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How Great Generals Win
Demonstrates the strategies and techniques applied by the greatest generals in history, from Genghis Khan to Norman Schwarzkopf, to show the consistency of the basic principles of warfare.
320 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 1993
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559 people want to read
About the author
Bevin Alexander
14 books35 followersBevin Alexander is an American military historian and author. He served as an officer during the Korean War as part of the 5th Historical Detachment. His book Korea: The First War We Lost was largely influenced by his experiences during the war.
Bevin has served as a consultant and adviser to several groups due to his military expertise, including work for the Rand Corporation, work as a consultant for military simulations instituted by the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, and as director of information at the University of Virginia in Charlottesville, Virginia. .
He was formerly on the president’s staff as director of information at the University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Va., and is a retired adjunct professor of history at Longwood University, in Farmville, Virginia.
Bevin has served as a consultant and adviser to several groups due to his military expertise, including work for the Rand Corporation, work as a consultant for military simulations instituted by the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, and as director of information at the University of Virginia in Charlottesville, Virginia. .
He was formerly on the president’s staff as director of information at the University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Va., and is a retired adjunct professor of history at Longwood University, in Farmville, Virginia.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 39 reviews
July 3, 2019
All military encounters are an exercise in maximizing one's own strengths while exploiting the enemy's weaknesses—a concept nearly as abstract and reductive as it is axiomatic and obtuse. How exactly military leaders go about maximizing and minimizing is where the concept breaks down for it has surely as many iterations as there are wars, cultures that fight them, and generals to conduct them. The premise of this survey of military history is that deception is the fundamental tool of military leadership, and the author cites ten examples throughout history, from Rome to the Korean War, in order to support his point.
His argument is valid as far as it goes, but increasingly throughout the book the accounts touch upon elements of military leadership which lead to victory that are not based upon deception. The logistics and supply of MacArthur's invasion of Inchon, for instance, is an oft overlooked aspect of that attack (the particulars of transport being somewhat prosaic for military history.) Professor Alexander does describe the weight of American forces that were engaged in that action, but his emphasis is on the nature of the surprise rather than the orchestration of the attack itself.
In making his case, Alexander uses a definition of deception that is perhaps too broad to be a functional concept. Deceptive troop movements and feints are certainly among the tools of war leaders, but striking the enemy in a position left undefended or at an unexpected time are more along the lines of reading an enemy's disposition and devising an inventive plan of attack rather than tricking that opponent. There is a vague element of deception in that sort of attack in that one doesn't reveal one's plans to the enemy, but maintaining information security isn't quite the same thing as actively seeking to deceive the enemy.
Further, the brute frontal assaults that Professor Alexander cites as the antithesis of military leadership do have a role in the annals of war in a way quite comparable to the effects on the morale and support of the people, politicians and commanders that Alexander attributes to deception, and many military operations could be viewed as a combination of deception and brute force (minimizing/maximizing) rather than one or the other.
As a military survey, this text does convey accurately and clearly the events that are used as examples. Most of those campaigns are familiar to military history readers, but Alexander does give due attention to some that are often ignored in Western military history such as Mao's campaign to oust Chang Kai Shek, and the particulars of the British push into Palestine in 1918. As a general survey, How Great Generals Win works admirably.
However, it may not fulfill the function of its title and basic premise. Deception is a major aspect of the role of great generals, but leadership is a multi-faceted thing, and not the entirety of how battles or campaigns are managed, conducted, or won. Strangely, that emphasis makes it worth checking out for a novice reader of military history in that it serves as an introduction to the concepts of generalship that is easily grasped. Further, it works as a text that focuses on a single aspect of leadership for a reader more familiar with military history. The middling reader, however, might find it less useful, and would probably be better off finding individual texts on the leaders/conflicts that Alexander uses as examples before picking up his text on the subject.
The chapters in his text focus on:
The First Punic War
The Mongol Empire
The Campaigns of Napoleon
Stonewall Jackson
William Tecumseh Sherman
The British in Palestine during WWI
The Red Army in China under Mao
The German invasion of France in 1940.
Rommel's Campaign in North Africa
MacArthur in Korea
My own knowledge of Mao's campaign in China, for instance, is rather lacking, and I found myself less able to engage with Prof. Alexander's premise in that chapter than in, say, the chapter on Hannibal and Scipio with whom I am much more familiar.
With that in mind, there's no particular reason why one couldn't skip a chapter or three in this text, though Prof. Alexander does make an effort to show a continuity between them.
Overall, this is a good, solid read, and I would recommend it to others with the above notes and cautions.
His argument is valid as far as it goes, but increasingly throughout the book the accounts touch upon elements of military leadership which lead to victory that are not based upon deception. The logistics and supply of MacArthur's invasion of Inchon, for instance, is an oft overlooked aspect of that attack (the particulars of transport being somewhat prosaic for military history.) Professor Alexander does describe the weight of American forces that were engaged in that action, but his emphasis is on the nature of the surprise rather than the orchestration of the attack itself.
In making his case, Alexander uses a definition of deception that is perhaps too broad to be a functional concept. Deceptive troop movements and feints are certainly among the tools of war leaders, but striking the enemy in a position left undefended or at an unexpected time are more along the lines of reading an enemy's disposition and devising an inventive plan of attack rather than tricking that opponent. There is a vague element of deception in that sort of attack in that one doesn't reveal one's plans to the enemy, but maintaining information security isn't quite the same thing as actively seeking to deceive the enemy.
Further, the brute frontal assaults that Professor Alexander cites as the antithesis of military leadership do have a role in the annals of war in a way quite comparable to the effects on the morale and support of the people, politicians and commanders that Alexander attributes to deception, and many military operations could be viewed as a combination of deception and brute force (minimizing/maximizing) rather than one or the other.
As a military survey, this text does convey accurately and clearly the events that are used as examples. Most of those campaigns are familiar to military history readers, but Alexander does give due attention to some that are often ignored in Western military history such as Mao's campaign to oust Chang Kai Shek, and the particulars of the British push into Palestine in 1918. As a general survey, How Great Generals Win works admirably.
However, it may not fulfill the function of its title and basic premise. Deception is a major aspect of the role of great generals, but leadership is a multi-faceted thing, and not the entirety of how battles or campaigns are managed, conducted, or won. Strangely, that emphasis makes it worth checking out for a novice reader of military history in that it serves as an introduction to the concepts of generalship that is easily grasped. Further, it works as a text that focuses on a single aspect of leadership for a reader more familiar with military history. The middling reader, however, might find it less useful, and would probably be better off finding individual texts on the leaders/conflicts that Alexander uses as examples before picking up his text on the subject.
The chapters in his text focus on:
The First Punic War
The Mongol Empire
The Campaigns of Napoleon
Stonewall Jackson
William Tecumseh Sherman
The British in Palestine during WWI
The Red Army in China under Mao
The German invasion of France in 1940.
Rommel's Campaign in North Africa
MacArthur in Korea
My own knowledge of Mao's campaign in China, for instance, is rather lacking, and I found myself less able to engage with Prof. Alexander's premise in that chapter than in, say, the chapter on Hannibal and Scipio with whom I am much more familiar.
With that in mind, there's no particular reason why one couldn't skip a chapter or three in this text, though Prof. Alexander does make an effort to show a continuity between them.
Overall, this is a good, solid read, and I would recommend it to others with the above notes and cautions.
October 30, 2021
This one is obviously for lovers of military history and strategy. I don’t think this was one of the best Great Courses books, but that may be because I’ve enjoyed so many on similar topics that nothing here felt fresh. Obviously, that could be quite different if I had started with this one. Overall, it’s a nice (if short) look at the importance of deception to a commander, but in doing so, other critical elements of success seemed to me to get minimized whether they be supply, discipline, etc.
If you liked this review, you can find more at www.gilbertstack.com/reviews.
If you liked this review, you can find more at www.gilbertstack.com/reviews.
January 17, 2017
A very enjoyable read, this book traces military history, tactics and most especially grand tactics from the Ancient age to the middle of the last Century. Starting with Scipio Africanus, and covering Napoleon, Sherman, Guderian and Mao,among others, before ending with MacArthur, Alexander gives us the Great Captains and their finest military moves. The author set the scene with a quick discussion of the day and then gives a quick description of the General and his masterpiece, singular battle or campaign. Here the only glaring fault of this book becomes clear, Alexander gives usually only a map of the sphere of operations, without the detailed maps for each maneuvre that would really explain the feat to the lay reader. It can get confusing easily, especially when the place names are similar sounding, as say in the Korean Campaign of 1950. But over all this is a good book for all levels of military history interest. I hope that a version with a plethora of battlemaps can be developed, as the basic lessons are good and approachable to any reader.
August 13, 2012
I will NEVER again mention to my southerner wife that Mr.Alexander thought Robert E. Lee was not a good tactical leader. Her reply? "Shut your mourh you damn Yankee."
February 21, 2015
"How Great Generals Win," is a study of tactics, the rules of war and how they were put in to practice by great generals. The major rules covered are: operating on the line of least expectation and least resistance, maneuvering onto the rear of the enemy, occupying the central position, following a 'plan with branches' (attacking from different directions and switching attacks from one line of advance to another) and making convergent tactical blows.
The actions covered with which the author illustrates the rules are Hannibal Barca, Scipio Africanus, Genghis Khan, Napoleon Bonaparte, Thomas 'Stonewall' Jackson, William T. Sherman, T. E. Lawrence, Sir Edmund Allenby, Mao Zedong, Heinz Guderian, Erich von Manstein, Irwin Rommel and Douglas MacArthur.
All of the illustrations are valid, in my opinion, save one. Douglas MacArthur was not a great tactician. He did lead the invasion at Inchon in Korea, which was remarkable, but his incompetence in ordering the US troops north to the Yalu river and into a trap illustrates his incompetence as a leader and his constant insubordination during his entire career would have cashiered any other commander but he cultivated the press and the public and had become nearly untouchable. He was totally unprepared for the invasion of the Philippines in 1941 AFTER Pearl harbor had already been attacked and had allowed his planes to be wiped out when they did so. Admiral Husband Kimmel and General Watler Short, the commanders at Pearl Harbor lost their careers over being actually surprised by the attack while MacArthur, who should not have been surprised when the Philippines were attacked, was promoted to higher command. When all was lost in the Philippines, MacArthur abandoned his troops in their direst hour and fled (albeit with orders from FDR). When he left, he took his wife and child (who should have been evacuated long before) and his servants instead of taking veteran combat pilots who were crucial to the American war effort. I assume that Bevin Alexander, the author of the book, chose the Inchon invasion as it was not that long ago and chose MacArthur merely because he led the effort. I imagine that if the book was written today, MacArthur would be replaced by 'Stormin" Norman Schwarzkopf and his leadership in the Gulf War which illustrates many of the tactics mentioned by Alexander.
Alexander well defines and adequately explains the rules of war and excellent illustrates each and how they were used by the warrior in question. I had already read a lot of books on military tactics but still found "How Great Generals Win" to be interesting and enlightening. If you want a book explaining how tactics work and apply to actual combat situations, this is your book.
The actions covered with which the author illustrates the rules are Hannibal Barca, Scipio Africanus, Genghis Khan, Napoleon Bonaparte, Thomas 'Stonewall' Jackson, William T. Sherman, T. E. Lawrence, Sir Edmund Allenby, Mao Zedong, Heinz Guderian, Erich von Manstein, Irwin Rommel and Douglas MacArthur.
All of the illustrations are valid, in my opinion, save one. Douglas MacArthur was not a great tactician. He did lead the invasion at Inchon in Korea, which was remarkable, but his incompetence in ordering the US troops north to the Yalu river and into a trap illustrates his incompetence as a leader and his constant insubordination during his entire career would have cashiered any other commander but he cultivated the press and the public and had become nearly untouchable. He was totally unprepared for the invasion of the Philippines in 1941 AFTER Pearl harbor had already been attacked and had allowed his planes to be wiped out when they did so. Admiral Husband Kimmel and General Watler Short, the commanders at Pearl Harbor lost their careers over being actually surprised by the attack while MacArthur, who should not have been surprised when the Philippines were attacked, was promoted to higher command. When all was lost in the Philippines, MacArthur abandoned his troops in their direst hour and fled (albeit with orders from FDR). When he left, he took his wife and child (who should have been evacuated long before) and his servants instead of taking veteran combat pilots who were crucial to the American war effort. I assume that Bevin Alexander, the author of the book, chose the Inchon invasion as it was not that long ago and chose MacArthur merely because he led the effort. I imagine that if the book was written today, MacArthur would be replaced by 'Stormin" Norman Schwarzkopf and his leadership in the Gulf War which illustrates many of the tactics mentioned by Alexander.
Alexander well defines and adequately explains the rules of war and excellent illustrates each and how they were used by the warrior in question. I had already read a lot of books on military tactics but still found "How Great Generals Win" to be interesting and enlightening. If you want a book explaining how tactics work and apply to actual combat situations, this is your book.
January 6, 2019
One of the cleanest synthesis of historically successful field tactics I've read thus far. Alexander focuses his study by identifying a select few tactical gambits that have shown themselves efficacious repeatedly throughout history in diverse scenarios, cultures, and geographies. These cases include the battle of Cannae, and a few others from Scipio's campaign against Hannibal during the 2nd Punic Wars, Subbutai and Batu Khan's invasion of Hungary and Poland, a few battles from the Napoleonic wars, including the Battle of Jena, Stonewall Jackson's skirmishes with McClellan in the Shenandoah Valley campaign, Sherman's drive through Georgia and South Carolina, the British Palestinian campaign against the Ottoman's in the first World War, possibly a few other battles in WWI that I can't recall, the early German campaign of the Ardennes Forest against French and British, the skirmishes between Rommel and a gaggle of commanders on the British side in North Africa, Mao's campaign against the KMT, during the Chinese civil war, and finally the North Korean drive south against the U.N. forces, McArthurs landings on Incheon, and the subsequent PLA's drive south deep into the peninsula against the Allied forces.
One would think given the broad scope of history covered, it would be difficult to paint a convincing narrative of singular tactics that survive the march of technologies, and the multitudes of scenarios. Yet, Alexander identifies exactly those precepts that bind all these threads together into one cohesive narrative.
These include, the occupation of the central position, the avoidance of frontal assaults, or what Napoleon penned as the "Manoeuvre sur la derriere", or the exploitation of flanks, the plan with branches, and the related coordinated columns sweep, which usually must end with convergent tactical blows, lest they are feints or "sweeping up" operations against a routed opponent. These above gambits with a few others, Alexander shows, have repeatedly been deployed in successful battle, and form the kernel, of a theory of tactics.
Alexander also goes slightly above the level of field operations to describe broader strategic thought on battle, namely that the one flaw many commanders have made through the ages is to confuse their objective as the annihilation of the opposing force. This is incorrect, with those commanders believing this fallacy repeatedly attempting to "force battle", instead of finding ways of compelling their opponent to bend to their will without wasting the lives of men. This fallacy is illustrated several times, including Scipio's avoidance of battle, and instead his razing of the Carthaginian farms near New Carthage, thereby compelling his opponent to react, and arrive at a place of his choosing. These tactics were also deployed by the Mongols, who used their superior mobility to navigate around armies of European knights to destroy supplies and population centers, or to threaten said assets, and thus, compel their opponents to hold their position, until they could ascertain the Mongol's intents (an example of the use of branches). In each case, the superior commander understood the true aim of the conflict was to have his opponent yield, not have them all destroyed. This abides not only Sun Tzu's dictum's but also the notion of the economy of force, of Clausewitz and others. Unfortunately, the fallacy of total annihilation of opposing forces as a war aim has persisted to the relatively recent, exemplified by the "body count" metric of McNamara in the American campaign in Vietnam, as well as informing the perverse arms races and strategies of "nuclear warfare."
Following which, having read several books on the broad subject of warfare, whether at the tactical level or strategic, I find many devolve into a collection of "Fortune Cookie" wisdom, a list of quotable. "Do not divide forces", "concentrate mass at one point", "exploit the rear", etc. Although some of that is present here, Alexander takes care to build a more mechanistic and causal narrative, whereby the logic of technology, logistics, and even simple physics helps explain why certain precepts work, and others may not. For instance, if the flank has often been the most logical choice in 2-dimensional field warfare, identified and demonstrated famously Napoleons numerous campaigns, why did both the belligerents of World War I face off in what amounts to a giant stationary frontal assault? Alexander answers these types of questions as a side effect from his historical commentary on technology alongside his discussion of the tactical precepts.
In fact, even now after finishing the book, I am still making potential connections between the skew of cost from defence to offence circa the first World War, and the successful feint operations Mao deployed to "hold" his numerically superior opponent at defence while he used economy of force to guide the PLA strikes.
To properly review this book would take many more pages and much more thought than an ad-hoc impression after an initial read. Alexander discusses much much more including the effects of foraging vs supply lines on manoeuvre and position, the impact of storm tactics, the various uses and misuses of the diverging column advance, the uses of feints, and implicitly, how information guides the field. Really a marvellous book. Should be read by anyone who wants to exercise their mind, and learn some interesting history. The only drawback is the reader often sighs and sometimes stops to catch his breath. But, given the tremendous value of the bool, this can easily be discounted. Highly recommended.
One would think given the broad scope of history covered, it would be difficult to paint a convincing narrative of singular tactics that survive the march of technologies, and the multitudes of scenarios. Yet, Alexander identifies exactly those precepts that bind all these threads together into one cohesive narrative.
These include, the occupation of the central position, the avoidance of frontal assaults, or what Napoleon penned as the "Manoeuvre sur la derriere", or the exploitation of flanks, the plan with branches, and the related coordinated columns sweep, which usually must end with convergent tactical blows, lest they are feints or "sweeping up" operations against a routed opponent. These above gambits with a few others, Alexander shows, have repeatedly been deployed in successful battle, and form the kernel, of a theory of tactics.
Alexander also goes slightly above the level of field operations to describe broader strategic thought on battle, namely that the one flaw many commanders have made through the ages is to confuse their objective as the annihilation of the opposing force. This is incorrect, with those commanders believing this fallacy repeatedly attempting to "force battle", instead of finding ways of compelling their opponent to bend to their will without wasting the lives of men. This fallacy is illustrated several times, including Scipio's avoidance of battle, and instead his razing of the Carthaginian farms near New Carthage, thereby compelling his opponent to react, and arrive at a place of his choosing. These tactics were also deployed by the Mongols, who used their superior mobility to navigate around armies of European knights to destroy supplies and population centers, or to threaten said assets, and thus, compel their opponents to hold their position, until they could ascertain the Mongol's intents (an example of the use of branches). In each case, the superior commander understood the true aim of the conflict was to have his opponent yield, not have them all destroyed. This abides not only Sun Tzu's dictum's but also the notion of the economy of force, of Clausewitz and others. Unfortunately, the fallacy of total annihilation of opposing forces as a war aim has persisted to the relatively recent, exemplified by the "body count" metric of McNamara in the American campaign in Vietnam, as well as informing the perverse arms races and strategies of "nuclear warfare."
Following which, having read several books on the broad subject of warfare, whether at the tactical level or strategic, I find many devolve into a collection of "Fortune Cookie" wisdom, a list of quotable. "Do not divide forces", "concentrate mass at one point", "exploit the rear", etc. Although some of that is present here, Alexander takes care to build a more mechanistic and causal narrative, whereby the logic of technology, logistics, and even simple physics helps explain why certain precepts work, and others may not. For instance, if the flank has often been the most logical choice in 2-dimensional field warfare, identified and demonstrated famously Napoleons numerous campaigns, why did both the belligerents of World War I face off in what amounts to a giant stationary frontal assault? Alexander answers these types of questions as a side effect from his historical commentary on technology alongside his discussion of the tactical precepts.
In fact, even now after finishing the book, I am still making potential connections between the skew of cost from defence to offence circa the first World War, and the successful feint operations Mao deployed to "hold" his numerically superior opponent at defence while he used economy of force to guide the PLA strikes.
To properly review this book would take many more pages and much more thought than an ad-hoc impression after an initial read. Alexander discusses much much more including the effects of foraging vs supply lines on manoeuvre and position, the impact of storm tactics, the various uses and misuses of the diverging column advance, the uses of feints, and implicitly, how information guides the field. Really a marvellous book. Should be read by anyone who wants to exercise their mind, and learn some interesting history. The only drawback is the reader often sighs and sometimes stops to catch his breath. But, given the tremendous value of the bool, this can easily be discounted. Highly recommended.
June 12, 2016
Bevin Alexander is an interesting fellow. He's a skillful and engaging writer of history. This book is filled with history's most proficient, intelligent and capable military leaders from Hannibal Barca to Douglas MacArthur. There are maps, descriptions of weapons, terrain, tactics and battle plans. BA even goes so far as to explain why he excludes certain generals such as U. S. Grant and Robert E. Lee from the line-up. I'm surprised it took me this long to finish a book this good but I've been busier than usual lately.
December 6, 2014
Read for political science class, and it was really interesting. A little dry- somewhat bland. Some chapters were more interesting then others. Meh.
September 7, 2018
Tough to follow the geography but very fascinating, I appreciate the strategy of battle
June 28, 2025
In How Great Generals Win Bevin Alexander gives several characteristics great generals share. First, they rarely make frontal assaults on heavily fortified positions. Such attacks frequently fail with high casualties. When they succeed, they usually achieve Pyric Victories that do little to advance the war aims of the generals who order them. Instead, they push the enemy back on lines of transportation and reinforcements.
Great generals usually attack a position like that from the side or from the rear. If they cannot do that, they bypass the position.
Second, great generals attack positions of critical importance to the enemy, when the enemy does not expect to be attacked there, and the position is lightly defended.
Third, the kind of man who is likely to be a great general is unlikely to be promoted to general. The kind of man who rises in a military hierarchy is likely to be a man with a perfectly kept uniform, a snappy salute, and a hearty “Can do, Sir!” attitude about life. A man like that will attack the enemy when, where, and how the enemy expects him to, and pay the price in casualties.
The kind of man who will become a great general is likely to have a rumpled uniform, and an ambivalent, questioning approach to life. He will be a loner, who would rather watch a play by Euripides than the Army Navy Game. If a man like that manages against the odds to be promoted to general, he will attack the enemy by the flank or from the rear, by surprise, and he will win important victories with few casualties.
I do not know if the Civil War Gen. Sherman liked plays by Euripides. Nevertheless, he avoided direct encounters with Confederate forces and concentrated on destroying the agricultural ability of the Confederacy. This made Confederate soldiers want to desert so they could defend their family’s farms. If they deserted, they were too disorganized to disrupt the efforts of Gen. Sherman’s forces. Alexander thinks Gen Sherman won the Civil War.
He thinks Gen. Grant, who is usually credited with winning the War, nearly lost it. This was because Grant specialized in frontal assaults on heavily fortified positions and suffered so many casualties that many people in the North were ready to negotiate a peace with the Confederacy.
During the War in Korea Gen. MacArthur did what Alexander recommended. He invaded Inchon when the North Koreans did not expect him to and captured it with few casualties. Then he blocked the only train track from North Korea to South Korea. When North Korean soldiers knew that they could not be supplied or reinforced, they retreated in a disorganized manner to North Korea.
At this point Gen. MacArthur made a catastrophic mistake. He tried to conquer all of North Korea, forgetting that the Chinese had valid security interests. In 1931 the Japanese invaded Manchuria through northern Korea and conquered it. The Chinese government told the Indian government, who had diplomatic relations with China and the United States, that the Chinese would not oppose South Korean troops in North Korea, but they would not let the American forces reach the Yalu River, which was the border between North Korea and China.
MacArthur thought the Chinese were bluffing. The Chinese were not.
MacArthur should have conquered the southern part of North Korea and left the northern part alone. What remained of North Korea would have served as a buffer zone between the U.S. Army and China. It would have been too small to threaten South Korea. A more restrained response to the aggression by North Korea would have achieved a better result, sooner, and at less cost.
The main shortcoming of this book is that there is no mention of the invasion of Normandy. The strongest German defenses were at Calais. The second strongest were at Normandy. Further south German defenses thinned out. Normandy had a port that the Allies wanted to unload soldiers and equipment for the liberation of France and the conquest of Germany. After establishing a bridgehead further south it would have been easy to turn around and take the German bunkers at Normandy from behind. Their guns were pointed toward the ocean. The bunkers could not turn around.
I am sure a landing zone further south was considered. I would have liked for Alexander to have explained why it was rejected.
Great generals usually attack a position like that from the side or from the rear. If they cannot do that, they bypass the position.
Second, great generals attack positions of critical importance to the enemy, when the enemy does not expect to be attacked there, and the position is lightly defended.
Third, the kind of man who is likely to be a great general is unlikely to be promoted to general. The kind of man who rises in a military hierarchy is likely to be a man with a perfectly kept uniform, a snappy salute, and a hearty “Can do, Sir!” attitude about life. A man like that will attack the enemy when, where, and how the enemy expects him to, and pay the price in casualties.
The kind of man who will become a great general is likely to have a rumpled uniform, and an ambivalent, questioning approach to life. He will be a loner, who would rather watch a play by Euripides than the Army Navy Game. If a man like that manages against the odds to be promoted to general, he will attack the enemy by the flank or from the rear, by surprise, and he will win important victories with few casualties.
I do not know if the Civil War Gen. Sherman liked plays by Euripides. Nevertheless, he avoided direct encounters with Confederate forces and concentrated on destroying the agricultural ability of the Confederacy. This made Confederate soldiers want to desert so they could defend their family’s farms. If they deserted, they were too disorganized to disrupt the efforts of Gen. Sherman’s forces. Alexander thinks Gen Sherman won the Civil War.
He thinks Gen. Grant, who is usually credited with winning the War, nearly lost it. This was because Grant specialized in frontal assaults on heavily fortified positions and suffered so many casualties that many people in the North were ready to negotiate a peace with the Confederacy.
During the War in Korea Gen. MacArthur did what Alexander recommended. He invaded Inchon when the North Koreans did not expect him to and captured it with few casualties. Then he blocked the only train track from North Korea to South Korea. When North Korean soldiers knew that they could not be supplied or reinforced, they retreated in a disorganized manner to North Korea.
At this point Gen. MacArthur made a catastrophic mistake. He tried to conquer all of North Korea, forgetting that the Chinese had valid security interests. In 1931 the Japanese invaded Manchuria through northern Korea and conquered it. The Chinese government told the Indian government, who had diplomatic relations with China and the United States, that the Chinese would not oppose South Korean troops in North Korea, but they would not let the American forces reach the Yalu River, which was the border between North Korea and China.
MacArthur thought the Chinese were bluffing. The Chinese were not.
MacArthur should have conquered the southern part of North Korea and left the northern part alone. What remained of North Korea would have served as a buffer zone between the U.S. Army and China. It would have been too small to threaten South Korea. A more restrained response to the aggression by North Korea would have achieved a better result, sooner, and at less cost.
The main shortcoming of this book is that there is no mention of the invasion of Normandy. The strongest German defenses were at Calais. The second strongest were at Normandy. Further south German defenses thinned out. Normandy had a port that the Allies wanted to unload soldiers and equipment for the liberation of France and the conquest of Germany. After establishing a bridgehead further south it would have been easy to turn around and take the German bunkers at Normandy from behind. Their guns were pointed toward the ocean. The bunkers could not turn around.
I am sure a landing zone further south was considered. I would have liked for Alexander to have explained why it was rejected.
December 23, 2021
I would give this a 5 star review but he seems a little too enthusiastic and naive about the communists.
Super fun book! I had been wanting to read more about Napoleon and the Mongols and I enjoyed those parts especially.
I think this is a better version but very similar to Liddel Harts book Strategy. He does a better job breaking up the terms and speaking about narrower specific strategies then the previous book by Hart which is obsessed with direct v indirect approach. In that book the terms get very obscure as he says Cannae was a great indirect approach to victory despite fighting head on. Alexander is much better at distinguishing and limiting the terms.
Some of the battles I wasn't familiar with were hard to follow but if you spend time with the maps it should be ok except maybe the mongol one. I got very lost in Turkistan.
His talking about MacArthur was interesting. I had read a novel about the first year of the war and it was nice to get a brief historical overview was nice. From all the reading I have done it seems the Allies did not beat the Germans because they were better tactically or strategically. Their just wasn't any way they were loosing once the Germans made a few mistakes. So when Vietnam and Korea started we thought we were superior in all aspects of war. When in reality we had some huge advantages in supply, tech, wealth, and numbers but we also had very real flaws. Success is a poor teacher to those who win but a professor to those who lose. As evidenced by Germany from ww1 to ww2.
Super fun book! I had been wanting to read more about Napoleon and the Mongols and I enjoyed those parts especially.
I think this is a better version but very similar to Liddel Harts book Strategy. He does a better job breaking up the terms and speaking about narrower specific strategies then the previous book by Hart which is obsessed with direct v indirect approach. In that book the terms get very obscure as he says Cannae was a great indirect approach to victory despite fighting head on. Alexander is much better at distinguishing and limiting the terms.
Some of the battles I wasn't familiar with were hard to follow but if you spend time with the maps it should be ok except maybe the mongol one. I got very lost in Turkistan.
His talking about MacArthur was interesting. I had read a novel about the first year of the war and it was nice to get a brief historical overview was nice. From all the reading I have done it seems the Allies did not beat the Germans because they were better tactically or strategically. Their just wasn't any way they were loosing once the Germans made a few mistakes. So when Vietnam and Korea started we thought we were superior in all aspects of war. When in reality we had some huge advantages in supply, tech, wealth, and numbers but we also had very real flaws. Success is a poor teacher to those who win but a professor to those who lose. As evidenced by Germany from ww1 to ww2.
September 30, 2017
As a student of military history and retired Army Logistics officer, I enjoyed Bevin Alexander's walk through history. He is absolutely correct in his summary, that throughout history great generals have sought to mystify, mislead, and surprise the enemy. And the most successful generals did it well.
I think he used a good survey of battles across history, though it would have been nice to see reference made to either Dien Bien Phu or some of the Vietnam War battles.
Overall, I found the book a good, fairly easy read. I agree with many of his choices, but could tell when he really liked a particular commander, such as Rommel.
I think he used a good survey of battles across history, though it would have been nice to see reference made to either Dien Bien Phu or some of the Vietnam War battles.
Overall, I found the book a good, fairly easy read. I agree with many of his choices, but could tell when he really liked a particular commander, such as Rommel.
October 6, 2025
This is filled with exceptional case studies of generals creatively achieving their objective through aggressive strategies. I remember virtually all the chapters from memory: Hannibal's and Scipio's great victories, Genghis Khan's conquests, Subutai's invasion of Europe, Napoleon's invasion of Italy, Stonewall Jackson's maneuvers in the Shenandoah, Sherman's march to Atlanta, the brilliant campaigns in Palestine in World War I that broke the stalemate of trench warfare, the blitzkrieg through France in 1940, and Rommel's magical victories in North Africa.
This influenced me profoundly and complemented my study of Sun Tzu and Theodore Ayrault Dodge.
This influenced me profoundly and complemented my study of Sun Tzu and Theodore Ayrault Dodge.
July 21, 2017
This is a dense book. It is written by a military historian for Military minds. As an avid reader there were certain perspectives I had never seen that Alexander expounded on. His chapter on Moa Zedong was fascinating, inspiring me to read up more into Chinese history.
Great book that gives brief histories of important military events.
Great book that gives brief histories of important military events.
August 13, 2020
An uninspired writing style in an effort to pump up the concept that a mobster who kills 20 people is a terrible criminal, a mobster who kills 10.000 and is ready to order the killing of many more is someone who deserves a big pension from the people who don't want their brains blown up on the sidewalk.
November 29, 2021
How did the Great Captains from antiquity and the likes of Scipio Africanus to MacArthur at Inchon make strategic decisions of consequence? Bevin Alexander unpacks the history of how the tactical and operational data on the ground influenced the generals and admirals in their thought processes throughout time in this 1993 piece.
July 17, 2022
This book is easy to read and makes a lot of interesting points, especially in the beginning. However, the book does not offer much new material for military history enthusiasts. I recommend this book for beginners interested in military history, especially cadets and young officers.
January 25, 2018
Dull. I listened to the audiobook so I didn't get to look at any maps.
October 10, 2020
A look at several generals and their battles.
March 29, 2021
“Mystify, mislead, and surprise”
July 8, 2025
good until it gets to the more modern generals and isn't good at keeping things together. maps sucked.
January 5, 2012
Excellent book. One of my new favorites.
Notice that most reviewers have a strong cultural bias, personally I was surprised the American civil war would even find a place in a review of great generals, but like the situation in Korea, I suppose it was used because of the depth of good supporting literature available. The reviews of Hannibal, Scipio, Kahn and Mao were each fantastic. I'm surprised Timur wasn't included amongst the great generals though.
The great general is like Janus.
One face is simple, open, and honest so that the troops love you and the military respects you (and promotes you).
One face is cunning, you must deceive your enemy, mystify him, surprise him.
Most generals are simpletons because the structure requires the simple, open and honest, yet they only think of direct solutions - which will not work if a) enemies are evenly matched or b) your enemy is a great general.
Be like a great general, be like Janus.
Principles of war do not change, because humans don't change. War is an art.
Operate on the line of least expectation and least resistance. Take risk marching over mountains, through swamps, or under oceans. The risks of nature are manageable, even the most dangerous. The risk of a head on attack is drastic and almost NEVER leads to a decisive victory because you just push the enemy back along his existing supply lines.
Supreme excellence consists of breaking the enemies will to fight, without fighting.
When you are weak, appear strong.
When you are near, appear far.
Get there first with the most (but you need to know where *there* is).
Mystify. Mislead. And surprise!
You must make you opponent believe that you are going to attack somewhere other than where you actually will attack - or put them on the horns of a dilemma, making them pick between defending one of two or more targets.
Most battles are won by attacking the rear, flank, or supply lines of the enemy.
War is political. You have no need to defeat the entire army on the battle field, to point destroy your enemies ability to make war.
Great generals do not repeat what has failed before. They do not send troops directly into a battle for which the enemy is prepared and waiting. On the contrary, great generals strike where they are least expected against opposition that is weak and disorganized.
One of the remarkable facts about great generals throughout history is—except in cases where they possessed overwhelming power—practically all their successful moves have been made against the enemy’s flank or rear, either actual or psychological. Great generals realize that a rear attack distracts, dislocates, and often defeats an enemy physically by cutting him off from his supplies, communications, and reinforcements; and mentally by undermining his confidence and sense of security. Great generals know a direct attack, on the other hand, consolidates an enemy’s defenses and, even if he is defeated, merely forces him back onto his reserves and his supplies.
Throughout history great generals have done what their enemies have least expected. Instead of direct, predictable attack, they have deceived, encircled, outflanked, out-thought, and triumphed over often superior armies commanded by conventional thinkers. Collected here are the stories of the most successful commanders of all time—among them Hannibal, Genghis Khan, Napoleon, Stonewall Jackson, Sherman, Rommel, Mao Zedong—who have demonstrated, at their own points in history, the strategic and tactical genius essential for victory. Ironically this virtue does not come naturally to military organizations, since more often than not the straight-ahead, narrow-thinking soldier will be promoted over his more original, more devious counterpart. Yet when the latter gets control, the results may be spectacular.
Notice that most reviewers have a strong cultural bias, personally I was surprised the American civil war would even find a place in a review of great generals, but like the situation in Korea, I suppose it was used because of the depth of good supporting literature available. The reviews of Hannibal, Scipio, Kahn and Mao were each fantastic. I'm surprised Timur wasn't included amongst the great generals though.
The great general is like Janus.
One face is simple, open, and honest so that the troops love you and the military respects you (and promotes you).
One face is cunning, you must deceive your enemy, mystify him, surprise him.
Most generals are simpletons because the structure requires the simple, open and honest, yet they only think of direct solutions - which will not work if a) enemies are evenly matched or b) your enemy is a great general.
Be like a great general, be like Janus.
Principles of war do not change, because humans don't change. War is an art.
Operate on the line of least expectation and least resistance. Take risk marching over mountains, through swamps, or under oceans. The risks of nature are manageable, even the most dangerous. The risk of a head on attack is drastic and almost NEVER leads to a decisive victory because you just push the enemy back along his existing supply lines.
Supreme excellence consists of breaking the enemies will to fight, without fighting.
When you are weak, appear strong.
When you are near, appear far.
Get there first with the most (but you need to know where *there* is).
Mystify. Mislead. And surprise!
You must make you opponent believe that you are going to attack somewhere other than where you actually will attack - or put them on the horns of a dilemma, making them pick between defending one of two or more targets.
Most battles are won by attacking the rear, flank, or supply lines of the enemy.
War is political. You have no need to defeat the entire army on the battle field, to point destroy your enemies ability to make war.
Great generals do not repeat what has failed before. They do not send troops directly into a battle for which the enemy is prepared and waiting. On the contrary, great generals strike where they are least expected against opposition that is weak and disorganized.
One of the remarkable facts about great generals throughout history is—except in cases where they possessed overwhelming power—practically all their successful moves have been made against the enemy’s flank or rear, either actual or psychological. Great generals realize that a rear attack distracts, dislocates, and often defeats an enemy physically by cutting him off from his supplies, communications, and reinforcements; and mentally by undermining his confidence and sense of security. Great generals know a direct attack, on the other hand, consolidates an enemy’s defenses and, even if he is defeated, merely forces him back onto his reserves and his supplies.
Throughout history great generals have done what their enemies have least expected. Instead of direct, predictable attack, they have deceived, encircled, outflanked, out-thought, and triumphed over often superior armies commanded by conventional thinkers. Collected here are the stories of the most successful commanders of all time—among them Hannibal, Genghis Khan, Napoleon, Stonewall Jackson, Sherman, Rommel, Mao Zedong—who have demonstrated, at their own points in history, the strategic and tactical genius essential for victory. Ironically this virtue does not come naturally to military organizations, since more often than not the straight-ahead, narrow-thinking soldier will be promoted over his more original, more devious counterpart. Yet when the latter gets control, the results may be spectacular.
June 10, 2013
Bevin Alexander's thesis is clear, succinct, and basically uncontroversial: great generals win by taking the path of least resistance and least expectation, enabling them to concentrate their greatest strength against their opponent's greatest weakness.
To support his thesis, Alexander describes the campaigns of some of history's most brilliant military captains, including Napoleon, Stonewall Jackson, and Heinz Guderian.
Alexander stresses the importance of avoiding a direct frontal assault, since such an attack completely nullifies the element of surprise, and even if successful to a point, merely pushes the enemy back on his supply lines. Far better is to attack the flanks, thereby causing confusion in the enemy's ranks while disturbing his supply lines.
This is probably a must-read for students of military history, although I would not recommend it for beginners as their first military history book. While the fundamental principles of war Alexander discusses should form the foundation of understanding how great generals win, the book's concepts and degree of detail make it a more difficult read for a neophyte than preferable.
To support his thesis, Alexander describes the campaigns of some of history's most brilliant military captains, including Napoleon, Stonewall Jackson, and Heinz Guderian.
Alexander stresses the importance of avoiding a direct frontal assault, since such an attack completely nullifies the element of surprise, and even if successful to a point, merely pushes the enemy back on his supply lines. Far better is to attack the flanks, thereby causing confusion in the enemy's ranks while disturbing his supply lines.
This is probably a must-read for students of military history, although I would not recommend it for beginners as their first military history book. While the fundamental principles of war Alexander discusses should form the foundation of understanding how great generals win, the book's concepts and degree of detail make it a more difficult read for a neophyte than preferable.
February 25, 2013
I learned about a number of conflicts about which I have never read before. I couldn't have told you the first thing about Genghis Khan and the Mongols until reading this book. Ditto for T.E. Lawrence in Palestine. Alexander is fairly clear in his explanations. That said, he tries a little too hard to bang every chapter into his framework, which is that great generals: (1) never assault an enemy frontally unless they have to do so; (2) succeed by flanking movements that end up on the enemy's rear; (3) stay in between enemy armies to prevent them from joining up; and (4) advance in multiple columns to hide the ultimate target. I'd appreciate some examples of instances where this strategy didn't work or where frontal assaults against a main force have been necessary and successful. Alexander would have more credibility if he addressed the exceptions to the rule.
August 12, 2013
Nice showcase of various battles through history and to some extent the author's interpretation. Seems like some stupid decisions made by governments could be entirely avoided had they done an in-depth (often "cold") analysis of an adversary and I did a quick check on wiki out of curiosity to see if he is either an adviser to planners in either government or military. (It would appear he is not.)
Would however note that I do not find it the least bit ironic that an innovator, such as Hannibal, would later see his own strategies used against him. Really is just sound tactics and maybe psychological too that if your opponent has the better idea, might as well take it and run with it versus poor (and often costly) to just stick with what you are doing if it is clearly not working.
Still a nice read and kind of a sampler for future readings.
Would however note that I do not find it the least bit ironic that an innovator, such as Hannibal, would later see his own strategies used against him. Really is just sound tactics and maybe psychological too that if your opponent has the better idea, might as well take it and run with it versus poor (and often costly) to just stick with what you are doing if it is clearly not working.
Still a nice read and kind of a sampler for future readings.
August 6, 2015
This book is staying in the section of my library mentally marked "How to kick rear end."
Unlike other books, this one correctly captures the nature of leadership as more than just something you can do. To be really audacious, the great general must take on the two-faced Janus nature. Perhaps more faces than that are necessary to get the job done depending on the situation.
This book also correctly deals with the political contexts and how great leaders are often unrecognized until it is too late.
While I don't agree with all his assessments, he is correct in slamming MacArthur, lamenting Scipio's lack of notoriety in subsequent generations, and that there might actually have been split Union if Stonewall Jackson had been listened to.
I highlighted a lot and plan to use these ideas a lot.
Unlike other books, this one correctly captures the nature of leadership as more than just something you can do. To be really audacious, the great general must take on the two-faced Janus nature. Perhaps more faces than that are necessary to get the job done depending on the situation.
This book also correctly deals with the political contexts and how great leaders are often unrecognized until it is too late.
While I don't agree with all his assessments, he is correct in slamming MacArthur, lamenting Scipio's lack of notoriety in subsequent generations, and that there might actually have been split Union if Stonewall Jackson had been listened to.
I highlighted a lot and plan to use these ideas a lot.
October 17, 2014
Thoroughly enjoyable and immensely informative. A relatively fair and balanced perspective on the generals who are examined. For the most part this book refrains from hero worship and instead demonstrates their military genius with clear examples.
Many great generals and their campaigns are missing, and those included aren't critiqued on battles or campaigns they lost. Apart from MacArthur, and this is only because the author experienced first hand how arrogant and self assured he was in Korea, and wanted to show how disastrous a general who thinks he is great can be.
Many great generals and their campaigns are missing, and those included aren't critiqued on battles or campaigns they lost. Apart from MacArthur, and this is only because the author experienced first hand how arrogant and self assured he was in Korea, and wanted to show how disastrous a general who thinks he is great can be.
August 2, 2015
Fascinating book about strategy and tactics employed by some of history's greatest captains of war. From Hannibal to MacArthur the author explains their genial concept of how to defeat an enemy. Except for MacArthur the author however does not go into great detail of how these geniuses got defeated (for example he only talks about Napoleon's Italy campaign, and not about Waterloo or the Russian campaign)
I would like to have seen in the book explained how by diverging from their principles these famous commanders did get eventually defeated.
I would like to have seen in the book explained how by diverging from their principles these famous commanders did get eventually defeated.
March 17, 2008
Alexander draws out key behaviors of victorious generals from Roman times to the Korean War. He focuses on 10 generals and highlights specific campaigns that featured or emphasized one or more of the key behaviors. This is a clear and direct piece of scholarship. Some of the maps in the book were less helpful than they could have been.
January 7, 2015
It was a pretty interesting book about strategies generals use to win battles. In most of the chapters, I enjoyed the introduction and the conclusion. I felt that sometimes in the middle of the chapter gets bogged down in the details.
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