Historian Shelia Fitzpatrick’s thesis is straightforward, and in some ways, obvious. However monstrous Stalin’s tyranny, he didn’t operate like a version of Ming the Merciless, issuing edicts from his Kremlin ice palace. Instead, Stalin worked for decades with a varied yet remarkably stable coterie of advisers and party officials who remained personally loyal throughout his reign. Moreover, this “team” managed to sustain its collective leadership of the Soviet Union after Stalin’s death in 1953 until Nikita Khrushchev took full power in 1957.
Fitzpatrick offers an important and often overlooked perspective on how Stalin wielded such unprecedented, brutal, and often erratic power for almost three decades, from the 1920s to his death. He did so by manipulating his inner circle, alternately praising and criticizing them, always ensuring that their chief loyalty was to him, and cutting down anyone whose stature seemed, even momentarily, to rival his own. His advisers may have held great authority in such areas as security, agriculture, and industry — even party affairs — but ultimately, they were all dependent on Stalin’s good will.
Who were the chief members of this team who, falling in and out of favor, largely survived the Stalin years — unlike millions of other victims, from party apparatchiks to peasants— who suffered death or the gulag? Vyacheslav Molotov, Anastas Mikoyan, Georgy Malenkov, Laventy Beria, Lazar Kaganovich, Grigory Ordzhonikidze, Klim Voroshilov, and later, Nikita Khrushchev. This is only a partial list of figures that cycled in and out of the leadership in these years. On Stalin’s Team, based on extensive archival research of Soviet Communist Party records, may be nirvana for Kremlinologists, but rather daunting for the general reader for whom many of the names are relatively unfamiliar.
The intense focus on the minutia of inter-group relations effectively conveys the claustrophobic quality of working within Stalin’s inner circle. But it also smothers the larger narrative of what Stalin’s policies meant for the country, and the world, when carried out by such zealous subordinates, each trying to outdo the other in loyalty to their leader. True, figures like Molotov and Beria had more latitude to question and even dissent from some of Stalin’s proposals. On the other hand, they could only preserve themselves, and their careers, by implementing such major policies as the enforced collectivization of agriculture, which led to a horrific famine in Ukraine, and signing off on the torture and execution that marked the Great Terror of the late 1930s.
The highpoint for the collective leadership may have been World War II, when Stalin needed every bit of political support after misjudging Hitler and presiding over an unprecedented military disaster in 1941, until the German advance stalled before Moscow and the turning-point victory at Stalingrad in 1942. This also would have been the only moment when the team could have united and collectively ousted Stalin. Their combination of loyalty and fear, however, was too great and the moment passed.
The coming of the Cold War and Stalin’s increasing paranoia crushed any hopes of a genuine political thaw in the late 1940s. For the first time, moreover, Stalin’s differences with his team members threatened their careers and even their lives. The most notorious example was the arrest of Molotov’s Jewish wife, who was imprisoned and exiled until Stalin’s death.
Fitzgerald portrays a diminished but dangerous Stalin in the postwar years, someone who hated to be alone, yet proceeded to arrest and interrogate members of his own extended family. As a result, Stalin became even more dependent on his inner political circle to accompany him in drunken late-night dinners while they still had responsibilities running party and government affairs. It comes as no surprise that chronic fatigue and ill health plagued them all.
Stalin’s paranoia peaked at the time of the concocted Doctor’s Plot in 1952, but fortunately he died before his plans could be implemented. The team executed Beria, the secret police chief whom the others feared most, but Fitzgerald argues that the collective leadership proved its strength and resilience by continuing to operate effectively until Khrushchev’s Anti-Party campaign ousted his rivals in the late 1950s.