem with providing this assurance is that it feels like, “America has all the watches, but the terrorists have all the time.” (p. 204)

Yet, even though the terrorists don’t have “territory” per se, they do have matters that they care about. For example, terrorists care about their reputations. Downgrading the hefty federal bounties on known terrorists wounds their pride and “smokes them out” because, “He wants to say I’m alive. He wants to prove he is still important and worthy of the higher bounty.” (p. 189) As a result, the terrorist plans something and creates enough noise and movement that the intelligence community can get a bead on him. As General McChrystal said, “When a person moves, that’s when we can get them. If they sit in a hole and are not taking any chances, we can’t get them.” (p. 189). Other techniques involve starting rumors that terrorist commanders aren’t paying the promised funds to the families of suicide bombers or that they hadn’t provided the promised long lines of Iraqi women willing to service their followers (p. 159) These are all fascinating techniques. And, since revealing them exposes some of our intelligence techniques, one has to wonder what new tricks our counterterrorism community has added to the toolkit.

I was also intrigued by the brief description of counter-broadcasting against insurgent “pirate” radio stations, both by overriding with a stronger signal over the precise frequency, but also providing counter-programming with a different message just to the left or right of the dial of that jammed frequency so that “…the insurgents’ audience lands instead on the favorable programming on the adjacent channel. This system not only blots out the insurgent transmissions but also drives listeners to channels filled with programming that counters the extremist message. The trick is that this has to happen in real time, since some of the pirate stations are in the backs of trucks or even towed in trailers behind motorcycles.” (pp. 175-6)

Frankly, this book opened my eyes to the efforts being made to keep the U.S. “reasonably” safe and underscored the reality that we will never be truly safe again. It is simultaneously encouraging and discouraging. I’m very glad I read it.

[Mal Warwick · Rating 3 out of 5]

One of democracy’s most remarkable characteristics is the sheer volume of closely guarded information that can be reported and published without resulting in jail time or torture for the authors. Counterstrike, a remarkable bit of longitudinal reporting by two veterans of the New York Times, brings to light a host of insights and behind-the-scene details about America’s decade-long campaign against Al Qaeda and its affiliates and imitators.

The principal theme of Counterstrike is how in the course of the past decade ”the government’s force of professional counterterrorism analysts has grown from a group small enough to know each other’s phone numbers to a vast army linked by supercomputers processing thousands of bits of data in nanoseconds.” And, by no means incidentally, spending tens of billions of dollars in the process.

Schmitt and Shanker reveal without editorial comment the strong contrast between the management styles of our last two Presidents: “While Bush showed an apetite for tactical and operational details — [for example,] the number of spies working against Al Qaeda in Pakistan . . . — Obama wanted to understand the strategic nature of the threat and demanded to know when his personal orders were required to break through resistance across the intelligence and security community to make things work at the tactical and operational level.” The bureaucratic squabbles, most notably during the tenure of Secretary of Defense Runsfeld, are another theme that stands out.

However, the overarching theme of Counterstrike is the gradual maturation of American counterterrorist policy in the opening decade of the 21st Century, shifting gradually from one bent simply on using brute force to kill or capture terrorists to a much more sophisticated and broad-based policy of deterrence drawn from the playbook of the Cold War. As Scmitt and Shanker report, “Deterrence — updated, expanded, even redefined — is now official American policy for countering Al Qaeda and its affiliated terrorist organizations.”

At first blush, deterrence might seem futile against an enemy willing, even eager, to die for his beliefs. However, as Schmitt and Shanker reveal, there is a wide range of tactics available to delay or prevent terrorist attacks. Among these are multi-faceted techniques such as cyberwarfare to disrupt the communications and financial transactions of the Al Qaeda network and creative actions by local CIA or military officers. (In the most amusing of the latter, American officers first set high bounty prices on Al Qaeda commanders, then lowered them to imply that the terrorists’ importance had declined; soon, to prove their continuing importance, the terrorists revealed their locations by striking out against the Americans in impulsive and foolhardy ways. The result is that they were then either killed or captured.)

So, there is considerable substance in Counterstrike. The discussion of how deterrence policy evolved into the U.S. strategy against Al Qaeda is especially illuminating. Unfortunately, the structure and writing style don’t enhance the reader’s experience. The book is slow going, consisting largely of one long expository paragraph after another, relieved only by lengthy quotes from some of the hundreds of individuals the authors interviewed. Schmitt and Shanker might have benefited from a few lessons in nonfiction writing by a master of the craft such as Tracy Kidder, Erik Larson, or even Bob Woodward.

(From www.malwarwickonbooks.com)

[Ray · Rating 4 out of 5]

​When I wondered if I should read this book or not, I feared it might be little more than the retelling of the tracking and killing of Osama Bin Laden, which by now has been told several times​. But I started the book, and soon found out it was much more than that. The authors ​are experienced reporters from The New York Times, ​and well versed in security issues. They take the reader through the significant changes in the U.S. approach to counterterrorism over the years. I think the post 9/11 stories about the disfunction between our intelligence agencies and the inter-department turf wars between the FBI and CIA showed that we could, and must, do a better job of intelligence gathering and sharing. And Schmitt and Shanker take us through that process.

​After 9/11, America barely knew who or what Al Qaeda was. We learn a little more about how we went from that as a beginning point to our refinements and intelligence gathering of today. Much of what goes on is behind the scenes to most citizens, and things like cyberwarfare, intelligence gathering techniques, and disruption of terrorist funding don't get much recognition. But hearing that those techniques are being used, effectively in most cases, is helpful. This is especially so since many intelligence "successes" remain unknown to us, since revealing them could reveal sources and techniques which need to remain secret.

[Noel Burke · Rating 3 out of 5]

The one thing I was most surprised about was the apparent level of detail of operations and strategy that was presented in this book. Towards the end of the book they were talking about things that had occurred only a few years ago. It seems to me that this book could be treasure trove of info for the enemy. I don't mind bring light to operations if it is declassified (i.e. this is what happened during a war 20 years ago), but the American public does not need to know that much detail about how we keep our freedoms so close to the war we are still fighting. I am all about holding the government accountable, but when the elements of surprise and unpredictability are needed to be successful, we sure shoot ourselves in the foot for the sake of being transparent. Let's give the boys fighting for our freedom time to fight their fight without us having to tell the world what they are doing. Of course, that is just my opinion. Other than that the book was good. I found it interesting that the book began before 9/11 and shared insight into little known attacks that a majority of the US never heard about. Listened on my iPod.

[Lee Holz · Rating 4 out of 5]

Counterstrike is an authoritative and comprehensive account of America’s campaign against Al Qaeda. It is a must read for anyone interested in the topic. One understands that the price of access to the players and those in the know was certain limitations on what the authors could say on all points. Still, the book has one substantial flaw or rather omission. Putting aside the intelligence failures and the geopolitical stupidity that lead to the invasion of Iraq, the invasion was a disaster in terms of our struggle with Al Qaeda. It gave Al Qaeda an unprecedented public relations victory in the Muslim world, attracting large numbers of fighters for their cause, attracting substantial financial support that would not have otherwise materialized and gave Al Qaeda the opportunity to cost us dearly in lives and money. Although we prevailed over Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, they remain a threat to the Iraqi democracy we nurtured. The book is silent on this point. This failing aside, the book is excellent.

[Mike · Rating 2 out of 5]

I thought this would be an interesting book about how US special forces going into the dark places. It has a little bit of that. A lot of it has more to do with how US intelligence services learned over 10 years how to do their job better in light of the new threat of stateless terrorism.

Some of the intelligence work is neat. The stories there are gripping. But other areas simply drag and felt like reading dull history. Which this isn't, as it is actual events in the recent past.

The biggest revelation is that many of the intelligence gains were more happenstance. Or that instead of compartmentalizing the intelligence, it took a high ranking general to take advantage of those gains. Agencies don't like sharing, even if it means not finding the bad guys. Now it is much better, at least.

As someone who has read a lot about conflict in the 20th century, the topic is relevant, but the flow wasn't there for me.

[James Pritchert · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is an interesting read that details the fight with Al Qaeda. It deals with the personalities and the enormity of the battle that is raging against terrorism. The political ins and outs are fascinating and the people who are waging war against terrorism are a select breed of warriors. Although the information is a bit dated in the rapidly changing war, this is valuable and critical background for those of us who are outside the circle of direct participants. This is a must read for anyone who is seeking a background on the war on terrorism and who enjoys the ins and outs of politics.

[Douglas Hackney]

Horribly titled book. Decently written compilation of primarily the strategic level actions taken before and after 9/11. The book is about as far from what you think the title implies as possible. I bought it based on a review and recommendation and never would have purchased it based on the title and cover design, which belong on a dime-store paperback.

The authors were not well served by their publishers here.

[Matt · Rating 2 out of 5]

A very dry book that is mainly focused on how the gov't is adopting cold war deterrence strategies for its antiterrorism efforts, using foreign PR campaigns to counter the message of extremist groups & terrorist recruiters, trying to maintain relations with Pakistan, dealing with "lone gunman" type terrorist and terrorist cells, etc. One is left with more of a feeling of hopelessness than hopefulness for the future.

[Steven · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a very good book. It reads like a 300 page NYT investigative feature. The historical allegory to the Cold War doctrine of deterrence, which is the recurring theme of the book, is exceptionally well done.
Counterstrike is hard-hitting, easy-to-read, and offers a very unique and exclusive perspective on how America's counter-terrorism apparatus works and how it evolved.

[Sean · Rating 3 out of 5]

Well researched look at the sausage making requires to respond to the new terrorism threat. Interesting background on how the Cold War philosophy of deterrence was used upon terrorists. The book leaves the reader with the understanding that we will never defeat terrorism, but we can minimizes its physical and psychological impacts.

[John · Rating 3 out of 5]

Encouraging in that it documents an improving coordination among our terrorist-fighting agencies. The account of Bin Laden's take-down interesting especially in the amount of preparation made. Good reporting but not an engaging read.

[Nadim Karmoussa · Rating 5 out of 5]

A very rich book. It shows all the efforts against terrorism from government point of view. The most interesting aspect is seeing how strategies are developed, adjusted and influenced. The book is a bit naively optimistic in my opinion, but still very valuable. I enjoyed reading it.

[Chuckdee · Rating 4 out of 5]

The authors presented a solid understanding of the complexities of the war on islamic extremism...there were sections that dragged a bit, and I felt sections that were more broad than deep. But in all, they were able to explain recruitment and appeal of AQ in an understandable way.

[Jay Clement · Rating 3 out of 5]

17-2019. The guts of this book are chilling and informative about the actual war on terror worldwide. It is meticulously sourced, which is sort of a weakness for me. Lots of first-person chatting about various events and activities. I am glad I read the book.

[Katie · Rating 4 out of 5]

A worthwhile read for those looking at the war against al Qaeda in layman's terms. I would not plan on reading this twice.

[ARMY]

Fontenot

[Rick Cheeseman · Rating 3 out of 5]

Easy read, enjoyable. Good look at the non-kinetic efforts behind fighting terrorism.

[Mazen Alloujami · Rating 3 out of 5]

It's in the domain of propaganda more than real history. I don't like it.