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The Pecking Order: Social Hierarchy as a Philosophical Problem
A trenchant case for a novel philosophical that our political thinking is driven less by commitments to freedom or fairness than by an aversion to hierarchy.
Niko Kolodny argues that, to a far greater extent than we recognize, our political thinking is driven by a concern to avoid relations of inferiority. In order to make sense of the most familiar ideas in our political thought and discourse—the justification of the state, democracy, and rule of law, as well as objections to paternalism and corruption—we cannot merely appeal to freedom, as libertarians do, or to distributive fairness, as liberals do. We must instead appeal directly to claims against inferiority—to the conviction that no one should stand above or below.
The problem of justifying the state, for example, is often billed as the problem of reconciling the state with the freedom of the individual. Yet, Kolodny argues, once we press hard enough on worries about the state’s encroachment on the individual, we end up in opposition not to unfreedom but to social hierarchy. To make his case, Kolodny takes inspiration from two recent trends in philosophical on the one hand, the revival of the republican and Kantian traditions, with their focus on domination and dependence; on the other, relational egalitarianism, with its focus on the effects of the distribution of income and wealth on our social relations.
The Pecking Order offers a detailed account of relations of inferiority in terms of objectionable asymmetries of power, authority, and regard. Breaking new ground, Kolodny looks ahead to specific kinds of democratic institutions that could safeguard against such relations.
Niko Kolodny argues that, to a far greater extent than we recognize, our political thinking is driven by a concern to avoid relations of inferiority. In order to make sense of the most familiar ideas in our political thought and discourse—the justification of the state, democracy, and rule of law, as well as objections to paternalism and corruption—we cannot merely appeal to freedom, as libertarians do, or to distributive fairness, as liberals do. We must instead appeal directly to claims against inferiority—to the conviction that no one should stand above or below.
The problem of justifying the state, for example, is often billed as the problem of reconciling the state with the freedom of the individual. Yet, Kolodny argues, once we press hard enough on worries about the state’s encroachment on the individual, we end up in opposition not to unfreedom but to social hierarchy. To make his case, Kolodny takes inspiration from two recent trends in philosophical on the one hand, the revival of the republican and Kantian traditions, with their focus on domination and dependence; on the other, relational egalitarianism, with its focus on the effects of the distribution of income and wealth on our social relations.
The Pecking Order offers a detailed account of relations of inferiority in terms of objectionable asymmetries of power, authority, and regard. Breaking new ground, Kolodny looks ahead to specific kinds of democratic institutions that could safeguard against such relations.
496 pages, Kindle Edition
Published February 21, 2023
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Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews
December 21, 2023
This is the beginning of a project, and as such, there are some inconsistencies and a lot of details to work out. However, the central thesis of Kolodny - that the claim against the state is not one against coercion nor domination, but against interpersonal inferiority - seems to be true; or at least, Kolodny makes a great case for it.
If the thesis is true, then this is a path-breaking book in political philosophy. If it isn't, you should read it nonetheless, because Kolodny's precision and inventiveness will greatly inspire any philosopher
If the thesis is true, then this is a path-breaking book in political philosophy. If it isn't, you should read it nonetheless, because Kolodny's precision and inventiveness will greatly inspire any philosopher
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March 26, 2025'If complex, large-scale society - if, in one sense of the world, civilization - requires a differentiation of roles and a concentration of power and authority, can it be reconciled with the equality of standing that was guarded so jealously before?
It is a question that one imagines those on the margins of the first kingdoms and empires must have asked themselves, in that uneasy season between when they first grasped the strange, new terms of life on offer and when they fled beyond the hinterlands or were compelled, by force of arms or lack of alternatives, to accept those terms.'
It is a question that one imagines those on the margins of the first kingdoms and empires must have asked themselves, in that uneasy season between when they first grasped the strange, new terms of life on offer and when they fled beyond the hinterlands or were compelled, by force of arms or lack of alternatives, to accept those terms.'
July 29, 2024
The book has some really outstanding elements. Its central claim, that "relations of inferiority" are the basis of at least some complaints against the state that are not adequately explained by canonical worries by liberals regarding the states use of force, coercion, and threats (chapters 2-4), strikes me as correct and a real insight. Kolodny also offers excellent and careful discussions of what these "relations of inferiority" consist of, and what conditions, which he calls "tempering factors", are needed to mitigate the objectionable nature of relations of inferiority (Chapters 5-9). The book then hits a rough patch. From chapters 11 through 20 he applies this framework to a variety of issues in political philosophy, e.g., claims to the rule of law, claims to equal liberty, claims against discrimination. These chapters are variable in quality--some have good insights, others are frankly not very interesting (some applications of his master concept in these chapters seem tendentious to me, though that claim requires far more discussion than I am going to offer here). Aside of their varying quality, these chapters suffer form a really monotonous structure that ventures into tedium ("here's the usual framing of X in political philosophy, here's why it's insufficient, here's how my theory resolves the issue). The book thankfully comes back around and ends on a high note in its last part (Chapters 24-32). It has an original criticism of sortition and argument for representative democracy--quite the feat given the how well-trodden these debates are,--some interesting things to say about gerrymandering, and an interesting, though ultimately unconvincing, argument against Achen and Bartels' empirical work on voting behavior.
Aside from the rough patch in the middle, I think the big weakness of the book is its complete ignoring of anti-Enlightenment and Marxist discussions of this issue. Bluntly, while this topic is new to contemporary liberal thought, Nietzsche, MacIntyre, and many other critics of the Enlightenment and modern democracy have made the exact observation that much of what people like about democracy is its ability to give them a sense of social worth and that people will jealously guard the pleasure of social equality and thereby reject relations of inferiority (even some 19th century liberals, especially Tocqueville and Mill, made similar observations). The Anti-enlightenment tradition thought that it was to society's detriment that we have these reactions to relations of inferiority. The anti-enlightenment thought these were irrational impulses that would result in a kind of nihilistic anarchy that rendered complex societies impossible because no one would ever accept the social hierarchies necessary to maintain their structure. Even liberals like Mill were wary of the pitfalls people's knee-jerk rejection of feeling "relations of inferiority" would have because he feared it would cause people to feel jealous of great and experimental individuals and try to repress them as a result. Kolodny badly needed to discuss these types of views and explain why we should prefer his highly positive perspective on people's reactions to social hierarchy.
Also lacking was a discussion of the Marxist tradition, which has (implicitly) taken Kolodny's argument and applied it to ALL social relations--political, economic, etc.--arguing we both need a much more capacious conception of what kinds of relations of inferiority are objectionable than liberalism will (because of the private/public distinction), and that we should prioritize combating these relations of inferiority over respecting liberal rights throughout the social world (something Kolodny at least in part wants to deny). Why? Why draw the boundaries around relations of inferiority in the way Kolodny has? Someone more cynical than I am might reasonably wonder if Kolodny's way of drawing his lines is stack the conceptual deck in favor of the liberal egalitarianism position Kolodny himself favors.
Aside from the rough patch in the middle, I think the big weakness of the book is its complete ignoring of anti-Enlightenment and Marxist discussions of this issue. Bluntly, while this topic is new to contemporary liberal thought, Nietzsche, MacIntyre, and many other critics of the Enlightenment and modern democracy have made the exact observation that much of what people like about democracy is its ability to give them a sense of social worth and that people will jealously guard the pleasure of social equality and thereby reject relations of inferiority (even some 19th century liberals, especially Tocqueville and Mill, made similar observations). The Anti-enlightenment tradition thought that it was to society's detriment that we have these reactions to relations of inferiority. The anti-enlightenment thought these were irrational impulses that would result in a kind of nihilistic anarchy that rendered complex societies impossible because no one would ever accept the social hierarchies necessary to maintain their structure. Even liberals like Mill were wary of the pitfalls people's knee-jerk rejection of feeling "relations of inferiority" would have because he feared it would cause people to feel jealous of great and experimental individuals and try to repress them as a result. Kolodny badly needed to discuss these types of views and explain why we should prefer his highly positive perspective on people's reactions to social hierarchy.
Also lacking was a discussion of the Marxist tradition, which has (implicitly) taken Kolodny's argument and applied it to ALL social relations--political, economic, etc.--arguing we both need a much more capacious conception of what kinds of relations of inferiority are objectionable than liberalism will (because of the private/public distinction), and that we should prioritize combating these relations of inferiority over respecting liberal rights throughout the social world (something Kolodny at least in part wants to deny). Why? Why draw the boundaries around relations of inferiority in the way Kolodny has? Someone more cynical than I am might reasonably wonder if Kolodny's way of drawing his lines is stack the conceptual deck in favor of the liberal egalitarianism position Kolodny himself favors.
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