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Two Faces of Liberalism
Following on the heels of the widely hailed False Dawn, this new work by John Gray, "one of Britain’s leading intellectuals" (The Wall Street Journal), offers a thoughtful and provocative analysis of the failure of classical liberalism to keep up with the complex political realities of today’s increasingly divided world.
Two Faces of Liberalism argues that, from its inception, liberalism contained two contradictory philosophies of tolerance. In one, it advanced the enlightenment project of a universal civilization. In the other, it framed terms for peaceful coexistence between warring communities and different ways of life. Each of these liberal ideals of toleration, developed when a single worldview dominated society, has many historic achievements to its credit. But how relevant is traditional liberalism in a world where Kosovo represents the collapse of the spirit of cohabitation?
In a spirited attack on today’s liberal orthodoxies, Gray argues that establishing a modus vivendi between different cultures and regimes should be at the heart of contemporary liberalism. In this major contribution to political theory, Gray proposes a new framework for liberal thought that addresses these burning issues.
Two Faces of Liberalism argues that, from its inception, liberalism contained two contradictory philosophies of tolerance. In one, it advanced the enlightenment project of a universal civilization. In the other, it framed terms for peaceful coexistence between warring communities and different ways of life. Each of these liberal ideals of toleration, developed when a single worldview dominated society, has many historic achievements to its credit. But how relevant is traditional liberalism in a world where Kosovo represents the collapse of the spirit of cohabitation?
In a spirited attack on today’s liberal orthodoxies, Gray argues that establishing a modus vivendi between different cultures and regimes should be at the heart of contemporary liberalism. In this major contribution to political theory, Gray proposes a new framework for liberal thought that addresses these burning issues.
176 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 2000
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About the author
John Gray
51 books918 followersJohn Nicholas Gray is a English political philosopher with interests in analytic philosophy and the history of ideas. He retired in 2008 as School Professor of European Thought at the London School of Economics and Political Science. Gray contributes regularly to The Guardian, The Times Literary Supplement and the New Statesman, where he is the lead book reviewer.
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Displaying 1 - 21 of 21 reviews
September 17, 2011
John Gray is a sceptic—and perhaps the thing he is most sceptical of is utopian ends. In his twenty-first century books he has posited the strands of Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment movements that tested their mettle in pitted struggles against each other across the face of the globe in the previous century as being principally motivated by utopian beliefs. In Two Faces of Liberalism he has identified this illusory utopian strain in one of the two main branches of liberal political philosophy; and though he pays it respect for the benefits it has brought to Western society—it is an achievement that cannot be valued too highly—he firmly believes that the time has come to bid it, and its universality, adieu—We cannot do without that early modern ideal; but it cannot be our guide in late modern circumstances.
At its most binary level, Gray sees liberal philosophy forking down two principal paths of development: the first, stemming from John Locke and Immanuel Kant through to Friedrich Hayek and John Rawls, has espoused liberal toleration as a means towards achieving the end of universal liberty as the ideal way of life; the second, flowing from Thomas Hobbes and David Hume towards Isaiah Berlin and Michael Oakeshott, accepts a proliferation of plural values for the express purpose of establishing a peaceful coexistence amongst humanity. The development of liberal thought in the nuclear shadow of the Second World War has seen a growing recognition of the fact that different societies and cultures can lead the good life. What thinkers like Hayek and Rawls have done is to filter these different forms through abstract philosophical constructions that force them to emerge, cramped and constrained, upon the singular road that leads to the universal end game: for Hayek, the planting of Liberty at the apex of the pyramidal best way of life; for Rawls, the bowing of everything valuational and right-bearing to the primacy of Justice. With patient and persistent argument, Gray endeavors to reveal that all of these systems of the primary liberal thoroughfare are chimerical; that, whatever the acrobatics performed to conceal or obscure, at root every determination of a best way of life or universal good is a value judgement made by individuals and influenced by all the forces that are inevitably brought to bear in matters of determination. Since it is unreasonable that reasonable people will all agree on identical interpretations of values and/or morals—and the best method(s) to pursue such aims—it is unreasonable to ever expect the utopia of a common valuational consensus, a universal drive to liberal perfection, to be aught than a distant mirage that ever beckons on the faithful. What Gray, and his tutelary thinkers like Berlin, Oakeshott, and the better-half of John Stuart Mill offer as a workable and more realistic alternative is a modus vivendi between different cultures and realms that aims for peaceful coexistence—a global cohabitation that strives to avoid the evils and ills that have plagued mankind since its emergence onto two feet—and realizes that compromise, eschewing perfection, holds the promise for avoiding the terrible dangers inherent in any fracturing of the modern nation state into the inchoate energy of tribalism and religious and ethnic hatreds.
Two Faces of Liberalism was a brisk and educational read, though the constant repetition of certain basic tenets of Gray's theme became quite wearisome by the fourth and final chapter; and although the British intellectual is a persuasive advocate, I was hampered in evaluating the merits of his critique of Rawls and his appreciation of Berlin—both of which are significant—by being woefully unread in the political thought of the former and underread in that of the latter. Being a sceptic myself, Gray in many ways was preaching to the choir, and the arguments for abandoning the prime liberal forking in favour of his alternative I found convincing and brimming with common sense—see Iraq for a textbook example of the perils of one-size-fits-all liberal implementation. However, I would have to partake of the countering views from such exponents as Rawls, Nozick, and Rorty before I could fully assess the strengths of Gray's attack. Nevertheless, Gray is always worth reading—if you don't come away from his books feeling particularly hopeful or optimistic, you generally do come away better- and counter-intuitively informed; and that makes them time well spent.
At its most binary level, Gray sees liberal philosophy forking down two principal paths of development: the first, stemming from John Locke and Immanuel Kant through to Friedrich Hayek and John Rawls, has espoused liberal toleration as a means towards achieving the end of universal liberty as the ideal way of life; the second, flowing from Thomas Hobbes and David Hume towards Isaiah Berlin and Michael Oakeshott, accepts a proliferation of plural values for the express purpose of establishing a peaceful coexistence amongst humanity. The development of liberal thought in the nuclear shadow of the Second World War has seen a growing recognition of the fact that different societies and cultures can lead the good life. What thinkers like Hayek and Rawls have done is to filter these different forms through abstract philosophical constructions that force them to emerge, cramped and constrained, upon the singular road that leads to the universal end game: for Hayek, the planting of Liberty at the apex of the pyramidal best way of life; for Rawls, the bowing of everything valuational and right-bearing to the primacy of Justice. With patient and persistent argument, Gray endeavors to reveal that all of these systems of the primary liberal thoroughfare are chimerical; that, whatever the acrobatics performed to conceal or obscure, at root every determination of a best way of life or universal good is a value judgement made by individuals and influenced by all the forces that are inevitably brought to bear in matters of determination. Since it is unreasonable that reasonable people will all agree on identical interpretations of values and/or morals—and the best method(s) to pursue such aims—it is unreasonable to ever expect the utopia of a common valuational consensus, a universal drive to liberal perfection, to be aught than a distant mirage that ever beckons on the faithful. What Gray, and his tutelary thinkers like Berlin, Oakeshott, and the better-half of John Stuart Mill offer as a workable and more realistic alternative is a modus vivendi between different cultures and realms that aims for peaceful coexistence—a global cohabitation that strives to avoid the evils and ills that have plagued mankind since its emergence onto two feet—and realizes that compromise, eschewing perfection, holds the promise for avoiding the terrible dangers inherent in any fracturing of the modern nation state into the inchoate energy of tribalism and religious and ethnic hatreds.
Two Faces of Liberalism was a brisk and educational read, though the constant repetition of certain basic tenets of Gray's theme became quite wearisome by the fourth and final chapter; and although the British intellectual is a persuasive advocate, I was hampered in evaluating the merits of his critique of Rawls and his appreciation of Berlin—both of which are significant—by being woefully unread in the political thought of the former and underread in that of the latter. Being a sceptic myself, Gray in many ways was preaching to the choir, and the arguments for abandoning the prime liberal forking in favour of his alternative I found convincing and brimming with common sense—see Iraq for a textbook example of the perils of one-size-fits-all liberal implementation. However, I would have to partake of the countering views from such exponents as Rawls, Nozick, and Rorty before I could fully assess the strengths of Gray's attack. Nevertheless, Gray is always worth reading—if you don't come away from his books feeling particularly hopeful or optimistic, you generally do come away better- and counter-intuitively informed; and that makes them time well spent.
January 1, 2013
Gray argues against the liberal tradition of Locke, Kant and Rawls that believes there is a "best way of life" where "the ideals of life" are "fused into one all-encompassing human good" that can be reached by rational consensus. Gray says that perspective doesn't work in a pluralistic world where there are conflicting freedoms and interests. He supports the alternative liberal tradition of Hobbes and Hume that argues that the best that can be hoped for is a peaceful co-existence among competing values, and Gray believes it is possible to "grade" various governing norms and regimes regarding their ability to manage such conflict.
This argument is clear enough, but it gets fuzzier when he weaves his way through these two traditions. He states that "Justice does not speak always with one voice," which suggests that there is more or less some notion of what justice is. He writes that there are "universal human goods and evils" and that, "too affirm that humans thrive in many different ways is not to deny that there are universal human values. Nor is it to reject the claim that there should be universal human rights." But, he adds, "It is to deny that universal values can only be fully realized in a universal regime." This suggests that, while there are universal values, there are many ways to achieve them. But the distinctions he makes between values, interests, good, evil, justice, and a universal "best way of life" quickly gets confusing, particularly when one of his four chapters is about "plural values," which makes the reader wonder what are universal values and what are plural values and, thus, what tradition Gray actually favors.
Gray does a good job on the pluralistic side of things, noting how seemingly universal values like freedom get expressed in incompatible ways (conflicting freedoms). But he perhaps goes too far when he writes that "in ethics there are no a priori truths." As products of an evolutionary heritage, we are self-seeking beings. Is that not only the biological (a part of our internal and universal species heritage) basis for freedom (from restriction), but also isn't this the essence of what we ought to be? Of course, this leads to the conflicting freedom problem that is the basis for Gray's plural values argument and his modus vivendi approach (what's practical, feasible) to resolve conflicts. Logically, it then follows, and this is something that Gray says that J.S. Mill and Hobbes attempted to do, that one's freedom to seek should not conflict with the freedom of others to seek their own ends if the freedom of each is to be expressed. Some form of the golden rule ("justice" as balance) is necessary within group life: Individuals don't deceive, manipulate or impose; they don't rob, rape or murder; and governments don't restrict unless it's necesary to maintain order and promote balance between self and other. Also, it follows logically that equality is required to obtain and maintain the balance between conflicting freedoms. In other words, freedom is a priori in the sense that it is embedded in our biology; justice and equality are a priori in the sense that both are necessary conditions for our essential (as in essence) freedom.
Seen this way, perhaps Kant and Rawls were onto something after all. But even within this overarching, universal and a priori framework, there is a need for norms and governing systems to reconcile the conflicting freedoms. Other than respecting the freedom of each, there might not be such things as "human rights" - although the "freedom of each" concept encompasses a lot - and how conflicting individual interests and values get resolved is a matter of convention and negotiation. As Gray writes, some cultures and governing systems are better (fairer, or more conducive to order) than others. While Hobbesian theory about how best to protect the freedom of each might be vigorously debated, there still might not be the inherent conflict with Kant and Rawls that Gray outlines in this book about the universal value of freedom for that too was Hobbes' goal. Humankind desires freedom, and equality and justice (as balance) goes along with that freedom. Once those overarching values are clearly understood for both traditions, the next question is how to best achieve those ends and, understandably, there will be the divergence of opinion for the reasons Gray notes.
This argument is clear enough, but it gets fuzzier when he weaves his way through these two traditions. He states that "Justice does not speak always with one voice," which suggests that there is more or less some notion of what justice is. He writes that there are "universal human goods and evils" and that, "too affirm that humans thrive in many different ways is not to deny that there are universal human values. Nor is it to reject the claim that there should be universal human rights." But, he adds, "It is to deny that universal values can only be fully realized in a universal regime." This suggests that, while there are universal values, there are many ways to achieve them. But the distinctions he makes between values, interests, good, evil, justice, and a universal "best way of life" quickly gets confusing, particularly when one of his four chapters is about "plural values," which makes the reader wonder what are universal values and what are plural values and, thus, what tradition Gray actually favors.
Gray does a good job on the pluralistic side of things, noting how seemingly universal values like freedom get expressed in incompatible ways (conflicting freedoms). But he perhaps goes too far when he writes that "in ethics there are no a priori truths." As products of an evolutionary heritage, we are self-seeking beings. Is that not only the biological (a part of our internal and universal species heritage) basis for freedom (from restriction), but also isn't this the essence of what we ought to be? Of course, this leads to the conflicting freedom problem that is the basis for Gray's plural values argument and his modus vivendi approach (what's practical, feasible) to resolve conflicts. Logically, it then follows, and this is something that Gray says that J.S. Mill and Hobbes attempted to do, that one's freedom to seek should not conflict with the freedom of others to seek their own ends if the freedom of each is to be expressed. Some form of the golden rule ("justice" as balance) is necessary within group life: Individuals don't deceive, manipulate or impose; they don't rob, rape or murder; and governments don't restrict unless it's necesary to maintain order and promote balance between self and other. Also, it follows logically that equality is required to obtain and maintain the balance between conflicting freedoms. In other words, freedom is a priori in the sense that it is embedded in our biology; justice and equality are a priori in the sense that both are necessary conditions for our essential (as in essence) freedom.
Seen this way, perhaps Kant and Rawls were onto something after all. But even within this overarching, universal and a priori framework, there is a need for norms and governing systems to reconcile the conflicting freedoms. Other than respecting the freedom of each, there might not be such things as "human rights" - although the "freedom of each" concept encompasses a lot - and how conflicting individual interests and values get resolved is a matter of convention and negotiation. As Gray writes, some cultures and governing systems are better (fairer, or more conducive to order) than others. While Hobbesian theory about how best to protect the freedom of each might be vigorously debated, there still might not be the inherent conflict with Kant and Rawls that Gray outlines in this book about the universal value of freedom for that too was Hobbes' goal. Humankind desires freedom, and equality and justice (as balance) goes along with that freedom. Once those overarching values are clearly understood for both traditions, the next question is how to best achieve those ends and, understandably, there will be the divergence of opinion for the reasons Gray notes.
May 8, 2019
An argument about the core of liberalism in the anti-universalist tradition of Nieburh and Kennan. Gray's basic argument is that there are 2 competing traditions in liberalism, especially in regards to why we tolerate those who disagree with us. The first is a species of universalistic liberalism that tolerates difference because it expects that over time the world will converge on a single vision of the good. This is a teleological, rationalist liberalism that sees something like the lingering of religion or conservatism as a holdout against probably inexorable waves of enlightenment. The second kind is modus vivendi liberalism, which is focused on creating institutions and systems in which people who disagree can coexist, cooperate, and compete within certain boundaries. The ultimate progenitor of this liberalism is Hobbes, who treated politics not as a quest for ultimate goods but as a way to create and preserve peace among competing parties.
Under this form of liberalism, the one that Gray prefers, there are many possible ways of achieving the good, fulfilled life depending on different individuals and societies. Gray is not a relativist, and he says that there are certainly certain cultures and political regimes that make decent life impossible and should be rejected. However, ultimately he concludes that there will never be a universal convergence on one way of living and thinking, no matter how well thought out those plans are. The ways that people define and pursue the good simply vary too much, and their versions of the good are largely incommensurable. Moreover, their freedoms will often conflict and prevent a true harmony. Thus, the best political outcome is to create systems and institutions that bound this conflict, processes that hash out the differences without violence, and certain basic principles that define minimum ethical standards for individual and international interaction.
My favorite part of this book was Gray's discussion of human rights. He argues that the list of human rights has proliferated to the extent that they are simply untenable politically. Rights cannot be the same in all societies because ideas about rights inherently reflect different interests and conception of the good. How, for instance, can a society with little notion of the importance of privacy have privacy enshrined as a right? How can societies without wage labor institute many of the rights included in various international declarations, such as wage labor? Is it wise to demand unfettered religious exercise as a right when in some contexts that might lay the groundwork for violence? Plus, Gray argues, saying that you have a right to something doesn't win political arguments (see care, health) and in fact makes compromises even tougher. Instead of this absolutist discourse of rights, Gray recommends that we think of rights as minimal standards of individual dignity and group interaction. A more limited, essential roster of rights, both for individuals and states, like the right against aggression, can create conditions for modus vivendi in which interests are hashed out.
I think Gray develops a delicate but effective balance between relativism and universalism here. I found myself nodding along to much of his argument, which fits with the anti-universalist, anti-utopian thought of people like Niebuhr, Schlesinger, Kennan (although he wasn't a liberal), and others who aren't coming to mind. At times, though, I thought that his argument wasn't that different from what mainstream liberalism usually seeks to do: enshrine certain standards of human behavior while create norms and institutions that contain and channel conflict. I think the core dilemma he points out is whether you, as a liberal, expect that conflict to carry on forever in various forms or to converge into a dominant, even universal form. I usually put myself in the first camp.
Recommended for people interested in political thought, especially on (duh) liberalism. It is dense, but short, and Gray moves ahead at a deliberate pace that isn't too hard to follow.
Under this form of liberalism, the one that Gray prefers, there are many possible ways of achieving the good, fulfilled life depending on different individuals and societies. Gray is not a relativist, and he says that there are certainly certain cultures and political regimes that make decent life impossible and should be rejected. However, ultimately he concludes that there will never be a universal convergence on one way of living and thinking, no matter how well thought out those plans are. The ways that people define and pursue the good simply vary too much, and their versions of the good are largely incommensurable. Moreover, their freedoms will often conflict and prevent a true harmony. Thus, the best political outcome is to create systems and institutions that bound this conflict, processes that hash out the differences without violence, and certain basic principles that define minimum ethical standards for individual and international interaction.
My favorite part of this book was Gray's discussion of human rights. He argues that the list of human rights has proliferated to the extent that they are simply untenable politically. Rights cannot be the same in all societies because ideas about rights inherently reflect different interests and conception of the good. How, for instance, can a society with little notion of the importance of privacy have privacy enshrined as a right? How can societies without wage labor institute many of the rights included in various international declarations, such as wage labor? Is it wise to demand unfettered religious exercise as a right when in some contexts that might lay the groundwork for violence? Plus, Gray argues, saying that you have a right to something doesn't win political arguments (see care, health) and in fact makes compromises even tougher. Instead of this absolutist discourse of rights, Gray recommends that we think of rights as minimal standards of individual dignity and group interaction. A more limited, essential roster of rights, both for individuals and states, like the right against aggression, can create conditions for modus vivendi in which interests are hashed out.
I think Gray develops a delicate but effective balance between relativism and universalism here. I found myself nodding along to much of his argument, which fits with the anti-universalist, anti-utopian thought of people like Niebuhr, Schlesinger, Kennan (although he wasn't a liberal), and others who aren't coming to mind. At times, though, I thought that his argument wasn't that different from what mainstream liberalism usually seeks to do: enshrine certain standards of human behavior while create norms and institutions that contain and channel conflict. I think the core dilemma he points out is whether you, as a liberal, expect that conflict to carry on forever in various forms or to converge into a dominant, even universal form. I usually put myself in the first camp.
Recommended for people interested in political thought, especially on (duh) liberalism. It is dense, but short, and Gray moves ahead at a deliberate pace that isn't too hard to follow.
January 5, 2026
Another book for class. Liberalism has two forms. One aims to find a rational consensus for all human beings, a way of life or theory of justice that all rational people will or should accept. Difference and dissent are tolerated, but as a means to an end, to reach that final rational consensus. Gray argues this form of liberalism is unrealistic; there are too many differing conceptions of the good life. Instead, we should embrace modus vivendi liberalism, a liberalism that seeks peaceful coexistence by giving up any belief in a rational consensus or single regime.
Gray argues that modus vivendi liberalism doesn't collapse into relativism or subjectivism, but I'm not so sure. Regardless, it's an interesting and thought provoking read. At times too repetitive.
Gray argues that modus vivendi liberalism doesn't collapse into relativism or subjectivism, but I'm not so sure. Regardless, it's an interesting and thought provoking read. At times too repetitive.
October 1, 2023
"Liberalism contains two philosophies. In one, toleration is justified as a means to truth. In this view, toleration is an instrument of rational consensus, and a diversity of ways of life is endured in the faith that it is destined to disappear. In the other, toleration is valued as a condition of peace, and divergent ways of living are welcomed as marks of diversity in the good life. The first conception supports an ideal of ultimate convergence on values, the latter an ideal of modus vivendi."
Who knew that John Gray would be flirting with anarchism" ... er, I mean, modus vivendi ...
Who knew that John Gray would be flirting with anarchism" ... er, I mean, modus vivendi ...
October 4, 2024
Unlike the postmodern critiques we hear about, which can be defeatist and negative in all the same modern ways, Gray’s take is immediately applicable and based on a practical philosophy. His ideas apply Nietzsche’s critique of idealism in the economic and political realms. Human rights and laws are based in a struggle between two vertical ideals that can be recognized and affirmed by a people and its authority. Any sweeping policy will be wrong if it does not take into consideration the bureaucratic procedural struggle over the negation of an ideal. The struggle over its working definition, representation, or meaning.
To allow for a culture of representation based in polyvocality, it starts with a population willing to question its utopian faith in a single better political ideal. These ideals are historically used for exploitation and eventually monopolize markets to nepotistic militarized ends. Regardless of which ideal wins. There can be more than one way to achieve freedom or utility, at the same time. No individuated mode of life need be redundantly enforced over others to win a representational territory. There are battles over the miscommunication of needs and the perpetual rationalization of resulting illusions.
Modus vivendi is one place these late capitalist discussions can start. To recognize incommensurability means questioning the modern paradigm of rationality. There are smarter, more sustainable, simpler ways to logically coexist. And even if this particular ideal is true, it need not be ritualized by the reification procedures of the current ontology.
The incommensurability of an ideal, and a people’s conformity to the equity of its enforcement, is the whole reason governance and human rights are necessary. Ideals like “peace” or religious “freedom” have no meaning when it’s all one way or the other. Any country that can deescalate its protectionism will start by coordinating cooperative discussions over the political ideals. The alternative has been to violently enforce winning ideals over losing ones. As if there can only be one formal way to represent a winning ideology.
“The reasons that move communities to seek coexistence with one another are many and varied - no less so than human interests. The variety of interests that lead people to seek an accommodation with one another is what makes peaceful coexistence possible. It is foolish to imagine that society or government is at its most stable when it rests on foundations of principle. Often, it is principled commitment to rival ideals that makes peaceful coexistence impossible.
For all its talk of pluralism, the liberal political philosophy that has been dominant over the past generation thinks of conflicts of value as if they were a passing phase in human affairs. In contrast, modus vivendi is a view that takes rival views of the good and the right to be a universal feature of political life. Now and in any future we can envision, communities and states will be divided by rival claims about justice and what makes human life worth living.
Unlike liberal toleration, modus vivendi does not cherish the hope that the world will someday converge on truth. It does not seek convergence on the truth - even the truth of value-pluralism. The idea that political life could be without illusions is itself illusive. Nor, if it were possible, would politics without illusions be without loss. As Nietzsche perceived, illusion may be a condition of some forms of life that are worth living. If variety in ways of life depends partly on some of them making strongly universalist claims, a world in which everyone subscribed to value-pluralism might not be notably diverse. In that case, value-pluralism could be self-undermining.
The theory of modus vivendi does not imagine that a world without illusions is possible, or wholly desirable. It seeks only to cure us of the false hopes that go with philosophies that promise an end to conflicts of value. In our time, an hubristic species of rights-based liberalism is foremost among those philosophies.
It may seem that giving up this liberal philosophy and opting for modus vivendi involves giving up liberalism itself. From one perspective this must be so. Modus vivendi relinquishes the project of a universal regime. If that is the essence of liberalism, then modus vivendi cannot be other than a post-liberal philosophy.
All varieties of liberalism which advance a strongly universalist morality are versions of the Enlightenment project. In part, these species of liberalism rest on a positivist philosophy of history. History has falsified that philosophy. In part, also, they embody the rationalist ideal of reconstructing ethical life so as to resolve conflicts of value by applying 'principles'. That ideal runs aground on the fact that these 'principles' turn out to be either themselves conflicting, or else too indeterminate to be able to guide practice.
It cannot be denied that Enlightenment universalism is a powerful tendency in liberal philosophy. It marks the thought even of thinkers, such as Hobbes and Hume, who did not subscribe to the ideal of a universal regime. For much of its history, liberalism and the project of a universal rational morality have been indistinguishable. All liberal philosophies that take their cue from Locke or Kant, or which embody the side of John Stuart Mill's thought that aimed for a reconstructed version of Benthamite utilitarianism, are variations on the Enlightenment project of a rationally reconstructed, universally authoritative morality. Not only Rawls and Nozick but Popper and Hayek are disciples of this philosophy of liberal universalism. If anything has become clear in the present inquiry, it is that this liberal philosophy is a dead letter.
For those who think liberalism and the Enlightenment project inseparable, this can only be a defeat for liberalism.
But there is another way of thinking that is no less coeval with liberal thought. The other liberalism is much less closely tied to Enlightenment hopes.”
To allow for a culture of representation based in polyvocality, it starts with a population willing to question its utopian faith in a single better political ideal. These ideals are historically used for exploitation and eventually monopolize markets to nepotistic militarized ends. Regardless of which ideal wins. There can be more than one way to achieve freedom or utility, at the same time. No individuated mode of life need be redundantly enforced over others to win a representational territory. There are battles over the miscommunication of needs and the perpetual rationalization of resulting illusions.
Modus vivendi is one place these late capitalist discussions can start. To recognize incommensurability means questioning the modern paradigm of rationality. There are smarter, more sustainable, simpler ways to logically coexist. And even if this particular ideal is true, it need not be ritualized by the reification procedures of the current ontology.
The incommensurability of an ideal, and a people’s conformity to the equity of its enforcement, is the whole reason governance and human rights are necessary. Ideals like “peace” or religious “freedom” have no meaning when it’s all one way or the other. Any country that can deescalate its protectionism will start by coordinating cooperative discussions over the political ideals. The alternative has been to violently enforce winning ideals over losing ones. As if there can only be one formal way to represent a winning ideology.
“The reasons that move communities to seek coexistence with one another are many and varied - no less so than human interests. The variety of interests that lead people to seek an accommodation with one another is what makes peaceful coexistence possible. It is foolish to imagine that society or government is at its most stable when it rests on foundations of principle. Often, it is principled commitment to rival ideals that makes peaceful coexistence impossible.
For all its talk of pluralism, the liberal political philosophy that has been dominant over the past generation thinks of conflicts of value as if they were a passing phase in human affairs. In contrast, modus vivendi is a view that takes rival views of the good and the right to be a universal feature of political life. Now and in any future we can envision, communities and states will be divided by rival claims about justice and what makes human life worth living.
Unlike liberal toleration, modus vivendi does not cherish the hope that the world will someday converge on truth. It does not seek convergence on the truth - even the truth of value-pluralism. The idea that political life could be without illusions is itself illusive. Nor, if it were possible, would politics without illusions be without loss. As Nietzsche perceived, illusion may be a condition of some forms of life that are worth living. If variety in ways of life depends partly on some of them making strongly universalist claims, a world in which everyone subscribed to value-pluralism might not be notably diverse. In that case, value-pluralism could be self-undermining.
The theory of modus vivendi does not imagine that a world without illusions is possible, or wholly desirable. It seeks only to cure us of the false hopes that go with philosophies that promise an end to conflicts of value. In our time, an hubristic species of rights-based liberalism is foremost among those philosophies.
It may seem that giving up this liberal philosophy and opting for modus vivendi involves giving up liberalism itself. From one perspective this must be so. Modus vivendi relinquishes the project of a universal regime. If that is the essence of liberalism, then modus vivendi cannot be other than a post-liberal philosophy.
All varieties of liberalism which advance a strongly universalist morality are versions of the Enlightenment project. In part, these species of liberalism rest on a positivist philosophy of history. History has falsified that philosophy. In part, also, they embody the rationalist ideal of reconstructing ethical life so as to resolve conflicts of value by applying 'principles'. That ideal runs aground on the fact that these 'principles' turn out to be either themselves conflicting, or else too indeterminate to be able to guide practice.
It cannot be denied that Enlightenment universalism is a powerful tendency in liberal philosophy. It marks the thought even of thinkers, such as Hobbes and Hume, who did not subscribe to the ideal of a universal regime. For much of its history, liberalism and the project of a universal rational morality have been indistinguishable. All liberal philosophies that take their cue from Locke or Kant, or which embody the side of John Stuart Mill's thought that aimed for a reconstructed version of Benthamite utilitarianism, are variations on the Enlightenment project of a rationally reconstructed, universally authoritative morality. Not only Rawls and Nozick but Popper and Hayek are disciples of this philosophy of liberal universalism. If anything has become clear in the present inquiry, it is that this liberal philosophy is a dead letter.
For those who think liberalism and the Enlightenment project inseparable, this can only be a defeat for liberalism.
But there is another way of thinking that is no less coeval with liberal thought. The other liberalism is much less closely tied to Enlightenment hopes.”
May 23, 2022
John Gray distinguishes between two kinds of liberalism that have been characterized in modern and contemporary political philosophy: liberalism as a rational consensus best represented by Rawls but also by Hayek; liberalism as a modus vivendi between competing forms of life that build on an eclectic set of figures such as Berlin and Hobbes. Gray makes no mystery that he prefers the latter.
The nice aspect of the book is that it convincingly points out and discusses the main issue in orthodox accounts of liberalism, i.e., that they one way or another overestimate the scope of universal agreement over which liberalism values can foster. Written in 2000, the book convincingly anticipates recent developments in the post Rawlsian litterature about diversity and disagreement and echoes the difficulties faced by liberal democracies.
The book also has limits. First, it oversimplifies the views that it disparages, especially Rawls's. Second, it only sketches the alternative modus vivendi account, alluding to some interesting ideas that would merit more development. Third, the book is essentially making claims rather than developing arguments based on careful theoretical and empirical analysis. Gray repeatedly writes that in contemporary societies individuals belong to different forms of life, that because of that the ideal of an overlapping consensus is a chimera, that the essence of politics is in the regulation of conflict to presence peaceful existence, ... These are interesting claims, but it is unclear that the book will convince someone who is not already convinced by them.
Now, there are clearly many valid and valuable points in this work. The most significant is the claim that the scope of value pluralism extends to the political realm of principles justice, and that the justification of principles of justice cannot be independent from assumptions about conceptions of the good as they are found in the variety of forms of life we encounter in liberal societies.
The nice aspect of the book is that it convincingly points out and discusses the main issue in orthodox accounts of liberalism, i.e., that they one way or another overestimate the scope of universal agreement over which liberalism values can foster. Written in 2000, the book convincingly anticipates recent developments in the post Rawlsian litterature about diversity and disagreement and echoes the difficulties faced by liberal democracies.
The book also has limits. First, it oversimplifies the views that it disparages, especially Rawls's. Second, it only sketches the alternative modus vivendi account, alluding to some interesting ideas that would merit more development. Third, the book is essentially making claims rather than developing arguments based on careful theoretical and empirical analysis. Gray repeatedly writes that in contemporary societies individuals belong to different forms of life, that because of that the ideal of an overlapping consensus is a chimera, that the essence of politics is in the regulation of conflict to presence peaceful existence, ... These are interesting claims, but it is unclear that the book will convince someone who is not already convinced by them.
Now, there are clearly many valid and valuable points in this work. The most significant is the claim that the scope of value pluralism extends to the political realm of principles justice, and that the justification of principles of justice cannot be independent from assumptions about conceptions of the good as they are found in the variety of forms of life we encounter in liberal societies.
August 19, 2017
good, but asserts rather than demonstrates his uncompromising value pluralism
also, makes one wonder what vantage point of knowledge and judgement you need to assume to state value pluralism in this way
also, makes one wonder what vantage point of knowledge and judgement you need to assume to state value pluralism in this way
June 3, 2025
This book points out some central contradictions in liberal thought. An enlightenment vision of universal liberties and values often clashes with a claimed tolerance for all viewpoints. Gray exposes this paradox and calls for more honesty about the limitations of both positions.
May 25, 2020
Wszystko o modus vivendi co Gray uznał za rozsądne.
Rozsądne.
Rozsądne.
July 24, 2025
si no creyera en dios, le rezaría a este libro. amén
January 31, 2021
Although John Grey introduces useful concepts for thinking about the future of liberalism his writing style is that of an academic on speed and this makes the book impenetrable.
The book promises to be accessible but, thanks to his love of two sentence paragraphs there is no flow to this text and it is difficult to follow what is being said.
I tried 3 times to read this book but I have been beaten. Professor Grey is clearly an intelligent man and it is a shame that he isn’t able to convey his ideas in a clearer way.
The book promises to be accessible but, thanks to his love of two sentence paragraphs there is no flow to this text and it is difficult to follow what is being said.
I tried 3 times to read this book but I have been beaten. Professor Grey is clearly an intelligent man and it is a shame that he isn’t able to convey his ideas in a clearer way.
February 17, 2025
John Gray’s Two Faces of Liberalism (2000) offers a critical examination of the philosophical foundations of liberalism, arguing that the tradition contains two distinct and often conflicting strands: a liberalism of “choice” and a liberalism of “pluralism.” Gray contends that the dominant strand of liberal thought—rooted in Enlightenment rationalism and the idea of a universal liberal order—has failed to accommodate the realities of cultural and moral diversity. Instead, he advocates for a more pluralistic liberalism that accepts the incommensurability of values and seeks modus vivendi arrangements rather than universal principles.
Gray’s core thesis is that liberalism has historically been shaped by two different conceptions of tolerance and coexistence:
1. Liberalism as a Universalist Project – The dominant form of liberalism, exemplified by thinkers such as John Stuart Mill and Immanuel Kant, is grounded in the belief that all rational individuals will ultimately converge on a single, universal set of liberal values. This tradition assumes that through reason and deliberation, societies will gradually move toward a consensus on rights, justice, and democracy. Gray critiques this view as utopian and historically untenable, particularly in light of ongoing global conflicts rooted in deep cultural and moral differences.
2. Liberalism as a Modus Vivendi – In contrast, Gray champions a liberalism of “modus vivendi,” which prioritizes pragmatic coexistence over universal moral prescriptions. Drawing on thinkers such as Thomas Hobbes and Isaiah Berlin, he argues that societies should not seek a single vision of the good life but should instead focus on negotiating peaceful arrangements that allow for the coexistence of multiple, often conflicting, worldviews. This form of liberalism acknowledges the irreducible plurality of human values and resists imposing a single model of political organization.
Gray’s approach is primarily philosophical and historical. He engages with key liberal thinkers, tracing the intellectual genealogy of different strands of liberalism while critically assessing their applicability in contemporary global politics. His writing is characterized by a sharp critique of Enlightenment rationalism, drawing on postmodern and realist traditions to argue that political theory must abandon the search for universal moral truths.
Two Faces of Liberalism has been widely discussed in academic and policy circles. Many scholars have praised Gray for his incisive critique of universalist liberalism, particularly in light of post-Cold War liberal interventions that have sought to impose Western-style democracy on diverse societies. His argument aligns with broader critiques of liberal universalism found in the works of Alasdair MacIntyre, Richard Rorty, and Charles Taylor.
However, critics have raised several objections. Some argue that Gray’s rejection of universal liberal principles risks sliding into a form of relativism that offers little normative guidance for addressing issues such as human rights abuses and authoritarianism. Others contend that his emphasis on modus vivendi liberalism, while pragmatically appealing, underestimates the extent to which shared liberal norms can emerge organically through dialogue and democratic engagement.
John Gray’s Two Faces of Liberalism is a thought-provoking and timely critique of liberal political thought. By challenging the assumption that liberal values are universally applicable, he forces readers to reconsider the foundations of liberal democracy and the prospects for peaceful coexistence in a pluralistic world. While some of his conclusions remain controversial, the book remains an essential contribution to contemporary debates on liberalism, pluralism, and global governance. It is a valuable resource for scholars of political theory, international relations, and philosophy.
GPT
Gray’s core thesis is that liberalism has historically been shaped by two different conceptions of tolerance and coexistence:
1. Liberalism as a Universalist Project – The dominant form of liberalism, exemplified by thinkers such as John Stuart Mill and Immanuel Kant, is grounded in the belief that all rational individuals will ultimately converge on a single, universal set of liberal values. This tradition assumes that through reason and deliberation, societies will gradually move toward a consensus on rights, justice, and democracy. Gray critiques this view as utopian and historically untenable, particularly in light of ongoing global conflicts rooted in deep cultural and moral differences.
2. Liberalism as a Modus Vivendi – In contrast, Gray champions a liberalism of “modus vivendi,” which prioritizes pragmatic coexistence over universal moral prescriptions. Drawing on thinkers such as Thomas Hobbes and Isaiah Berlin, he argues that societies should not seek a single vision of the good life but should instead focus on negotiating peaceful arrangements that allow for the coexistence of multiple, often conflicting, worldviews. This form of liberalism acknowledges the irreducible plurality of human values and resists imposing a single model of political organization.
Gray’s approach is primarily philosophical and historical. He engages with key liberal thinkers, tracing the intellectual genealogy of different strands of liberalism while critically assessing their applicability in contemporary global politics. His writing is characterized by a sharp critique of Enlightenment rationalism, drawing on postmodern and realist traditions to argue that political theory must abandon the search for universal moral truths.
Two Faces of Liberalism has been widely discussed in academic and policy circles. Many scholars have praised Gray for his incisive critique of universalist liberalism, particularly in light of post-Cold War liberal interventions that have sought to impose Western-style democracy on diverse societies. His argument aligns with broader critiques of liberal universalism found in the works of Alasdair MacIntyre, Richard Rorty, and Charles Taylor.
However, critics have raised several objections. Some argue that Gray’s rejection of universal liberal principles risks sliding into a form of relativism that offers little normative guidance for addressing issues such as human rights abuses and authoritarianism. Others contend that his emphasis on modus vivendi liberalism, while pragmatically appealing, underestimates the extent to which shared liberal norms can emerge organically through dialogue and democratic engagement.
John Gray’s Two Faces of Liberalism is a thought-provoking and timely critique of liberal political thought. By challenging the assumption that liberal values are universally applicable, he forces readers to reconsider the foundations of liberal democracy and the prospects for peaceful coexistence in a pluralistic world. While some of his conclusions remain controversial, the book remains an essential contribution to contemporary debates on liberalism, pluralism, and global governance. It is a valuable resource for scholars of political theory, international relations, and philosophy.
GPT
August 4, 2023
La crítica de John Gray sobre el liberalismo es bastante acertada, oponiendo las ideas sobre que "El liberalismo es el mejor modo de vida" y "El liberalismo debe respetar otros modos de vidas distintos al propio liberalismo". Aunque Gray comete grandes errores en algunas de sus críticas a ideologías como el Utilitarismo, ese no es el principal propósito del libro, y por lo tanto, no disminuye demasiado la calidad de la lectura.
March 16, 2018
"...peace and justice are universal goods; but sometimes they make demands that are incompatible. When peace and justice are rivals, which is worse, war or injustice?" (p.7)
"They (Kantian/Rawlsian/Liberals) never tire of telling us that the demands of justice must take priority over any ideal of the good. They appear to have overlooked the fact that different view of the good support different views of justice." (p.16)
This book changed how I think about Rawls' Liberalism and American liberal (elite) culture. John Gray thinks it is unnecessary, if not impossible, to design a comprehensive Rawlsian/Lockean doctrine (legal system) that will be accepted as universally reasonable and legitimate, or more simply, it is impossible to write laws that will be accepted by people of different religions and moral philosophies, and instead we should revisit Hobbes' philosophy of modus vivendi which accepts that there will be different conceptions of what is good. By accepting the idea that there are different ways of conceptualizing what is good we can then negotiate laws through robust democratic institutions.
Gray also accuses Rawlsians of "anti-political legalism" which means that Rawlsians are overly concerned with preserving an abstract notion protecting individual rights that they fail to take into account the individuals that they are working with, individuals with a history and culture.
Gray concludes that the best form of liberal government is modus vivendi, peaceful coexistence that does not rely on a single regime or moral doctrine
January 25, 2014
Written before his full break with liberalism (and also apparently before his full adoption of trolling ideological projects in general which I find so fun) this appears to be Gray's final attempt to salvage something from liberal political theory. He sort of succeeds be restoring the dialogue to the interesting issue of competitive rights between communities and upends the usual eurocentric 'FREEDUMBZ' story by positively citing the pre-collapse Ottoman Empire as an example of this in action.
In the end though, one has to conclude that Gray failed to reconcile these various divisions though, based on the nature of his later polemics. Its just as well, outside of social and public rights I personally see no practical use for liberal values. Now, liberals (of both right and left) would contend that social and public rights are the most important thing. I do agree they are important, and worth fighting for even against impossible odds, but as they ignore economics, resource issues, and geopolitics I think, like Gray, that I can no longer see them as central in any state building process, and rather that they must come second, not first, as the many failed UN state building projects attest to starkly.
In the end though, one has to conclude that Gray failed to reconcile these various divisions though, based on the nature of his later polemics. Its just as well, outside of social and public rights I personally see no practical use for liberal values. Now, liberals (of both right and left) would contend that social and public rights are the most important thing. I do agree they are important, and worth fighting for even against impossible odds, but as they ignore economics, resource issues, and geopolitics I think, like Gray, that I can no longer see them as central in any state building process, and rather that they must come second, not first, as the many failed UN state building projects attest to starkly.
March 26, 2019
A dense read that raises a number of interesting points and provides a fully explained account of value pluralism. The conclusion remained a little unconvincing but the journey proved interesting, though dragged in the section in which he chose to define his theory in contrast to Rawls.
February 11, 2024
A lucid and sceptical analysis of liberal political philosophy. Offers a cogent alternative, a modus vivendi, whereby institutions rather than laws provide a means of negotiating differences.
June 22, 2013
Liberalizm farklı düşünce ve yaşam tarzlarının bir arada yaşayabileceğini savunmakla birlikte, bu farklı düşünce ve yaşam tarzlarının biraradalığını mümkün kılan akılcı bir yaşamın mümkün olduğunu varsayar. Gray eserinde "liberal hoşgörü"nün bu iki yönünün birbiriyle çatıştığı fikrini temellendiriyor.
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July 31, 2007John Gray is insane. He starts with stating that values and ways of life are incommensurable, but in the next chapter pares that down to arguing that in some contexts, some values cannot be directly compared. Uhm, congratulations?
More when I've read more than the first two chapters.
More when I've read more than the first two chapters.
September 6, 2012
You probably need to read ' The Morality of Freedom ' by J. Raz - before - you read this.
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