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The Roots of Modern Conservatism: Dewey, Taft, and the Battle for the Soul of the Republican Party
Between 1944 and 1953, a power struggle emerged between New York governor Thomas Dewey and U.S. senator Robert Taft of Ohio that threatened to split the Republican Party. In "The Roots of Modern Conservatism," Michael Bowen reveals how this two-man battle for control of the GOP--and the Republican presidential nomination--escalated into a divide of ideology that ultimately determined the party's political identity.
Initially, Bowen argues, the separate Dewey and Taft factions endorsed fairly traditional Republican policies. However, as their conflict deepened, the normally mundane issues of political factions, such as patronage and fund-raising, were overshadowed by the question of what "true" Republicanism meant. Taft emerged as the more conservative of the two leaders, while Dewey viewed Taft's policies as outdated. Eventually, conservatives within the GOP organized against Dewey's leadership and, emboldened by the election of Dwight Eisenhower, transformed the party into a vehicle for the Right. Bowen reveals how this decade-long battle led to an outpouring of conservative sentiment that had been building since World War II, setting the stage for the ascendancy of Barry Goldwater and the modern conservative movement in the 1960s.
Initially, Bowen argues, the separate Dewey and Taft factions endorsed fairly traditional Republican policies. However, as their conflict deepened, the normally mundane issues of political factions, such as patronage and fund-raising, were overshadowed by the question of what "true" Republicanism meant. Taft emerged as the more conservative of the two leaders, while Dewey viewed Taft's policies as outdated. Eventually, conservatives within the GOP organized against Dewey's leadership and, emboldened by the election of Dwight Eisenhower, transformed the party into a vehicle for the Right. Bowen reveals how this decade-long battle led to an outpouring of conservative sentiment that had been building since World War II, setting the stage for the ascendancy of Barry Goldwater and the modern conservative movement in the 1960s.
272 pages, Paperback
First published September 26, 2011
About the author
Michael Bowen
2 books1 followerLibrarian Note:
There is more than one author in the Goodreads database with this name.
There is more than one author in the Goodreads database with this name.
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Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews
April 7, 2018
Over the course of the twentieth century, the Republican Party evolved from an ideologically diverse coalition of regional groups into a more uniformly conservative organization. There were many steps in this process, from the split created by Theodore Roosevelt’s presidential run in 1912 to the struggle between the so-called “Rockefeller” and “Goldwater” Republicans in the 1960s, which have received attention from scholars. In this book Michael Bowen focuses another step in this transformation, the battle between the supporters of Thomas E. Dewey and Robert Taft in the 1940s and early 1950s. In the process, he corrects several misconceptions about the nature of their conflict, corrections that shed considerable light on the modern-day struggles within the GOP today.
Bowen begins with the Republican Party in the early 1940s, when it faced successive losses to the Democrats in the 1940 and 1944 presidential elections. Though defeated by Franklin Roosevelt in 1944, Dewey used his role as the Republican nominee to install his people in key positions within the party. With their help Dewey sought to project a more moderate image for the GOP, one that might be more appealing to the broader electorate. This goal, however, put Dewey at odds with Taft, who projected a more conservative tone and sought to capture the presidential nomination for himself. Yet Bowen sees their clash as more a matter of ambition and style rather than substance, noting both Dewey’s conservative positions and Taft’s moderate stance on a few prominent subjects. Yet what ultimately proved the determining factor was organization, something which Dewey’s aides (most notably Herbert Brownell) proved far superior at than their pro-Taft’s forces, as was ultimately demonstrated by their success in ensuring Dwight Eisenhower’s nomination as the Republican presidential candidate in 1952.
Detailed and insightful, Bowen’s book offers a detailed look at a key period in the history of the Republican Party. The product of extensive research in several archives, it illuminates the backroom maneuvering that was no less significant for happening behind the scenes. Yet the book is plagued by a number of troubling factual errors (Joseph Martin, for example, was minority leader in the House of Representatives in 1944, not majority leader; Taft was first elected to the Senate in 1938 rather than 1936, and Christian Herter was a Congressman in 1950, not governor of Massachusetts) that, while minor in and of themselves, collectively raise doubts about some of his interpretations of events. Yet these errors don’t completely detract from the effort Bowen has made in shedding light on a party struggle that helped to define the GOP as we understand it today.
Bowen begins with the Republican Party in the early 1940s, when it faced successive losses to the Democrats in the 1940 and 1944 presidential elections. Though defeated by Franklin Roosevelt in 1944, Dewey used his role as the Republican nominee to install his people in key positions within the party. With their help Dewey sought to project a more moderate image for the GOP, one that might be more appealing to the broader electorate. This goal, however, put Dewey at odds with Taft, who projected a more conservative tone and sought to capture the presidential nomination for himself. Yet Bowen sees their clash as more a matter of ambition and style rather than substance, noting both Dewey’s conservative positions and Taft’s moderate stance on a few prominent subjects. Yet what ultimately proved the determining factor was organization, something which Dewey’s aides (most notably Herbert Brownell) proved far superior at than their pro-Taft’s forces, as was ultimately demonstrated by their success in ensuring Dwight Eisenhower’s nomination as the Republican presidential candidate in 1952.
Detailed and insightful, Bowen’s book offers a detailed look at a key period in the history of the Republican Party. The product of extensive research in several archives, it illuminates the backroom maneuvering that was no less significant for happening behind the scenes. Yet the book is plagued by a number of troubling factual errors (Joseph Martin, for example, was minority leader in the House of Representatives in 1944, not majority leader; Taft was first elected to the Senate in 1938 rather than 1936, and Christian Herter was a Congressman in 1950, not governor of Massachusetts) that, while minor in and of themselves, collectively raise doubts about some of his interpretations of events. Yet these errors don’t completely detract from the effort Bowen has made in shedding light on a party struggle that helped to define the GOP as we understand it today.
June 16, 2024
Twain may or may not have said that history rhymes, but it’s one of those quotes that’s too good not to be true. I’d add that reading political history cultivates one’s sense of rhythm and sharpens one’s ability to sense it, even in the discordant cacophony that passes for American political discourse today.
Michael Bowen’s The Roots of Modern Conservatism: Dewey, Taft, and the Battle for the Soul of the Republican Party revises the accepted, liberal account of the 1940s and -50s Republican Party as one in which ideological “moderates,” led by New York Governor Thomas E. Dewey, the party’s defeated standard-bearer in 1944 and 1948, prevailed over ideological conservatives led by Ohio Senator Robert A. Taft until white resentment over civil rights gains reversed that verdict in the 1960s and beyond. In this interpretation, good guys and bad were clear: “Some people dislike the devil,” New York Times publisher Arthur Hays Sulzberger wrote Dewey, “That’s the way I feel about conservative Republicans.”
Bowen’s take is more structural. Dewey’s 1944 defeat at the hands of FDR was the fourth consecutive GOP loss. The only major American party to lose five straight, Bowen observes, was the Federalists, who thereupon expired. The dispute over the path forward, in this telling, was not over ideology but over how to win.
Thus for Bowen, the party’s major rift was not between liberals and conservatives, but over political strategy. Team Dewey believed the party was unelectable until it clearly and convincingly conveyed acceptance of the New Deal, while the Old Guard believed Americans wanted a clear alternative to what would be two decades of uninterrupted Democratic rule.
This is an old political tune: co-opt the other guys versus clarify the contradictions. The Taftites may have been more “conservative,” to the extent the term maps accurately back to that era. But Bowen offers many examples of GOP officeholders and officials choosing the side further from their personal ideological alignment. What really mattered to them was (1) which strategy would more likely produce a Republican presidency, and (2) which faction would place said official in a position from which to receive and dispense sweet, sweet political patronage. Another perennial chart-topper.
While the Taft strategy produced GOP Congressional wins in the 1946 and 1950 off-elections, Dewey captured party leadership in 1944 and again in a bitter 1948 contest, before his faction scored the definitive triumph in 1952. A year later, Taft would be dead and President Eisenhower consolidated “moderate” control, for a time.
Ultimately, Bowen argues, the Dewey faction was simply better at internal party politics than its rivals. And, in Eisenhower, they found a candidate whose personal popularity could settle the internal rift in their favor.
Even so, the decades after these events would see a European-style sorting of the two major parties into more coherent ideological blocs. Accordingly, Bowen needs to explain how this came about.
Essentially, he argues that the more the Dewey and Taft factions appealed to ideology, even as something of a cover for political gamesmanship, the more rank-and-file Republicans developed expectations that their party would deliver policies that aligned with those ideological pronouncements. The growth of national media accelerated this trend, as did the emergence of William F. Buckley’s new conservative fortnightly National Review, which earned its initial stripes as a strong critic of the self-declared “progressive” Eisenhower Administration.
Although Bowen only cursorily takes the story beyond Eisenhower, his thesis implies that the road to Goldwater and beyond was probable if not inevitable once the popular Ike left the scene. In more ideological times, ideologues would outperform tacticians. Another old tune.
Ultimately, I am uncertain whether Bowen carries the day. Fewer dead Illinoisians suddenly resurrecting on Election Day 1960 and Richard Nixon would have been in the White House, and the GOP arguably a very different party.
Regardless, Bowen’s is a genuine contribution to the literature, one that both upsets received wisdom and reminds us that the music we hear today is filled with echoes of the past.
Michael Bowen’s The Roots of Modern Conservatism: Dewey, Taft, and the Battle for the Soul of the Republican Party revises the accepted, liberal account of the 1940s and -50s Republican Party as one in which ideological “moderates,” led by New York Governor Thomas E. Dewey, the party’s defeated standard-bearer in 1944 and 1948, prevailed over ideological conservatives led by Ohio Senator Robert A. Taft until white resentment over civil rights gains reversed that verdict in the 1960s and beyond. In this interpretation, good guys and bad were clear: “Some people dislike the devil,” New York Times publisher Arthur Hays Sulzberger wrote Dewey, “That’s the way I feel about conservative Republicans.”
Bowen’s take is more structural. Dewey’s 1944 defeat at the hands of FDR was the fourth consecutive GOP loss. The only major American party to lose five straight, Bowen observes, was the Federalists, who thereupon expired. The dispute over the path forward, in this telling, was not over ideology but over how to win.
Thus for Bowen, the party’s major rift was not between liberals and conservatives, but over political strategy. Team Dewey believed the party was unelectable until it clearly and convincingly conveyed acceptance of the New Deal, while the Old Guard believed Americans wanted a clear alternative to what would be two decades of uninterrupted Democratic rule.
This is an old political tune: co-opt the other guys versus clarify the contradictions. The Taftites may have been more “conservative,” to the extent the term maps accurately back to that era. But Bowen offers many examples of GOP officeholders and officials choosing the side further from their personal ideological alignment. What really mattered to them was (1) which strategy would more likely produce a Republican presidency, and (2) which faction would place said official in a position from which to receive and dispense sweet, sweet political patronage. Another perennial chart-topper.
While the Taft strategy produced GOP Congressional wins in the 1946 and 1950 off-elections, Dewey captured party leadership in 1944 and again in a bitter 1948 contest, before his faction scored the definitive triumph in 1952. A year later, Taft would be dead and President Eisenhower consolidated “moderate” control, for a time.
Ultimately, Bowen argues, the Dewey faction was simply better at internal party politics than its rivals. And, in Eisenhower, they found a candidate whose personal popularity could settle the internal rift in their favor.
Even so, the decades after these events would see a European-style sorting of the two major parties into more coherent ideological blocs. Accordingly, Bowen needs to explain how this came about.
Essentially, he argues that the more the Dewey and Taft factions appealed to ideology, even as something of a cover for political gamesmanship, the more rank-and-file Republicans developed expectations that their party would deliver policies that aligned with those ideological pronouncements. The growth of national media accelerated this trend, as did the emergence of William F. Buckley’s new conservative fortnightly National Review, which earned its initial stripes as a strong critic of the self-declared “progressive” Eisenhower Administration.
Although Bowen only cursorily takes the story beyond Eisenhower, his thesis implies that the road to Goldwater and beyond was probable if not inevitable once the popular Ike left the scene. In more ideological times, ideologues would outperform tacticians. Another old tune.
Ultimately, I am uncertain whether Bowen carries the day. Fewer dead Illinoisians suddenly resurrecting on Election Day 1960 and Richard Nixon would have been in the White House, and the GOP arguably a very different party.
Regardless, Bowen’s is a genuine contribution to the literature, one that both upsets received wisdom and reminds us that the music we hear today is filled with echoes of the past.
June 29, 2012
This is a good and important book for understanding how the Republican Party became a conservative party from 1940-1960.
February 17, 2015
I understand the point of the book, but I couldn't get into it. Academically written, it just didn't grab me.
Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews