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The Future of Blasphemy: Speaking of the Sacred in an Age of Human Rights
In the days of Moses, blasphemy was the mortal offence of failing to respect the divine. In an age of human rights, blasphemy is understood as a failure to respect persons, as insult, defamation, or "advocacy of religious hatred." The criminalisation of this personal blasphemy has been advanced at the United Nations and upheld by the European Court of Human Rights, which has asserted a universal "right to respect for religious feelings."
The Future of Blasphemy turns respect on its head. Respect demands that we grant each other equal standing in the moral community, not that we never offend. Politically, respect for citizens requires a public discourse that is open to all viewpoints. Going beyond the question of free speech versus religion, The Future of Blasphemy defends an ethical model of blasphemy. Controversies surrounding sacrilege are contests over what counts as sacred, disagreements about what has central, inviolable, and incommensurable value. In such public contestation of the sacred, each of us-secular and religious alike-has equal right to speak on its behalf.
The Future of Blasphemy turns respect on its head. Respect demands that we grant each other equal standing in the moral community, not that we never offend. Politically, respect for citizens requires a public discourse that is open to all viewpoints. Going beyond the question of free speech versus religion, The Future of Blasphemy defends an ethical model of blasphemy. Controversies surrounding sacrilege are contests over what counts as sacred, disagreements about what has central, inviolable, and incommensurable value. In such public contestation of the sacred, each of us-secular and religious alike-has equal right to speak on its behalf.
208 pages, Paperback
First published January 26, 2012
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About the author
Austin Dacey
4 books10 followers"Austin Dacey is a philosopher who writes on the intersection of science, religion, and ethics.
He serves as a respresentative to the United Nations for the Center for Inquiry, a think tank concerned with the secular, scientific outlook. He is also on the editorial staff of Skeptical Inquirer and Free Inquiry magazines. His writings have appeared in numerous publications including the New York Times, USA Today, and Science."
"Austin Dacey is a writer and human rights advocate based in New York City. His writings have appeared in numerous publications including the New York Times, USA Today, and Science. In 2008 he released The Secular Conscience: Why Belief Belongs in Public Life. Arguing for the central role of conscience in political and moral discourse, the book "lifted quite a few eyebrows" according to the New York Times. Embraced by figures as diverse as Sam Harris and Father Richard John Neuhaus, The Secular Conscience was noted in North American, European, and Arabic media, and called "timely and important" by Asharq Alawsat.
As United Nations representative for the Center for Inquiry, Austin Dacey has participated in international debates regarding freedom of expression, religion, and the "dialogue among civilizations," speaking before the U.N. Human Rights Council in Geneva and other fora. In 2007 he helped to organize the Secular Islam Summit. He holds a doctorate in applied ethics and social philosophy and has taught most recently at Polytechnic Institute of New York University."
He serves as a respresentative to the United Nations for the Center for Inquiry, a think tank concerned with the secular, scientific outlook. He is also on the editorial staff of Skeptical Inquirer and Free Inquiry magazines. His writings have appeared in numerous publications including the New York Times, USA Today, and Science."
"Austin Dacey is a writer and human rights advocate based in New York City. His writings have appeared in numerous publications including the New York Times, USA Today, and Science. In 2008 he released The Secular Conscience: Why Belief Belongs in Public Life. Arguing for the central role of conscience in political and moral discourse, the book "lifted quite a few eyebrows" according to the New York Times. Embraced by figures as diverse as Sam Harris and Father Richard John Neuhaus, The Secular Conscience was noted in North American, European, and Arabic media, and called "timely and important" by Asharq Alawsat.
As United Nations representative for the Center for Inquiry, Austin Dacey has participated in international debates regarding freedom of expression, religion, and the "dialogue among civilizations," speaking before the U.N. Human Rights Council in Geneva and other fora. In 2007 he helped to organize the Secular Islam Summit. He holds a doctorate in applied ethics and social philosophy and has taught most recently at Polytechnic Institute of New York University."
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Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews
June 3, 2024
A PHILOSOPHER OF ETHICS LOOKS AT THE CONCEPT OF BLASPHEMY
Author Austin Dacey wrote in the Preface to this 2012 book, “the contemporary talk of blasphemy in the international public square is neither a recent invention nor a return of a medieval theological specter. Rather, it is a distinctly modern phenomenon in which blasphemy has been reframed within the secular idiom of respect for persons… those most vulnerable to the abuse of laws against blasphemy and therefore most vocal in defiance of them are dissidents within the very communities whose ‘feelings’ the laws are purportedly protecting… such dissidents are not just engaging in ‘free speech’ but manifesting religiously heterodox or secular commitments of conscience that are no less worthy than those they affront.” (Pg. vi)
He notes, “‘Respect’ works for diplomats for the same reason that it makes work for philosophers: it is multiple, prodigiously ambiguous… The first [type of] respect can be called ‘respect as reverence,’ the second ‘respect as appraisal, the third ‘respect as honor,’ and the fourth ‘respect as recognition.’ The object of the last kind of respect is not excellence, merit, or fearsome power, but rather AUTHORITY. It is not an evaluation of worth, but instead a commitment to entering into a mutual relationship with another in which the claims of each can have the status of reasons to the other.” (Pg. 8-9)
He summarizes, “Blasphemy was a crime in search of a victim. With the embrace of pluralism, the secular state, and equal individual rights, Western political culture rejected blasphemy against the divine and blasphemy against the community as targets for criminal law. Beginning with the nameless stranger of Leviticus, annihilated for failing to acknowledge in the Name the source of all moral authority, it came to locate the source of moral authority in the person, neighbor and stranger alike. In the person, the object of reverence, recognition, and appraisal is joined. As the discourse of blasphemy enters international law, it is grappling not with the deference that people owe to their God, but with the deference they owe to each other.” (Pg. 36-37)
He suggests, “Here, then, are three positive reasons in favor of religious criticism, even when it offends: treating believers as equals in the moral community exercising the civic virtue of holding public claims accountable in the space of reasons, and defending one’s own vision of the sacred. In exchange for the freedom of belief accorded us in an open society, we are obligated to accept a certain degree of public scrutiny of our beliefs. The very same principles that allow us to live our lives according to our beliefs give others the right to question them, and sometimes even to desecrate them. It is true, as we often hear, that with freedom of speech comes responsibility, the responsibility to use that free judiciously in a way that recognizes the equal moral standing of others. But the freedom of belief also carries with it responsibility, the responsibility to enter the space of reasons and abide by the public accountability that reigns there. The very same freedom that lights up this space for belief also creates belief’s shadow, its inseparable companion, blasphemy.” (Pg. 62-63)
He argues, “Blasphemy can be the expression, if only implicit, of stances toward things spiritual. It can also be part of a spiritual practice. At its best, religious practice is a manifestation of the human search for answers to ultimate questions… But for some, that search leads out of one faith community toward another. For others, the search for answers to ultimate questions does not end in a faith at all… So, the affirmation of the value of freedom of religion or belief … must be the affirmation of the engagement with ultimate questions as such, and those powers of persons through which this engagement is possible at all… Blasphemy must be legally protected as a matter of equal treatment before the law and as an exercise of the fundamental rights of freedom of expression and freedom of conscience.” (Pg. 96-97)
He states, “the notion of an affront to the sacred is at least coherent. It is also morally relevant as it concerns our central reasons for action. Indeed, many secular persons already accept some things that satisfy the normative criteria for the sacred: the worth of persons, and arguably also beauty and truth. If there are other normatively important, inviolable, and incomparable values, a rational person would want to be able to discover them. So we have good grounds for practicing a stance of openness to the possibility of the sacred.” (Pg. 121-122)
He sums up, “conflicts over the sacred are conflicts over central, inviolable, and incommensurable values. They are born of ancient human struggles to understand what we have reason to feel and do. Therefore, we should not expect these conflicts to go away quietly.” (Pg. 124)
He concludes, “By making blasphemy a personal matter, modern liberal thought brought it from sin to secular crime. The task that remains is to complete this secularization, to re-imagine the sacred as a domain of the moral and to realize that we all have equal right and equal authority to speak on its behalf.” (Pg. 130)
This book will be of some interest to those concerned with the political implications of blasphemy in the modern world.
Author Austin Dacey wrote in the Preface to this 2012 book, “the contemporary talk of blasphemy in the international public square is neither a recent invention nor a return of a medieval theological specter. Rather, it is a distinctly modern phenomenon in which blasphemy has been reframed within the secular idiom of respect for persons… those most vulnerable to the abuse of laws against blasphemy and therefore most vocal in defiance of them are dissidents within the very communities whose ‘feelings’ the laws are purportedly protecting… such dissidents are not just engaging in ‘free speech’ but manifesting religiously heterodox or secular commitments of conscience that are no less worthy than those they affront.” (Pg. vi)
He notes, “‘Respect’ works for diplomats for the same reason that it makes work for philosophers: it is multiple, prodigiously ambiguous… The first [type of] respect can be called ‘respect as reverence,’ the second ‘respect as appraisal, the third ‘respect as honor,’ and the fourth ‘respect as recognition.’ The object of the last kind of respect is not excellence, merit, or fearsome power, but rather AUTHORITY. It is not an evaluation of worth, but instead a commitment to entering into a mutual relationship with another in which the claims of each can have the status of reasons to the other.” (Pg. 8-9)
He summarizes, “Blasphemy was a crime in search of a victim. With the embrace of pluralism, the secular state, and equal individual rights, Western political culture rejected blasphemy against the divine and blasphemy against the community as targets for criminal law. Beginning with the nameless stranger of Leviticus, annihilated for failing to acknowledge in the Name the source of all moral authority, it came to locate the source of moral authority in the person, neighbor and stranger alike. In the person, the object of reverence, recognition, and appraisal is joined. As the discourse of blasphemy enters international law, it is grappling not with the deference that people owe to their God, but with the deference they owe to each other.” (Pg. 36-37)
He suggests, “Here, then, are three positive reasons in favor of religious criticism, even when it offends: treating believers as equals in the moral community exercising the civic virtue of holding public claims accountable in the space of reasons, and defending one’s own vision of the sacred. In exchange for the freedom of belief accorded us in an open society, we are obligated to accept a certain degree of public scrutiny of our beliefs. The very same principles that allow us to live our lives according to our beliefs give others the right to question them, and sometimes even to desecrate them. It is true, as we often hear, that with freedom of speech comes responsibility, the responsibility to use that free judiciously in a way that recognizes the equal moral standing of others. But the freedom of belief also carries with it responsibility, the responsibility to enter the space of reasons and abide by the public accountability that reigns there. The very same freedom that lights up this space for belief also creates belief’s shadow, its inseparable companion, blasphemy.” (Pg. 62-63)
He argues, “Blasphemy can be the expression, if only implicit, of stances toward things spiritual. It can also be part of a spiritual practice. At its best, religious practice is a manifestation of the human search for answers to ultimate questions… But for some, that search leads out of one faith community toward another. For others, the search for answers to ultimate questions does not end in a faith at all… So, the affirmation of the value of freedom of religion or belief … must be the affirmation of the engagement with ultimate questions as such, and those powers of persons through which this engagement is possible at all… Blasphemy must be legally protected as a matter of equal treatment before the law and as an exercise of the fundamental rights of freedom of expression and freedom of conscience.” (Pg. 96-97)
He states, “the notion of an affront to the sacred is at least coherent. It is also morally relevant as it concerns our central reasons for action. Indeed, many secular persons already accept some things that satisfy the normative criteria for the sacred: the worth of persons, and arguably also beauty and truth. If there are other normatively important, inviolable, and incomparable values, a rational person would want to be able to discover them. So we have good grounds for practicing a stance of openness to the possibility of the sacred.” (Pg. 121-122)
He sums up, “conflicts over the sacred are conflicts over central, inviolable, and incommensurable values. They are born of ancient human struggles to understand what we have reason to feel and do. Therefore, we should not expect these conflicts to go away quietly.” (Pg. 124)
He concludes, “By making blasphemy a personal matter, modern liberal thought brought it from sin to secular crime. The task that remains is to complete this secularization, to re-imagine the sacred as a domain of the moral and to realize that we all have equal right and equal authority to speak on its behalf.” (Pg. 130)
This book will be of some interest to those concerned with the political implications of blasphemy in the modern world.
July 31, 2023
Audiobook, lowered to 3.75.
October 7, 2014
This book is really interesting, taking a difficult and emotionally evocative topic and approaching it from an empathic but-still-so-philosophical lens. If the title speaks to you, then you'll love the content.
Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews