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Zoopolis: A Political Theory of Animal Rights
Zoopolis offers a new agenda for the theory and practice of animal rights. Most animal rights theory focuses on the intrinsic capacities or interests of animals, and the moral status and moral rights that these intrinsic characteristics give rise to. Zoopolis shifts the debate from the realm of moral theory and applied ethics to the realm of political theory, focusing on the relational obligations that arise from the varied ways that animals relate to human societies and institutions. Building on recent developments in the political theory of group-differentiated citizenship, Zoopolis introduces us to the genuine "political animal". It argues that different types of animals stand in different relationships to human political communities. Domesticated animals should be seen as full members of human-animal mixed communities, participating in the cooperative project of shared citizenship. Wilderness animals, by contrast, form their own sovereign communities entitled to protection
against colonization, invasion, domination and other threats to self-determination. "Liminal" animals who are wild but live in the midst of human settlement (such as crows or raccoons) should be seen as "denizens", resident of our societies, but not fully included in rights and responsibilities of citizenship. To all of these animals we owe respect for their basic inviolable rights. But we inevitably and appropriately have very different relations with them, with different types of obligations. Humans and animals are inextricably bound in a complex web of relationships, and Zoopolis offers an original and profoundly affirmative vision of how to ground this complex web of relations on principles of justice and compassion.
against colonization, invasion, domination and other threats to self-determination. "Liminal" animals who are wild but live in the midst of human settlement (such as crows or raccoons) should be seen as "denizens", resident of our societies, but not fully included in rights and responsibilities of citizenship. To all of these animals we owe respect for their basic inviolable rights. But we inevitably and appropriately have very different relations with them, with different types of obligations. Humans and animals are inextricably bound in a complex web of relationships, and Zoopolis offers an original and profoundly affirmative vision of how to ground this complex web of relations on principles of justice and compassion.
329 pages, Hardcover
First published November 1, 2011
104 people are currently reading
1864 people want to read
About the author
Sue Donaldson
11 books11 followersSue Donaldson (also known as Susan Cliffe) is a Canadian author and philosopher who is a research fellow in the Department of Philosophy at Queen's University, and an affiliate fellow in the department's Animals in Philosophy, Politics, Law & Ethics (APPLE) research cluster.
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May 21, 2021
An interesting political theory of animal rights, although I have three concerns with the general argument.
Firstly, Donaldson and Kymlicka argue that we should grant animals certain political rights (citizenship, denizenship, or sovereignty) based largely on an appeal to autonomy - without these rights, animal communities can't be autonomous. But it's not obvious to me that autonomy (at least in the strong sense we associate with human communities) really is valuable to animals. Animals don't seem to have the epistemic or reflective capabilities to value autonomy in a very strong sense, so it's not clear to me that allowing them to live their lives with (generally) little human interference is valuable for them.
Secondly, although Donaldson and Kymlicka mention often that most animal rights theorists group animals into two, and only two, categories - wild animals or domestic animals - I worry that they're doing the same thing when they talk, for instance, of animal communities being species. For instance, they discuss our obligations to sperm whales (as a group) due to our previous mistreatment of this group. But why is this a group? Surely the sorts of communities they have in mind are not determined by species membership.
Additionally, suppose that we hold that groups are determined by some sort of communality, such that (for instance) a group of deer living in the wild and a group of wolves are different communities. These communities should then be granted sovereignty. But it seems that Donaldson and Kymlicka would want to say that that means that we should not interfere with what happens with these groups. So we should let the wolves kill the deer if they can catch them. But wouldn't our obligations be very different if these were sovereign human communities? Surely we are obligated to step in if one sovereign community is attacking another one. So why are we not obligated to step in to stop the wolves from killing the deer? (Or, if we conceive the wolves and the deer as part of one community, won't this risk falling back into grouping all wild animals in just that category: wild?)
Thirdly, it's not clear to me that denizenship really applies to animals, at least not in a very similar form to humans. One of the reasons for this is that when humans are denizens in another state, it seems that they should generally know, or be capable of knowing, the rules regarding their presence there. So it may be legitimate to, for instance, remove illegal migrants from their country of immigration. But animals don't and (generally) can't know this. This epistemic difference suggests to me that we may not be able to restrict animals from having fuller access to human states.
Firstly, Donaldson and Kymlicka argue that we should grant animals certain political rights (citizenship, denizenship, or sovereignty) based largely on an appeal to autonomy - without these rights, animal communities can't be autonomous. But it's not obvious to me that autonomy (at least in the strong sense we associate with human communities) really is valuable to animals. Animals don't seem to have the epistemic or reflective capabilities to value autonomy in a very strong sense, so it's not clear to me that allowing them to live their lives with (generally) little human interference is valuable for them.
Secondly, although Donaldson and Kymlicka mention often that most animal rights theorists group animals into two, and only two, categories - wild animals or domestic animals - I worry that they're doing the same thing when they talk, for instance, of animal communities being species. For instance, they discuss our obligations to sperm whales (as a group) due to our previous mistreatment of this group. But why is this a group? Surely the sorts of communities they have in mind are not determined by species membership.
Additionally, suppose that we hold that groups are determined by some sort of communality, such that (for instance) a group of deer living in the wild and a group of wolves are different communities. These communities should then be granted sovereignty. But it seems that Donaldson and Kymlicka would want to say that that means that we should not interfere with what happens with these groups. So we should let the wolves kill the deer if they can catch them. But wouldn't our obligations be very different if these were sovereign human communities? Surely we are obligated to step in if one sovereign community is attacking another one. So why are we not obligated to step in to stop the wolves from killing the deer? (Or, if we conceive the wolves and the deer as part of one community, won't this risk falling back into grouping all wild animals in just that category: wild?)
Thirdly, it's not clear to me that denizenship really applies to animals, at least not in a very similar form to humans. One of the reasons for this is that when humans are denizens in another state, it seems that they should generally know, or be capable of knowing, the rules regarding their presence there. So it may be legitimate to, for instance, remove illegal migrants from their country of immigration. But animals don't and (generally) can't know this. This epistemic difference suggests to me that we may not be able to restrict animals from having fuller access to human states.
January 28, 2013
I had the pleasure of seeing Will Kymlicka speak this past summer (2012). He set me on fire with his passion and conviction and at that point getting my hands on Zoopolis ceased to be a choice.
The primary premise laid out this text is: The animal welfare movement has gone horribly awry. It has been radically marginalized and has failed to make any meaningful progress towards achieving its goals.
The question then is as follows: What has gone wrong? Why is animal advocacy so ineffective, and what can be done?
Donaldson and Kymlicka then set out to lay the case for their primary argument: we must radically rething how we regard animals on their own terms, and as they relate to human society.
Thus, Zoopolise- the vision of a world in which the concept of the political has been extended so that Human's are no longer the only rights holders, and we are realistic about the notion that our society is inextricably enmeshed with the lives of animals.
Donaldson and Kymlicka propose that animals- particularly ones that are heavily interdependent on humans- are given a kind of citizenship, wherein their interests and rights are protected in our political decision making. Other animals- those left in the sparse pockets of wilderness left to the world, should be regarded as autonomous agents, and their territory should be given the same respect as political boundaries are.
This book is meant for someone already invested in animal advocacy. Unlike a landmark book such as Peter Singer's Animal Liberation, it is not meant as a text designed to convince the reader of the moral imperative of animal protection. Instead, it is meant to lay the case for a paradigm shift in how we consider animals. The philosophical and political heavy lifting is accomplished in the first half of the text- the latter half is dedicated to working out how their proposal would function pragmatically.
I love this book for its vision, and for the author's ability to think outside the utilitarian's well established animal rights box. What is worrisome, however, is that the authors never quite manage to show how their theory will manage to accomplish what the current animal advocacy movement has not. Why will this new overtly politicized version of animal advocacy succeed where the advocates of the past have failed? How will this theory refrain from being marginalized and labeled extreme, how will it manage to dismantle the monster of an industry known as Big Agriculture? These questions are not adequately addressed or answered.
While that detracts from the effectiveness of the book as a road map towards a better way- it does not detract from the pleasure of reading such a well thought out notion of what the world could be like.
The primary premise laid out this text is: The animal welfare movement has gone horribly awry. It has been radically marginalized and has failed to make any meaningful progress towards achieving its goals.
The question then is as follows: What has gone wrong? Why is animal advocacy so ineffective, and what can be done?
Donaldson and Kymlicka then set out to lay the case for their primary argument: we must radically rething how we regard animals on their own terms, and as they relate to human society.
Thus, Zoopolise- the vision of a world in which the concept of the political has been extended so that Human's are no longer the only rights holders, and we are realistic about the notion that our society is inextricably enmeshed with the lives of animals.
Donaldson and Kymlicka propose that animals- particularly ones that are heavily interdependent on humans- are given a kind of citizenship, wherein their interests and rights are protected in our political decision making. Other animals- those left in the sparse pockets of wilderness left to the world, should be regarded as autonomous agents, and their territory should be given the same respect as political boundaries are.
This book is meant for someone already invested in animal advocacy. Unlike a landmark book such as Peter Singer's Animal Liberation, it is not meant as a text designed to convince the reader of the moral imperative of animal protection. Instead, it is meant to lay the case for a paradigm shift in how we consider animals. The philosophical and political heavy lifting is accomplished in the first half of the text- the latter half is dedicated to working out how their proposal would function pragmatically.
I love this book for its vision, and for the author's ability to think outside the utilitarian's well established animal rights box. What is worrisome, however, is that the authors never quite manage to show how their theory will manage to accomplish what the current animal advocacy movement has not. Why will this new overtly politicized version of animal advocacy succeed where the advocates of the past have failed? How will this theory refrain from being marginalized and labeled extreme, how will it manage to dismantle the monster of an industry known as Big Agriculture? These questions are not adequately addressed or answered.
While that detracts from the effectiveness of the book as a road map towards a better way- it does not detract from the pleasure of reading such a well thought out notion of what the world could be like.
July 23, 2022
A refreshing and necessary compliment to classical animal rights theory books. Loved the books pragmatism, and the way the authors emphasize that animal rights should not be only about negative things (things not to do to animals) but also about positive duties. It also leaves room for helping animals in the wild (a subject dear to my heart), though it doesn't go as far there as I would go.
August 23, 2021
As I understand it, Donaldson and Kymlicka's Zoopolis is something of a must-read for those interested in understanding the contemporary political turn in animal ethics. In this post, I'll discuss the first half of Zoopolis, where Donaldson and Kymlicka explain the theory underlying their proposed way of incorporating animals within political communities.
Summary
The book begins by portraying the modern animal advocacy movement as more or less a failure. Although we can find moderate victories (such as California's Prop 2 and the subsequent Prop 12, which together banned animal products sourced from gestation crates, veal crates, and battery cages), these reforms are but a blip on the screen. Once we zoom out, we see a larger picture of increased harm and exploitation. Since 1960, wild animal populations have dropped by 1/3; since 1980, world meat production has tripled; and these trends are likely to continue.
According to Donaldson and Kymlicka (hereafter D&K), these failures can be attributed to the flawed moral frameworks used by animal advocates. The animal question is largely approached by one of three dominant frameworks: the welfarist approach, the ecological approach, and the basic rights approach. The welfarist and ecological approaches both assume a moral hierarchy. The former maintains that animals should be treated humanely, but only if this does not require substantial sacrifices on the part of humans; the latter maintains that the good of individual animals is subordinate to the good of ecosystems, largely because of the value these ecosystems provide for humans.
On the other hand, the basic rights approach gives animals full moral standing, ascribing universal negative rights, such as the right against killing. But for D&K, that is precisely the problem: the basic rights approach focuses only on universal negative rights. In doing so, it fails both intellectually and politically. As a matter of theory, the basic rights approach misses half of the moral picture, neglecting important questions about the particular positive obligations we owe to animals. As a matter of practice, this emphasis on universal negative rights alienates potential allies. Since universal negative rights are best respected by avoiding human-animal interactions altogether, the basic rights approach appears to demand an end to meaningful forms of interaction such as the guardianship of companion animals. On the other hand, since these rights are universal, the basic rights approach appears to demand that we interfere with nature to prevent predation. Thus, D&K maintain, modern animal rights theory (ART) must be revised for both intellectual and political reasons.
In chapter 2, D&K review the arguments for animal rights, drawing on figures such as Regan and Francione. They ground the existence of animal rights in the fact that animals possess selfhood: animals are different from rocks because there is someone home, as animals can experience the world from their own perspective. Interestingly, D&K think that selfhood should replace the notion of personhood. They make two points. First, a distinction between "mere" selfhood and personhood would be useless since it could not justify an anthropocentric conception of rights. Here, they appeal to the argument from species overlap: any attempt to include all and only humans within the realm of rights would inevitably fail because of variation within humans and animals. Second, they claim that this distinction would be unjustified on its own terms since it attempts to draw a hard line along a continuum of more or less advanced forms of agency. I'm not so convinced of this second claim since there really does appear to be a qualitative difference between typical human agency and typical nonhuman agency. Humans have a certain form of reflective self-consciousness that allows us to entertain normative questions--questions about what we ought to do and what we ought to believe. This is substantiated by our own first-person experience and the remarkable diversity in human lifestyles. Rejecting such a qualitative difference between "mere" selfhood and personhood would seem to contradict the view that only humans can be moral agents, and it is hard to see how such a revisionary picture of moral agency could be sustained. At any rate, this position does not seem to play any crucial role within D&K's overall theory.
In chapter 3, D&K argue for an expansion of ART to include positive obligations grounded in our particular relations with animals. The resulting picture is best illustrated by looking at humans. Although modern political theorists do typically ascribe universal negative rights to humans, they do not simply stop there. Instead, humans also have particular obligations owed to them based on the relations in which they stand to other individuals and institutions: one has a right to vote in one's home country, but not in a foreign country. Modern political theorists ground these differentiated rights in citizenship theory, a framework for understanding how different groups of individuals stand in relation to the state. These different relations are supposed to ground different rights.
But why should one accept this theory of rights? Doesn't it exhibit unjust partiality? D&K defend citizenship theory over a cosmopolitan alternative on both pragmatic and principled grounds. Pragmatically, this is already the world we live in, and robust political institutions would be hard to maintain without practices of partiality and attachment. Moreover, some would argue that preferential attachments are part of the good life: individuals must feel that they are part of some particular community, and they require a right to self-determination that can only exist when social environments are partitioned. This principled defense seems to be quite weak. Although I would agree that special relationships are essential to the good life, it is hard to see why the relevant level of attachment should be to one's nation rather than one’s race, ethnicity, world, galaxy, and so on. It seems likely that this focus on the state is merely a cultural product, not necessarily constitutive of the good life. Nonetheless, the pragmatic defense provides good reason to adopt citizenship theory.
But there is, of course, a seeming confusion in applying citizenship theory to animals. We think of citizens as those with a right to debate in town halls, vote in elections, and so on; yet animals can do none of these. Here D&K provide an enlightening analysis of the function of citizenship, perhaps my favorite part of the book. On their account, citizenship consists of at least three dimensions: rights of nationality, inclusion within popular sovereignty, and democratic political agency. All people must have a right to live somewhere, and citizenship affords them this right to nationality by granting them the ability to reside in and return to one's nation. Animals can clearly be called citizens in this sense since they too need a home, and humans have taken over much habitable land. In modern times, we think of the state as a republic in the sense of a res publica, a public affair. The state derives its legitimacy from the popular sovereignty of its citizens, those individuals for whose sake the state governs. Animals can be citizens in this sense, too, since political structures influence the lives of animals. Lastly, citizens are not only passive beneficiaries of political structures but also democratic political agents, playing an active role in political decision-making. As remarked above, one might think that animals surely cannot be citizens in this sense since they lack the requisite cognitive capacities. But this position relies on a uniform conception of political agency, failing to recognize that individuals can play an active role in many ways. For instance, the modern disability rights movement has pushed for disabled individuals to have a form of democratic political agency known as "assisted agency." This form of cooperation allows caretakers to infer preferences from disabled individuals, thus allowing these individuals to represent their own good. In short, D&K reject the notion that animals cannot be citizens, saying:
But even supposing that animals can be citizens as a conceptual matter, it does not straightforwardly follow that citizenship theory makes sense for animals. According to a common picture of human-animal relationships, there are only two categories: wild animals and domesticated animals. The former should be left alone, and the latter cannot be given justice since their very existence is unjust. D&K object that this picture is both descriptively and normatively flawed. Descriptively, it fails to recognize various groups of animals that cannot properly be called wild or domesticated: for instance, so-called "liminal animals" such as squirrels, raccoons, and geese. Furthermore, wild animals cannot simply be “left alone,” given the global effects of a state’s actions: for instance, through climate change. They also cannot have “no-go zones” built around them since wild animals migrate around and within human areas. Normatively, although domesticated animals might have been brought into being through an unjust process, that does not mean we should seek extinction, but rather that we must attend to the obligations due to them no. Likewise, wild animals should not simply be “left alone” since we have already fundamentally altered their habitats.
Once we recognize the common picture of human-animal relationships as fundamentally flawed, we see the need for citizenship theory to help us make sense of our relational and differentiated duties to particular groups of animals. Domesticated animals can be seen as more typical citizens; liminal animals can be seen as "denizens," and so on. Thus D&K have provided the foundations for a more comprehensive theory of animal rights.
Analysis
Donaldson and Kymlicka do a great job of outlining the history and philosophy behind the modern animal movement. Their criticisms are astute, and their explanation of citizenship theory as applied to animals is both novel and interesting. According to my knowledge, recent work in political theory regarding animals such as Alasdair Norcross' Sentientist Politics: A Theory of Global Inter-Species Justice are largely responses to the relational and differentiated rights approach advocated by D&K. Having not dived deeply into the literature yet myself, I have some initial reservations, both in theory and in practice. D&K want to apply citizenship theory not only in understanding the obligations we have to animals residing within political communities but also in understanding the obligations we have to wild animals. However, it seems unclear why the normative categories employed in citizenship theory apply to wild animals. A biome composed of wild animals is not some organized entity that can be compared to a foreign country. The life of a wild animal is as Hobbes envisioned the state of nature: nasty, brutish, and short. The wilderness seems more comparable to a failed state than a sovereign nation, in which case intervention seems more appropriate. I have some more reading to do on this debate since I know figures such as Oscar Horta have criticized D&K's account of wild animals. More pragmatically, it isn't clear that D&K's framework is likely to solve the impasse that the authors discuss in the beginning. It seems to me that a relational approach might even lead us to focus excessively on companion animals and liminal animals, all the while exploitative industries continue to harm more and more animals.
Despite these reservations, I would recommend this book to anyone interested in understanding the modern debate in animal ethics and political theory. I'm sure that I will return to this work, and perhaps some of my reservations will be defused by a more thorough understanding.
Summary
The book begins by portraying the modern animal advocacy movement as more or less a failure. Although we can find moderate victories (such as California's Prop 2 and the subsequent Prop 12, which together banned animal products sourced from gestation crates, veal crates, and battery cages), these reforms are but a blip on the screen. Once we zoom out, we see a larger picture of increased harm and exploitation. Since 1960, wild animal populations have dropped by 1/3; since 1980, world meat production has tripled; and these trends are likely to continue.
According to Donaldson and Kymlicka (hereafter D&K), these failures can be attributed to the flawed moral frameworks used by animal advocates. The animal question is largely approached by one of three dominant frameworks: the welfarist approach, the ecological approach, and the basic rights approach. The welfarist and ecological approaches both assume a moral hierarchy. The former maintains that animals should be treated humanely, but only if this does not require substantial sacrifices on the part of humans; the latter maintains that the good of individual animals is subordinate to the good of ecosystems, largely because of the value these ecosystems provide for humans.
On the other hand, the basic rights approach gives animals full moral standing, ascribing universal negative rights, such as the right against killing. But for D&K, that is precisely the problem: the basic rights approach focuses only on universal negative rights. In doing so, it fails both intellectually and politically. As a matter of theory, the basic rights approach misses half of the moral picture, neglecting important questions about the particular positive obligations we owe to animals. As a matter of practice, this emphasis on universal negative rights alienates potential allies. Since universal negative rights are best respected by avoiding human-animal interactions altogether, the basic rights approach appears to demand an end to meaningful forms of interaction such as the guardianship of companion animals. On the other hand, since these rights are universal, the basic rights approach appears to demand that we interfere with nature to prevent predation. Thus, D&K maintain, modern animal rights theory (ART) must be revised for both intellectual and political reasons.
In chapter 2, D&K review the arguments for animal rights, drawing on figures such as Regan and Francione. They ground the existence of animal rights in the fact that animals possess selfhood: animals are different from rocks because there is someone home, as animals can experience the world from their own perspective. Interestingly, D&K think that selfhood should replace the notion of personhood. They make two points. First, a distinction between "mere" selfhood and personhood would be useless since it could not justify an anthropocentric conception of rights. Here, they appeal to the argument from species overlap: any attempt to include all and only humans within the realm of rights would inevitably fail because of variation within humans and animals. Second, they claim that this distinction would be unjustified on its own terms since it attempts to draw a hard line along a continuum of more or less advanced forms of agency. I'm not so convinced of this second claim since there really does appear to be a qualitative difference between typical human agency and typical nonhuman agency. Humans have a certain form of reflective self-consciousness that allows us to entertain normative questions--questions about what we ought to do and what we ought to believe. This is substantiated by our own first-person experience and the remarkable diversity in human lifestyles. Rejecting such a qualitative difference between "mere" selfhood and personhood would seem to contradict the view that only humans can be moral agents, and it is hard to see how such a revisionary picture of moral agency could be sustained. At any rate, this position does not seem to play any crucial role within D&K's overall theory.
In chapter 3, D&K argue for an expansion of ART to include positive obligations grounded in our particular relations with animals. The resulting picture is best illustrated by looking at humans. Although modern political theorists do typically ascribe universal negative rights to humans, they do not simply stop there. Instead, humans also have particular obligations owed to them based on the relations in which they stand to other individuals and institutions: one has a right to vote in one's home country, but not in a foreign country. Modern political theorists ground these differentiated rights in citizenship theory, a framework for understanding how different groups of individuals stand in relation to the state. These different relations are supposed to ground different rights.
But why should one accept this theory of rights? Doesn't it exhibit unjust partiality? D&K defend citizenship theory over a cosmopolitan alternative on both pragmatic and principled grounds. Pragmatically, this is already the world we live in, and robust political institutions would be hard to maintain without practices of partiality and attachment. Moreover, some would argue that preferential attachments are part of the good life: individuals must feel that they are part of some particular community, and they require a right to self-determination that can only exist when social environments are partitioned. This principled defense seems to be quite weak. Although I would agree that special relationships are essential to the good life, it is hard to see why the relevant level of attachment should be to one's nation rather than one’s race, ethnicity, world, galaxy, and so on. It seems likely that this focus on the state is merely a cultural product, not necessarily constitutive of the good life. Nonetheless, the pragmatic defense provides good reason to adopt citizenship theory.
But there is, of course, a seeming confusion in applying citizenship theory to animals. We think of citizens as those with a right to debate in town halls, vote in elections, and so on; yet animals can do none of these. Here D&K provide an enlightening analysis of the function of citizenship, perhaps my favorite part of the book. On their account, citizenship consists of at least three dimensions: rights of nationality, inclusion within popular sovereignty, and democratic political agency. All people must have a right to live somewhere, and citizenship affords them this right to nationality by granting them the ability to reside in and return to one's nation. Animals can clearly be called citizens in this sense since they too need a home, and humans have taken over much habitable land. In modern times, we think of the state as a republic in the sense of a res publica, a public affair. The state derives its legitimacy from the popular sovereignty of its citizens, those individuals for whose sake the state governs. Animals can be citizens in this sense, too, since political structures influence the lives of animals. Lastly, citizens are not only passive beneficiaries of political structures but also democratic political agents, playing an active role in political decision-making. As remarked above, one might think that animals surely cannot be citizens in this sense since they lack the requisite cognitive capacities. But this position relies on a uniform conception of political agency, failing to recognize that individuals can play an active role in many ways. For instance, the modern disability rights movement has pushed for disabled individuals to have a form of democratic political agency known as "assisted agency." This form of cooperation allows caretakers to infer preferences from disabled individuals, thus allowing these individuals to represent their own good. In short, D&K reject the notion that animals cannot be citizens, saying:
Many people assume that animals cannot be citizens because (a) citizenship is about the exercise of political agency; and (b) political agency requires cognitively sophisticated capacities for public reason and deliberation. Neither claim is correct, even for human beings. Citizenship is about more than political agency, and political agency takes forms other than public reason.
But even supposing that animals can be citizens as a conceptual matter, it does not straightforwardly follow that citizenship theory makes sense for animals. According to a common picture of human-animal relationships, there are only two categories: wild animals and domesticated animals. The former should be left alone, and the latter cannot be given justice since their very existence is unjust. D&K object that this picture is both descriptively and normatively flawed. Descriptively, it fails to recognize various groups of animals that cannot properly be called wild or domesticated: for instance, so-called "liminal animals" such as squirrels, raccoons, and geese. Furthermore, wild animals cannot simply be “left alone,” given the global effects of a state’s actions: for instance, through climate change. They also cannot have “no-go zones” built around them since wild animals migrate around and within human areas. Normatively, although domesticated animals might have been brought into being through an unjust process, that does not mean we should seek extinction, but rather that we must attend to the obligations due to them no. Likewise, wild animals should not simply be “left alone” since we have already fundamentally altered their habitats.
Once we recognize the common picture of human-animal relationships as fundamentally flawed, we see the need for citizenship theory to help us make sense of our relational and differentiated duties to particular groups of animals. Domesticated animals can be seen as more typical citizens; liminal animals can be seen as "denizens," and so on. Thus D&K have provided the foundations for a more comprehensive theory of animal rights.
Analysis
Donaldson and Kymlicka do a great job of outlining the history and philosophy behind the modern animal movement. Their criticisms are astute, and their explanation of citizenship theory as applied to animals is both novel and interesting. According to my knowledge, recent work in political theory regarding animals such as Alasdair Norcross' Sentientist Politics: A Theory of Global Inter-Species Justice are largely responses to the relational and differentiated rights approach advocated by D&K. Having not dived deeply into the literature yet myself, I have some initial reservations, both in theory and in practice. D&K want to apply citizenship theory not only in understanding the obligations we have to animals residing within political communities but also in understanding the obligations we have to wild animals. However, it seems unclear why the normative categories employed in citizenship theory apply to wild animals. A biome composed of wild animals is not some organized entity that can be compared to a foreign country. The life of a wild animal is as Hobbes envisioned the state of nature: nasty, brutish, and short. The wilderness seems more comparable to a failed state than a sovereign nation, in which case intervention seems more appropriate. I have some more reading to do on this debate since I know figures such as Oscar Horta have criticized D&K's account of wild animals. More pragmatically, it isn't clear that D&K's framework is likely to solve the impasse that the authors discuss in the beginning. It seems to me that a relational approach might even lead us to focus excessively on companion animals and liminal animals, all the while exploitative industries continue to harm more and more animals.
Despite these reservations, I would recommend this book to anyone interested in understanding the modern debate in animal ethics and political theory. I'm sure that I will return to this work, and perhaps some of my reservations will be defused by a more thorough understanding.
January 10, 2019
Ça y est, voici venir la Véganie. C’est bien beau mais comment on fait, théoriquement ? Comment définir nos nouvelles relations avec les animaux (si on décide d’avoir des relations avec eux d’ailleurs) ? Comment construire une société progressiste et juste pour tout le monde ?
Terminée la dichotomie domestiqué/sauvage, les auteurs introduisent une 3ème catégorie d’animaux que sont les liminaires: ceux qui vivent en bordure ou dans nos villes, évitant la plupart du temps le contact mais vivant en relative symbiose avec l’environnement humain, pour des questions de praticité ou de sécurité (souris, rat, ours, coyote, oie, cerf…)
Les auteurs appliquent la théorie de la citoyenneté à ses trois classes identifiés d’animaux, pour définir de façon très précise et théorique nos devoirs dans un monde (utopique, si vous voulez vite fait mon avis) où on traite les animaux comme des sujets et non comme des objets au service de nos fins. Ça donne donc en synthèse :
- Les animaux domestiques sont dépendants et méritent un statut de concitoyens, au sein d’une société mixte humains-animaux.
- Les animaux liminaires sont légitimes et méritent un statut de résidents (en analogie avec le statut du migrant pour les sociétés humaines)
- Les animaux sauvages sont souverains en leur territoire et ils méritent d’être perçus comme des communautés souveraines, sur lesquels on peut avoir une impact positive mais limitée, et toujours très circonstanciée.
Ce que j’ai aimé dans cet essai :
- la rigueur de l’analyse, qui n’a pas peur de décortiquer en profondeur des théories sur la citoyenneté humaine qui ne m’avait jamais interpellé. L’ouvrage est très référencé, propose toujours un état de l’art sur le sujet, en exposant à chaque fois la théorie ‘classique’ des droits des animaux, pour en montrer les forces et les faiblesses formelles ou morales.
- un traitement des situations qui n’ignore pas la complexité des cas et ne verse pas dans l’angélisme : il y a notamment tout une mise au point sur la consommation des oeufs de poule et de la laine qui me semble pleine de bon sens, malgré le discours très souvent entendu du « si tu manges un oeuf de poule ‘libérée’, t’es pas vegan, encore moins antispéciste ». Les auteurs prennent le temps de démontrer que les inter relations humains/animaux auront lieu de toute manière, au même titre que des animaux de race différentes cohabitent et/ou se croisent dans leur milieu sauvage, et en trouvant des bénéfices mutuels à cette relation. Sur la question de l’abolition des animaux domestiques (belle vie pour les survivants mais stérilisations systématiques pour éteindre les espèces en question : rejeté en bloc par les auteurs), ils montrent notamment que ce serait ajouter de l’injustice à l’injustice originelle que de « vivre et laisser vivre » ces animaux sans notre assistance. Que c’est aussi une façon de se dédouaner de nos responsabilités particulièrement forte sur cette classe.d’animaux réduite en esclavage? S’il est bien sûr souhaitable et même impératif de libérer les animaux domestiques de notre joug, nous sommes aussi des animaux ; et à ce titre interférer avec des communautés d’animaux, est naturel et même normal. A plus forte raison quand ces animaux sont incapables de survivre sans l’homme. Ainsi dans le cas de l’oeuf de la poule libérée, ou même de la laine du mouton libéré (qu’il aura fallu tondre de toute façon), les auteurs ne voient pas de problème à profiter de ces deux produits ‘accidentels’, dans un cadre évidemment strict, non systématique et non consumériste. C’est une idée qu’on entend peu en Véganie et que je trouve raisonnable (et que j’explique très mal…).
Quelques (petits) bémols :
- les situations proposées étant à des années lumières de ce que nous connaissons, certaines propositions m’ont semblé à l’inverse improbables ou irraisonnables, voire grotesques : munir les chats de clochette pour les empêcher de chasser par exemple. Si on a des devoirs de protection envers lui, lui n’en a pas envers les autres animaux il me semble, mais j’ai peut-être zappé un argumentaire. De manière générale tout ce qui permet à l’humain de contrer la nature des animaux au profit d’un autre me semble absurde et contre productif, et même teinté d’une forme de sentimentalisme mal placé.
- Quid de certaines situations qui ne sont pas abordées, comme les animaux domestiques qui ne peuvent pas mettre bas naturellement ou souffrent de problème de santé inhérent à leur génétique trafiquée ? J’ai été un peu sur ma fain sur la question des animaux domestiques, le projet en théorie est plaisant, mais ne m’a pas semblé viable.
Il faut avoir en tête que Zoopolis est une ‘théorie politique des droits des animaux’, on peut y lire un côté utopiste où en définitive, l’application stricte de son contenu créerait un cadre juridique et moral bien supérieur à celui dont les humains profitent actuellement (je pense notamment à la situation catastrophique de beaucoup de migrants ou encore à l’inégalité des chances pour les personnes handicapées, qui sont deux populations humaines avec lesquelles l’essai produit des analogies). Vu la situation imparfaite des droits humains sur cette belle planète, on ne peut s’empêcher de sourire devant des propositions faussement candides mais qui ont le mérite d’être assénées noir sur blanc, dans un souci de démonstration.
Voilà, cette critique part dans tous les sens, c’est vraiment un essai dense et précis, qui peut sembler aride dans sa forme (peu d’anecdotes ou d’illustrations du propos) mais qui a le mérite de poser les questions auxquelles personne n’ose se confronter : comment bâtir de nouvelles relations (ou non relations, là est la question) avec les communautés animales, dans une société antispéciste ? Une somme de pensées précieuse et fondatrice pour la suite des réflexions.
Terminée la dichotomie domestiqué/sauvage, les auteurs introduisent une 3ème catégorie d’animaux que sont les liminaires: ceux qui vivent en bordure ou dans nos villes, évitant la plupart du temps le contact mais vivant en relative symbiose avec l’environnement humain, pour des questions de praticité ou de sécurité (souris, rat, ours, coyote, oie, cerf…)
Les auteurs appliquent la théorie de la citoyenneté à ses trois classes identifiés d’animaux, pour définir de façon très précise et théorique nos devoirs dans un monde (utopique, si vous voulez vite fait mon avis) où on traite les animaux comme des sujets et non comme des objets au service de nos fins. Ça donne donc en synthèse :
- Les animaux domestiques sont dépendants et méritent un statut de concitoyens, au sein d’une société mixte humains-animaux.
- Les animaux liminaires sont légitimes et méritent un statut de résidents (en analogie avec le statut du migrant pour les sociétés humaines)
- Les animaux sauvages sont souverains en leur territoire et ils méritent d’être perçus comme des communautés souveraines, sur lesquels on peut avoir une impact positive mais limitée, et toujours très circonstanciée.
Ce que j’ai aimé dans cet essai :
- la rigueur de l’analyse, qui n’a pas peur de décortiquer en profondeur des théories sur la citoyenneté humaine qui ne m’avait jamais interpellé. L’ouvrage est très référencé, propose toujours un état de l’art sur le sujet, en exposant à chaque fois la théorie ‘classique’ des droits des animaux, pour en montrer les forces et les faiblesses formelles ou morales.
- un traitement des situations qui n’ignore pas la complexité des cas et ne verse pas dans l’angélisme : il y a notamment tout une mise au point sur la consommation des oeufs de poule et de la laine qui me semble pleine de bon sens, malgré le discours très souvent entendu du « si tu manges un oeuf de poule ‘libérée’, t’es pas vegan, encore moins antispéciste ». Les auteurs prennent le temps de démontrer que les inter relations humains/animaux auront lieu de toute manière, au même titre que des animaux de race différentes cohabitent et/ou se croisent dans leur milieu sauvage, et en trouvant des bénéfices mutuels à cette relation. Sur la question de l’abolition des animaux domestiques (belle vie pour les survivants mais stérilisations systématiques pour éteindre les espèces en question : rejeté en bloc par les auteurs), ils montrent notamment que ce serait ajouter de l’injustice à l’injustice originelle que de « vivre et laisser vivre » ces animaux sans notre assistance. Que c’est aussi une façon de se dédouaner de nos responsabilités particulièrement forte sur cette classe.d’animaux réduite en esclavage? S’il est bien sûr souhaitable et même impératif de libérer les animaux domestiques de notre joug, nous sommes aussi des animaux ; et à ce titre interférer avec des communautés d’animaux, est naturel et même normal. A plus forte raison quand ces animaux sont incapables de survivre sans l’homme. Ainsi dans le cas de l’oeuf de la poule libérée, ou même de la laine du mouton libéré (qu’il aura fallu tondre de toute façon), les auteurs ne voient pas de problème à profiter de ces deux produits ‘accidentels’, dans un cadre évidemment strict, non systématique et non consumériste. C’est une idée qu’on entend peu en Véganie et que je trouve raisonnable (et que j’explique très mal…).
Quelques (petits) bémols :
- les situations proposées étant à des années lumières de ce que nous connaissons, certaines propositions m’ont semblé à l’inverse improbables ou irraisonnables, voire grotesques : munir les chats de clochette pour les empêcher de chasser par exemple. Si on a des devoirs de protection envers lui, lui n’en a pas envers les autres animaux il me semble, mais j’ai peut-être zappé un argumentaire. De manière générale tout ce qui permet à l’humain de contrer la nature des animaux au profit d’un autre me semble absurde et contre productif, et même teinté d’une forme de sentimentalisme mal placé.
- Quid de certaines situations qui ne sont pas abordées, comme les animaux domestiques qui ne peuvent pas mettre bas naturellement ou souffrent de problème de santé inhérent à leur génétique trafiquée ? J’ai été un peu sur ma fain sur la question des animaux domestiques, le projet en théorie est plaisant, mais ne m’a pas semblé viable.
Il faut avoir en tête que Zoopolis est une ‘théorie politique des droits des animaux’, on peut y lire un côté utopiste où en définitive, l’application stricte de son contenu créerait un cadre juridique et moral bien supérieur à celui dont les humains profitent actuellement (je pense notamment à la situation catastrophique de beaucoup de migrants ou encore à l’inégalité des chances pour les personnes handicapées, qui sont deux populations humaines avec lesquelles l’essai produit des analogies). Vu la situation imparfaite des droits humains sur cette belle planète, on ne peut s’empêcher de sourire devant des propositions faussement candides mais qui ont le mérite d’être assénées noir sur blanc, dans un souci de démonstration.
Voilà, cette critique part dans tous les sens, c’est vraiment un essai dense et précis, qui peut sembler aride dans sa forme (peu d’anecdotes ou d’illustrations du propos) mais qui a le mérite de poser les questions auxquelles personne n’ose se confronter : comment bâtir de nouvelles relations (ou non relations, là est la question) avec les communautés animales, dans une société antispéciste ? Une somme de pensées précieuse et fondatrice pour la suite des réflexions.
April 3, 2023
Zelden heb ik zo'n vernieuwende politieke theorie gelezen. Argumenten worden helder opgebouwd, tegenargumenten worden krachtig weerlegd en de lezer kan (mijns inziens) niet anders dan overtuigd raken van dit idee: dierenrechten moeten worden gevormd aan de hand van burgerschapstheorie.
June 6, 2025
Inspirerend, vernieuwend en de missende schakel in het dierenrechten verhaal. Hoe dit nu pas op mijn radar komt is mij een raadsel...de verandering moet plaats gaan vinden bij de veganist...niet de carnist...willen we echt af van de bio-industrie...en dat begint wat mij betreft bij Zoopolis.
Wellicht bereikt zoopolis geen groter publiek omdat het niet alleen vraagt te stoppen met vlees eten van de mens, maar om zijn leven radicaal anders in te gaan delen...maar zonder echt te schetsen wat het de mens oplevert. Leuk dat huisdieren, wilde dieren en liminale dieren rechten krijgen gelijk aan die van de mens...maar regelgeving alleen is niet genoeg...en ook niet echt sexy. Ze eindigen het boek notabene dat de mens alleen al veranderen wanneer het eigen belang om de hoek komt kijken, schrijf dan ook uit hoe het eigen belang van de mens gediend wordt. Nou weet je wat! Dan schrijf ik daar wel over!
check www.theveganthinker.com
Wellicht bereikt zoopolis geen groter publiek omdat het niet alleen vraagt te stoppen met vlees eten van de mens, maar om zijn leven radicaal anders in te gaan delen...maar zonder echt te schetsen wat het de mens oplevert. Leuk dat huisdieren, wilde dieren en liminale dieren rechten krijgen gelijk aan die van de mens...maar regelgeving alleen is niet genoeg...en ook niet echt sexy. Ze eindigen het boek notabene dat de mens alleen al veranderen wanneer het eigen belang om de hoek komt kijken, schrijf dan ook uit hoe het eigen belang van de mens gediend wordt. Nou weet je wat! Dan schrijf ik daar wel over!
check www.theveganthinker.com
May 8, 2013
A masterpiece that redefine the basis of animal right theory. Kymlicka is a great scholar that draw interesting parallels between animal studies and other political fields to build his theory.
Read
February 9, 2019Really interesting approach to Animal Rights. Highly recommended.
November 18, 2022
Readable and excellently thought provoking. Highly recommended. It provides a fresh take on many important issues in animal rights theory by embracing a "practical" approach that leverages existing, neoliberal political structures--namely the concept of national citizenship. Their basic argument is that non-human animals should be treated as citizens, in the same way that humans are citizens. Wild animals should be citizens of their own, sovereign states, domesticated animals should be co-citizens in our existing states, and animals that travel between wild areas and human-controlled areas--what the authors refer to as liminal animals--should be treated like travelers or immigrants.
Granting citizenship immediately solves some challenging problems with animal welfare. We all have duties to our co-citizens that include things like protection from harm or undue coercion. So citizenship becomes a path to taking animal welfare seriously. The more challenging part of the argument is that these duties typically go both ways. This raises the question of how non-human animals can participate as citizens given communication barriers.
The authors tackle this argument along multiple dimensions. First, they provide a hierarchy of different ways that one can be a citizen. The minimal requirement is mere existence in a state. Think about citizens of a totalitarian state that controls all political action. The people in that state are still citizens even though they are not allowed to have a political voice. The authors don't advocate for that position for animals, but it is important to note that we already have a broad and flexible concept of what citizenship means.
On the other end of the spectrum, the authors argue that non-human animals can and do communicate their preferences to us all the time, so it is not actually hard to fit non-human animals into a more participatory, democratic idea of citizenship. This argument is where the authors bring in a second important framework--disability studies. The authors point to (traditional rather than critical) disabilities studies frameworks as providing guidance on how to create social and political institutions that allow for meaningful participation by all citizens, regardless of cognitive of physical differences. Again, the authors are leveraging neoliberalism to make progress on animal rights issues that have really bogged down previous theories.
An example of how disability theory applies here. Consider an individual who has a verbal disability, for instance due to a stroke or because they are a baby. With the help of partners (legal guardians, caregivers, etc), that person can still participate in political and social life by working with their partner to communicate via the language that the individual and their partner share. Practically, think of an individual who cannot physically access a polling place for an election. In some states, another designated individual can assist in filling out the ballot and delivering it. An important goal of disability theory is to expand the scope and representativeness of participation through things like changes to voting policies. A similar process could apply to non-human animal participation, with a designated representative of partner helping to interpret preferences.
This framework starts to sound a lot like one of my preferred ways to encourage environmental sustainability, which is to grant legal personhood to features of the environment. The authors don't go into specifics on how partners would be selected or incentivized, but one could imagine, for example, that some fraction of resource rents could go into an account that can be used to fund legal representation, in a similar way that corporations are granted legal personhood and pay for legal representation out of revenues.
Overall, I found the citizenship + disability theory framework really helpful for thinking about domesticated animals. It likely leads to the same place as more traditional animal welfare arguments (namely, emancipation of most domesticated animals), but it is placed in a framework that is both better grounded in our current legal system and which can also encompass liminal and wild animals.
The concept also makes sense for wild animals, although the natural objection is about whether we would be comfortable leaving wild animals to self-govern if we think there are non-human animal rights violations going on in these other, supposedly sovereign places. International law is weak, and what would happen if a country decided to wage war on one of the wild animal nations? It has been too long since I read the book for me to remember the authors' response here, so I should revisit.
Liminal animals pose an even thornier problem. In the citizenship framework, The book presupposes that we are "Kantians when it comes to humans but utilitarians when it comes to animals." One need only look at how immigrants and refugees are treated, however, to see that this is not the case. A major weakness of the book is that it seems to have way too rosy of an image of how humans treat other humans, both in the abstract and in the real world. I still think it would be a tremendous improvement if we treated non-human animals only as badly as we treat other humans, but it is not a panacea.
The other, related weakness is that, as mentioned, the theory relies on, and thus has to accept the baggage of, neoliberal politics. I was surprised by how much progress could be made by accepting this framework, and I certainly see the appeal of trying to "meet the world where it is," but the example of how refugees are treated in practice versus how they might be treated in some more utopian world starts to reveal the cracks in the framework. There is also the unaddressed issue of neoliberalism's sibling, global capitalism, and whether any real sustainability can be achieved while those two hang around. Still, I credit the book with really giving me a lot to think about, and for providing a way to talk about animal welfare even with folks who might be immediately skeptical of more traditional arguments.
Granting citizenship immediately solves some challenging problems with animal welfare. We all have duties to our co-citizens that include things like protection from harm or undue coercion. So citizenship becomes a path to taking animal welfare seriously. The more challenging part of the argument is that these duties typically go both ways. This raises the question of how non-human animals can participate as citizens given communication barriers.
The authors tackle this argument along multiple dimensions. First, they provide a hierarchy of different ways that one can be a citizen. The minimal requirement is mere existence in a state. Think about citizens of a totalitarian state that controls all political action. The people in that state are still citizens even though they are not allowed to have a political voice. The authors don't advocate for that position for animals, but it is important to note that we already have a broad and flexible concept of what citizenship means.
On the other end of the spectrum, the authors argue that non-human animals can and do communicate their preferences to us all the time, so it is not actually hard to fit non-human animals into a more participatory, democratic idea of citizenship. This argument is where the authors bring in a second important framework--disability studies. The authors point to (traditional rather than critical) disabilities studies frameworks as providing guidance on how to create social and political institutions that allow for meaningful participation by all citizens, regardless of cognitive of physical differences. Again, the authors are leveraging neoliberalism to make progress on animal rights issues that have really bogged down previous theories.
An example of how disability theory applies here. Consider an individual who has a verbal disability, for instance due to a stroke or because they are a baby. With the help of partners (legal guardians, caregivers, etc), that person can still participate in political and social life by working with their partner to communicate via the language that the individual and their partner share. Practically, think of an individual who cannot physically access a polling place for an election. In some states, another designated individual can assist in filling out the ballot and delivering it. An important goal of disability theory is to expand the scope and representativeness of participation through things like changes to voting policies. A similar process could apply to non-human animal participation, with a designated representative of partner helping to interpret preferences.
This framework starts to sound a lot like one of my preferred ways to encourage environmental sustainability, which is to grant legal personhood to features of the environment. The authors don't go into specifics on how partners would be selected or incentivized, but one could imagine, for example, that some fraction of resource rents could go into an account that can be used to fund legal representation, in a similar way that corporations are granted legal personhood and pay for legal representation out of revenues.
Overall, I found the citizenship + disability theory framework really helpful for thinking about domesticated animals. It likely leads to the same place as more traditional animal welfare arguments (namely, emancipation of most domesticated animals), but it is placed in a framework that is both better grounded in our current legal system and which can also encompass liminal and wild animals.
The concept also makes sense for wild animals, although the natural objection is about whether we would be comfortable leaving wild animals to self-govern if we think there are non-human animal rights violations going on in these other, supposedly sovereign places. International law is weak, and what would happen if a country decided to wage war on one of the wild animal nations? It has been too long since I read the book for me to remember the authors' response here, so I should revisit.
Liminal animals pose an even thornier problem. In the citizenship framework, The book presupposes that we are "Kantians when it comes to humans but utilitarians when it comes to animals." One need only look at how immigrants and refugees are treated, however, to see that this is not the case. A major weakness of the book is that it seems to have way too rosy of an image of how humans treat other humans, both in the abstract and in the real world. I still think it would be a tremendous improvement if we treated non-human animals only as badly as we treat other humans, but it is not a panacea.
The other, related weakness is that, as mentioned, the theory relies on, and thus has to accept the baggage of, neoliberal politics. I was surprised by how much progress could be made by accepting this framework, and I certainly see the appeal of trying to "meet the world where it is," but the example of how refugees are treated in practice versus how they might be treated in some more utopian world starts to reveal the cracks in the framework. There is also the unaddressed issue of neoliberalism's sibling, global capitalism, and whether any real sustainability can be achieved while those two hang around. Still, I credit the book with really giving me a lot to think about, and for providing a way to talk about animal welfare even with folks who might be immediately skeptical of more traditional arguments.
August 27, 2020
Hayvan Hakları Kuramı’na oldukça geniş bir perspektif getiren, hayvanları yalnızca “içeride(evcil)” ya da “dışarıda(yaban)” diye basitçe iki gruba ayıramayacağımızı ve toplumsal yaşam içerisinde nerelere, nasıl ve neden konumlandırabileceğimizi kapsamlı bir şekilde ele alan, kendi yaşamına ve çevresiyle ilişkisine (diğer insanlar, doğa, hayvanlar...) daha anlamlı bir şekilde bakabilmesi için herkesin okuması gereken bir kitap.
May 1, 2012
This book is a contribution to the animal rights literature, and is aimed at people who are already invested in that field. This doesn't mean that the book is hard to read. Donaldson and Kymlicka are wonderful authors, and this book is extremely easy to read even though it contains some quite nuanced arguments. It means that if you're a normal person who is never really thought about animal rights, this book probably won't convince you to go vegan and get on board the animal rights bandwagon.
Although the authors take to task various "pro-environment" positions, the authors mainly contrast themselves with existing animal rights theory, which states that animals have intrinsic worth that must be respected. The authors argue that this conception is too limited, and results in strong negative rights for animals (which the authors support) but little in terms of positive rights. Existing animal rights theory, the authors argue, default to a "Leave animals alone so much as possible" position in which the ideal is separation between humans and animals. The authors argue that this position is flawed in at least two respects. First, it ignores the impact that people and animals have on each other even when we are "separate". Human activity necessarily affects ecosystems, for instance. Second, and more fundamentally, they argue that the "separation" idea is unrealistic and asks too much. Many animals live among us, and it is fantasy to imagine that we could live in urban environments without squirrels, pigeons, rats, etc. Standard animal rights theory doesn't seem to have much to say when it comes to dealing with these animals.
The authors ultimately argue that we can generate a theory that yields positive duties if we rethink our political relationship with animals. Domestic animals are to be thought of as co-citizens, wild animals as part of sovereign entities, and "liminal animals" - those animals who live among us to varying degrees but who are not domesticated - as "denizens". Citizenship confers benefits and significant consideration of one's needs, but also entails certain responsibilities, i.e.: to be able to live and function in society in a mutually appropriate way. Denizenship confers fewer benefits, but requires less active consideration and is thus less burdensome. For instance, a domestic dog should (the authors argue) have wide latitude in terms of mobility, having her preferences met, etc. The cost of this is being socialized (when young - the authors argue that lifelong socialization means unacceptable paternalism) not to poop in some areas, to not chase small animals or jump up on people, etc. Pigeons, on the other hand, should be taken into consideration only in that we should design out urban landscapes in order to provide them with the opportunity to live safely and in a way that allows them to flourish qua pigeons. When it comes to wild animals, we should respect their sovereignty. This does not necessarily entail no contact whatsoever - after all, countries do trade with one another - but it does imply that any contact must be done in a way that is mutually respectful.
If you've read this review up to this point, you probably think that there is a lot in this book that is objectionable. And you would be right. There is an amazing number of claims that can be disputed, re-interpreted, or questioned. But the authors' intention is to try to provide a new framework, not proof of the validity of a facet of an existing framework, so I don't consider that to be much of a flaw. I give it four stars because it's intelligent, clear, and fun to read. I am not an animals rights proponent - I think Singer's utilitarian argument in Animal Liberation is more appealing - but this is probably going to be a really important book in the AR canon.
Although the authors take to task various "pro-environment" positions, the authors mainly contrast themselves with existing animal rights theory, which states that animals have intrinsic worth that must be respected. The authors argue that this conception is too limited, and results in strong negative rights for animals (which the authors support) but little in terms of positive rights. Existing animal rights theory, the authors argue, default to a "Leave animals alone so much as possible" position in which the ideal is separation between humans and animals. The authors argue that this position is flawed in at least two respects. First, it ignores the impact that people and animals have on each other even when we are "separate". Human activity necessarily affects ecosystems, for instance. Second, and more fundamentally, they argue that the "separation" idea is unrealistic and asks too much. Many animals live among us, and it is fantasy to imagine that we could live in urban environments without squirrels, pigeons, rats, etc. Standard animal rights theory doesn't seem to have much to say when it comes to dealing with these animals.
The authors ultimately argue that we can generate a theory that yields positive duties if we rethink our political relationship with animals. Domestic animals are to be thought of as co-citizens, wild animals as part of sovereign entities, and "liminal animals" - those animals who live among us to varying degrees but who are not domesticated - as "denizens". Citizenship confers benefits and significant consideration of one's needs, but also entails certain responsibilities, i.e.: to be able to live and function in society in a mutually appropriate way. Denizenship confers fewer benefits, but requires less active consideration and is thus less burdensome. For instance, a domestic dog should (the authors argue) have wide latitude in terms of mobility, having her preferences met, etc. The cost of this is being socialized (when young - the authors argue that lifelong socialization means unacceptable paternalism) not to poop in some areas, to not chase small animals or jump up on people, etc. Pigeons, on the other hand, should be taken into consideration only in that we should design out urban landscapes in order to provide them with the opportunity to live safely and in a way that allows them to flourish qua pigeons. When it comes to wild animals, we should respect their sovereignty. This does not necessarily entail no contact whatsoever - after all, countries do trade with one another - but it does imply that any contact must be done in a way that is mutually respectful.
If you've read this review up to this point, you probably think that there is a lot in this book that is objectionable. And you would be right. There is an amazing number of claims that can be disputed, re-interpreted, or questioned. But the authors' intention is to try to provide a new framework, not proof of the validity of a facet of an existing framework, so I don't consider that to be much of a flaw. I give it four stars because it's intelligent, clear, and fun to read. I am not an animals rights proponent - I think Singer's utilitarian argument in Animal Liberation is more appealing - but this is probably going to be a really important book in the AR canon.
July 29, 2020
Es un buen libro, y siento que da un paso más allá que las teorías abolicionistas clásicas de la teoría del derecho animal, como también deja bastante atrás muchas posturas del animalismo más utilitarista. El libro se adentra en una comprensión más profunda de las relaciones animales (humanos y no-h), y desde un contexto actual -presente-, donde vivimos con diversas interacciones según hábitats o características e intereses. Puntualmente los divide en animales domesticados, liminales y salvajes, para los cuales ofrece distintas consideraciones y salidas políticas.
Sin embargo,,,,,,,
Sus propuestas y soluciones son desde la teoría política liberal, asume en diversas instancias que el actual sistema político es la máxima en cuanto a organización económica-política-social (comentando también que los comunismos y fascismos son cosa del pasado). De esta forma construyen todo su argumento en base a una idealización del estado de bienestar, y su modelo de inclusión -ampliación- de los derechos invulnerables los hace con una confianza -que considero peligrosa- en La Justicia y sus Leyes.
Si ya es cuestionable la credibilidad del sistema jurídico en los humanos, será necesario hacerlo si se trata de incluir a más animales a sociedades mixtas con derechos a conciudadanía o cuasi-ciudadanía.
Si bien les autores dejan en claro que para que tal cosa funcione deberá existir un cambio del estatus moral, o que deberá haber una alta regulación en tal incorporación jurídica, los riesgos de llevar un proyecto son altos, quizás por el hecho de que los animales no humanos son la última esfera de la otredad (especie) y por otro lado, esta misma categorización de lo viviente -que ha sido el canon occidental-, produce en consecuencia exclusión de la vida -individuos que no entran dentro del estándar liberal- y son perseguidos, marginalizados, y en otros períodos más oscuros, exterminados.
Me parece poco realista tratar de hacer un mundo mixto feliz idealizado dentro de capitales humanas, y no sé con qué propósitos les autores omiten la violencia estatal de nuestras sociedad. Entiendo que el libro se escribió el 2011 y quizás por eso después de casi 10 años ya no hace ningún sentido. Varias situaciones mencionadas de un funcionamiento idóneo de la sociedad liberal, eran para mí, un lector situado en Latinoamérica, algo totalmente ajeno.
Sin embargo,,,,,,,
Sus propuestas y soluciones son desde la teoría política liberal, asume en diversas instancias que el actual sistema político es la máxima en cuanto a organización económica-política-social (comentando también que los comunismos y fascismos son cosa del pasado). De esta forma construyen todo su argumento en base a una idealización del estado de bienestar, y su modelo de inclusión -ampliación- de los derechos invulnerables los hace con una confianza -que considero peligrosa- en La Justicia y sus Leyes.
Si ya es cuestionable la credibilidad del sistema jurídico en los humanos, será necesario hacerlo si se trata de incluir a más animales a sociedades mixtas con derechos a conciudadanía o cuasi-ciudadanía.
Si bien les autores dejan en claro que para que tal cosa funcione deberá existir un cambio del estatus moral, o que deberá haber una alta regulación en tal incorporación jurídica, los riesgos de llevar un proyecto son altos, quizás por el hecho de que los animales no humanos son la última esfera de la otredad (especie) y por otro lado, esta misma categorización de lo viviente -que ha sido el canon occidental-, produce en consecuencia exclusión de la vida -individuos que no entran dentro del estándar liberal- y son perseguidos, marginalizados, y en otros períodos más oscuros, exterminados.
Me parece poco realista tratar de hacer un mundo mixto feliz idealizado dentro de capitales humanas, y no sé con qué propósitos les autores omiten la violencia estatal de nuestras sociedad. Entiendo que el libro se escribió el 2011 y quizás por eso después de casi 10 años ya no hace ningún sentido. Varias situaciones mencionadas de un funcionamiento idóneo de la sociedad liberal, eran para mí, un lector situado en Latinoamérica, algo totalmente ajeno.
April 28, 2020
If I could give this book zero stars I would. The book is inherently racist and comes from the stance of two incredibly privileged individuals. I was repulsed reading it and cannot believe it was ever published. I tried reading it multiple times to get anything from this book, and every time was truly revolting.
Chapter 7: Animal Rights and Aboriginal Rights was especially repugnant. In an effort to address the "avoidance strategy" (Animal Rights activists exempting Indigenous people from hunting, fishing, whaling, etc.) they come off as completely gross. Firstly, the authors' argument fits into a larger narrative that requires every non-white person to conform to a colonial idea of what ethics are, ultimately concluding that AR would benefit if only Indigenous people would just give up or change those traditions and culture of theirs! Though the authors attempt to demonstrate the agreement between Indigenous groups and AR, the message still states that it is indigenous who must change.
Secondly, the authors argue that treaty rights which permit hunting are null and void because no person ever has a right to kill animals. This is deplorable for a number of reasons: first, we, non-indigenous people rely on the argument that we have a de jure right to learn and live on this land because of the metal treaties that were signed between the first people and the crown. Even if this is not the entire truth, our use of that argument means that we have obligations to honour the treaties which provide indigenous with rights. Furthermore, if we are to be so absolutist to say that "your treaty rights do not exist because no one has a right to kill animals," then surely we must take the stance that it is always wrong to steal and acknowledge that we have no right to this land.
Maybe Indigenous practices are not always ethical - but that can be a determination in a book from an indigenous person(s). I will not listen to two white, privileged "scholars" offer up their opinion as to how they can civilize groups and include them in a white dream. At the end of the day, I guess the saying is right, "if you're white and mean you CAN go to queens."
Chapter 7: Animal Rights and Aboriginal Rights was especially repugnant. In an effort to address the "avoidance strategy" (Animal Rights activists exempting Indigenous people from hunting, fishing, whaling, etc.) they come off as completely gross. Firstly, the authors' argument fits into a larger narrative that requires every non-white person to conform to a colonial idea of what ethics are, ultimately concluding that AR would benefit if only Indigenous people would just give up or change those traditions and culture of theirs! Though the authors attempt to demonstrate the agreement between Indigenous groups and AR, the message still states that it is indigenous who must change.
Secondly, the authors argue that treaty rights which permit hunting are null and void because no person ever has a right to kill animals. This is deplorable for a number of reasons: first, we, non-indigenous people rely on the argument that we have a de jure right to learn and live on this land because of the metal treaties that were signed between the first people and the crown. Even if this is not the entire truth, our use of that argument means that we have obligations to honour the treaties which provide indigenous with rights. Furthermore, if we are to be so absolutist to say that "your treaty rights do not exist because no one has a right to kill animals," then surely we must take the stance that it is always wrong to steal and acknowledge that we have no right to this land.
Maybe Indigenous practices are not always ethical - but that can be a determination in a book from an indigenous person(s). I will not listen to two white, privileged "scholars" offer up their opinion as to how they can civilize groups and include them in a white dream. At the end of the day, I guess the saying is right, "if you're white and mean you CAN go to queens."
July 22, 2021
This is one of the most important books I've read in a long time. I wish that I had read it years ago. The challenge in reading much of the animal rights literature is that each portion is drawn from a fairly narrow band - a branch of philosophy, an interpretation of a religion's teaching, a biological cost benefit analysis, or a human welfare critique. Reading this rich debate is like watching a series of small battles won, while watching the war be lost. Moreover, no battle is won without an immediate dogmatic attack on the victor making it confusing to salvage coherence in a master strategy for redesigning human/nonhuman animal relations. This book uses political theories and approaches emerging in the discussion of the rights of immigrants and nomatic peoples, responses to racism, rights of first nations, and advocacy for the other-abled to suggest political approaches to building the realistic laws, practices, and human behavioral changes necessary to accomplish a great shift in the relations of humans and other animals. One of the challenges in these discussions is the need to focus on the individuals on one battle front - the victims of a circus or an aquarium for example - and the larger groups on another. The daily loss of habitat and the daily deaths from insecticides, roads, buildings and climate change impacts millions of animals and results in the loss of entire species. This book provides a framework to move on all fronts without getting bogged down in the differences in how we treat a dog in our house, a wolf in the wild or a coyote in the suburban fringe. We don't treat humans the same in all settings, and we've developed a rich set of theories to advance justice and fairness in these different settings nonetheless. The book doesn't end the debates, but it advances a useful context for them to advance and bring others into the discussion.
June 3, 2020
Revolucionaria visión la de Zoópolis. Tras años en los que la teoría de los derechos de los animales parece haberse estancado, el ensayo de Donaldson y Kymlicka supone un revulsivo que la lanza hacia delante con toda la fuerza que necesitaba. Los autores abogan por ir más allá del plano moral y llegar hasta el político, proponiendo extender la ciudadanía a los animales domésticos, la soberanía a los animales salvajes y la cuasi-ciudadanía a los animales liminales (aquellos que sin ser domésticos viven en esctrecha relación con los humanos).
Indispensable.
Indispensable.
May 30, 2025
The main point of this book is "extending animal rights via citizenship theory", but you have to accept a couple of premises to get there. Unfortunately I'm one of the readers who gets stuck on those premises, but I want to try to respect the main thesis. I am not an expert so please do not take this to represent what the authors are actually saying. This is just my thinking in reaction to reading the book.
(1) Talk of "inviolable rights" has had empirical success at improving the conditions for human flourishing.
(2) Further, "Citizenship theory" is more successful than "Human rights theory" in part because it respects the fact we construe our duties to one another as historical-contextual and relational.
(3) It makes no sense to attribute rights based on *species* instead of on *sentience*.
(4) We should attribute inviolable rights to animals.
(5) We should attribute various forms of relational rights-based statuses (citizenship, denizenship, sovereignty) to animals.
I think (1) and (3) taken together are meant to imply (4). This position is roughly "Animal Rights Theory" (ART), and it's meant to be a prerequisite position for this book. Then, further assuming (2) should imply (5). The application of (2) to ART is what I understand to be novel, and why I picked up the book.
For me, (3) in particular seems obvious, even allowing for wide variance in how "sentience" is defined. "Species" is not a category of moral concern. (2) I'm fascinated by, and I would be excited to learn more about how it has played out in practice in various situations. I'm compelled by (2) in part because of my skepticism of (1) by itself. Here's Hannah Arendt in The Origins of Totalitarianism:
"No one seems able to define with any assurance what these general human rights, as distinguished from the rights of citizens, really are."
"No paradox of contemporary politics is filled with a more poignant irony than the discrepancy between the efforts of well-meaning idealists who stubbornly insist on regarding as 'inalienable' those human rights, which are enjoyed only by citizens of the most prosperous and civilized countries, and the situation of the rightless themselves."
What Arendt is getting at is that rights don't buy you anything outside of the institutions that guarantee those rights. Hence, the contradiction that is built into modern nation-states. You might anticipate that the category of "citizenship" is going to undergo some further tension as, for example, Kiribati goes underwater. But this tension was always there, and we should have learned that lesson seventy years ago. This is why I'm excited about the idea of alternative, special, or liminal statuses like denizenship. Maybe there is enough conceptual wiggle room there for real solutions. I also like that it gives us real-world concrete examples to learn from.
There are two particular successes in bringing this to the case of animals that I want to highlight made a big impact on me. These are the concepts of *dependent agency* and the concept of *particular human-animal relationships as a moral resource*.
"Dependent agency" comes from disability and feminist studies. It presents citizenship as a positive right whereby we owe it to one another to facilitate each others' capacity as active members of a community.
"In these new models, people with mental disabilities can enact their citizenship, but it requires other people—whom Francis and Silvers call ‘collaborators’—to help construct a ‘script’ of their conception of the good life, drawing on both verbal and nonverbal expressions of preference. As they put it, ‘The collaborator’s role is to attend to these expressions, to fit them together into an account of ongoing preferences that constitutes a personalized idea of the good, and to work out how to realize this good under existing circumstances’ (Francis and Silvers 2007: 325), and to bring this information into the political process, so that their views can shape ongoing debates about social justice."
"This may sound like an exceptional case, but in fact we all go through stages of our lives when we are in need of such assisted agency, whether as infants and children, or when temporarily incompetent due to illness, or in old age. Immigrants may need translation help to understand political debates; people with speech or hearing impediments may need accommodations or assistance if they are to participate. Any plausible conception of citizenship must acknowledge the value of agency, but it must also acknowledge that capacities for agency expand and contract over time, and vary across persons, and that a central task of a theory of citizenship is to support and enable what is often a partial and fragile achievement. This needs to be central to, and not incidental to, a theory of citizenship."
I just think this is such an amazing thought:
"Barbara Arneil notes that since we are all highly dependent on structures that enable us to function independently, dependency should be seen ‘not as an antonym of autonomy but as in some sense, its precursor’."
Regarding human-animal relationships as a moral resource, this to me is about how pragmatic this book is despite being a book about concepts. The authors know that rational arguments haven't moved the needle on veganism yet. The intervention to focus on rights as *relational*, however, makes sense of where the eventual needle-moving resource may come from. If it is particular relationships that ground certain rights and responsibilities, then perhaps it is by attending to those relationships and the role they play in people's lives that would actually motivate people.
"It is asking too much of moral arguments to expect them to overcome by themselves deeply entrenched cultural assumptions and the powerful forces of self-interest, but moral arguments should at least identify the moral resources that do exist, tapped and untapped, within our society, and should work to strengthen them. These moral resources for AR include ordinary folk who bond with their companion animals, dedicated members of wildlife organizations, and ecologists working for habitat conservation and restoration."
I also thank Donaldson and Kymlicka for bringing me "Iris Murdoch's account of the kestrel" and its attendant "unselfing":
"I am looking out of my window in an anxious and resentful state of mind, oblivious of my surroundings, brooding perhaps on some damage done to my prestige. Then suddenly I observe a hovering kestrel. In a moment everything is altered. The brooding self with its hurt vanity has disappeared. There is nothing now but kestrel. And when I return to thinking of the other matter it seems less important."
(1) Talk of "inviolable rights" has had empirical success at improving the conditions for human flourishing.
(2) Further, "Citizenship theory" is more successful than "Human rights theory" in part because it respects the fact we construe our duties to one another as historical-contextual and relational.
(3) It makes no sense to attribute rights based on *species* instead of on *sentience*.
(4) We should attribute inviolable rights to animals.
(5) We should attribute various forms of relational rights-based statuses (citizenship, denizenship, sovereignty) to animals.
I think (1) and (3) taken together are meant to imply (4). This position is roughly "Animal Rights Theory" (ART), and it's meant to be a prerequisite position for this book. Then, further assuming (2) should imply (5). The application of (2) to ART is what I understand to be novel, and why I picked up the book.
For me, (3) in particular seems obvious, even allowing for wide variance in how "sentience" is defined. "Species" is not a category of moral concern. (2) I'm fascinated by, and I would be excited to learn more about how it has played out in practice in various situations. I'm compelled by (2) in part because of my skepticism of (1) by itself. Here's Hannah Arendt in The Origins of Totalitarianism:
"No one seems able to define with any assurance what these general human rights, as distinguished from the rights of citizens, really are."
"No paradox of contemporary politics is filled with a more poignant irony than the discrepancy between the efforts of well-meaning idealists who stubbornly insist on regarding as 'inalienable' those human rights, which are enjoyed only by citizens of the most prosperous and civilized countries, and the situation of the rightless themselves."
What Arendt is getting at is that rights don't buy you anything outside of the institutions that guarantee those rights. Hence, the contradiction that is built into modern nation-states. You might anticipate that the category of "citizenship" is going to undergo some further tension as, for example, Kiribati goes underwater. But this tension was always there, and we should have learned that lesson seventy years ago. This is why I'm excited about the idea of alternative, special, or liminal statuses like denizenship. Maybe there is enough conceptual wiggle room there for real solutions. I also like that it gives us real-world concrete examples to learn from.
There are two particular successes in bringing this to the case of animals that I want to highlight made a big impact on me. These are the concepts of *dependent agency* and the concept of *particular human-animal relationships as a moral resource*.
"Dependent agency" comes from disability and feminist studies. It presents citizenship as a positive right whereby we owe it to one another to facilitate each others' capacity as active members of a community.
"In these new models, people with mental disabilities can enact their citizenship, but it requires other people—whom Francis and Silvers call ‘collaborators’—to help construct a ‘script’ of their conception of the good life, drawing on both verbal and nonverbal expressions of preference. As they put it, ‘The collaborator’s role is to attend to these expressions, to fit them together into an account of ongoing preferences that constitutes a personalized idea of the good, and to work out how to realize this good under existing circumstances’ (Francis and Silvers 2007: 325), and to bring this information into the political process, so that their views can shape ongoing debates about social justice."
"This may sound like an exceptional case, but in fact we all go through stages of our lives when we are in need of such assisted agency, whether as infants and children, or when temporarily incompetent due to illness, or in old age. Immigrants may need translation help to understand political debates; people with speech or hearing impediments may need accommodations or assistance if they are to participate. Any plausible conception of citizenship must acknowledge the value of agency, but it must also acknowledge that capacities for agency expand and contract over time, and vary across persons, and that a central task of a theory of citizenship is to support and enable what is often a partial and fragile achievement. This needs to be central to, and not incidental to, a theory of citizenship."
I just think this is such an amazing thought:
"Barbara Arneil notes that since we are all highly dependent on structures that enable us to function independently, dependency should be seen ‘not as an antonym of autonomy but as in some sense, its precursor’."
Regarding human-animal relationships as a moral resource, this to me is about how pragmatic this book is despite being a book about concepts. The authors know that rational arguments haven't moved the needle on veganism yet. The intervention to focus on rights as *relational*, however, makes sense of where the eventual needle-moving resource may come from. If it is particular relationships that ground certain rights and responsibilities, then perhaps it is by attending to those relationships and the role they play in people's lives that would actually motivate people.
"It is asking too much of moral arguments to expect them to overcome by themselves deeply entrenched cultural assumptions and the powerful forces of self-interest, but moral arguments should at least identify the moral resources that do exist, tapped and untapped, within our society, and should work to strengthen them. These moral resources for AR include ordinary folk who bond with their companion animals, dedicated members of wildlife organizations, and ecologists working for habitat conservation and restoration."
I also thank Donaldson and Kymlicka for bringing me "Iris Murdoch's account of the kestrel" and its attendant "unselfing":
"I am looking out of my window in an anxious and resentful state of mind, oblivious of my surroundings, brooding perhaps on some damage done to my prestige. Then suddenly I observe a hovering kestrel. In a moment everything is altered. The brooding self with its hurt vanity has disappeared. There is nothing now but kestrel. And when I return to thinking of the other matter it seems less important."
April 24, 2025
Zoopolis, Sue Donaldson ve Will Kymlicka’nın 2011 yılında Oxford Üniversitesi Yayınları tarafından ilk kez yayımlanan ve 2016’da Alma Éditeur tarafından Fransızca’ya çevrilerek Türkçeye de kazandırılmayı hak eden çarpıcı bir eser. Hayvan hakları üzerine geliştirilen bu siyasi teori, yalnızca hayvanseverlerin değil, toplum, politika, ekoloji ve hukuk alanında düşünen herkesin dikkatini çekecek derinlikte bir çalışma. İnsan türü olarak hayvanları sömürme hakkını kendimizde nasıl buluyoruz? Hayvanların hakları var mıdır ve varsa bunlar neler olmalıdır? Bu sorulara yanıt arayan Zoopolis, hayvan hakları teorisini insan hakları ve vatandaşlık kavramlarıyla ilişkilendirerek, bu hakların evrensel ve farklılaşmış boyutlarını titizlikle ele alıyor.
Kitap, hayvanların toplumdaki yerini yeniden düşünmeye davet ediyor ve bu amaçla evcil hayvanlar, vahşi hayvanlar ve şehirlerde insanlarla iç içe yaşayan sincap, fare ya da rakun gibi liminal hayvanlar arasında ayrım yaparak konuyu zenginleştiriyor. Her bir kategori, insan-hayvan ilişkilerinin çeşitliliğini ve bu ilişkilerin politik, mekânsal ve etik boyutlarını anlamak için özenle inceleniyor. Yazarlar, temel evrensel haklar ile hayvanların türüne ve insanlarla ilişkilerine göre farklılaşan haklar arasında bir denge kurmayı öneriyor. Örneğin, evcil hayvanların insan toplumunda bir nevi vatandaş gibi kabul edilebileceği, vahşi hayvanların ise kendi özerk alanlarında korunması gerektiği fikri, teorinin yenilikçi yönlerinden biri.
Zoopolis’in en güçlü yönü, karmaşık bir konuyu hem akademik bir titizlikle hem de geniş bir kitleye hitap edecek şekilde sunabilmesi. Kitap, yoğun bir teorik çerçeve sunarken, somut örneklerle ve anlaşılır argümanlarla okuyucuyu sıkmadan ilerliyor. Yazarların, hayvan hakları teorisine yönelik eleştirilere karşı geliştirdikleri karşı argümanlar, özellikle bu alanda yeni olanlar için oldukça aydınlatıcı. Kitabın sonunda yer alan kapsamlı bibliyografisi, çalışmanın ne kadar sağlam bir temele dayandığını kanıtlıyor.
Bu eser, insan ve hayvanların bir arada yaşayabileceği bir toplum modelini hayal ederken, hem bireysel hem de kolektif düzeyde sorumluluklarımıza dikkat çekiyor. Vegan ya da vejetaryen olanlar için bir başucu kitabı olabileceği gibi, hayvan hakları konusuna mesafeli olanları da düşünmeye sevk edecek bir içeriğe sahip. Hayvanların sadece birer mal ya da kaynak değil, kendi çıkarları ve hakları olan varlıklar olduğunu savunan Zoopolis, bu fikirleri politik bir çerçevede tartışmaya açarak ezber bozuyor. Hayvanların duygusal ve zihinsel kapasitelerini, insanlarla olan bağımlılık ve bağımsızlık ilişkilerini göz ardı etmeden, adil bir toplum düzeninin mümkün olabileceğini gösteriyor.
Bu kitap, sadece hayvan hakları savunucuları için değil, insan merkezli bir dünyayı sorgulayan, doğayla ve diğer türlerle daha uyumlu bir yaşam arayışında olan herkes için bir davet. Okurken sabır ve dikkat gerektirse de, sunduğu vizyon ve düşünsel derinlik, her sayfaya değiyor. Zoopolis, hayvanların da bu dünyada bir yeri olduğunu ve bu yerin politik bir hak olarak tanınması gerektiğini cesurca ortaya koyan, ilham verici bir eser.
Kitap, hayvanların toplumdaki yerini yeniden düşünmeye davet ediyor ve bu amaçla evcil hayvanlar, vahşi hayvanlar ve şehirlerde insanlarla iç içe yaşayan sincap, fare ya da rakun gibi liminal hayvanlar arasında ayrım yaparak konuyu zenginleştiriyor. Her bir kategori, insan-hayvan ilişkilerinin çeşitliliğini ve bu ilişkilerin politik, mekânsal ve etik boyutlarını anlamak için özenle inceleniyor. Yazarlar, temel evrensel haklar ile hayvanların türüne ve insanlarla ilişkilerine göre farklılaşan haklar arasında bir denge kurmayı öneriyor. Örneğin, evcil hayvanların insan toplumunda bir nevi vatandaş gibi kabul edilebileceği, vahşi hayvanların ise kendi özerk alanlarında korunması gerektiği fikri, teorinin yenilikçi yönlerinden biri.
Zoopolis’in en güçlü yönü, karmaşık bir konuyu hem akademik bir titizlikle hem de geniş bir kitleye hitap edecek şekilde sunabilmesi. Kitap, yoğun bir teorik çerçeve sunarken, somut örneklerle ve anlaşılır argümanlarla okuyucuyu sıkmadan ilerliyor. Yazarların, hayvan hakları teorisine yönelik eleştirilere karşı geliştirdikleri karşı argümanlar, özellikle bu alanda yeni olanlar için oldukça aydınlatıcı. Kitabın sonunda yer alan kapsamlı bibliyografisi, çalışmanın ne kadar sağlam bir temele dayandığını kanıtlıyor.
Bu eser, insan ve hayvanların bir arada yaşayabileceği bir toplum modelini hayal ederken, hem bireysel hem de kolektif düzeyde sorumluluklarımıza dikkat çekiyor. Vegan ya da vejetaryen olanlar için bir başucu kitabı olabileceği gibi, hayvan hakları konusuna mesafeli olanları da düşünmeye sevk edecek bir içeriğe sahip. Hayvanların sadece birer mal ya da kaynak değil, kendi çıkarları ve hakları olan varlıklar olduğunu savunan Zoopolis, bu fikirleri politik bir çerçevede tartışmaya açarak ezber bozuyor. Hayvanların duygusal ve zihinsel kapasitelerini, insanlarla olan bağımlılık ve bağımsızlık ilişkilerini göz ardı etmeden, adil bir toplum düzeninin mümkün olabileceğini gösteriyor.
Bu kitap, sadece hayvan hakları savunucuları için değil, insan merkezli bir dünyayı sorgulayan, doğayla ve diğer türlerle daha uyumlu bir yaşam arayışında olan herkes için bir davet. Okurken sabır ve dikkat gerektirse de, sunduğu vizyon ve düşünsel derinlik, her sayfaya değiyor. Zoopolis, hayvanların da bu dünyada bir yeri olduğunu ve bu yerin politik bir hak olarak tanınması gerektiğini cesurca ortaya koyan, ilham verici bir eser.
October 10, 2021
This book is so fraught with an investment in a citizenship model rooted in Western concepts of dignity and obligation while simultaneously trying to reconcile critiques of non-whites and disability advocates.
Major critiques:
1) the conflation of how non-whites have been disenfranchised with forms of animal abuse and killing without distinguishing what the salient determiners were. (Donaldson was very close to being able to sophisticatedly distinguish these, but there is not enough room in this text to do that).
2) The idea that a citizenship model will alleviate the issues we face with animals. Though she does bring important distinctions that ART and abolitionists skip over, it did not need to be couched in the citizenship model as the remedy. The urge to dignify animals by extending anthropocentric concepts of dignity seems to be implicitly gridding this entire endeavor. This is the same issue I have with liberals who wish to call non-whites people persons. Yes, non-whites may have used the language of personhood, citizenship etc. to dignify the wretched situations that were imposed on them, but this does not mean their ontological status is remedied in a philosophical system and world-view where white is the a priori norm. Nor do I think that is 1) a possibility or 2) should be aimed for. I can have dignified relations with whites without having to be engaged as equal to them in any rich sense in their systems. This is the caution I bring with the idea of citizenship which is rife with so many issues that non-white and marginal peoples have brought up and I think Donaldson is creating opportunity to reify the problems if people take the metaphor and legal classification of citizenship/denizens/sovereignty as seriously extendable to animals.
3) The negotiation of how to play sexual matchmaker for domestic animals so they can live some Aristotelean idea of flourishing. Like wtf? Are you serious? Why is this even a consideration? sometimes, we need to step out of our armchairs and have a beer.
I am still committed to an abolitionist perspective, but I appreciate the productive work Donaldson made in envisioning how that can be done without a lazzaie-faire approach disregarding the glaring obvious obligations we have to domestic and liminal species. But though I think we can be informed by concepts of citizenship, denizenship etc. I don't think transposing these concepts without really grappling with critiques of the axioms undergridding these models will suffice. Also engaging with how human social models that are not based on citizenship (beyond gestures to certain indigenous practices) relate with animals is critical to understand this may not be applied globally in determining human and non-human relations. What does it look like to penalize sovereign nations/peoples/states who do not wish to subscribe to these ideas because they are in major disagreement with the citizenship model even for human society?
Major critiques:
1) the conflation of how non-whites have been disenfranchised with forms of animal abuse and killing without distinguishing what the salient determiners were. (Donaldson was very close to being able to sophisticatedly distinguish these, but there is not enough room in this text to do that).
2) The idea that a citizenship model will alleviate the issues we face with animals. Though she does bring important distinctions that ART and abolitionists skip over, it did not need to be couched in the citizenship model as the remedy. The urge to dignify animals by extending anthropocentric concepts of dignity seems to be implicitly gridding this entire endeavor. This is the same issue I have with liberals who wish to call non-whites people persons. Yes, non-whites may have used the language of personhood, citizenship etc. to dignify the wretched situations that were imposed on them, but this does not mean their ontological status is remedied in a philosophical system and world-view where white is the a priori norm. Nor do I think that is 1) a possibility or 2) should be aimed for. I can have dignified relations with whites without having to be engaged as equal to them in any rich sense in their systems. This is the caution I bring with the idea of citizenship which is rife with so many issues that non-white and marginal peoples have brought up and I think Donaldson is creating opportunity to reify the problems if people take the metaphor and legal classification of citizenship/denizens/sovereignty as seriously extendable to animals.
3) The negotiation of how to play sexual matchmaker for domestic animals so they can live some Aristotelean idea of flourishing. Like wtf? Are you serious? Why is this even a consideration? sometimes, we need to step out of our armchairs and have a beer.
I am still committed to an abolitionist perspective, but I appreciate the productive work Donaldson made in envisioning how that can be done without a lazzaie-faire approach disregarding the glaring obvious obligations we have to domestic and liminal species. But though I think we can be informed by concepts of citizenship, denizenship etc. I don't think transposing these concepts without really grappling with critiques of the axioms undergridding these models will suffice. Also engaging with how human social models that are not based on citizenship (beyond gestures to certain indigenous practices) relate with animals is critical to understand this may not be applied globally in determining human and non-human relations. What does it look like to penalize sovereign nations/peoples/states who do not wish to subscribe to these ideas because they are in major disagreement with the citizenship model even for human society?
May 17, 2024
Rating this book was difficult in the sense that there were five star sections of the book as well as two star sections of the book and so I decided to average all this out to about four stars. I am so glad I read this book and know that there will be elements of the analysis that I'm going to be citing and advocating for for the rest of my life.
Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka's treatment of issues related to domestic animals is probably the best such treatment of these issues I've ever come across. The analysis spoke to me as a pet parent, but I imagine that it would accord with the sensibilities of domestic animals themselves too if they could weigh in on the discussion. I love the concept of conceiving of domesticated animals as full citizens and members of our nations, families, and communities. Donaldson and Kymlicka's analysis of issues from veterinary care to animal training to working animals to the use of animal products is spot on. I can't say enough good things about this section of the book and I think the book would have been even better if the authors had devoted the remainder of the book to sorting out issues related to domestic animals within society. Instead, they turn their attention to "liminal" animals and wild animals and the analysis goes downhill from there.
The analysis on liminal animals strikes me as particularly unrealistic and confused in its thinking, but the section on wild animals wasn't much better. It doesn't make a lot of sense to talk about negotiating property rights with non-domestic rodents or coyotes when such creatures have no ability to conceptualize these matters and it won't stop them from invading your home. I do agree that we should do much more to respect the right to life and the ability to flourish of wild and "liminal" animals, but I tend to think that the authors were out of their depth in this area of the book and would have done better to expand and defend their analysis of domestic animal issues, which was excellent.
Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka's treatment of issues related to domestic animals is probably the best such treatment of these issues I've ever come across. The analysis spoke to me as a pet parent, but I imagine that it would accord with the sensibilities of domestic animals themselves too if they could weigh in on the discussion. I love the concept of conceiving of domesticated animals as full citizens and members of our nations, families, and communities. Donaldson and Kymlicka's analysis of issues from veterinary care to animal training to working animals to the use of animal products is spot on. I can't say enough good things about this section of the book and I think the book would have been even better if the authors had devoted the remainder of the book to sorting out issues related to domestic animals within society. Instead, they turn their attention to "liminal" animals and wild animals and the analysis goes downhill from there.
The analysis on liminal animals strikes me as particularly unrealistic and confused in its thinking, but the section on wild animals wasn't much better. It doesn't make a lot of sense to talk about negotiating property rights with non-domestic rodents or coyotes when such creatures have no ability to conceptualize these matters and it won't stop them from invading your home. I do agree that we should do much more to respect the right to life and the ability to flourish of wild and "liminal" animals, but I tend to think that the authors were out of their depth in this area of the book and would have done better to expand and defend their analysis of domestic animal issues, which was excellent.
April 26, 2020
La obra de Donaldson y Kymlicka se constituye como un referente en lo relativo al universo de lo político en nuestra relación con los animales. Después de aceptar las tesis éticas de Singer sobre los animales - antiespecismo, veganismo, animalismo - los autores se plantean cuales han de ser los pasos a tomar para vivir en una sociedad que respete profundamente los derechos de los animales.
Enfrentados a posturas que apuestan por el bienestar animal - por su antiespecismo débil - y a aquellos que apuestan por una separación radical entre humanos y animales - y que apuestan por una extinción de los animales domésticos para impedir que sufran y una política de no-intervención para con los animales salvajes - adoptan una postura política en la que la colaboración y cooperación entre animales y personas pueda ser cuasíplena
¿Qué diferenciación podemos establecer en nuestra relación con los animales? ¿Podemos convivir con ellos? En base a estas preguntas los autores distinguen entre animales domesticados - que vivirían junto con las personas pero siempre respetando las preferencias de estos - de los animales salvajes - que vivirían en entornos naturales y donde la intervención humana desaparece prácticamente; excepto en casos de extrema necesidad en donde la intervención no perjudique directamente a estos (presenta diferentes ejemplos). En última instancia, se plantean los cuasíderechos de los animales liminales (aquellos que viven a caballo entre los animales salvajes y los domésticos (veasé ardillas, ratones, palomas, y otros animales que viven en los márgenes de la ciudad)
Enfrentados a posturas que apuestan por el bienestar animal - por su antiespecismo débil - y a aquellos que apuestan por una separación radical entre humanos y animales - y que apuestan por una extinción de los animales domésticos para impedir que sufran y una política de no-intervención para con los animales salvajes - adoptan una postura política en la que la colaboración y cooperación entre animales y personas pueda ser cuasíplena
¿Qué diferenciación podemos establecer en nuestra relación con los animales? ¿Podemos convivir con ellos? En base a estas preguntas los autores distinguen entre animales domesticados - que vivirían junto con las personas pero siempre respetando las preferencias de estos - de los animales salvajes - que vivirían en entornos naturales y donde la intervención humana desaparece prácticamente; excepto en casos de extrema necesidad en donde la intervención no perjudique directamente a estos (presenta diferentes ejemplos). En última instancia, se plantean los cuasíderechos de los animales liminales (aquellos que viven a caballo entre los animales salvajes y los domésticos (veasé ardillas, ratones, palomas, y otros animales que viven en los márgenes de la ciudad)
June 30, 2024
This one was difficult and I don't normally write reviews. I would have rated two stars, but ultimately I think it has some good contributions to animal rights theory. However, I think they get some stuff completely wrong. For instance, they say about abolitionists that they have an "extinction" theory of domesticated animals. Which is a weird of way of saying we should just phase out animals that are bred purely for our uses and can't live comfortable lives. And I'm not sure animals have the same forward facing concern for their species writ large like humans do. If an earth shattering meteor was flying to earth we'd have an interest in stopping it. But even if we accept the view that, say, it's better that cows that future cows have the pleasure of living rather than making sure we stop forcefully breeding cows the authors go on to say it would take some time for cows that can't breed without forceful insemination, or chickens that can't stand up without breaking their legs to be bred out and that it would ultimately be a desirable thing. Which is sort of repeating the abolition argument they rejected earlier. I think pugs are cute too, but they shouldn't exist.
They also premise this by saying about the nation-state it exists so people with similar language, values, culture, religions, etc can all live peacefully together. That's the weirdest goddamn reason I've read the origins and reasons for the nation-state to have developed. Plenty of people across time and space have thrived perfectly fine without the nation-state. But, whatever.
They also premise this by saying about the nation-state it exists so people with similar language, values, culture, religions, etc can all live peacefully together. That's the weirdest goddamn reason I've read the origins and reasons for the nation-state to have developed. Plenty of people across time and space have thrived perfectly fine without the nation-state. But, whatever.
November 17, 2025
“Before Africa, if I were walking in the woods and came across a squirrel, I would enjoy its presence, but I would experience it as a member of a class, ‘squirrel’. Now, I experience every squirrel I encounter as a small, fuzzy-tailed, person-like creature. Even though I usually don’t know this squirrel from another, I know that if I tried, I would, and that once I did, this squirrel would reveal itself as an utterly unique being, different in temperament and behaviour from every other squirrel in the world. In addition, I am aware that if this squirrel had a chance to get to know me, he or she might relate to me differently than to any other person in the world. My awareness of the individuality of all beings, and of the capacity of at least some beings to respond to the individuality in me, transforms the world into a universe replete with opportunities to develop personal relationships of all kinds. Such relationships can be ephemeral, like those developed with the birds in whose territories we might picnic, or life-long, like those established with cats, dogs, and human friends (Smuts 2001: 301).”
January 16, 2021
This book was a very smooth read, and packed with a lot of concise arguments and new ideas.
I loved this book for several reasons:
- I believe it gave me a good introduction to political theory (I haven't studied in the field)
- It gave me a better idea on how a society which doesn't treat other animals unjustly could look like. Quite stimulating, and I believe it generally gave me a more positive outlook on the future.
- It also provided some concise introduction into the more classical animal rights literature, e.g. why strong animal rights are not only an ethical imperative, but also would strengthen human rights
- I also appreciated the detailed examples/descriptions of forward-looking animal-human relationships which already exists (e.g. Barbara Smuts and her dog Safi, or the cat shelter in Rome)
So whether you are entirely new to the topic or already more deeply involved, I certainly recommend this book! Doubly so since it is not a particularly long read (258 pages without footnotes)
I loved this book for several reasons:
- I believe it gave me a good introduction to political theory (I haven't studied in the field)
- It gave me a better idea on how a society which doesn't treat other animals unjustly could look like. Quite stimulating, and I believe it generally gave me a more positive outlook on the future.
- It also provided some concise introduction into the more classical animal rights literature, e.g. why strong animal rights are not only an ethical imperative, but also would strengthen human rights
- I also appreciated the detailed examples/descriptions of forward-looking animal-human relationships which already exists (e.g. Barbara Smuts and her dog Safi, or the cat shelter in Rome)
So whether you are entirely new to the topic or already more deeply involved, I certainly recommend this book! Doubly so since it is not a particularly long read (258 pages without footnotes)
July 26, 2025
I'd seen this book referenced in several other things I was reading, but initially kind of dismissed it as too "out there" for my work. In my defence, the idea of citizenship rights for animals sounded kind of bizarre to me.
But from the very first chapter, I found myself convinced and compelled by the arguments being made. From me being a hard sell, it became a case of the authors preaching to the choir. Probably the only part they lost me was when they said they'd feed domesticated pets a vegan diet. I can't get behind that. Everything else makes a lot of sense - and is written in a clear, easy-to-read style.
But from the very first chapter, I found myself convinced and compelled by the arguments being made. From me being a hard sell, it became a case of the authors preaching to the choir. Probably the only part they lost me was when they said they'd feed domesticated pets a vegan diet. I can't get behind that. Everything else makes a lot of sense - and is written in a clear, easy-to-read style.
August 8, 2025
A while back I tried to read Peter Singer’s Animal Liberation, but got so depressed about half way through that I couldn’t finish it at the time. I’m going to finish it someday, but in the meantime I read this one. It is a very interesting view into animal rights. I’m sure some vegan, and animal rights activists will have issues with some of the ideas in here, but for most parts it felt more pragmatic than Animal Liberation (as far as I had got at least). The authors come to this from the angle that we should look at animals as part of our world, and that we are not above them. And therefore they should have rights as individuals. It is well written, and I’m going to read it again someday.
December 5, 2018
3.5?
This became somewhat of a slog to finish because the writing was a bit convoluted and the theories seemed to get more & more divorced from political feasibility as it went on.
Having stepped back, however, I now recognize that the authors do propose some valuable changes to animal rights theory. How we think about animals could definitely be improved by leaving room for different relational duties (i.e. our responsibility towards pets is different from our relationship with wild animals).
[Summary of a longer review]
This became somewhat of a slog to finish because the writing was a bit convoluted and the theories seemed to get more & more divorced from political feasibility as it went on.
Having stepped back, however, I now recognize that the authors do propose some valuable changes to animal rights theory. How we think about animals could definitely be improved by leaving room for different relational duties (i.e. our responsibility towards pets is different from our relationship with wild animals).
[Summary of a longer review]
January 5, 2021
Interesting approach to animal rights. It is more practical and easier to project than the typical "you should not interact with animals in any way" motto that seems to be the base of many animal rights theories.
It felt like one of these (few) books that unveil in front of you a whole new line of thinking you never knew existed and change your values forever.
The book was not always pleasant to read, the writing is quite average and dry at times, but I am glad I read it and will definitively be a better human from it.
It felt like one of these (few) books that unveil in front of you a whole new line of thinking you never knew existed and change your values forever.
The book was not always pleasant to read, the writing is quite average and dry at times, but I am glad I read it and will definitively be a better human from it.
August 14, 2023
A very important expansion of animal rights theory that deals mostly with 'our' relationship with animals; split into domesticated animals, wild animals and luminal animals - the wild/non-domesticated animals that live among us humans. Even though I do not always agree with the writers' conclusions - after reading the book I still think the best 'solution' is for domesticated animals to go extinct - the expansion of animal rights theory with political theory is a very important one. A must read for anyone interested in animal rights!
August 11, 2025
This book is perfect except it mentions Star Trek.
Literally everything else is great and it would have received five stars if in the last two pages it didn’t include the show of molesters.
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/pedoph...
To be clear, the word “unmolested” does not belong in the same paragraph as the title Star Trek, the reference didn’t bolster the argument, if anything it undermined it, and was further unnecessarily dragged through to the final conclusion of the text.
Literally everything else is great and it would have received five stars if in the last two pages it didn’t include the show of molesters.
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/pedoph...
To be clear, the word “unmolested” does not belong in the same paragraph as the title Star Trek, the reference didn’t bolster the argument, if anything it undermined it, and was further unnecessarily dragged through to the final conclusion of the text.
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