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The J Curve: A New Way to Understand Why Nations Rise and Fall
An international expert presents an analysis of why and how nations make business decisions while demonstrating how the U.S. can best act in its own interests, revealing how the examples of Saddam Hussein and Fidel Castro can inform us about North Korea's Kim Jong-il, the role America should take in strengthening China's economy, and the importance of acting in Saudi Arabia before it is broken apart. 40,000 first printing.
320 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2006
61 people are currently reading
1073 people want to read
About the author
Ian Bremmer
34 books376 followersIan Bremmer (born November 12, 1969) is an American political scientist specializing in US foreign policy, states in transition, and global political risk. He is the president and founder of Eurasia Group, a leading global political risk research and consulting firm, and a professor at Columbia University. Eurasia Group provides financial, corporate, and government clients with information and insight on how political developments move markets. Bremmer is of Armenian and German descent.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 49 reviews
April 8, 2009
To me, the J Curve is an extrapolation of the tenet that as long as the masses are fed, they will remain complicit. A pervasive insinuation throughout the book is that the richer the majority of people in a nation are, the more stable the government. It's hard to argue with this stance, since a quick look at revolutions in the last 200 years bears this out. Regime change brought about by insurrection was often preceded by abject poverty, and severe social and infrastructure decline. This idea has been visited by historians often.
However, Bremmer couples that idea with political openness. He draws a causal relationship between prosperity and governmental stability, while simultaneously drawing a connection between political isolation and authoritarianism. The concept is intriguing, and his modern examples support the claim.
I have two major qualms with the book, resulting in 4/5 stars. One, it's boring. It took me a couple weeks to slog through the historical narrative. Second, the main concept is unquantifiable. It's hard to lend credence to "steepness" of the curve, if one cannot quantize the openness of a regime, or the stability of the nation. What units do you use to measure openness or stability? There are many indicators to these adjectives, but they're not exactly measurable. However, I concede the point that my mathematical irks aside, Bremmer makes a strong argument.
One last thing that I appreciate about this book is that it provides useful advice for future Western foreign policy. It doesn't just throw out an idea and give some history, it actually provides perspective and a path forward. What's better is that the events of today's news can easily be seen in the context of the J Curve, which is immensely useful in understanding the actions of our political leaders.
However, Bremmer couples that idea with political openness. He draws a causal relationship between prosperity and governmental stability, while simultaneously drawing a connection between political isolation and authoritarianism. The concept is intriguing, and his modern examples support the claim.
I have two major qualms with the book, resulting in 4/5 stars. One, it's boring. It took me a couple weeks to slog through the historical narrative. Second, the main concept is unquantifiable. It's hard to lend credence to "steepness" of the curve, if one cannot quantize the openness of a regime, or the stability of the nation. What units do you use to measure openness or stability? There are many indicators to these adjectives, but they're not exactly measurable. However, I concede the point that my mathematical irks aside, Bremmer makes a strong argument.
One last thing that I appreciate about this book is that it provides useful advice for future Western foreign policy. It doesn't just throw out an idea and give some history, it actually provides perspective and a path forward. What's better is that the events of today's news can easily be seen in the context of the J Curve, which is immensely useful in understanding the actions of our political leaders.
October 22, 2007
I wrote Ian Bremmer a fairly detailed email about what he thought about several West African democracies, more specifically Mali/Senegal, that is to say, if they match a bulk of the criteria which predicate a free openly democratic society why is it that they are in such dismal economic disarray? He wrote me back an even more in-depth email, which I thought was fantastic! He likes to use the J-curve analogy as often as possible, thus he made use of the open forum for a very predictable response, paraphrased - "every nation's J-curve is different". So not exactly what I wanted, but it was cool for him to speak to me so intimately like that. One point that I like was his idea about the right for every individual to have access to free and independent media outlets. I thought of Mali instantly, Mali has a plethora of local radio outlets all over, and that is one of the pre-conditions to a functioning democracy. Bremmer agreed. I guess I just wanted a sounding board for my thoughts and it was cool to get an expert's input sent to my inbox. I enjoyed the book, but would have appreciated a more in-depth look at the economics at work, a introduction to how economics work in closed societies or recently emerging market economies.
January 24, 2026
Mission 2026: Binge reviewing all previous Reads, I was too slothful to review back when I read them.
Reading Ian Bremmer’s 'The J Curve' felt like revisiting an old geopolitical map with new anxieties penciled into the margins. First published in the mid-2000s but still circulating energetically in policy and business circles, the book proposes a deceptively simple model: a nation’s stability and prosperity can be plotted along a J-shaped curve defined by openness and political control.
At the top of the curve sit open, democratic, globally integrated states; at the other end, closed authoritarian regimes. In between lies the dangerous dip — the zone of transition, where states liberalise without yet building resilient institutions, and where instability thrives.
The appeal of the J Curve is immediate. Bremmer offers clarity in a world of complexity, a visual metaphor that promises to explain why some countries collapse when they reform, while others flourish. As someone reading this long after the optimism of post–Cold War globalisation has frayed, I found the book both illuminating and revealing of its time — confident, managerial, and deeply shaped by a belief in global integration as destiny.
Bremmer’s core argument is that openness is not a linear path to stability. Closed systems can be remarkably stable, not because they are just or prosperous, but because control suppresses dissent and uncertainty. When such systems begin to open—economically, politically, or culturally—they often destabilise faster than they improve. Institutions lag behind expectations. Social contracts dissolve before new ones form. The result is vulnerability: to populism, violence, corruption, and collapse.
This insight is not trivial. Bremmer pushes back against naive assumptions that liberalisation automatically produces order. He insists that transitions are the most perilous phase in a nation’s life cycle. This is where revolutions stall, reforms backfire, and external actors miscalculate. The book’s examples—drawn from post-Soviet states, Latin America, the Middle East, and parts of Asia—illustrate how partial openness can be worse than none at all.
What gives the book its distinctive tone is Bremmer’s background in political risk analysis. 'The J Curve' is not primarily written for scholars or activists, but for investors, policymakers, and corporate strategists. The implicit question running through the book is not only 'Why do states fail? ' but 'where is it safe to engage, invest, or intervene?' This orientation shapes both the strengths and limitations of the work.
Bremmer is at his best when describing how states manage control. He shows how authoritarian regimes maintain stability through information monopolies, patronage networks, and coercive capacity. China, in particular, emerges as a case study in strategic partial openness—economically integrated, politically closed, and highly attentive to the risks of liberalisation. Bremmer does not predict China’s collapse; instead, he treats it as a state deliberately trying to remain on the stable end of the curve without falling into the transitional abyss.
The treatment of openness is more ambiguous. Bremmer defines it broadly — encompassing free markets, political pluralism, rule of law, and global integration — but tends to treat these as a bundle rather than distinct variables. This can flatten important differences. Economic openness without political reform behaves differently from political liberalization without institutional capacity. The J Curve risks oversimplifying these dynamics in pursuit of elegance.
Reading the book, it is impossible not to test its claims against recent history. The Arab Spring fits Bremmer’s model almost too perfectly: regimes loosened control, expectations surged, institutions failed to adapt, and instability followed.
But other cases complicate the curve. Long-standing democracies experiencing democratic backsliding, polarization, and institutional decay challenge the idea that openness guarantees stability at the top of the curve.
This is where the book begins to show its age. Bremmer largely assumes that open societies, once consolidated, remain stable unless disrupted by external shocks. The last decade has demonstrated that openness itself can generate new forms of fragility: information overload, disinformation, cultural fragmentation, and loss of institutional trust. The J Curve does not fully account for internal decay within openness.
Another limitation is the book’s state-centric lens. Bremmer treats nations as coherent actors managing their position on the curve. But globalization has weakened state sovereignty in uneven ways. Capital, technology, and culture often move faster than governments can regulate. This creates vulnerabilities that are not simply transitional but structural. The curve does not easily capture these asymmetries.
That said, the book remains valuable precisely because it forces readers to think about stability as a political achievement rather than a moral condition. Bremmer does not romanticize instability in the name of freedom. He warns that premature reform can destroy lives and institutions. This is an uncomfortable message, especially for readers inclined toward liberal interventionism, but it is a necessary one.
What I appreciated most was Bremmer’s insistence that reform must be sequenced. Institutions matter more than intentions. Rule of law, administrative capacity, and social trust cannot be conjured overnight. External pressure to liberalize — whether through markets, aid conditionality, or diplomacy — can push states into the dangerous middle of the curve without providing tools for survival.
At the same time, Bremmer’s tone sometimes veers toward technocratic fatalism. The suffering experienced in transitional states is often treated as risk rather than tragedy. Human costs appear as data points rather than lived realities. This is not cruelty so much as distance, but it leaves the book emotionally cool.
Stylistically, 'The J Curve' is clear, brisk, and designed to persuade. Bremmer writes with confidence, using case studies selectively to reinforce his model. The prose is accessible, even when the ideas are complex. This accessibility is part of the book’s success, but it also means nuance is occasionally sacrificed for momentum.
In the context of my 2024 reading list—alongside works on genocide, nationalism, imperial strategy, and political thought — 'The J Curve' felt like a bridge between theory and application. It lacks the moral depth of Samantha Power or the historical sweep of Ikenberry, but it offers a pragmatic framework for thinking about power, reform, and risk.
The book’s most enduring contribution is its challenge to linear narratives of progress. It reminds readers that change is dangerous, that stability can coexist with repression, and that good intentions do not guarantee good outcomes. These are lessons that remain relevant in a world still grappling with failed states, stalled revolutions, and fragile democracies.
'The J Curve' ultimately reflects the anxieties of a globalized age that believed integration was inevitable but feared its costs. Reading it now, after those assumptions have been shaken, the curve feels less predictive and more diagnostic — a tool for understanding why transitions hurt, not a map for avoiding pain altogether.
If the book sometimes overpromises with its metaphor, it nonetheless succeeds in forcing hard questions about timing, capacity, and humility in international engagement. For that reason alone, it remains worth revisiting — not as prophecy, but as a cautionary lens on the politics of change.
Most recommended.
Reading Ian Bremmer’s 'The J Curve' felt like revisiting an old geopolitical map with new anxieties penciled into the margins. First published in the mid-2000s but still circulating energetically in policy and business circles, the book proposes a deceptively simple model: a nation’s stability and prosperity can be plotted along a J-shaped curve defined by openness and political control.
At the top of the curve sit open, democratic, globally integrated states; at the other end, closed authoritarian regimes. In between lies the dangerous dip — the zone of transition, where states liberalise without yet building resilient institutions, and where instability thrives.
The appeal of the J Curve is immediate. Bremmer offers clarity in a world of complexity, a visual metaphor that promises to explain why some countries collapse when they reform, while others flourish. As someone reading this long after the optimism of post–Cold War globalisation has frayed, I found the book both illuminating and revealing of its time — confident, managerial, and deeply shaped by a belief in global integration as destiny.
Bremmer’s core argument is that openness is not a linear path to stability. Closed systems can be remarkably stable, not because they are just or prosperous, but because control suppresses dissent and uncertainty. When such systems begin to open—economically, politically, or culturally—they often destabilise faster than they improve. Institutions lag behind expectations. Social contracts dissolve before new ones form. The result is vulnerability: to populism, violence, corruption, and collapse.
This insight is not trivial. Bremmer pushes back against naive assumptions that liberalisation automatically produces order. He insists that transitions are the most perilous phase in a nation’s life cycle. This is where revolutions stall, reforms backfire, and external actors miscalculate. The book’s examples—drawn from post-Soviet states, Latin America, the Middle East, and parts of Asia—illustrate how partial openness can be worse than none at all.
What gives the book its distinctive tone is Bremmer’s background in political risk analysis. 'The J Curve' is not primarily written for scholars or activists, but for investors, policymakers, and corporate strategists. The implicit question running through the book is not only 'Why do states fail? ' but 'where is it safe to engage, invest, or intervene?' This orientation shapes both the strengths and limitations of the work.
Bremmer is at his best when describing how states manage control. He shows how authoritarian regimes maintain stability through information monopolies, patronage networks, and coercive capacity. China, in particular, emerges as a case study in strategic partial openness—economically integrated, politically closed, and highly attentive to the risks of liberalisation. Bremmer does not predict China’s collapse; instead, he treats it as a state deliberately trying to remain on the stable end of the curve without falling into the transitional abyss.
The treatment of openness is more ambiguous. Bremmer defines it broadly — encompassing free markets, political pluralism, rule of law, and global integration — but tends to treat these as a bundle rather than distinct variables. This can flatten important differences. Economic openness without political reform behaves differently from political liberalization without institutional capacity. The J Curve risks oversimplifying these dynamics in pursuit of elegance.
Reading the book, it is impossible not to test its claims against recent history. The Arab Spring fits Bremmer’s model almost too perfectly: regimes loosened control, expectations surged, institutions failed to adapt, and instability followed.
But other cases complicate the curve. Long-standing democracies experiencing democratic backsliding, polarization, and institutional decay challenge the idea that openness guarantees stability at the top of the curve.
This is where the book begins to show its age. Bremmer largely assumes that open societies, once consolidated, remain stable unless disrupted by external shocks. The last decade has demonstrated that openness itself can generate new forms of fragility: information overload, disinformation, cultural fragmentation, and loss of institutional trust. The J Curve does not fully account for internal decay within openness.
Another limitation is the book’s state-centric lens. Bremmer treats nations as coherent actors managing their position on the curve. But globalization has weakened state sovereignty in uneven ways. Capital, technology, and culture often move faster than governments can regulate. This creates vulnerabilities that are not simply transitional but structural. The curve does not easily capture these asymmetries.
That said, the book remains valuable precisely because it forces readers to think about stability as a political achievement rather than a moral condition. Bremmer does not romanticize instability in the name of freedom. He warns that premature reform can destroy lives and institutions. This is an uncomfortable message, especially for readers inclined toward liberal interventionism, but it is a necessary one.
What I appreciated most was Bremmer’s insistence that reform must be sequenced. Institutions matter more than intentions. Rule of law, administrative capacity, and social trust cannot be conjured overnight. External pressure to liberalize — whether through markets, aid conditionality, or diplomacy — can push states into the dangerous middle of the curve without providing tools for survival.
At the same time, Bremmer’s tone sometimes veers toward technocratic fatalism. The suffering experienced in transitional states is often treated as risk rather than tragedy. Human costs appear as data points rather than lived realities. This is not cruelty so much as distance, but it leaves the book emotionally cool.
Stylistically, 'The J Curve' is clear, brisk, and designed to persuade. Bremmer writes with confidence, using case studies selectively to reinforce his model. The prose is accessible, even when the ideas are complex. This accessibility is part of the book’s success, but it also means nuance is occasionally sacrificed for momentum.
In the context of my 2024 reading list—alongside works on genocide, nationalism, imperial strategy, and political thought — 'The J Curve' felt like a bridge between theory and application. It lacks the moral depth of Samantha Power or the historical sweep of Ikenberry, but it offers a pragmatic framework for thinking about power, reform, and risk.
The book’s most enduring contribution is its challenge to linear narratives of progress. It reminds readers that change is dangerous, that stability can coexist with repression, and that good intentions do not guarantee good outcomes. These are lessons that remain relevant in a world still grappling with failed states, stalled revolutions, and fragile democracies.
'The J Curve' ultimately reflects the anxieties of a globalized age that believed integration was inevitable but feared its costs. Reading it now, after those assumptions have been shaken, the curve feels less predictive and more diagnostic — a tool for understanding why transitions hurt, not a map for avoiding pain altogether.
If the book sometimes overpromises with its metaphor, it nonetheless succeeds in forcing hard questions about timing, capacity, and humility in international engagement. For that reason alone, it remains worth revisiting — not as prophecy, but as a cautionary lens on the politics of change.
Most recommended.
April 20, 2009
The main thesis of this book goes like this: For every degree of openess in a country, there is less stability, and on the contrary for every degree of stability, the measure of openess is limited. It is interesting thought, worth pondering. But I must say this seems a bit simplistic, the author even admits his theory fails to explain the case of Singapore & Dubai, 2 highly closed countries yet stable in every way.
September 26, 2015
The most important idea from this book is the foreign policy implication in the conclusion. Bremmer suggests that policy experts consider how policy affects both supply AND demand. So, for example, one would seek to address both the demand for drugs and the supply for drugs. Or one would address both the supply of terrorism (by bombing them/knocking out their communications) and the demand for terrorism(economic growth/help stability of countries in the area, etc.)
July 3, 2010
I tried to understand it. I found the author from an interview on The Daily Show with John Stewart. I blame the school system and the mainstream media for the fact that I cannot comprehend complex subjects unless they are broken up into two minute segments.
November 10, 2011
The J Curve describes how stable a government is. On the left indicates instability and an authoritarian type rule. On the right indicates a more stable rule as in a democracy. The more stable a society is, the more likely they are to overcome a shock, such as a natural disaster.
May 20, 2009
Sound and straight-forward idea explained over and over in a hundred pages to many.
December 17, 2010
This is not a book. It is an essay posing as a book.
January 27, 2022
Straightforward and inspiring.
By bringing up with the J Curve, Ian shows us a correlation between stability and openness. The left side is steep, and the right side is relatively smooth, a dip in the middle.
When a country is bracing openness, unavoidably it will go through a period of instability-the price of democracy. At this time, some countries may quickly shift back to autocracy, after all erecting a wall is much more easy than a long transition to stability. But the problem is that this system cannot be sustained in the long term, as it highly relies on a specific person or a group of people, not the institutions. Whenever the flaws are exposed and exacerbated, the society will undergo a huge unrest. In contrast, for democratic countries, even though there’s instability, as people have a common belief in the institutions, it can be absorbed and digested.
An impetuous change to the right side also cannot persist, as the process of openness is a long way, after all building consensus is not an easy job. Really shocked at India’s democracy, a country with such a high degree of diversity( language, religion, caste, factions…) can manage to do that. India and China’s mirror images are also intriguing. One with open politics and closed economics, the other opens economically, but remains politically closed. Btw: which country’s economy is more open today?
China’s path is an outlier from a global view, and let’s see whether it will work in the end. Ps. What about Singapore? What’s the difference between these two countries?
How to pull the left side to the right? Isolation will only push them away. “Openness enables change. Change is an essential ingredient in growth and prosperity.”
But for the US facing China, the problem today is: why if the left side can erode and undermine the right side? In this way, the US also takes a “short-sighted” approach.
By bringing up with the J Curve, Ian shows us a correlation between stability and openness. The left side is steep, and the right side is relatively smooth, a dip in the middle.
When a country is bracing openness, unavoidably it will go through a period of instability-the price of democracy. At this time, some countries may quickly shift back to autocracy, after all erecting a wall is much more easy than a long transition to stability. But the problem is that this system cannot be sustained in the long term, as it highly relies on a specific person or a group of people, not the institutions. Whenever the flaws are exposed and exacerbated, the society will undergo a huge unrest. In contrast, for democratic countries, even though there’s instability, as people have a common belief in the institutions, it can be absorbed and digested.
An impetuous change to the right side also cannot persist, as the process of openness is a long way, after all building consensus is not an easy job. Really shocked at India’s democracy, a country with such a high degree of diversity( language, religion, caste, factions…) can manage to do that. India and China’s mirror images are also intriguing. One with open politics and closed economics, the other opens economically, but remains politically closed. Btw: which country’s economy is more open today?
China’s path is an outlier from a global view, and let’s see whether it will work in the end. Ps. What about Singapore? What’s the difference between these two countries?
How to pull the left side to the right? Isolation will only push them away. “Openness enables change. Change is an essential ingredient in growth and prosperity.”
But for the US facing China, the problem today is: why if the left side can erode and undermine the right side? In this way, the US also takes a “short-sighted” approach.
December 24, 2025
the Wilde Amazone
Very mediocre
6/10
I had really high expectations for this book based on the summary and the reviews but finished it with a feeling that can be described as "blah."
The author is definitely smart and he has a good writing style that is very accessible. However, the theory and the argument is unfocused at best.
While I learned a little history, I'm still wondering really the "so what?" from the book.
The author merely makes a statement about how he sees countries on a very limited framework.
Even when he doesn't go into a historical tangent and even when he doesn't try to force a country into his own little graph, he fails to make the connection as to why this information is useful.
Sure, he gives some broad policy suggestions which I find humorous in their simplicity, but other than that he doesn't bring his 'theory' into a logical package which can be used as a predictive tool or anything useful to well, anyone.
Maybe he was pressured to turn his thoughts into the "Freakonomics of international relations" or however the review went (leaving aside the obvious criticisms from that analogy) and turned what could've been a useful idea into something that is easier to digest but lacking in substance.
Again, I did learn some things and it is valuable to learn how other people see things (even if it is unfocused), but overall this book left me wanting.
Would I recommend it?
If you want just some interesting reading that is just easy, then sure....
if you're looking to get something from it and are hoping to read a legit theory, then no, I would definitely not recommend it.
Shawn C
March 1, 2018
The author's premise is that a nation's behavior can be charted on a graph with the vertical axis representing "stability" and the horizontal axis "openness". The curve looks like a distorted, elongated "U", or a "J" on its side. Authoritarian regimes such as North Korea are on the left side of the curve, and democracies such as the US are on the right. Countries that slide down the curve from either side will fall into a state of instability.
The book was published in 2006, but it is surprising how little has changed in 12 years. Of the twelve nations discussed in the book, nine are still in the news today. The author provides brief histories of each country, plus an explanation of their current political situation. A good book for those that are intrigued but sometimes baffled by current world events.
The book was published in 2006, but it is surprising how little has changed in 12 years. Of the twelve nations discussed in the book, nine are still in the news today. The author provides brief histories of each country, plus an explanation of their current political situation. A good book for those that are intrigued but sometimes baffled by current world events.
May 29, 2021
The book is building a great analysis tool called J curve to study the political risk of many countries and predict how these countries will respond to political and economic shocks. It provides selective examples of countries that lay in different areas of the J curve between stability and openness.
Although the book is interesting and informative, I was not convinced by the author hypothesis that there is one face of globalization and that countries have to be laid between stability and openness axis, even though countries have different tools for stability such as democratic institutions, money, oil, police etc. he emphasized mostly on political and economic tools, and that is why China for example was not a clear case, for the author, as it is mixing its policies between different tools to preserve its internal stability besides opening up its economy with the world.
Although the book is interesting and informative, I was not convinced by the author hypothesis that there is one face of globalization and that countries have to be laid between stability and openness axis, even though countries have different tools for stability such as democratic institutions, money, oil, police etc. he emphasized mostly on political and economic tools, and that is why China for example was not a clear case, for the author, as it is mixing its policies between different tools to preserve its internal stability besides opening up its economy with the world.
October 2, 2025
This book comes from the perspective of a broad worldview. It touches on several countries but does a good job of laying out similarities and differences between many of the countries. Bremmer also provides much needed and often overlooked historical context for the countries mentioned. Reading in 2025, it gave a great insight on how accurate much of what he predictive indeed has occurred. Overall a great read with much to discuss after.
April 9, 2025
It felt like sections were quite repetitive in the economic theory but it was interesting to read about the history of different countries. Although it was written almost 20 years ago, the material still felt relevant to today’s world and provided food for thought about the current geopolitical and economic happenings. Overall, it was a fine read but I didn’t find myself reaching for it.
May 7, 2017
A bit dated since it was published back in 2006, nevertheless Bremmer's take on why and how authoritarian regimes eventually either slip into anarchy or move towards a more democratic form of rule is still relevant.
August 2, 2021
Bread and Circuses. If a country can pull through a crisis, then it will emerge stronger. Quite a simple idea, but well thought up and explained persuasively in the J-curve
September 12, 2020
This book gave me a new way of looking at an old problem - which is my definition of a great book.
The book discusses the J curve, obviously, which is a curve on a graph where the axis are stability and openness within any country.
Stability within a country is fairly obvious. Openness is defined as both the willingness or ability of a country to communicate and be involved with other countries and the ability of the people within the country to communicate with each other.
The chapters of the book discuss the ideas of the J curve by discussing specific countries that lie on different points of the curve. North Korea, Cuba and Iraq are discussed as countries on the far left of the curve, i.e. countries that are highly stable but closed. (This book was published in 2006 and Iraq is discussed under Saddam Hussein's rule.) Iran, Saudi Arabia and Russia are discussed as examples of countries that are sliding toward instability. South Africa and Yugoslavia are discussed as examples of states that slide to the depth of the instability curve, with South Africa surviving as a state and Yugoslavia breaking apart. Turkey, Israel and India are discussed as countries on the stable and open side of the curve. And finally, China is discussed as a country in contradiction. Economically it is an open country but politically it is closed. So where on the curve does it fit? The author answers that question.
The major point I got from this author is that nations that are on the right side of the curve, that is on the stable and open side of the curve, have a vested interest in helping states on the left side of the curve move towards the right. But those nations must be smart about how they try to accomplish this task. Using the example of how the US worked during the Cold War, the author writes:
"As General Wesley Clark has written, 'Western labor unions, encouraged by their governments, aided the emergence of a democratic trade-union movement, especially in Poland. Western organizations provided training for a generation of human-rights workers. Western broadcast media pumped in culture and political thought, raising popular expectations and undercutting Communist state propaganda. And Western businesses and financial institutions entered the scene, too, ensnaring command economies in Western market pricing and credit practices.' In essence, the United States used every means at its disposal to open these closed societies, to replace demand for Soviet Communism with demand for political reform. The former Warsaw Pact countries did not become democracies because America imposed democracy from the outside. In fact, the United States never invaded a country under Moscow's control. The former Warsaw Pact states embraced democracy because they wanted democracy."
Using this same line of reasoning, the author makes the case for how right-side of the curve nations should think about their policies in regards to left-side nations. Instead of helping those states stay isolated (eg. imposing sanctions), making it easier for their authoritarian governments to control the populace and their propaganda, instead right-sided nations should use measures to aid the citizens of those countries to gain information, to move up the economic ladder through trade, and to learn more about the outside world. Then those citizen will create the change from within.
As I said, this book helped me look at countries around the world and at the US policies towards those countries in a different way. And that is what makes a great book.
ETA: I reread this book during Trump and Covid of 2020. The book casts a whole different light now. I was not surprised at how many of Bremmer's "possibilities," aka predictions, came true. But what really caught my eye was on the third page of chapter one. It says: "Other states - the United States, Japan, Sweden - are stable because they are invigorated by the forces of globalization. [Income inequality does not come into play in this book.] These states are able to withstand political conflict, because their citizens - and international investors - know that political and social problems within them will be peacefully resolved by institutions that are independent of one another and that the electorate will broadly accept the resolution as legitimate. The institutions, not the personalities, matter in such a state."
No state is guaranteed their place on the curve.
The book discusses the J curve, obviously, which is a curve on a graph where the axis are stability and openness within any country.
Stability within a country is fairly obvious. Openness is defined as both the willingness or ability of a country to communicate and be involved with other countries and the ability of the people within the country to communicate with each other.
The chapters of the book discuss the ideas of the J curve by discussing specific countries that lie on different points of the curve. North Korea, Cuba and Iraq are discussed as countries on the far left of the curve, i.e. countries that are highly stable but closed. (This book was published in 2006 and Iraq is discussed under Saddam Hussein's rule.) Iran, Saudi Arabia and Russia are discussed as examples of countries that are sliding toward instability. South Africa and Yugoslavia are discussed as examples of states that slide to the depth of the instability curve, with South Africa surviving as a state and Yugoslavia breaking apart. Turkey, Israel and India are discussed as countries on the stable and open side of the curve. And finally, China is discussed as a country in contradiction. Economically it is an open country but politically it is closed. So where on the curve does it fit? The author answers that question.
The major point I got from this author is that nations that are on the right side of the curve, that is on the stable and open side of the curve, have a vested interest in helping states on the left side of the curve move towards the right. But those nations must be smart about how they try to accomplish this task. Using the example of how the US worked during the Cold War, the author writes:
"As General Wesley Clark has written, 'Western labor unions, encouraged by their governments, aided the emergence of a democratic trade-union movement, especially in Poland. Western organizations provided training for a generation of human-rights workers. Western broadcast media pumped in culture and political thought, raising popular expectations and undercutting Communist state propaganda. And Western businesses and financial institutions entered the scene, too, ensnaring command economies in Western market pricing and credit practices.' In essence, the United States used every means at its disposal to open these closed societies, to replace demand for Soviet Communism with demand for political reform. The former Warsaw Pact countries did not become democracies because America imposed democracy from the outside. In fact, the United States never invaded a country under Moscow's control. The former Warsaw Pact states embraced democracy because they wanted democracy."
Using this same line of reasoning, the author makes the case for how right-side of the curve nations should think about their policies in regards to left-side nations. Instead of helping those states stay isolated (eg. imposing sanctions), making it easier for their authoritarian governments to control the populace and their propaganda, instead right-sided nations should use measures to aid the citizens of those countries to gain information, to move up the economic ladder through trade, and to learn more about the outside world. Then those citizen will create the change from within.
As I said, this book helped me look at countries around the world and at the US policies towards those countries in a different way. And that is what makes a great book.
ETA: I reread this book during Trump and Covid of 2020. The book casts a whole different light now. I was not surprised at how many of Bremmer's "possibilities," aka predictions, came true. But what really caught my eye was on the third page of chapter one. It says: "Other states - the United States, Japan, Sweden - are stable because they are invigorated by the forces of globalization. [Income inequality does not come into play in this book.] These states are able to withstand political conflict, because their citizens - and international investors - know that political and social problems within them will be peacefully resolved by institutions that are independent of one another and that the electorate will broadly accept the resolution as legitimate. The institutions, not the personalities, matter in such a state."
No state is guaranteed their place on the curve.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
April 22, 2015
Bremmer posits the framework of the J Curve upon which to examine why (and to an extent how) nations rise and fall. This framework is built on the a graph with vertical axis measuring stability and the horizontal axis measuring openness, with a J-shaped curve (not dissimilar in look to the Nike swoosh). Bremmer examines the place that North Korea, Cuba, Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Russia, south Africa, Yugoslavia, Turkey, Israel, India and China fall within the J Curve, grouping those nations by their place in the J Curve, how they got there through their socio-political history and the result of each nation’s particular circumstances in considering both the present and the possible future.
It is interesting to note that with this book being published in 2006, world events have developed nine years later in order to allow for some examination of some thoughts and ideas postulated. The two that immediately sprang to mind were the subsequent actions of Russia’s Putin, and the ongoing instability of Iraq and the rhetoric, efforts and stake that most notably USA but also others have and continue to say, do and hold.
I do not pretend to have sufficient foreign policy experience, a detailed knowledge of relevant history or or a nuanced understanding of geopolitical affairs to properly offer a view about the merits of the concepts presented and future actions proposed. However, this book has given me a new perspective on these issues and I am particularly grateful for that.
It is interesting to note that with this book being published in 2006, world events have developed nine years later in order to allow for some examination of some thoughts and ideas postulated. The two that immediately sprang to mind were the subsequent actions of Russia’s Putin, and the ongoing instability of Iraq and the rhetoric, efforts and stake that most notably USA but also others have and continue to say, do and hold.
I do not pretend to have sufficient foreign policy experience, a detailed knowledge of relevant history or or a nuanced understanding of geopolitical affairs to properly offer a view about the merits of the concepts presented and future actions proposed. However, this book has given me a new perspective on these issues and I am particularly grateful for that.
April 3, 2016
Bremmer’s graph plots stability against openness, resulting in a J-shaped curve. A closed state may be moderately stable. As it begins to open up (through revolution, coup, etc.), it destabilizes. As the state becomes truly open, it becomes more stable than before. It may as well do so, since: “As the authoritarian countries of the Communist bloc discovered, all closed states eventually wither or explode.” (p. 277)
“‘Stability’ has two crucial components: the state’s capacity to withstand shocks and its ability to avoid producing them. A nation is only unstable if both are absent.” A “shock” can be a natural disaster or an internally produced or externally imposed political crisis. “Anyone can feel the difference between a ride in a car with good shock absorbers and in one that has no shock absorbers. Stability fortifies a nation to withstand political, economic, and social turbulence. Stability enables a nation to remain a nation.” (p. 8)
“A state with no stability is a failed state; it can neither implement nor enforce government policy. Such a country can fragment, it can be taken over by outside forces, or it can descend into chaos.” (p. 9)
An open society can be internally stable while still wielding colonial power that destabilizes other states. “However destabilizing for other states, a nation’s foreign policy,” Bremmer comments, “only alters its position on the J curve to the extent those policies reflect or alter internal policy.” (p. 210)
“‘Stability’ has two crucial components: the state’s capacity to withstand shocks and its ability to avoid producing them. A nation is only unstable if both are absent.” A “shock” can be a natural disaster or an internally produced or externally imposed political crisis. “Anyone can feel the difference between a ride in a car with good shock absorbers and in one that has no shock absorbers. Stability fortifies a nation to withstand political, economic, and social turbulence. Stability enables a nation to remain a nation.” (p. 8)
“A state with no stability is a failed state; it can neither implement nor enforce government policy. Such a country can fragment, it can be taken over by outside forces, or it can descend into chaos.” (p. 9)
An open society can be internally stable while still wielding colonial power that destabilizes other states. “However destabilizing for other states, a nation’s foreign policy,” Bremmer comments, “only alters its position on the J curve to the extent those policies reflect or alter internal policy.” (p. 210)
September 4, 2020
Generally like the idea of "demand-side geopolitics", and probably agree with it, but I'm also fairly skeptical of seemingly overly-simplistic general claims about the world.
That being said, most predictions ended up being true, except for the one on China which sticks out like a soar thumb. Hu Jintao's regime led to Xi Xinping's, an unarguably more strongarm authoritarian and brutal regime, while also pushing for more economically, right of the curve reforms (heightened privitization of industries, reduction in corporate taxes, increase in SEZ). Suggests that there might be some general truth to the claim, but there's likely quite a bit more.
What I mean here is that, although there may be a general truth that you could break down politics into a supply and demand problem, what you're really refering to is the distribition of outcomes. there's an important intermediary that needs to be factored in! Institutions and the strength they exhibit influence velocity of outcomes, and the strength of the CCP is what most creates that transition. There's plenty of exidence to indicate that one can have essentially uncompetitive and unopen governance while still maintaining strong stability (S Korea and Japan are excellent examples). Ignoring this aspect is detrimental to a general theory of geo-politics.
My opinion? Take Bremmer's position into consideration but not as prophecy!
That being said, most predictions ended up being true, except for the one on China which sticks out like a soar thumb. Hu Jintao's regime led to Xi Xinping's, an unarguably more strongarm authoritarian and brutal regime, while also pushing for more economically, right of the curve reforms (heightened privitization of industries, reduction in corporate taxes, increase in SEZ). Suggests that there might be some general truth to the claim, but there's likely quite a bit more.
What I mean here is that, although there may be a general truth that you could break down politics into a supply and demand problem, what you're really refering to is the distribition of outcomes. there's an important intermediary that needs to be factored in! Institutions and the strength they exhibit influence velocity of outcomes, and the strength of the CCP is what most creates that transition. There's plenty of exidence to indicate that one can have essentially uncompetitive and unopen governance while still maintaining strong stability (S Korea and Japan are excellent examples). Ignoring this aspect is detrimental to a general theory of geo-politics.
My opinion? Take Bremmer's position into consideration but not as prophecy!
October 23, 2014
Although the book has got a bit dated, however that should not stop one from still reading this. Ian has brought out some great trends to watch out for while analysing a country. This book is highly recommended for those who are investing in various countries.
I like the recommendation given by Ian on handling North Korea, although it is going to be difficult to carry out the same, which has also been outlined by Ian. Although Kim Jong Il is no more and his son has taken over (as was correctly identified by Ian in the Cuba case) , however, it still remains on the shorter end of the J curve , with all the insulations from external wold. However, it looks seemingly poised to slip down the curve.
Ian's analysis of Russia and China is quite spot on and gives a good insights. Most of these have been encountered by us during various interactions. China's dilemma is growing by the day. The recent events of Hong Kong is quite expected, but what is more concerning is the declining growth rates.
The write up on Saudi Arabia is also interesting, especially in light of the falling oil prices. Lets wait and watch.
I will keenly look forward to the next edition of this book from Ian
I like the recommendation given by Ian on handling North Korea, although it is going to be difficult to carry out the same, which has also been outlined by Ian. Although Kim Jong Il is no more and his son has taken over (as was correctly identified by Ian in the Cuba case) , however, it still remains on the shorter end of the J curve , with all the insulations from external wold. However, it looks seemingly poised to slip down the curve.
Ian's analysis of Russia and China is quite spot on and gives a good insights. Most of these have been encountered by us during various interactions. China's dilemma is growing by the day. The recent events of Hong Kong is quite expected, but what is more concerning is the declining growth rates.
The write up on Saudi Arabia is also interesting, especially in light of the falling oil prices. Lets wait and watch.
I will keenly look forward to the next edition of this book from Ian
June 20, 2016
This book was selected by The Economist as one of the best books of 2006. Bremmer's J curve outlines the link between a country's openness and its stability. While many countries are stable because they are open (the United States, France, Japan), others are stable because they are closed (North Korea, Cuba, Iraq under Saddam Hussein). It was a very good read, fresh and clear, not burdened down with dogma and theory. It is a nice trip through history of nations such as Cuba, Russia, Israel, South Africa, Iraq, Iran, and Turkey. He explains things very succinctly and gets to the point. As I read this book, I thought that he would make a good professor- in the way that he so easily makes his points. In fact Bremmer currently teaches at New York University.
March 5, 2009
This book is a great resource, one which I expect to refer back to or read again in the future. It is logically and concisely written to make very complicated information accessible and interesting.
This book sat around my house while I was reading it, and everyone who picked it up to pass the time or flip through a few pages found it to be very interesting. I would definitely recommend it for anyone who has an interest in foreign affairs, government, or sociopolitical issues.
This book sat around my house while I was reading it, and everyone who picked it up to pass the time or flip through a few pages found it to be very interesting. I would definitely recommend it for anyone who has an interest in foreign affairs, government, or sociopolitical issues.
January 26, 2008
This book is radically brilliant. The perfect mix of science and socio-political philosophy. It is a must read for anyone interested in an explaination of why the world is the way it is or anyone who wants to dealve into the politics and philosophy for state development. Can't say enough about how great this book is.
March 7, 2009
Still in the beginning half, but despite seeing criticism of the author's arguments in this book, I really am enjoying it. Even if it may be true that his arguments could use more factual evidence, I think what really gets me about this book are the ideas and the new perspective on an old topic.
Its really interesting to me. I recommend it, thus far!
December 9, 2009
This book altered my reasons for thinking economic sanctions are generally a waste of time, and indeed may prolong a bad situation. Having said that, I'm left wanting some sort of stick specifically targeting enemy leadership, given that this book advocates - in all but exceptional circustances - an uninterrupted supply of carrots as a means of effectuating change in unfriendly nations.
May 26, 2010
If you are open to new thought and willing to reconsider conventional wisdom This is a book for you Honestly I think my views concerning American foreign policy have matured since reading this book. You have any interest in politics you must OWN this book. You might not agree with every point but it will have you lock down your own thoughts
August 22, 2014
Great explanation of government control and the difference between free societies and those under despotic rule even though they both achieve stability. Also the peril of chaos at the bottom of the curve necessary for the transition to a free open society. Sometimes the chaos is just to great. Great history and background of the countries discussed. Very interesting and well written.
December 17, 2007
I was a big dork who loved econ. in college, and this book does more to explain why closed systems in government fail better than any poly/sci text ever could. After all, economics is the universal language.
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