The central theme of this important book is that we are paying the price of an arrogance that refuses to recognize mystery. The author invites the reader to enter into the argument that he holds with himself on a great number of problems. Written in the early 1950s, Marcel’s discussion of these topics are remarkably contemporary, e.g.: * Our crisis is a metaphysical, not merely social, one. * What a man is depends partly on what he thinks he is, and a materialistic philosophy turns men into things. * Can a man be free except in a free country? * Stoicism is no longer a workable philosophy because today pressure can be put on the mind as well as on the body. * Technical progress is not evil in itself, but a technique is a means that, regarded as an end, can become either an idol or an excuse for self-idolatry. State control of scientific research, leading to a concentration on new means of destruction, is a calamity. * Fanaticism is an opinion that refuses to argue, and so the fanatic is an enemy of truth. * The kind of unification that science is bringing about today is really an ironing out of differences, but the only valuable kind of unity is one that implies a respect for differences. * We must beware of thinking in terms of great numbers and so blinding ourselves to the reality of individual suffering. Our philosophical approach to being is made possible only by our practical approach to our neighbor. * We must encourage the spirit of fraternity and distrust the kind of egalitarianism that is based on envy and resentment. * No man however humble should feel that he cannot spread the light among his friends. No easy solution is offered, but the author conveys his own faith that ultimately love and intelligence will triumph.
Gabriel Marcel (1889–1973) was a philosopher, drama critic, playwright and musician. He converted to Catholicism in 1929 and his philosophy was later described as “Christian Existentialism” (most famously in Jean-Paul Sartre's “Existentialism is a Humanism”) a term he initially endorsed but later repudiated. In addition to his numerous philosophical publications, he was the author of some thirty dramatic works. Marcel gave the Gifford Lectures in Aberdeen in 1949–1950, which appeared in print as the two-volume The Mystery of Being, and the William James Lectures at Harvard in 1961–1962, which were collected and published as The Existential Background of Human Dignity.
This is a brilliant, at times wordy (c'était sa chose), but overall insightful set of essays examining the philosophical and metaphysical underpinnings and practical consequences of ideas that have come to dominate the assumption ground-water of a lot modern/post mentalities, especially the "Western".
His analysis of the seeds of cultural authoritarianism, groupthink, and the trend to idolatry of the technical is reminiscent of Jacques Ellul. What I always come away from Marcel's works with is his consistent affirmation of the simple but deep spiritual reality of what being human is, which (to borrow an ancient image), breathes real life into his expositions.
This is going to be a difficult review to write as there's a lot to say and I don't have much time.
First of all, the rating. I don't really like rating books by numbers, and it's particularly ironic in this case in a book that is about the increasing failure of humans to grasp a qualitative rather than quantitative dimension of life. Nonetheless, I wasn't sure that it would be fair to Marcel to give him zero stars, when my intention is that this book, with the help of my review, might be a little more widely read (not that I think I have much influence in that sphere, but I might just have some). So, I was sadly aware, while reading this, that I would have to give it a star rating, and hovered, in my mind, between three stars and four. In the end, I decided on four. My reservations relate to the fact that the book seems, not exactly poorly written, but poorly organised, diffuse, unnecessarily circumlocutory, and tending towards abstraction, which robs the book of a lot of the immediacy and power it might have had in addressing what is very important subject matter.
This abstraction is somewhat baffling in view of the fact that Marcel cites abstract thinking as one of the great influences for evil in human society.
I'm somewhat put in mind of my university days, when a student from somewhere in Scandinavia told me that British universities were particularly strict about having citations and so on for all the salient facts of any given essay. He lampooned this by saying that he couldn't write his name on an essay paper in a British university without a footnote that said, "See my passport".
Is it because I am British that I find Marcel's almost complete failure to back up his assertions with concrete examples astonishing? Is it because the vogue for current affairs books these days has popularised a style where multiple sources are quoted, with all manner of statistics and with innumerable anecdotal examples to illustrate, make vivid and even to validate the points the author is making? In other words, did Marcel write his book at a time, and in a place and a milieu where it was more acceptable for him to offer barely a scrap of evidence in support of what he was saying? Should we be understanding what he is doing in different terms?
Quite possibly there are questions of expectation that are at work here, but nonetheless, I found it extremely frustrating that it didn't occur to Marcel that the almost complete absence of concrete examples leaves his very important argument entirely vulnerable to anyone who might wish to dismiss it off-hand as a verbose 'opinion piece'.
On almost every page of the book there are assertions such as "But in the actual world we are living in it is impossible not to recognize that making war is linked to lying". If it were impossible not to recognise, you'd hardly need to write this book! Make us recognise it, for Heaven's sake! And constructions such as "it is obvious to any person whose thinking goes beyond the superficial" etc., are far, far too common in this text.
And added to this is a sense that almost everything in the book is in the manner of preliminary remarks. On page 115, he writes, "But all this is by way of preliminary", and I had the distinct feeling he meant not only the preceding paragraphs of that chapter, but the entire previous 114 pages of the book.
So, then, why four stars, which, in the language of Goodreads translates as "really liked it"?
Because, the simple fact is (okay, I don't know this, but this is the case that Marcel is putting, and I agree with it), materialism is destroying the world, and materialism is underpinned by ideologies that are extremely fashionable. Yes, atheism, for instance.
Here's a key quote from early on in the book:
"What we have to recognize is this. Thanks to the techniques of degradation it is creating and perfecting, a materialistic mode of thought, in our time, is showing itself capable of bringing into being a world which more and more tends to verify its own materialistic postulates."
If nothing else, Marcel is good for providing a number of such potent quotes.
The above means, of course, that in viewing the world in terms of sordid materialism, people are creating a sordid materialistic world.
At this point, I think I need to copy and paste some notes I made while reading the book:
P.184: "It is perhaps above all in the field of law, in the field of the legal rights of the person, that this struggle ought to be carried on, for we must recognize that the very notion of law, in this sense, is no longer acknowledged, no longer understood. The men of my own generation can bear witness that in this realm a collapse has taken place of which, thirty or forty years ago, nobody would have been able even to conceive."
This work appeared in English in 1962, I think [but the back cover blurb says it was written in the 1950s]. This statement really intrigues, because I want to know exactly what this collapse is. One of my frustrations with this text is that Marcel did not appear - oddly - to consider that someone might be reading this in 2014, and that what was obvious to him, and he could allude to in passing, really, if these issues are as important as he believes them to be, needs to be spelt out and illustrated.
P.183: "In fact, nothing can serve Communism's purpose better than the spirit of social and religious reaction, and I should add that nothing can be more effectively exploited by atheists than a clericalism which has the tendency to make of God an autocrat served by a priestly caste whose interests are linked with those of dictatorship."
I pair the above quote with this, from page 170, which is Marcel's response to the question of whether the apocalypse is close at hand:
"But I don't think it is possible to answer such a question with a simple yes or no. Because it belongs to my essential nature, as a creature who is imprisoned by the senses and by the world of habits and prejudices in which I am caught up, to be for ever divided, this self of mine that is a prisoner may reply; 'No, I don't believe it', and thereupon may abandon itself to mere despair or, with more and more difficulty, may take refuge in some optimistic thought, some 'Suppose, after all...' However, something happens here which is of decisive importance: it is that this self of mine which is a prisoner cannot declare in all sincerity that it is I."
Now, this is an incredibly suggestive, fascinating and elusive passage. The despair here seems to have more than a hint of Kierkegaard's 'sickness unto death'. The eschatology that Marcel is discussing is clearly deeply related to such a sickness of despair - a sickness, as Kierkegaard asserts, that one MUST have, in order to be cured of it.
But what particularly struck me about the above is the last phrase about the self that is taken prisoner by a declaration either of yes or no, not being I. And this is precisely how I feel when pressed to express my beliefs in terms of a label. The label may take my self prisoner, but what is taken prisoner, in the end, is not I.
Now, this is something I came across recently that links, in my mind, to all of the above:
The Christian propaganda film here obviously deserves to be mocked. But, what do the authors of this post at 'Dangerous Minds' do? As if spitefully to hammer the last nail in the coffin of Christianity (or, more literally, given the clips, the last nail in the hand of Christ), they post 'The Mashin' of the Christ', the refrain of which (I could not make it up if I tried) is "Christianity is stupid. Communism is good." I'd really like to see the authors of that clip explain how great communism is to the survivors of the Gulags. Incredibly, in their response to Rev. Perkle's film, 'Dangerous Minds' manage to be even more stupid than Perkle. Is the refrain in 'The Mashin' of the Christ' meant ironically? If it is, it's a sneering and cowardly irony, since it is a way of making a statement without really taking responsibility for it. And maybe that's fine, for a work of creative art meant to provoke. But when this becomes a habit of thought, moreover, a generation's only habit of thought, and that one unquestioned, then it looks to me like we're in at least enough trouble to see why works such as Man against Mass Society are an important corrective.
Of course, in a sense, all 'The Mashin' of the Christ' is doing is mirroring the fears of the Perkles of the world - so one can, perhaps legitimately, blame the likes of Perkle. The dialogue, anyway, between Perkle's film and 'The Mashin' of the Christ' remains, whichever way you look at it, on a very crude level. They, as it were, 'deserve each other'.
Personally, I believe this crudity to be a result of either/or thinking. Stephen Fry may be a tediously staunch atheist, but he can agree with the Christian G.K. Chesterton on one thing: you either believe in Christianity, or you believe in nothing. All other options, apparently, are illegitimate.
But, in such a world, what is taken prisoner from me is not I.
[End of copy-and-pasted material.]
This work is also interesting to me in that I have read it almost back to back with Aldous Huxley's Time Must Have a Stop.
There is a considerable overlap in concerns between TMHaS and MaMS (incidentally, it's a shame that the title of the latter is so gender-specific). In TMHaS, the hero of the story, at the end, comes up with a [spoiler alert?] "Minimum Working Hypothesis". That is, he also has concluded that materialism and a bogus faith in "progress" is destroying the world, and recognises that a shared spirituality is necessary, but also recognises that you can't expect everyone all to convert to the same religion. Therefore, his Minimum Working Hypothesis is meant to be the very essence of what the different religions can agree on, in order that humans might acknowledge a shared spiritual reality on that basis.
Marcel is more explicitly Catholic, but nonetheless stresses the importance, in passing of the ecumenical, and takes care to give a 'separation of church and state'-like statement about how it is necessary for the philosopher to do his duty as a philosopher whatever his religious beliefs might be.
Marcel's Catholicism is no doubt problematical for some, who would prefer him (even if they agree with most of what he is saying) to be more in the Huxley mode of 'perennial philosophy' (the synthesis of the truths passed down the ages). On the other hand, it can be seen as a positive thing in that it demonstrates - or hopefully it does - that one does not have to abandon intelligence and love (which Marcel says, in the highest manifestation of both, are the same thing) in order to follow a specific religion - surely something that needs to be demonstrated both for the sake of those who do already follow specific religions and for the edification of those who don't.
Personally, I find myself in rather a lonely position, in that I increasingly recognise that what I believe to be true diverges from the stated beliefs and opinions of most of my peers. That is, I am often put in the position where, in a conversation or internet exchange, it is assumed that I believe in certain materialistic 'common sense' things about the world we live in. I tend to feel I have the choice between a) agreeing, but in bad faith, b) not saying anything, creating an awkwardness that may or may not be noticed, c) withdrawing from conversation on such topics with such people, in order to avoid a, b and d, or d) say what I actually think and risk being thought of as a lunatic of some stripe or other. And this is really very sad, because, more often than not the person with whom I am in bad faith, or from whom I am withdrawing, etc., is an intelligent person whom I might, or actually do, like, and who just happens to espouse views that I think are vile and destructive.
We are living in an age of aspiring transhumans.
This is from page 50 of MaMS (he may be more explicit on this theme elsewhere, but this is the best I can find at the moment):
"... a being conceived as Sartre conceives man is utterly incapable of receiving anything. But from another point of view, and yet in a closely connected way, the man who conceives of himself as Sartre conceives man will be led to think of himself as a sort of waste product of the universe which is, for that matter, an inconceivable universe--so that we see such a man, at the same time and for the same set of reasons, exalting and abasing himself beyond all just measure."
What else is transhumanism if not the movement to exalt and abase humans beyond all just measure?
On the one hand, to borrow from Burroughs, the transhumanist wishes to see the human race "degraded beyond all recognition". Why? Because being human is something to be despised. This is a deeply misanthropic movement. And yet "at the same time and for the same set of reasons", there is an incredible human hubris in transhumanism - a 'look what we can do, as lords of the universe and all nature'. This hubris and self-abasement are apiece.
But actual, sincere thought has long been eroded. Certain words, phrases and subjects receive a Pavlovian response. The phrase, for instance "political correctness gone mad" does not elicit thought, but only Pavlovian laughter. Similarly, if one talks about how the materialism of the modern world is turning us all into machines, we are likely to be greeted, with a similar Pavlovian response, a kind of Beavis and Butthead snigger: "Humans are turning in machines! Cool! Hurr hur hurr! Humans lose! Machines rule!!! Hur hur hur!"
And this is the same self-abasement and self-exaltation - the thoughtless arrogance of 'being cool' by abasing oneself before the symbol of the degradation of humankind, the machine.
And, here's another documentary to watch if you don't believe Marcel's warnings of the technological tail wagging the human dog are true:
(Incidentally, Marcel explains there is nothing intrinsically wrong with technology, only that it is currently in the service of a destructive philosophy.)
So, I suppose I'll try and bring this review to an end, though there is plenty more to write about this book.
Do I agree with every single word? Of course not.
But I think there is much value in this book, and, even if it held no other value, the book would have been worth writing for putting simple observations about how the worship of machines (of technique) degrades humans and the need to seriously recognise the spiritual dimension of life as an antidote to this, into a kind of philosophical/academic language. Why? Because sometimes citing (and quoting) a respected philosopher on such a subject can leave a particular imprint on the mind that changes the way in which the subject is treated.
I suspect, though, that there is more than simply that to this book, and I anticipate that I will be re-reading passages now and then.
A good treatise on abstract humanism. Marcel taps into meaning of what it is to be a person, free from controls set upon him or her by society. As with any philosopher who engages on questions regarding the social and technological, some parallels can be drawn against thinkers like Jacques Ellul, Marshall McLuhan and Friedrich Kittler (the last of whom with which I plan to really get into media and technology studies). Where he differs with Ellul especially is through theology. Ellul was a Calvinist, and Calvinists tend towards a determinist framework which re-enchanted the philosophy of Baruch Spinoza. both Calvin and Spinoza led the charge that the human subject is always oriented towards predictable outcomes. Ellul takes this, and applies it to technology and media studies and tends to believe that the dehumanizing effects of media and technology are not only subsuming us but we will not be able to stop its encroaching effects. Only those who have lived according to what only God knows as good will be able to escape its claws. Marcel, whose line of thought comes from Thomastic and personalist lineages, essentially sees potential in man's own volition to meet with the grace of God in a two-fold manner, where man and God participate in God's own plan. This contrast is the main dividing line between Monergistic conceptions of soteriology and Synergistic conceptions of it. Where he differs from the also Catholic McLuhan is that he doesn't see technology as extensions of man, but rather what extends into man from the outside, something Marcel shares with Friedrich Kittler. Only Kittler sees technology as being totally autonomous of man's input, not a product of man's doing. Regardless, Marcel declares that the dehumanizing effects of technology will essentially deprive man ultimately of his dependence on his fellow men, which ought to be prioritized over the mediating effects of the technology which he uses to mediate his communications. Instead he suggests putting each other in front of another in a genuine encounter as people with respect, admiration and care for our civilization. Or what we can salvage. Thinkers like Kittler and McLuhan, while critical - work on behalf of technology for its benefit, in McLuhan's case, or like Kittler, note that - through the activity of war and violence - technology is already sentient, autonomous and eventually will make human activity obsolete. Marcel says to hell with that, our concern is our fellow man. Not the work of machines. But unlike Ellul, isn't as fatalistic in assuming that only a small number can be saved from their robotic march forward.
The writing style of this guy is abysmal. Discursive, sententious, moralizing, building-castles-in-the-air, woolgathering, and wishful thinking. The worst traits of any philosopher. Weaving-back-and-forth, covering the same ground again and again..it is depressing and aimless 'prattle'. Tossed!
This appears to be a judgement of values and asserting a weight that is subjectively relevant.
"a kind of idolatry of which technical products become the object or at least the occasion." ... "this kind of idolatry can degenerate into something worse; it can become autolatry, worship of oneself, and often does so in those circles where people can get excited only about records" ... "In a very general way, we might say that the exaltation of speed records goes hand in hand with a weakening, an attenuation, of the sense of the sacred."
I think the underlying fundamental value here is more a transcendence of something more than human rather than the worship of a simplified object. What is being taken as against the sacred can be seeing as a making sacred. A making sacred can be see as a worship, but the author indicates this worship/scared is different here than there and can be seen as "sin" or "wrong". This is a subjective value jungle that makes the book seem to be the same problem as described. Like a satire about something becoming the victim of its own satire.
Marcel's dense, convoluted and frankly dated prose may have been made more-thicket-than-orchard in translation, but even skimming reveals ideas that have increased in relevance as technology, mores and social behaviour continue to alienate increasing numbers of thinking, caring people.
To Marcel, Kant's philosophy is only a significant potential force in the ostensibly Christian atmosphere that allowed for its conception. Similarly, his own writing feels very much like it may have been of greater weight in the context it was produced, namely the cold war and the popular social democracy that took root following the second world war. It is interesting to note that Marcel identifies that context, of the potential for cataclysmic nuclear exchange, as the origin of what he identifies as an Eschatological mood amongst the the west's intellectuals. What would he say if he could know that even when, for the most part, out of the woods of that particular apocalyptic event, Eschatological malaise was more prevalent than ever, not just amongst Catholic academics, but amongst the majority of Europe and America's population?
A lot, and in scant detail, based on the content of this book. There are a smattering of interesting or provocative thoughts amongst the incredible salvo of non specific discussion of topics as disparate as the role of the philosopher in society, the nature of servitude, the value of an honour based social organisation, the ethical implications of technique, the role and nature of law, academia's corrupting influence on philosophical inquiry, and so on. All of which, naturally, are deeply connected. The reader will wax nostalgic about the writer's commitment to rejecting the abstract in his philosophy around 70 pages in, and thereafter wish only that he would state clearly what he is discussing in a "political" way, if only for clarity rather than as a call to action.
"Los carceleros de la humanidad no me atraparán..." ¿Conocen la frase "Dios ha muerto" en el sentido que Nietzsche le dió? Significa, a mi entender, que abandonados los absolutos, decepcionados de estos, debemos darnos nuestros propios ideales, no habla de ateísmo como se cree. El tal llamado nihilismo nietzscheano, es la ausencia de valores sí, pero en tanto que es oportunidad de abandonar los valores heredados e ir por los propios. Un filósofo cristiano años después dijo: "A la afirmación proferida por Nietzsche: 'Dios ha muerto', casi tres cuartos de siglo más tarde. otra afirmación, mas murmurada en la angustia que proferida, viene hoy dìa a hacerle eco: 'el hombre está en agonía'. Entendámonos bien: esta afirmación está desprovista de toda intenciòn profética; (...). Decir que el hombre está agonizando es decir que se encuentra solamente en presencia, no de un acontecimiento exterior, como el aniquilamiento de nuestro planeta, que podría ser por ejemplo la consecuencia de un cataclismo sideral, sino de posibilidades de una destrucción completa de sí mismo que se presentan hoy como residiendo en èl, a partir del momento en que èl hace un mal uso, un uso impío de las potencias que lo constituyen. Podemos, pues, pensar tanto en la bomba atómica como en las técnicas de envilecimiento que han sido o son puestas en práctica en todos los Estados totalitarios sin excepción" {"Los hombres contra lo humano" G. Marcel}
"Desde el momento en que pienso -y pensar quiere aquí decir reflexionar- debo no sólo constatar el estado extremo de peligro en el que se halla hoy el mundo, sino también ser consciente de la responsabilidad que me incumbe en esta situación."