A reprint of the title originally released in 1997, Gates’ work condenses the state of knowledge of the era by the late nineties, which draws a lot from 70´s and 80´s secondary sources, with by then already massive bibliography. Most is summed in a final bibliographical essay.
Not leaving doubts about the author´s grade of command of the topic, it is not altogether clear what he sets out to do: an introduction, a general survey, a military account, an epochal characterization of socio-political conditions, a tactical and strategical analysis of the art of war, or a mishmash of all the aforesaid. There´s a sense of un-evenness, given the disparity with which he treats some campaigns. Either detailed minutiae, or straight one line mention.
Gates´ approach is a mixed bag of contents starting a caveat in the introduction, stressing the importance of being critical of sources and not take for fact anything written. Then there is an overview of each of the belligerents and key raw data and state of their armies and arms.
Action begins with the detailed Austerlitz campaign, after France and UK recommence hostilities. In this very first battle one can grasp one of the problems with the maps provided, being black and white, all forces, usually black squares, bear no distinction as to whose force they belong. The other problem is how hard is to follow operational troop deployments in wide array of german cities.
Interspersed is a chapter on naval wafare, mainly about how Royal navy was overstreched by the blockading, amphibious and convoying duties. The era saw little of decisive engagements, save from Trafalgar.
Chronological narrative carries on as campaigns ending on brilliant Jena and Austerstädt and further continuation in Eylau and Friedland knock Prussia and Russia out of the war. Gates` narrative again is lavish on movements and manouvers of corps.
One of the topical, essay-like chapters is about “the reformists”, dealing with the administrative and military challenges that the defeated ancient regime orders like Prussia, Russia and Austria had to cope with in order to level off Napoleon`s ingenious revolutionary empire.
Another chapter covers economic performance, comparing essentially French resource management to British one, and it´s confrontation through the continental system and orders in council. Despite severe strains, british finanacial system proved sounder. Ultimately, though, competition in merchant navy drags United States into conflict as well.
The most detailed chapter involves the Rise and fall of the fifth coalition, French invasion of Portugal, and especially battles of Eggmühl, Aspern-Essling and Wagram, curbing Austria but failing to destroy it.
After that, two chapters on Napoleon´s soon to be self-destructive failures: a full chapter on Peninsular war, and then another about the Invasion of Russia, not so fully loaded of military affairs but of diplomatic ones, leading to the breakup of Russo-french relations. In the next, German war of liberation, Napoleon constantly tries to make up for his severe losses and irreplaceable resource drainage, well handed in Lützen and Bautzen, but eventually exceeded, badly outnumbered and defeated in Leipzig. Descriptions about these battles are rather short. The same occurs in the defensive French campaign of 1814, yet here not even the names of the battles are given. Waterloo and the 100 days is dismissed as an overrated battle, and the chapter dedicated to it is largely filled with counter-factic claims that even a French victory there would have been too little and too late for Napoleon, against so large and determined odds. The conclusion states that successive coalitions learnt how to wage war together and how to offset Napoleons advantages. Napoleon, as well, fell short of the dogma of war serving just as a mean to achieve a political aim, and not an end it itself.
As said, the bibliographical ending chapter makes criticisms or warnings of colleagues` works. Very entertaining read.