What do you think?
Rate this book
Dark Star: A New History of the Space Shuttle
A captivating history of NASA’s Space Transportation System—the space shuttle—chronicling the inevitable failures of a doomed design.
In Dark Star , Matthew Hersch challenges the existing narrative of the most significant human space program of the last fifty years, NASA’s space shuttle. He begins with the origins of the space a century-long effort to develop a low-cost, reusable, rocket-powered airplane to militarize and commercialize space travel, which Hersch explains was built the wrong way, at the wrong time, and for all the wrong reasons. Describing the unique circumstances that led to the space shuttle’s creation by the administration of President Richard Nixon in 1972 and its subsequent flights from 1981 through 2011, Hersch illustrates how the space shuttle was doomed from the start.
While most historians have accepted the view that the space shuttle’s fatal accidents—including the 1986 Challenger explosion—resulted from deficiencies in NASA’s management culture that lulled engineers into a false confidence in the craft, Dark Star reveals the widespread understanding that the shuttle was predestined for failure as a technology demonstrator. The vehicle was intended only to give the United States the appearance of a viable human spaceflight program until funds became available to eliminate its obvious flaws. Hersch’s work seeks to answer the perilous questions of technological choice that confront every generation, and it is a critical read for anyone interested in how we can create a better world through the things we build.
In Dark Star , Matthew Hersch challenges the existing narrative of the most significant human space program of the last fifty years, NASA’s space shuttle. He begins with the origins of the space a century-long effort to develop a low-cost, reusable, rocket-powered airplane to militarize and commercialize space travel, which Hersch explains was built the wrong way, at the wrong time, and for all the wrong reasons. Describing the unique circumstances that led to the space shuttle’s creation by the administration of President Richard Nixon in 1972 and its subsequent flights from 1981 through 2011, Hersch illustrates how the space shuttle was doomed from the start.
While most historians have accepted the view that the space shuttle’s fatal accidents—including the 1986 Challenger explosion—resulted from deficiencies in NASA’s management culture that lulled engineers into a false confidence in the craft, Dark Star reveals the widespread understanding that the shuttle was predestined for failure as a technology demonstrator. The vehicle was intended only to give the United States the appearance of a viable human spaceflight program until funds became available to eliminate its obvious flaws. Hersch’s work seeks to answer the perilous questions of technological choice that confront every generation, and it is a critical read for anyone interested in how we can create a better world through the things we build.
- GenresHistoryNonfiction
320 pages, Kindle Edition
First published December 26, 2023
8 people are currently reading
39 people want to read
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews
February 22, 2025
I hadn't expected the book to engage so literally with its namesake film. “Astronauts alienated from society, without a sense of purpose or even a basic funding mandate, riding atop a bomb to create a better future: the crew of Dark Star and the astronauts of NASA’s space shuttle shared more than a little in common.” The author has a way with words.
Much as I value the stories of Richard Feynman identifying the O rings as the cause of the Challenger disaster, and of the work culture that led to the launch decision, this book locates the real problem in the original design. This is not hindsight. In 1982, the RAND Corporation “predicted that from one to three orbiters would be lost during the life of the program, a conclusion of depressing accuracy.” Feyman did comment on this as well. His problem wasn’t with the risk of failure being one per hundred flights: his problem was with NASA publicly stating that it was one per hundred thousand.
Written by an historian, the story starts fifty years before the space shuttle flew, with the first planned spaceplane: the Silvervogel, a German bomber which was intended to skim across the top of the atmosphere, devastate New York, then carry on to land in Japan. The spaceplane meme proved to be unshakeable. The author describes how air force pilots dominated NASA thinking so that only winged craft were seriously considered for the post-Apollo era. Never mind that, as one sceptic noted in 1970, the requirement for the shuttle to land on an runway made “about as much sense as requiring airplanes to be able to land at railroad stations.”
The author’s take is that, after Apollo, NASA needed a new programme that was substantial enough to sustain the organisation, but with enough scope for improvement for them to plan ahead. Potential shuttle missions -- supplying an enormous space station, a moon base, or interplanetary ships -- had disappeared, but that was by the by. Hence “the story of the space shuttle is less the story of a grand infrastructure that fell short [...] than a temporary, flawed solution to a problem that did not exist - and thus could never be solved.”
Perhaps the most chilling sections are on “safety theater”: publicity for devices and practices that supposedly safeguarded the crew, but had little or no real utility. For example, unlike Apollo, there was no way to escape the shuttle in case of a launch mishap. Hence, astronauts did not wear spacesuits during the initial launches, only jumpsuits and crash helmets. But after the Challenger disaster they started wearing them anyway, for show.
Another example of safety theater was the Personal Rescue Enclosure or “rescue ball”. This was “an inflatable, zippered white beach ball approximately three feet in diameter, in which space-suited crew members would encapsulate their unsuited colleagues”. (The author refrains from making a parallel with the film Dark Star.) NASA initially publicized this “morbid” technology “often in connection with women astronauts”. But anyone in the rescue ball had nowhere to go, because keeping a second shuttle on standby turned out to be too expensive.
In summary, “Rather than negligent oversights, the design compromises that came to define NASA’s space shuttle were purposeful accommodations to political and cultural goals, known to impose increased risks to the system.”
Much as I value the stories of Richard Feynman identifying the O rings as the cause of the Challenger disaster, and of the work culture that led to the launch decision, this book locates the real problem in the original design. This is not hindsight. In 1982, the RAND Corporation “predicted that from one to three orbiters would be lost during the life of the program, a conclusion of depressing accuracy.” Feyman did comment on this as well. His problem wasn’t with the risk of failure being one per hundred flights: his problem was with NASA publicly stating that it was one per hundred thousand.
Written by an historian, the story starts fifty years before the space shuttle flew, with the first planned spaceplane: the Silvervogel, a German bomber which was intended to skim across the top of the atmosphere, devastate New York, then carry on to land in Japan. The spaceplane meme proved to be unshakeable. The author describes how air force pilots dominated NASA thinking so that only winged craft were seriously considered for the post-Apollo era. Never mind that, as one sceptic noted in 1970, the requirement for the shuttle to land on an runway made “about as much sense as requiring airplanes to be able to land at railroad stations.”
The author’s take is that, after Apollo, NASA needed a new programme that was substantial enough to sustain the organisation, but with enough scope for improvement for them to plan ahead. Potential shuttle missions -- supplying an enormous space station, a moon base, or interplanetary ships -- had disappeared, but that was by the by. Hence “the story of the space shuttle is less the story of a grand infrastructure that fell short [...] than a temporary, flawed solution to a problem that did not exist - and thus could never be solved.”
Perhaps the most chilling sections are on “safety theater”: publicity for devices and practices that supposedly safeguarded the crew, but had little or no real utility. For example, unlike Apollo, there was no way to escape the shuttle in case of a launch mishap. Hence, astronauts did not wear spacesuits during the initial launches, only jumpsuits and crash helmets. But after the Challenger disaster they started wearing them anyway, for show.
Another example of safety theater was the Personal Rescue Enclosure or “rescue ball”. This was “an inflatable, zippered white beach ball approximately three feet in diameter, in which space-suited crew members would encapsulate their unsuited colleagues”. (The author refrains from making a parallel with the film Dark Star.) NASA initially publicized this “morbid” technology “often in connection with women astronauts”. But anyone in the rescue ball had nowhere to go, because keeping a second shuttle on standby turned out to be too expensive.
In summary, “Rather than negligent oversights, the design compromises that came to define NASA’s space shuttle were purposeful accommodations to political and cultural goals, known to impose increased risks to the system.”
December 28, 2024
I read this as an ebook checked out from the library. A fairly interesting account of the tortured development and operation of NASA's "space plane". The book points out the many compromises made during the craft's design phase, resulting in flaws that were made obvious by 2 fatal accidents. The book points out many other flaws that didn't result in crashes, and you have to wonder how much a role plain old luck played in keeping the shuttles in one piece over the years. The section of the book on the Soviet shuttle was particularly interesting and makes me want to investigate that topic further. My main complaint about the book is the plethora of spelling errors in the Kindle edition. Who proofreads these things, for cryin' out loud??? Four out of five stars.
May 4, 2024
An interesting retrospective history of the space shuttle program. His thesis is that while the risk level of the shuttle is often framed as one of poor management culture and risk assessment, or of risk born of an extremely complex design with uncontrollable risks; the truth was that NASA knew the design was the result of knowingly taking on too many priorities and design features that resulted in a complex system that was assumed to be an interim step to a future ship that never arrived. With no funding for a future system that the agency would accept, and with the alternative being accepting no US human spaceflight capability, NASA simply accepted the risk for far longer than intended.
The loss of Challenger was not an earth shattering shock to most that worked on the program, it was a shock to those who believed NASA when they said it was drastically safer than previous NASA craft (it is probably the case that is was somewhat safer). NASA then accepted the risk for a lack of alternatives because the feasible alternatives would have been less dynamic (capsules and expendable boosters) than the shuttle appeared to be, until the Colombia disaster forced the issue. Even then, the lack of alternatives force NASA to keep flying the Shuttle for the assembly of the ISS and Hubble servicing. Finally, NASA had to retire the shuttle and suffer the indignity of relying on Russian lift to orbit for its astronauts for 9 long years before the commercial crew program finally had the private sector flying US astronauts from the US in capsules.
The author says what he thinks a bit stridently, and has some of the "let it all hang out" of an expert and academic with nothing to lose. He feels like an academic at the end of his career who isn't trying to safeguard the feelings of anyone he might need as a source later. Seems a great synthesis of previous works. As a space nerd, I found it well worth my time.
The loss of Challenger was not an earth shattering shock to most that worked on the program, it was a shock to those who believed NASA when they said it was drastically safer than previous NASA craft (it is probably the case that is was somewhat safer). NASA then accepted the risk for a lack of alternatives because the feasible alternatives would have been less dynamic (capsules and expendable boosters) than the shuttle appeared to be, until the Colombia disaster forced the issue. Even then, the lack of alternatives force NASA to keep flying the Shuttle for the assembly of the ISS and Hubble servicing. Finally, NASA had to retire the shuttle and suffer the indignity of relying on Russian lift to orbit for its astronauts for 9 long years before the commercial crew program finally had the private sector flying US astronauts from the US in capsules.
The author says what he thinks a bit stridently, and has some of the "let it all hang out" of an expert and academic with nothing to lose. He feels like an academic at the end of his career who isn't trying to safeguard the feelings of anyone he might need as a source later. Seems a great synthesis of previous works. As a space nerd, I found it well worth my time.
November 11, 2024
This is an excellent critical history of the Space Shuttle program. My only caution to the prospective reader is that "Dark Star" assumes a high degree of pre-existing familiarity with the Shuttle on the part of the reader. If you are looking for a more basic introduction, I would suggest reading "Bold They Rise: The Space Shuttle Early Years, 1972-1986" and "Wheels Stop: The Tragedies and Triumphs of the Space Shuttle Program, 1986–2011" before reading "Dark Star".
April 4, 2024
Succinct and accessible writing for an academic book, also doesn't pull any punches. Particularly enjoyed reading about the Soviets' near-identical problems with Buran.
January 7, 2026
Fascinating read. Hersch presents a solid thesis and the writing is well organized. Completely changed my perception of the Shuttle Program and NASA as a whole.
Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews