An account of the career of the Civil War's master tactician argues that it was Lee's strategic timidity and not his prescience that prevented Jackson from striking north across the Potomac to force a peace. 15,000 first printing.
Bevin Alexander is an American military historian and author. He served as an officer during the Korean War as part of the 5th Historical Detachment. His book Korea: The First War We Lost was largely influenced by his experiences during the war.
Bevin has served as a consultant and adviser to several groups due to his military expertise, including work for the Rand Corporation, work as a consultant for military simulations instituted by the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, and as director of information at the University of Virginia in Charlottesville, Virginia. .
He was formerly on the president’s staff as director of information at the University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Va., and is a retired adjunct professor of history at Longwood University, in Farmville, Virginia.
This book is a real eye-opener. Studies of Southern generals in the Civil War generally fall under the spell of the Cult of Robert E. Lee. Alexander makes the case that Jackson was a true military revolutionary who grasped better than anyone else in the Rebel command the modern circumstances of war and how the tactics and methods of the time were hopelessly obsolete. Lee is depicted as a capable, and well-meaning, but outdated commander.
Jackson understood that the rifle had changed everything. Offense had ceded the advantage to defense. Jackson knew that massed ranks could not be withstand concentrated rifle and cannon fire. Jackson therefore repeatedly insisted that the Confederates, who were outgunned and had a weaker industrial infrastructure, should place their army in a strategic position where the Union had to attack them (such as between DC and Philadelphia). Then, on ground of their choosing, the Rebels would destroy the attacking Union armies and then counterattack. Repeatedly, Lee declined this advice, instead choosing to attack the Union wherever they happened to be.
As someone who feels that the nation benefited by the South's defeat, I'm glad Lee never listened to Jackson, otherwise the outcome of the war might have differed.
Bevin Alexander explores the daring strategy that Stonewall Jackson repeatedly tried to get Jefferson Davis and Robert E. Lee to approve. Jackson believed that the South would be overwhelmed by the North's resources. His solution was to strike north with his excellent troops plus more to be spent from the stalemate with McLellan outside Richmond. The North was still organizing and recruiting an army and they would be untrained recruits. He felt that if he struck north into Maryland quickly with his army (nicknamed the Foot Cavalry for their speed) he could threaten either Washington DC and Baltimore. Once he committed himself his army would overwhelm the disorganized militias that were guarding both cities. And once there he could resupply his troops through either port and then strike north to the manufacturing hub at Philadelphia. Destroying railroads and bridges as he went, isolating Washington and preventing reinforcements from reaching the capital. tryFrom Philly he would strike west and north doing the same to industry, railroads, and bridges. At some point as he rolled up victories in capitals of the nation and states England and France would likely intervene and force a peace on the North. Would this audacious plan work? We will never know. However, the strategy of Davis and Lee was doomed to failure by attrition. It is interesting to note that Jackson's strategy was similar to Sherman's march to the sea - cut loose from your supply base and keep moving forward, avoiding pitched battles and instead outmaneuver the enemy and keep them second-guessing. I was impressed by Alexander's account of what might have been.
Good information in this book, however the author would have you believe that the only reason the South lost the war is because Lee commanded the army instead of Jackson. While Stonewall was a brilliant field commander it is a fact that he lacked the temperament and the ability to see the big picture that was crucial to command the whole army.
The central thesis of this book, as the title suggests, is to demonstrate the military genius of Stonewall Jackson. It is true that Jackson was one of the best general in the American Civil War and perhaps THE best general in the war. Unfortunately, the author falls short, in my opinion, in proving real genius. The author does a good job in laying out the case as it relates to actions Jackson actually took but it is in the area of the 'could have been' that the case falls apart. The author spends too much time in explaining the failures and inadequacies of Robert E. Lee and attempts to use this as evidence of Jackson's 'genius.' It doesn't work. It is true that Jackson had many intriguing ideas for strategies that 'might' have worked but this is all speculation as he was never in the position to take these actions. Genius is not just about ideas. It also requires action, execution and adaptation.
The real bright spot of this book is the explanation the author gives to the 'new' technologies of the era and their impact on the tactics used. Jackson was, in fact, one of the first to realize the impact of the rifled musket on the tactical flow of battle. His realization lead to the rise of defensive tactics becoming the primary tactical method of victory but even he could not see all of the implications of this change. This point, to me, is the real value in this book. It helps to explain why cavalry in the ACW is no longer a shock attack force. It explains the relative rareness of successful bayonet charges. It explains why obviously brave men would break and run for battle only to reform and attack again.
Outstanding book. Best "Civil War" non-fiction book I've read in some time. The footnotes are worth reading as they are detailed and informative. A closing quote from the book describes the theme of the book: "Jackson was strong where Lee was weak thus the two commanders frequetly complemented each other in one of the most successful examples of symbiosis in warfare....Together Lee and Jackson produced...victories that astonished the world." The book gives battle by battle descriptions of these events as to how the battles developed from the results of the previous battle. It covers and enlightens the reader with a blend of minucia and major events leading up to the the death of Jackson. The promotion of Jackson as a military genius is effective. Authors writing style is easy to read. Recommend especialy if one has an interestin the Civil War.
A very interesting book, and a must-read for any serious student of the War Between the States. The author is able to interject a wealth of insight of Jackson, while at the same time providing detailed strategic and tactical information of the numerous battles fought by Jackson. While the author does not necessarily lambaste the military decisions made by Jackson’s superior, Robert E Lee, he does paint a vivid picture of the differences in opinions of warfare by the two Generals. The author is clearly a huge supporter and fan of Jackson, and his book offers up many glimpses of how the outcome of the war may have changed had Jackson’s initiatives been supported.
A great book, I'd always had the thought that Robert Lee wasn't a very good general, mostly based on how he failed at Gettysburg.
In this book we see time after time, Lee rejecting a brilliant strategic plan, and only wanting to plod along.
At Chancellorsville, Lee finally agreed to Jacksons plan, but after Jackson was shot, he abandoned it, and lost the chance to destroy the northern army.
I picked this up in a used bookstore while I was on summer holidays. I'm fascinated by American Civil War history, and have long admired Stonewall Jackson as an exceptional general who fought in that war. Though this book may give him a little too much credit with a whole lot of would'a, could'a, should'a kind of talk, it still provides a valuable glimpse of a great general.