What do you think?
Rate this book
Dialogues in Arab Politics
For decades, Arab states and societies have been involved in an ongoing conflict over the goals and norms of Arabism. In this comprehensive study, Michael Barnett explores the relationships between Arab identity, the meaning of Arabism, and desired regional order in the Middle East from 1920 to the present, focusing on Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia. Barnett examines the state system in four distinct time the mandate period to the establishment of the League of Arab States in 1945; 1945 through the Baghdad Pact of 1955; the Suez War through the 1967 war; and 1967 through the Gulf War. Within each of these time frames, the Arab states' relationship to unification, the West, and confrontation with Zionism are addressed.
Does Arab unity depend on excluding Western influences? Can an Arab state be at once Islamic and democratic? Why can't the Arab states agree on a common government? Barnett argues that the Arab states' symbolic and strategic interactions were responsible for the alterations in the norms of Arabism, and ultimately, the fragamentation that currently defines the region.
Does Arab unity depend on excluding Western influences? Can an Arab state be at once Islamic and democratic? Why can't the Arab states agree on a common government? Barnett argues that the Arab states' symbolic and strategic interactions were responsible for the alterations in the norms of Arabism, and ultimately, the fragamentation that currently defines the region.
394 pages, Paperback
First published October 5, 1998
2 people are currently reading
48 people want to read
About the author
Michael N. Barnett
17 books2 followersMichael N. Barnett is a Constructivist scholar and professor of international relations at the Elliott School of International Affairs, in Washington, D.C.. His research has been in the areas of international organizations, international relations theory, and Middle Eastern politics.
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews
August 17, 2018
Transitions in Political Identity
A rewarding and thoughtful refutation of neorealist interpretations of Middle Eastern politics favoured by the likes of John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt. The central thesis is that Arab policies have been determined not by the need for alliances based on material resources and capabilities rather the key determinant of behaviour has rested on cultural values and diplomatic maneuvering required to accumulate social capital and approval. This approach, called "Constructivism" (and indirectly the author) was introduced to me by reading some of the more recent work of Zeev Maoz. Barnett picks an interesting set of watershed events and probes the actions and reaction of Arab leaders to them.
Barnett divides the Arab world's modern era into 5 distinct periods, marked by watershed events. Following the collapse of Ottomanism (1) under the San Remo Convention (1920) and the system of Mandates created by the League of Nations the horizons of political aspiration contracted from the Ottoman Empire to individual States. Arabism was offered up as a dream of destiny linked by common language. (2) Following WW II the Arab League was created in 1945 with the purpose of creating coordination and common policy but in fact each of the participants tried to define this in terms of their own needs and advantages.
(3) The third phase is noted by regional alliances such as the Baghdad Pact (1955 - later called CENTO) when Iraq and Jordan sign an treaty with Turkey, Pakistan and Great Britain (with the US as a silent sponsor) in order to deter the Soviet Union. This alliance with the West, done without the approval of the Arab League, brings harsh condemnation from other members of the League, especially Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia. Further division occurs when Nasser decides to nationalize the Suez Canal. The footnotes that British Prime Minister Anthony Eden was having dinner with King Faysal (Iraq) and Nuri al-Said (Iraqi Prime Minister) at the time and they were horrified at the news, Said "urging Eden to strike at Egypt immediately and hard." (pp301)
The 2rd regional alliance explored is the United Arab Republic (UAR) created on Feb 1 1958, a prime example of rhetoric gone wrong. A Syrian delegation flies to Cairo proposing a joint state and joint chain of command in the name of Arab unity. Nasser is portrayed as a reluctant to take on Syria's structural and economic problems in addition to his own, yet having praised Arabism and the need for a common Arab front he is in a position of being unable to turn the offer down. Yemen joined the next month. However the problem of succession in Yemen came up the next year and Nasser was drawn into the resulting civil war. Jordan and Iraq responded by announcing their own Arab Federation based on Hashemite relations. The UAR was dissolved in 1961 when Syria left the union. The Arab Federation never even got off the ground - it became moot 5 months after it was proposed by fall of King Faysal and Nuri al-Said in a coup. Egypt creates the PLO, supposedly a creature of the Arab League, but the new organization has ambitions of it's own. In terms of rhetoric Arabism features prominently and is used to build up a sense of grievance and pride, but in practice it means whatever the speaker wants it to.
Next (4) is the humiliating Arab defeat of 1967. Arabism largely comes to mean the uplifting of local national sovereignties. King Hussein has to contend with an attempted PLO coup (Black September) and winds up expelling the PLO in 1972 which earns him some approbation from Syria and other members of the league while others nervously consider their own position. Sadat reverses course on Nasser's socialism and in the age of petrodollars seeks investment from the Gulf and capital and technology from the West. Following the 1973 war Sadat pursues a separate course, first signing the "Roger's Accords" and ending up with Camp David and the return of Sinai in 1979. For this Egypt is expelled from the Arab League, however in his scathing reply (pp 197) he responds that it was the Syrians "who slaughtered the Palestinians in Tall az-Za'tar" in Lebanon; King Hussain who slaughtered them in Amman in 1970 and Iraq had contributed little both in effort and materiel. The final era (5) is begins the first Gulf War. Saddam Hussein invades Kuwait and the Gulf States invite the Americans and the "coalition of the willing" to take him on rather than pit Arab brother against Arab brother.
Surprisingly Israel and the Palestinian issue come up more as an political object rather than as a subject. Palestinianism was largely used to accumulate social capital and public cachet. Which is not to say that the Israelis lacked reason to be concerned - public displays of competing pride could certainly lead to actual conflict. Yet in spite of public opposition to Zionism and pronouncements of support for the Palestinians, actual state involvement were quite modest. Barnett mentions a 1994 economic conference in Casablanca, attended by Israeli foreign minister Shimon Peres indicating progress in low level economic and diplomatic contacts. (pp 223/224)
Dialogues finishes in 1998. Since then we've had a great deal of history leading up to the present "Arab Spring". Instead of Arabism the growing unifying ideal appears to be Islam, but as before there is a strong possibility that each national group will interpret this differently while believing they agree.
The historical coverage is generally good and and he constructivist framework makes sense. There is a major omission of the bloody civil war in Algeria and IMV the author missed bringing up the animousity between Arafat and Assad (Assad backed the PFLP) which led to the PLO bypassing Syria for Lebanon and the coverage of Soviet/Arab relations could have been more detailed. Each of these topics would have fit in with the author's framework.
Barnett targets his writing towards political policy analysts and academics as opposed to a general audience. Nonetheless I found it an informative and satisfying read.
Highly recommended!
A rewarding and thoughtful refutation of neorealist interpretations of Middle Eastern politics favoured by the likes of John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt. The central thesis is that Arab policies have been determined not by the need for alliances based on material resources and capabilities rather the key determinant of behaviour has rested on cultural values and diplomatic maneuvering required to accumulate social capital and approval. This approach, called "Constructivism" (and indirectly the author) was introduced to me by reading some of the more recent work of Zeev Maoz. Barnett picks an interesting set of watershed events and probes the actions and reaction of Arab leaders to them.
Barnett divides the Arab world's modern era into 5 distinct periods, marked by watershed events. Following the collapse of Ottomanism (1) under the San Remo Convention (1920) and the system of Mandates created by the League of Nations the horizons of political aspiration contracted from the Ottoman Empire to individual States. Arabism was offered up as a dream of destiny linked by common language. (2) Following WW II the Arab League was created in 1945 with the purpose of creating coordination and common policy but in fact each of the participants tried to define this in terms of their own needs and advantages.
(3) The third phase is noted by regional alliances such as the Baghdad Pact (1955 - later called CENTO) when Iraq and Jordan sign an treaty with Turkey, Pakistan and Great Britain (with the US as a silent sponsor) in order to deter the Soviet Union. This alliance with the West, done without the approval of the Arab League, brings harsh condemnation from other members of the League, especially Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia. Further division occurs when Nasser decides to nationalize the Suez Canal. The footnotes that British Prime Minister Anthony Eden was having dinner with King Faysal (Iraq) and Nuri al-Said (Iraqi Prime Minister) at the time and they were horrified at the news, Said "urging Eden to strike at Egypt immediately and hard." (pp301)
The 2rd regional alliance explored is the United Arab Republic (UAR) created on Feb 1 1958, a prime example of rhetoric gone wrong. A Syrian delegation flies to Cairo proposing a joint state and joint chain of command in the name of Arab unity. Nasser is portrayed as a reluctant to take on Syria's structural and economic problems in addition to his own, yet having praised Arabism and the need for a common Arab front he is in a position of being unable to turn the offer down. Yemen joined the next month. However the problem of succession in Yemen came up the next year and Nasser was drawn into the resulting civil war. Jordan and Iraq responded by announcing their own Arab Federation based on Hashemite relations. The UAR was dissolved in 1961 when Syria left the union. The Arab Federation never even got off the ground - it became moot 5 months after it was proposed by fall of King Faysal and Nuri al-Said in a coup. Egypt creates the PLO, supposedly a creature of the Arab League, but the new organization has ambitions of it's own. In terms of rhetoric Arabism features prominently and is used to build up a sense of grievance and pride, but in practice it means whatever the speaker wants it to.
Next (4) is the humiliating Arab defeat of 1967. Arabism largely comes to mean the uplifting of local national sovereignties. King Hussein has to contend with an attempted PLO coup (Black September) and winds up expelling the PLO in 1972 which earns him some approbation from Syria and other members of the league while others nervously consider their own position. Sadat reverses course on Nasser's socialism and in the age of petrodollars seeks investment from the Gulf and capital and technology from the West. Following the 1973 war Sadat pursues a separate course, first signing the "Roger's Accords" and ending up with Camp David and the return of Sinai in 1979. For this Egypt is expelled from the Arab League, however in his scathing reply (pp 197) he responds that it was the Syrians "who slaughtered the Palestinians in Tall az-Za'tar" in Lebanon; King Hussain who slaughtered them in Amman in 1970 and Iraq had contributed little both in effort and materiel. The final era (5) is begins the first Gulf War. Saddam Hussein invades Kuwait and the Gulf States invite the Americans and the "coalition of the willing" to take him on rather than pit Arab brother against Arab brother.
Surprisingly Israel and the Palestinian issue come up more as an political object rather than as a subject. Palestinianism was largely used to accumulate social capital and public cachet. Which is not to say that the Israelis lacked reason to be concerned - public displays of competing pride could certainly lead to actual conflict. Yet in spite of public opposition to Zionism and pronouncements of support for the Palestinians, actual state involvement were quite modest. Barnett mentions a 1994 economic conference in Casablanca, attended by Israeli foreign minister Shimon Peres indicating progress in low level economic and diplomatic contacts. (pp 223/224)
Dialogues finishes in 1998. Since then we've had a great deal of history leading up to the present "Arab Spring". Instead of Arabism the growing unifying ideal appears to be Islam, but as before there is a strong possibility that each national group will interpret this differently while believing they agree.
The historical coverage is generally good and and he constructivist framework makes sense. There is a major omission of the bloody civil war in Algeria and IMV the author missed bringing up the animousity between Arafat and Assad (Assad backed the PFLP) which led to the PLO bypassing Syria for Lebanon and the coverage of Soviet/Arab relations could have been more detailed. Each of these topics would have fit in with the author's framework.
Barnett targets his writing towards political policy analysts and academics as opposed to a general audience. Nonetheless I found it an informative and satisfying read.
Highly recommended!
September 29, 2012
Very compact theory that replaces realism's assumption of anarchy with Arabist norms and states with regimes as the principle actors. In other words, international relations in the Arab world can be explained by looking at the decisions made by regimes within the context of Arab nationalism. What's more, is Arab nationalism is not constant but is shaped by the very regimes that act within it. It is brilliant, and worth the read for anyone studying the Middle East or international relations.
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews