I really wanted to love this book. I even had my highlighter out and everything. And while this book isn’t bad – there is nothing to be lost by reading it and some important information to be gained, in particular the final chapter is strong – I felt like I kept hitting theoretical lacunae in the development of the main argument.
The first part of the book in particular focuses on a critique of democracy “as a form of governance,” arguing that what is often described as democratic should be better understood as antidemocratic. What is desirable is democracy “as a way of life,” which is the focus of the second part of the book, and embodied by the practice of abolition feminism.
All that is clear enough, but the issues emerge in the details and terms. For example, “democratic living” is to be ungovernable, which is distinct from anarchist, but possibly anarchic, and certainly anti-authoritarian. Anarchism is unsatisfactorily dismissed by Quan because of its belief in individual autonomy and potential connections to “order,” the argument being that anarchy is simply another form of being governed and to truly to ungovernable is to be outside of order. But what “order” and “ungovernable” are precisely is not thoroughly excavated.
Quan cites an uprising in Wukan, China, where residents ran a village themselves for a brief period as an exemplar of becoming ungovernable. Quan says they created an “independent governing structure” and they were also “ungoverned.” How can both be true? Autonomous communities, in order to maintain community, almost always develop their own norms (or rules or laws) to manage (or govern) themselves. This also implies a form of ordering society. So those that Quan lifts up as ungovernable and existing outside order are actually just creating their own forms of governance and order. This is fine, but by not clarifying terms confusion is created, and it also muddies Quan’s dismissal of anarchism.
Another concern regards democracy, that famously undefined term. A major goal of the text is to rescue democracy from antidemocrats. However, it is unclear why that is necessary. According to Quan’s argument, all forms of democratic governance since the creation of the term democracy have actually been antidemocratic. This raises the question of if democracy is worth redeeming if it has never really existed. “Ah! But democratic living has existed,” the reply might go. Yet to bring it back to anarchism, Quan also critiques the European origins of classical anarchism, pointing to anarchic practices that existed long before the mid-1800s. That’s fair. Anarchism has never existed, but anarchic living has. But then wouldn’t the same argument hold true of democratic living? Has it not existed long before Athens (where it didn’t really exist anyway)? Would it not be more productive (and accurate and less Eurocentric) to argue that practices of anarchism and democracy have existed long before Europeans gave them names and claimed them as their own inventions? Is democracy (or anarchism) the hill we want to die on? If our commitments – and I believe Quan and I share similar ones – are for collective liberation, do the terms we append to it even matter?
Clearly, this book has given me much to think about, which is a value in and of itself. I feel it could have been stronger via a more thorough and consistent use and clarification of terms. At the same time, I also appreciate its appeal to abolition feminism and to the lifting up of various histories of rebellion, resistance, and refusal.