While many books and writings are available on the history of Lieutenant General James Longstreet of the Confederate States Army, nearly the entire body of this historiography marginalizes his accomplishments and is devoted to his falling from grace with the postwar Southern elites. This piece of historiography aims to look at Longstreet with twenty-first century objectivity, and completely abandons the Lost Cause linked hatred that many postwar Southern elites had for him and his post war politics. While Longstreet s political incorrectness was the reason he became ignored, politics is completely irrelevant to the student of warfare looking to garner lessons from Longstreet s battles and campaigns. This work will compare the similarities of Longstreet s innovations and operations to certain aspects of war that became standard in the First and Second World Wars. Interpreting Longstreet through the comparison of his methods to twentieth century methods shows Longstreet was a very modern general. Even more important than identifying Longstreet s originality is identifying how his actions greatly added to the changing complexion of warfare. Some of his innovations were the early origins of prominent facets in twentieth century warfare, and he clearly established his legacy as a modern innovator as early as 1862. But only now are the postwar negative portrayals of Longstreet faded enough for him to emerge as the Confederacy s most modern general.
This an outstanding book in that it assesses Longstreet from the perspective of a former officer with extensive experience in military operations. His analysis is thorough and well supported. It is also well written. I recommend it as you will gain an entirely new perspective.
The author claims General Longstreet was the Confederacy’s “Most Modern General” and then describes some of his “greatest hits” in modern military terminology.
One such action was his defense of Marye’s Heights at the battle of Fredericksburg, aided by his splendid artillerist, Porter Alexander. What it showed me was how well-planned his actions could be. Other such defenses by others had and were to occur at Malvern Hill, Gettysburg, Bristoe Station, Cold Harbor, and Franklin.
Another area in which Longstreet excelled was in the attack. When he hit you, you knew it. The author covers his breakthrough at Chickamauga; I wish he had also covered Longstreet at Second Manassas and his rolling up Hancock’s line in the Wilderness. An added feature, which I had not read of before, was his recommendation to attack Bridgeport which Bragg disregarded.
Longstreet did not fare so well at Knoxville.
The author’s main point, I think, is that “Longstreet’s contribution to the art and mechanics of war was a great one” (page xxvii). He expresses Longstreet’s achievements in modern terms, citing U.S. Army field manuals in doing so. I don’t quite see it. What he accomplished on the battlefield was the result of good planning and common sense. Weren’t his good deeds ignored in the decades after the Late Unpleasantness, due to his lack of tact in his memoirs and the enmity of General Early and the Lost Cause worshippers, until resurrected by The Killer Angels? I wonder whether von Moltke and his disciples really made a serious study of them.
The book will give readers a good appreciation of Longstreet’s ability and may convince a reader that he may be the outstanding corps commander of the war. Beyond that, readings of other, recent, biographies are recommended.
Will be meeting LTC Knudsen in July. This book is very interesting with regards to military tactics and how General Longstreet was ahead of his time in using the type of warfare he used.