Killed in action at the bloody Battle of Shiloh, Confederate general Albert Sidney Johnston stands as the highest-ranking American military officer to die in combat. His unexpected demise had cascading negative consequences for the South’s war effort, as his absence created a void in adequate leadership in the years that followed. In The Iron Dice of Battle , noted Civil War historian Timothy B. Smith reexamines Johnston’s life and death, offering remarkable insights into this often-contradictory figure.
As a commander, Johnston frequently faced larger and better-armed Union forces, dramatically shaping his battlefield decisions and convincing him that victory could only be attained by taking strategic risks while fighting. The final wager came while leading his army at Shiloh in April 1862. During a desperate gambit to turn the tide of battle, Johnston charged to the front of the Confederate line to direct his troops and fell mortally wounded after sustaining enemy fire.
The first work to survey the general’s career in detail in nearly sixty years, The Iron Dice of Battle builds on recent scholarship to provide a new and incisive assessment of Johnston’s life, his Confederate command, and the effect his death had on the course of the Civil War in the West.
Albert Sidney Johnston is the great enigma. The Confederacy's highest ranking field general, he entered the war with a great reputation earned through his high character and exceptional antebellum service. He died though at Shiloh, for many seemingly at the cusp of victory. Others though pointed to his failures before the war, particularly in the Republic of Texas. The only reason he found himself in a desperate fight at Shiloh was that on his watch the Rebels suffered defeats at Mill Springs, Fort Henry, and Fort Donelson which burst the Confederacy wide open. He died though before the war was even a year old. As such the debate has ever after raged on was he simply learning from his errors (Grant, Sherman, and Lee all stumbled in 1861) or was he doomed to mediocrity? Gibson opined “the West perished with Albert Sidney Johnston, and the Southern country followed.” Jefferson Davis agreed and Johnston's son, William Preston Johnston, wrote a biography of his father that for all its hagiography, is also well written and researched. Grant believed he showed no real promise. P.G.T. Beauregard took a middle stance. He respected Johnston's integrity and courage. He however did not think him equal to the assignment given to him. Timothy B. Smith makes it clear in one passage that he does not like Beauregard, and yet The Iron Dice of Battle follows Beauregard's line of thought.
The Iron Dice of Battle is not a traditional biography. The first section gives an overview of Johnston's life, Smith admitting that on this mark Charles Roland's biography is peerless. These chapters rather add color and context to the man and set up three dominant themes. The first is that Johnston was a methodical chess player who nevertheless would take great gambles when faced with a life crisis. The second is that he was lenient even meek, as shown by his refusal to punish a slave who stole from him. Third though is his impressive moral character. He took responsibility for defeats, was magnanimous, courageous, and commanded respect. These good traits papered over his weaknesses as a commander. Indeed, they were strengths in the heat of battle, such as at Monterrey and Shiloh. However, his responsibilities in the Western Theater called for attributes he did not have. One gets the feeling Johnston's true calling was commanding a division of infantry.
This reviewer is biased in favor of Johnston, but Smith presents a strong case. Perhaps though the book's larger point is that the Confederacy lacked talented leaders. Only Robert E. Lee and P.G.T. Beauregard had consistent success in major independent command. Smith had to conclude that for Johnstton's weaknesses, he had more strengths than his successors such as Bragg, Pemberton, Hood, and Joseph E. Johnston. If so, the implication is the Confederacy was doomed because it fought an opponent not only with greater resources but one tha found generals such as Grant, Thomas, Sherman, Rosecrans, and others who won most of their battles in the Western Theater. Sidney Johnston was the best hope. Yet, this reviewer concedes to Roland that perhaps Johnston would have improved. Certainly his leniency was shared by Lee and Grant. Lee was rarely harsh with subordinates and arguably kept around too many officers that failed him. Richard Anderson and Camdus Wilcox turned in spotty performances and somehow George Pickett always made his way back. Grant shielded his friends. Johnston's "meekness" might have been a strength, at least with better subordinates and even before Shiloh Johnston was cleaning house, with Crittenden and Carroll being removed. Johnston's indecisiveness was more of a failing, but again Johnston showed iron will by committing to battle at Shiloh, although he still had second thoughts. Once the battle started he threw himself into it.
I have always wondered why the Confederate government (especially close friend President Jefferson Davis) thought so highly of Albert S. Johnston, he never seemed to have done much of anything. And after reading Timothy B. Smith's excellent book, I wonder even more. Civil War historian Thomas Connelly has said that Johnston's pre-war record "does not merit any such acclaim". And his Civil War record seems not much better.
According to author Smith, Johnston just did not have the personality to be a great general. He writes that there are three personality traits that led him to be the general that he was. First "he was slow to make decisions", not a good trait for a general, especially during a campaign or a battle. Smith says that Johnston was a chess player, not a poker player. Second, he was "too lenient with subordinates". Johnston deferred to much to his subordinates, and would assume that they were making the proper decisions and seldom checking up on them. Finally, "Johnston's greatest weakness was his frequent crossing the line between acceptable risk taking to irrational behavior in the fast-moving poker game his life became, both personally and especially as Confederate theater commander". Johnston didn't respond well when quick decisions were needed.
At under 200 pages the book looks short, but then Johnston was killed at Shiloh in April of 1862, and he didn't do all that much. Smith, a very good historian, has done his usual fine job with this book. It is very well researched, covers Johnston's life fully, and keeps your interest. This is the definitive book on Johnston's life and career.
This stunning monograph takes a look at one of the great what-ifs of the Civil War: what if A.S. Johnston hadn't been killed at Shiloh?? The author posits that Johnston was more of a chess player than poker player; he liked to puzzle out the possibilities before making his move. And he gambled big at Shiloh and lost, not just the battle, but tragically his life as well. A very compelling read and well worth the time spent.
I was reluctant to purchase this overpriced slim volume (as usual with greedy university presses), but I'm glad I did. Smith offers a concise but conclusive assessment of Sidney Johnston. Wisely leaving the prewar biographical details to Roland's solid coverage, Smith sticks to his thesis that Johnston was a mixture of caution but then wild gambles when he found himself backed into a corner. Chessplayer versus gambler. It works very well as a means of assessing Johnston's actions as well as his potential if he had not fallen at Shiloh.
Smith's biography of Johnston is ok but pales in comparison to the efforts of previous biographers, W.P. Johnston and C.P. Roland. Smith's pre-war account of Johnston's life is basically a summary of the two previous works with little new information. It contains the same anecdotes and stories. The reader would be advised to read WPJ and Roland instead.
Smith's account of Johnston's Civil War career is serviceable but delves too deeply into the realm of unsubstantiated psychology. The author repeatedly comments on how Johnston was a "methodical chess player" rather than a "poker player" in nature, and when forced into situations where he had to act quickly or boldly, took desperate gambles that failed badly. The analogy is misplaced. A chess player can be bold, take risks, and act quickly. Equally, a poker player can be methodical and cautious.
Smith's claim does not apply to Johnston's career either. The "desperate gambles" were forced on him by the situation, not his personality. Robert E. Lee's generalship in Virginia was marked by similar desperate gambles. It was the merely the context in which the Confederate generals found themselves, outnumbered and outgunned by the North.
Although Smith does a fine job of capturing the life of Albert Sidney Johnston in this short biography, I was still left wondering why this confederate general was so revered…despite the lack of any measurable achievements. While this issue was never fully explained, I suspect that Johnston must have been quite charismatic (& very likable) during the course of his lifetime. For that matter, just as the lackluster George McClellan “looked” like a successful general in his early photos during the Civil War, I’ve always thought the 19th century image of Johnston (as shown on the cover of Smith’s biography) depicted a force to be reckoned with. Indeed, you can’t judge a book by its cover. Even so, I highly recommend this book to my fellow civil war buffs amidst Goodreads.
You cannot have a full grasp of the Civil War without understanding the Confederate war in the West. Until April 1862, Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston helmed what was largely considered by the Confederate government to be a theater second in importance to the East. In this monograph on Johnston, historian Timothy B. Smith chronicles Johnston’s life as a gambler with personality traits that ran against those typical of such a risk-taker. Awed by subordinates who were former superiors or highly-placed politicians, Johnston was never able to rein in these men who caused near disaster in the West in the early months of 1862. As the Western defense crumbled, Smith writes that Johnston was forced to make the ultimate gamble at Shiloh which, in the end, cost both him and the Confederacy dearly.
Smith does an admirable job of following Johnston’s life and career. Sticking to his main point throughout, that Johnston was a flawed commander, is clearly argued based on his inability to quickly see the big picture or make quick decisions. A shortage of troops, weapons and supply problems always vexed Johnston, but he still was not a ‘great commander’ and as in the Virginia theater, the inability to coordinate forces and focus on the enemy was a common problem.The micromanagement of the Western theater adds to the examples of Jefferson Davis flaws.