Inventing the Schlieffen Plan: German War Planning 1871-1914

by Terence Zuber

The existence of the Schlieffen plan has been one of the basic assumptions of twentieth-century military history. It was the perfect example of the evils of German aggressive, mechanical, disdainful of politics and of public morality. The Great War began in August 1914 allegedly because the Schlieffen plan forced the German government to transform a Balkan quarrel into a World War by attacking France. And, in the end, the Schlieffen plan failed at the battle of the Marne.
Yet it has always been recognized that the Schlieffen plan included inconsistencies which have never been satisfactorily explained. On the basis of newly discovered documents from German archives, Terence Zuber presents a radically different picture of German war planning between 1871 and 1914, and concludes that, in fact, there never really was a `Schlieffen plan'.

Genres: World War I

356 pages, Hardcover

First published January 1, 2002

About the author

Dr. Terence Zuber is an American retired army officer and military historian whose primary field of study is the First World War. He received his BA (History) in 1970 from the University of Minnesota, and entered the U.S. Army that same year. He served primarily in infantry units, and also as VII (US) Corps liaison officer to the 12. Panzerdivision of the West German Bundeswehr. He retired as a Major in 1990. He earned both his MA (History) in 1996, and his PhD summa cum laude in 2001, from the Julius-Maximilians-Universität Würzburg.

Reviews

[Jerome Otte · Rating 4 out of 5]

In this work Zuber examines the Schlieffen plan, which he emphasizes was more of a concept than a detailed plan (as well as a political ploy to increase the size of the army) and that much of Germany’s war planning was defensive.

Zuber does a good job outlining the challenges faced by German war planners, particularly how to defeat numerically superior French and Russian armies, and how to defeat them in the opening battles of a war. Schlieffen, he notes, never promised a quick victory. He also notes that German successes in 1914 were at the tactical level, and didn’t necessarily owe much to Schlieffen’s supposed genius.He also describes how each of the concept’s parts were translated down the chain of command and argues that Schlieffen’s thinking did not differ much from his predecessors. Zuber also discusses the first month or so of the 1914 campaign.

Zuber also emphasizes that the tradition of blaming Moltke began in the postwar years (when he was already dead) He also notes that the German General Staff decided to explain away its failures in 1914 by claiming that Schlieffen had a master plan that was ruined by Moltke, Hentsch, and Bülow.

Some more on the political and economic context may have helped,and the writing can get repetitive. Also at one point Zuber writes that “the last army to begin offensive operations in August 1914 was the German army” (so the invasions of Luxembourg and Belgium wasn’t one of those?) He also claims that Wilhelm Groener never served in a front-line or command role, and that Germany did not plan an offensive war, which isn’t very convincing. Some readers may find parts of the book speculative.

An interesting and well-written book,

[Andrew Daniels · Rating 3 out of 5]

not bad,
but definitely only for specialists
very specific analysis of Schlieffen plan and changing German war planning

not for a casual reader, you should have read WWI books before reading this

[Liquidlasagna · Rating 3 out of 5]

part marks
never overreach

[Johnny · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book is definitely not for the casual reader. While the author doesn't say it, this feels like his doctoral dissertation that he expanded into a book. Anyone not reading this on a kindle would be advised to have a German-English dictionary and a detailed map of the Imperial German borders handy. Actually even if you have a kindle, I would suggest a dictionary and the map.
That being said, on the whole, the book is very interesting and tackles what is considered to be a fundamental fact of the pre Great War. That is the Germans had a set and detailed plan to invade Belgium and sweep past Paris in a giant flanking maneuver once the order to mobilize was given. Dr. Zuber challenges that by going over in detail, German grand strategy from 1880 to 1914 and the different plans and war games that each of the Chief of Staff would do just about every year. He spends a great deal of time on Waldersee and Schlieffen time as Chief of Staff of the German Army. Some of the information about the war plans and games is incomplete due to a fire that occurred at the Archives in Berlin during the 1940s. But he is able to draw on some personal memoirs and letters to piece it together. According to Dr Zuber, Schlieffen was more interested and believed in counterattack and the use Germany's interior position and its railway to attack the flanks specifically at the line of retreat. He thought the right wing (which in only one of his war games included attacking Belgium first before the French) would hit the flanks and rear of the French line of Forts in Lorraine while the left wing would retreat and the counterattack the French Army and trap most of the Army and deny them the safety of their forts. While in the Eastern Front, the Germany Army would use its rail system and the geography of East Prussia to attack the flanks and line of retreat of the either one of both Russian armies that were thought to be used to attack Germany.
The idea of a concrete plan that was created by Schlieffen and later messed with and botched by Moltke the younger was a post war effort by many members of the German military as a way to explain how Germany lost the Great War. It was usually done by those who wanted to coverup their own mistakes at the Battle of the Frontiers.