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The Double-Cross System: In the War of 1939 to 1945
Filled with highly sensitive information about espionage, this secret report was never intended to go beyond a very select audience within the government and security services. The man who wrote it in 1945 was J. C. Masterman, MI5 recruit and leader of the shadowy XX Committee. He was the mastermind behind one of the war’s most remarkable achievements: finding, turning and then running almost every Nazi agent to penetrate the British Isles.
No man knew more about the dangers of double-dealing and counter-espionage, and in writing his report, Masterman was keen to give the most complete account possible (albeit braced with a dry wit). The exploits of the intelligence service make hair-raising reading: some German agents made attempts to escape, overpowering their guards; others had to be trusted to meet their German paymasters alone. On a daily or weekly basis, the committee had to decide what information to leak to the enemy – should they seek to mislead, or divulge truthful intelligence in order to build conviction for a future move? Occasional failures (‘Tricycle’ picked up information that pointed to Pearl Harbour, but a lack of Anglo-American co-operation at the time meant it was not acted upon), were counteracted by the enormous success of ‘Operation Fortitude’, a significant campaign of misinformation to disguise the true location of the D-day landings.
Redolent with a sense of immediacy and absolute authenticity, it is impossible to get closer to the desperate world of war-time espionage than this first-hand account written by a key player of the game.
215 pages, Hardcover
First published February 16, 1972
55 people are currently reading
1204 people want to read
About the author
J.C. Masterman
17 books10 followersBorn on 12 January 1891, John Cecil Masterman was educated at the Royal Naval Colleges of Osborne and Dartmouth and at Worcester College, Oxford, where he read Modern History.
He later studied at the University of Freiburg where he was also an exchange lecturer in 1914, which was where he was when World War I broke out. Consequently he was interned as an enemy alien for four years in a prisoner-of-war camp in Ruhleben, where he spent much of his time polishing his German.
After his return from captivity, he became tutor of Modern History at Christ Church, Oxford, where he was also censor from 1920 to 1926.
In the 1920s he became a very good cricketer, playing first-class for H D G Leveson-Gower's XI, Harlequins, the Free Foresters, and also for Oxfordshire in the Minor Counties Championship and the MCC. He toured North America with the Free Foresters in 1923, Ireland with the MCC in 1924, Egypt with H H Martineau's XI in 1930 and 1931 and Canada with the MCC in 1937. He also played tennis and field hockey, participating in international competitions. As a result of his sporting prowess he was acknowledged as a master gamesman in Stephen Potter's book 'Gamesmanship'.
A crime novel, 'An Oxford Tragedy', published in 1933, was his first work and he followed this in 1957 with his second and final crime novel, 'The Case of the Four Friends'.
He also wrote one novel, 'Fate Cannot Harm Me', a play 'Marshal Ney', an Oxford Guide Book, 'To Teach the Senators Wisdom' and his autobiography, 'On the Chariot Wheel' (1975).
When World War II broke out, he became chairman of the Twenty Committee, a group of British intelligence officials, who were responsible for the Double-Cross System, which turned German spies into double agents working for the British. Apparently its name was a pun based on the Roman numeral XX and its double-cross purpose.
In 1945 he had privately published a history of his time working on the double-cross system, 'The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939 to 1945', and it was finally officially published in 1972, in the USA because the English government objected to its publication under the Officials Secrets Act.
After World War II he returned to Oxford, becoming Provost of Worcester College from 1946 to 1961 and Vice-Chancellor of Oxford University from 1957 to 1958. He was knighted for his wartime services in 1959.
He died in Oxford on 6 June 1977.
He later studied at the University of Freiburg where he was also an exchange lecturer in 1914, which was where he was when World War I broke out. Consequently he was interned as an enemy alien for four years in a prisoner-of-war camp in Ruhleben, where he spent much of his time polishing his German.
After his return from captivity, he became tutor of Modern History at Christ Church, Oxford, where he was also censor from 1920 to 1926.
In the 1920s he became a very good cricketer, playing first-class for H D G Leveson-Gower's XI, Harlequins, the Free Foresters, and also for Oxfordshire in the Minor Counties Championship and the MCC. He toured North America with the Free Foresters in 1923, Ireland with the MCC in 1924, Egypt with H H Martineau's XI in 1930 and 1931 and Canada with the MCC in 1937. He also played tennis and field hockey, participating in international competitions. As a result of his sporting prowess he was acknowledged as a master gamesman in Stephen Potter's book 'Gamesmanship'.
A crime novel, 'An Oxford Tragedy', published in 1933, was his first work and he followed this in 1957 with his second and final crime novel, 'The Case of the Four Friends'.
He also wrote one novel, 'Fate Cannot Harm Me', a play 'Marshal Ney', an Oxford Guide Book, 'To Teach the Senators Wisdom' and his autobiography, 'On the Chariot Wheel' (1975).
When World War II broke out, he became chairman of the Twenty Committee, a group of British intelligence officials, who were responsible for the Double-Cross System, which turned German spies into double agents working for the British. Apparently its name was a pun based on the Roman numeral XX and its double-cross purpose.
In 1945 he had privately published a history of his time working on the double-cross system, 'The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939 to 1945', and it was finally officially published in 1972, in the USA because the English government objected to its publication under the Officials Secrets Act.
After World War II he returned to Oxford, becoming Provost of Worcester College from 1946 to 1961 and Vice-Chancellor of Oxford University from 1957 to 1958. He was knighted for his wartime services in 1959.
He died in Oxford on 6 June 1977.
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June 16, 2021
JC Masterman’s book, The Double-Cross System (in the War of 1939 to 1945), was first published in 1972 by Yale University Press. Why was a book about Britain’s wartime double-agent exploits, written by an Englishman, published in the USA? Because he was only allowed (by the British government) to publish it outside the UK and he also had to donate 50% of the profits to Her Majesty’s Stationery Office. If he had not agreed to these terms, he could have been prosecuted under the Official Secrets Act.
You can deduce from the above paragraph that he was writing about the most sensitive of issues; about techniques and events that could be useful to an enemy, and this gives some idea of how important was his work during the war.
Masterman had been an academic. In the First World War he had been in Germany studying German in August 1914 and was interned by the German authorities. He escaped once but was recaptured before he could cross the Dutch border. He taught again between the wars and, at the outbreak of World War II was called up by the Security Service (MI5), which is broadly equivalent to the American FBI, i.e. dealing with internal security.
MI5 already had one double-agent who had been working since 1936, but once the war began Germany sent over many agents with instructions to report back on all kinds of matters. These included aircraft specifications, locations of airfields, factories, barracks, etc., army regimental/divisional insignia, numbers of aircraft being produced, the effectiveness of bombing, food rationing and civilian morale, among others. It seemed incredible to me that the German secret service – the Abwehr – expected these agents to find such information in a time of war when people would naturally be suspicious of strangers asking questions.
In fact all but one of the agents parachuted in or landed from boats or U-boats were captured almost immediately by the British authorities. Some simply handed themselves in and offered to work for us instead; others were unrepentant, were tried and hanged as spies. The wireless (radio) sets issued by the Germans were either not very good (difficult to believe given German engineering is very good) or were not set up properly, and sometimes the codes they were given were unsophisticated. The one agent who was not captured was found after he committed suicide, having run out of money, alone and unable to contact his handlers. You have to feel sorry for the poor sod!
Most agents agreed, either voluntarily or under threat of prosecution, to become double agents and work for the British, and Masterman was instrumental in running this operation. I will not go into how this works because it is complex and you need to read the book.
The book itself is based on a report Masterman wrote in 1945, just after the end of the war in Europe, so it was all very fresh in his mind and this comes across in the text. He describes the theory and practice of running a double-cross system, and gives many examples of agents and their actions, and how they were controlled. The British were extremely patient and careful in building up the agents’ credibility, letting them send back true information that had been approved for release by the Twenty Committee (the Roman number for twenty, XX, is also a ‘double cross’), giving them fictional employment (such as on a farm – a man of fighting age could be called up [drafted] if not doing other important work, e.g. farming or factory work), and this helped to diminish German suspicions if the agent could not spend much time gathering intelligence. They also asked for more money at intervals because they had to live and travel. Some set up complete networks of other agents to report back to them, the information from whom the main agent then sent to the Abwehr. These agents were mostly fictional but the Germans didn’t know that, so sent a lot of money over to keep them going. In this way, the whole double-cross system was almost self-funded or, rather, funded by the enemy. By these means the British almost controlled the entire Abwehr campaign against the UK, and from the questions the agents were asked to answer by them were able to deduce a lot of information about the state of the Germans’ minds and their plans.
The book was originally a report so is not dramatic in tone, although the very nature of what is described is exciting. Masterman writes clearly and well; the narrative is easy to follow and understand. It is a fascinating story, and in this age of universal communication unlikely to ever be repeated.
You can deduce from the above paragraph that he was writing about the most sensitive of issues; about techniques and events that could be useful to an enemy, and this gives some idea of how important was his work during the war.
Masterman had been an academic. In the First World War he had been in Germany studying German in August 1914 and was interned by the German authorities. He escaped once but was recaptured before he could cross the Dutch border. He taught again between the wars and, at the outbreak of World War II was called up by the Security Service (MI5), which is broadly equivalent to the American FBI, i.e. dealing with internal security.
MI5 already had one double-agent who had been working since 1936, but once the war began Germany sent over many agents with instructions to report back on all kinds of matters. These included aircraft specifications, locations of airfields, factories, barracks, etc., army regimental/divisional insignia, numbers of aircraft being produced, the effectiveness of bombing, food rationing and civilian morale, among others. It seemed incredible to me that the German secret service – the Abwehr – expected these agents to find such information in a time of war when people would naturally be suspicious of strangers asking questions.
In fact all but one of the agents parachuted in or landed from boats or U-boats were captured almost immediately by the British authorities. Some simply handed themselves in and offered to work for us instead; others were unrepentant, were tried and hanged as spies. The wireless (radio) sets issued by the Germans were either not very good (difficult to believe given German engineering is very good) or were not set up properly, and sometimes the codes they were given were unsophisticated. The one agent who was not captured was found after he committed suicide, having run out of money, alone and unable to contact his handlers. You have to feel sorry for the poor sod!
Most agents agreed, either voluntarily or under threat of prosecution, to become double agents and work for the British, and Masterman was instrumental in running this operation. I will not go into how this works because it is complex and you need to read the book.
The book itself is based on a report Masterman wrote in 1945, just after the end of the war in Europe, so it was all very fresh in his mind and this comes across in the text. He describes the theory and practice of running a double-cross system, and gives many examples of agents and their actions, and how they were controlled. The British were extremely patient and careful in building up the agents’ credibility, letting them send back true information that had been approved for release by the Twenty Committee (the Roman number for twenty, XX, is also a ‘double cross’), giving them fictional employment (such as on a farm – a man of fighting age could be called up [drafted] if not doing other important work, e.g. farming or factory work), and this helped to diminish German suspicions if the agent could not spend much time gathering intelligence. They also asked for more money at intervals because they had to live and travel. Some set up complete networks of other agents to report back to them, the information from whom the main agent then sent to the Abwehr. These agents were mostly fictional but the Germans didn’t know that, so sent a lot of money over to keep them going. In this way, the whole double-cross system was almost self-funded or, rather, funded by the enemy. By these means the British almost controlled the entire Abwehr campaign against the UK, and from the questions the agents were asked to answer by them were able to deduce a lot of information about the state of the Germans’ minds and their plans.
The book was originally a report so is not dramatic in tone, although the very nature of what is described is exciting. Masterman writes clearly and well; the narrative is easy to follow and understand. It is a fascinating story, and in this age of universal communication unlikely to ever be repeated.
November 18, 2012
Written shortly after the end of the Second World War but not published for almost 30 years after that, John Cecil Masterman's account of the "double cross" system is meticulous, balanced and well organized. Since it was written relatively soon after the war ended, Masterman's perspective is still very immediate and there isn't too much hindsight to colour the impressions he has. As one might expect of an Oxford don, he writes well, with elegantly long sentences and touches of wry humour (one example: one of the double agents decides to steal an MI5 motorbike in an attempt to escape his guards; however, the motorcycle, "being government property, is not maintained effectively and soon breaks down"). The book also includes a very handy table at the end listing all of the major double-cross agents, their length of service, primary areas of interest, and reasons for discontinuing their use.
Because of its author and the time it was written, this is a particularly fascinating book. I would recommend it to those with an interest in the Second World War and espionage, with one suggestion: it may be helpful to read a more modern account first (e.g. by Christopher Andrew or Ben Macintyre), just to have the background fresh in your mind as you read. Masterman does provide ample explanation, since this book was originally written as a government report for an audience that may not have necessarily known the ins and outs of the system, but having the extra background really helped me personally.
Because of its author and the time it was written, this is a particularly fascinating book. I would recommend it to those with an interest in the Second World War and espionage, with one suggestion: it may be helpful to read a more modern account first (e.g. by Christopher Andrew or Ben Macintyre), just to have the background fresh in your mind as you read. Masterman does provide ample explanation, since this book was originally written as a government report for an audience that may not have necessarily known the ins and outs of the system, but having the extra background really helped me personally.
July 11, 2017
Oh boy, the British took the Germans for a wild ride with their double agents during world war two. Awesome read on how they hired from competition, convinced people to betray their paymasters for their own benefit. A very methodical book, which is primarily a declassified report on the whole affair, submitted right after the war.
It's not just a propaganda book, it describes the nature of double agents, counter-espionage, mistakes that were made, what went well and what not. It shows the uncertainty they had about the success of their efforts and human cost of the whole activity. At the end, they were effectively controlling all German agents in the UK and Neutral countries. They utilized them methodically to control the flow of information to Germany and set Germans up for deception that ensured the success of their Normandy Landings and of operations onwards into Europe.
It's not just a propaganda book, it describes the nature of double agents, counter-espionage, mistakes that were made, what went well and what not. It shows the uncertainty they had about the success of their efforts and human cost of the whole activity. At the end, they were effectively controlling all German agents in the UK and Neutral countries. They utilized them methodically to control the flow of information to Germany and set Germans up for deception that ensured the success of their Normandy Landings and of operations onwards into Europe.
April 29, 2018
The review vanished somewhere into the comments section...! Stupid site...
October 18, 2018
Not that detailed and, well, useless unless you know lots about the history of WW2 since the writer assumed that the reader knew about the major events and offensives.
May 22, 2021
'What evidence there is goes to show that the Germans were at least our equals in all the arts connected with espionage and counterespionage.'
This is a valuable and well-balanced account of a remarkable achievement. Masterman was the chair of the Twenty Committee, a wartime body made up of representatives of organisations such as MI5, MI6 and the armed forces, and civilian bodies such as Civil Defence. It oversaw MI5's effective control of all German intelligence activities in Britain during World War Two, principally between the fall of France in 1940 and the Allied landings in 1944, by the running of double agents.
Masterman wrote the work as a reference work, to be of use in 'the next war'. He acknowledges that it will be impossible to run this system again, but that important lessons can be learned. Throughout he is meticulous in his presentation style, reining himself in when it looks like he might be going beyond the immediate focus of each chapter. He suppresses any desire for triumphalism, but has to acknowledge the immense success of the venture on many levels.
One of the most particular aspects of his analysis is his insistence on treating agents properly. Towards the end he recounts how, shortly before the fall of Hamburg, Agent Tate passes some intelligence to his Abwehr handler, and then asks after a suitcase he left in care in 1939 (it's now 1945). He is assured that the suitcase was delivered safely to his sister in September 1944: 'If you wish agents to serve you well you must satisfy their personal wishes and their personal interests'.
He's also clear about the need to risk investment: 'you cannot expect in any case to draw a fortune unless you pay in, and pay in freely, first'. There seems to be a balancing act going on, with resources for the Double Cross being challenged and defended, and returns experienced in the sums of money sent by the Germans to their agents in Britain and in the saving of lives and of military installations and hardware.
To sum up, this is a most valuable resource for understanding the nature of wartime intelligence in itself, but also how it contributed to the overall prosecution of the war. It's written clearly, and gives great insights into a world of illusion created and maintained with great dexterity despite a wide range of challenges.
This is a valuable and well-balanced account of a remarkable achievement. Masterman was the chair of the Twenty Committee, a wartime body made up of representatives of organisations such as MI5, MI6 and the armed forces, and civilian bodies such as Civil Defence. It oversaw MI5's effective control of all German intelligence activities in Britain during World War Two, principally between the fall of France in 1940 and the Allied landings in 1944, by the running of double agents.
Masterman wrote the work as a reference work, to be of use in 'the next war'. He acknowledges that it will be impossible to run this system again, but that important lessons can be learned. Throughout he is meticulous in his presentation style, reining himself in when it looks like he might be going beyond the immediate focus of each chapter. He suppresses any desire for triumphalism, but has to acknowledge the immense success of the venture on many levels.
One of the most particular aspects of his analysis is his insistence on treating agents properly. Towards the end he recounts how, shortly before the fall of Hamburg, Agent Tate passes some intelligence to his Abwehr handler, and then asks after a suitcase he left in care in 1939 (it's now 1945). He is assured that the suitcase was delivered safely to his sister in September 1944: 'If you wish agents to serve you well you must satisfy their personal wishes and their personal interests'.
He's also clear about the need to risk investment: 'you cannot expect in any case to draw a fortune unless you pay in, and pay in freely, first'. There seems to be a balancing act going on, with resources for the Double Cross being challenged and defended, and returns experienced in the sums of money sent by the Germans to their agents in Britain and in the saving of lives and of military installations and hardware.
To sum up, this is a most valuable resource for understanding the nature of wartime intelligence in itself, but also how it contributed to the overall prosecution of the war. It's written clearly, and gives great insights into a world of illusion created and maintained with great dexterity despite a wide range of challenges.
January 26, 2022
It is a fact of the world that nations spy on each other. In peacetime, it is lower key in the sense that there is little in the way of urgency or violence. That changes when nations are at war, the stakes are higher, and the consequences of success and failure magnified. No area of spying is more challenging that that of the double agent, a person that is recruited by one side but ends up working for the other. Sometimes, when they are the best, they work for both sides.
This book is about some of the double agents that the British ran during World War II. It is not full of wild and dangerous exploits, the author lists many of the more prominent agents based on their code names and their operations. Running a double agent working for your side is very much a difficult operation. It is necessary for the agent to send useful information on occasion so their handlers on the other side don’t get suspicious that they have turned.
Furthermore, there are times when elaborate ruses have to be organized and executed. In World War II, the most significant such operation was when the Allies worked to confuse the Germans regarding where the Allies would land when they invaded Europe in 1944. The landings were so problematic that even the movement of a German division, specifically an armored one, away from the landing point could make the difference between success or failure.
While it is not loaded with wild spy action, this book is nevertheless fascinating. For it shows the double-cross spy game for what it is, a duplicitous game where it is necessary to pass along some truth in order to maintain the credibility of your spies. All the while saving your main actions of deception for when it is really needed.
This book is about some of the double agents that the British ran during World War II. It is not full of wild and dangerous exploits, the author lists many of the more prominent agents based on their code names and their operations. Running a double agent working for your side is very much a difficult operation. It is necessary for the agent to send useful information on occasion so their handlers on the other side don’t get suspicious that they have turned.
Furthermore, there are times when elaborate ruses have to be organized and executed. In World War II, the most significant such operation was when the Allies worked to confuse the Germans regarding where the Allies would land when they invaded Europe in 1944. The landings were so problematic that even the movement of a German division, specifically an armored one, away from the landing point could make the difference between success or failure.
While it is not loaded with wild spy action, this book is nevertheless fascinating. For it shows the double-cross spy game for what it is, a duplicitous game where it is necessary to pass along some truth in order to maintain the credibility of your spies. All the while saving your main actions of deception for when it is really needed.
October 17, 2017
Decided to reread this after reading Marks's book. Masterman focuses specifically on how the British infiltrated the German spy system in England and turned the agents into double agents. This was written as a government report shortly after the war ended, so in many ways, it reads like a report, but Masterman has a sly sense of humor that periodically pops up. And the topic itself is fascinating as he relates stories of staged sabotage and deception. Masterman also matter of factly gives practical tips on how to run a double agent system, which isn't practical advice for most people, but it is still interesting.
June 26, 2022
An important first-hand account of British success in deception
January 5, 2023
This book was originally written in 1945 but remained ‘secret’ for over 15 years until 1961. At that time the book was edited for publication. However, it remained unpublished until 1972 when it received another mild edit before hitting the book stands. John (Sir John now) Masterman was a member of the MI5 department (B1a) that was created to maintain control over all German agents that were identified in Britain just before and during the Second World War. The book was written as a way to describe the process of control that was applied to these agents as they were convinced to help Britain, and as they were used.
The book is not a summary of what the double-cross agents did. No cat and mouse games with the German’s Abwehr. Rather the book tells how they were identified, converted into British employment, and most importantly how they were controlled. There are also a handful of examples of what are probably the most significant deceptions executed by the double-cross agents. Few if any of these agents were British and almost all turned. Most of these agents came from neutral or occupied countries when they were recruited by the Germans. Most of them reported to the authorities as soon as they arrived in Britain. By 1941, virtually all newly arrived agents had been directed by the Germans to contact existing, turned, agents for assistance with housing, jobs and money. B1a believed that they were in control of all German agents operating in Britain during this period.
The ongoing control of German agents was important for several reasons. First, it gave B1a the information necessary for immediate capture of new agents. Second, B1a could learn radio, code, and photographic techniques that allowed easier code breaking in other areas and authentic looking messages to be sent back to the Germans. Third, continuing two-way traffic dissuaded the Germans from recruiting and sending new agents. Obviously, Germany expected benefits from her British agents; this required serious and careful planning and approvals. Lots of low-level material was sent over the period, a large portion was of a geography textbook nature. The German locations of interest helped the British decide where to locate and/or strengthen their defenses. At times, B1a would destroy small unimportant facilities but used photography and lighting to make the pictures appear as if the agent had completed major feats of sabotage in key places. This too would confirm the good standing of the turned agents.
Throughout the war, the B1a team always believed their deceptions were having a positive impact. There was a strict requirement for senior level authorization by all branches of the military and important civil functions of what could or could not be passed to the Germans. This forced the professional silos to work together to create an integrated view of what really needed to be protected. This brought about some re-allocation of resources to align with the real importance of locations and activities. B1a tried to protect its most important agents by ensuring that the active deception would not compromise the agent.
The strategy was to ensure the double-cross network was intact and useable when the Allies began to make advances against the Germans. Knowing the Germans would learn about major troop movements, the sailing of troop ships and the type of gear that was being issued, they actively supported the Torch (North Africa) landings. The Germans were allowed to think about Norway, Sardinia and Greece. The Torch landings came as a big surprise for the Germans who were in no position to defend these landings or to retain any position in North Africa. Operation Husky (Sicily landings) was supported by hints about Norway and Sardinia. In this case, although a lot of German units were relocated, most went to Norway and Yugoslavia. None were moved to Sicily or southern Italy. The biggest deception of all was put in place to support the D-Day landings in Normandy. Not only did the Germans not strengthen Normandy but they retained Army sized units further east at Pas de Calais and Dunkirk where the English Channel is at its narrowest. These units were held in place for over four weeks by which time the Allies were too strong to be beaten. The double-cross network also had an impact with the German V2 rockets. Early V2s landed in southern London; reported in the press as ‘London’. B1a worked a double-cross case that convinced the Germans that the rockets were landing in northern London. The result here was to move the target center two to three miles south to a more rural area thus reducing impacts on denser, more urbanized areas. This is estimated to have saved many lives and structures.
I did not particularly enjoy this book, but I did find it very interesting. The interest might wane if you did not have an interest in the topic. I was annoyed to find some abbreviations not included in the list of abbreviations. Three stars
The book is not a summary of what the double-cross agents did. No cat and mouse games with the German’s Abwehr. Rather the book tells how they were identified, converted into British employment, and most importantly how they were controlled. There are also a handful of examples of what are probably the most significant deceptions executed by the double-cross agents. Few if any of these agents were British and almost all turned. Most of these agents came from neutral or occupied countries when they were recruited by the Germans. Most of them reported to the authorities as soon as they arrived in Britain. By 1941, virtually all newly arrived agents had been directed by the Germans to contact existing, turned, agents for assistance with housing, jobs and money. B1a believed that they were in control of all German agents operating in Britain during this period.
The ongoing control of German agents was important for several reasons. First, it gave B1a the information necessary for immediate capture of new agents. Second, B1a could learn radio, code, and photographic techniques that allowed easier code breaking in other areas and authentic looking messages to be sent back to the Germans. Third, continuing two-way traffic dissuaded the Germans from recruiting and sending new agents. Obviously, Germany expected benefits from her British agents; this required serious and careful planning and approvals. Lots of low-level material was sent over the period, a large portion was of a geography textbook nature. The German locations of interest helped the British decide where to locate and/or strengthen their defenses. At times, B1a would destroy small unimportant facilities but used photography and lighting to make the pictures appear as if the agent had completed major feats of sabotage in key places. This too would confirm the good standing of the turned agents.
Throughout the war, the B1a team always believed their deceptions were having a positive impact. There was a strict requirement for senior level authorization by all branches of the military and important civil functions of what could or could not be passed to the Germans. This forced the professional silos to work together to create an integrated view of what really needed to be protected. This brought about some re-allocation of resources to align with the real importance of locations and activities. B1a tried to protect its most important agents by ensuring that the active deception would not compromise the agent.
The strategy was to ensure the double-cross network was intact and useable when the Allies began to make advances against the Germans. Knowing the Germans would learn about major troop movements, the sailing of troop ships and the type of gear that was being issued, they actively supported the Torch (North Africa) landings. The Germans were allowed to think about Norway, Sardinia and Greece. The Torch landings came as a big surprise for the Germans who were in no position to defend these landings or to retain any position in North Africa. Operation Husky (Sicily landings) was supported by hints about Norway and Sardinia. In this case, although a lot of German units were relocated, most went to Norway and Yugoslavia. None were moved to Sicily or southern Italy. The biggest deception of all was put in place to support the D-Day landings in Normandy. Not only did the Germans not strengthen Normandy but they retained Army sized units further east at Pas de Calais and Dunkirk where the English Channel is at its narrowest. These units were held in place for over four weeks by which time the Allies were too strong to be beaten. The double-cross network also had an impact with the German V2 rockets. Early V2s landed in southern London; reported in the press as ‘London’. B1a worked a double-cross case that convinced the Germans that the rockets were landing in northern London. The result here was to move the target center two to three miles south to a more rural area thus reducing impacts on denser, more urbanized areas. This is estimated to have saved many lives and structures.
I did not particularly enjoy this book, but I did find it very interesting. The interest might wane if you did not have an interest in the topic. I was annoyed to find some abbreviations not included in the list of abbreviations. Three stars
July 4, 2021
This book was originally written as a report that recapped the British intelligence operation in World War II that turned German spies in Britain against the Germans. In other words, it was a double cross system as the spies turned against their original masters. This double cross system allowed the British to mislead the Germans by sending false information back to Germany. It was quite an effective system with its crowning achievement being to disguise the June 1944 D-day invasion at Normandy in France with enough counter-intelligence that kept the Germans guessing as to where that invasion force may land. As for the quality of the book, it was lacking for details and expanded stories that may have enlivened the narrative. It provides a description for how this double cross system was developed and enhanced during the war. In a sense, it is an outline of how to implement such a system in the future. The man who wrote this report was involved in the creation and ongoing operation of the double cross system. Shortly after the war ended, he retired from active service, but was called upon to write this report to understand the reasons spies will switch sides and how to handle these people in continued operations. That purpose wasn’t the same as providing a book that would inform and entertain readers with antidotes about particular individuals and operations. The details are bare bones retelling of operations as examples of how and why the system worked. The original readers would have known the details of those operations and could judge for themselves if the rules of the double cross system could be supported by the examples provided. However, in general distribution, this report is rather dry and dull reading.
September 27, 2024
J.C. Masterman was the chairman of the Twenty Committee, which was a group of British intelligence officials, including wartime amateurs, who held the key to the Double Cross System. Well then, from the horses mouth, this must be the unadulterated truth and nothing but the truth. No frills. No grand-standing. No added, fictional, dramas.
He might, mind, be wanting to paper over a few of the embarrassing episodes. I'm of the mind he's put it all on paper.
This, I believe, was taken from the operational (secret) papers that were submitted post war. The failures are in here. The anxieties. The doubts. I'm happy.
What a read! To think they had the gumption to think they might pull it off. Made from the right stuff.
Real spy work. It's a terrific read.
He might, mind, be wanting to paper over a few of the embarrassing episodes. I'm of the mind he's put it all on paper.
This, I believe, was taken from the operational (secret) papers that were submitted post war. The failures are in here. The anxieties. The doubts. I'm happy.
What a read! To think they had the gumption to think they might pull it off. Made from the right stuff.
Real spy work. It's a terrific read.
February 18, 2019
This book is actually a report written by the author following the conclusion of WWII to the government on the successes, failures, and lessons learned from the counterintelligence effort during the war known as the double-cross system. He explains how the British uncovered German spies and turned them into double agents, feeding misleading information back to the Germans. The report isn't extremely detailed, but gives a good overview of their efforts and the more important agents they ran. There are also numerous stories to go along (after all, what's a good spy story (or after action report!)) without lots of good stories? It's a quick read too - can finish it in a day or three.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
October 17, 2019
One of the great things about reading on a Kindle is that you get a good sample to read before you have to make a decision to read, or not. In this case, I nearly didn't get past the sample stage, but the words intrigued me and I went the distance and eventually found the subject to be fascinating.
I must admit that I had never seriously thought about the double cross system of operating spies but I can recognise the value, if you get it right. I recognise that this book is not for everyone, but if you are a persistent bastard like me, you could be rewarded in the end.
I must admit that I had never seriously thought about the double cross system of operating spies but I can recognise the value, if you get it right. I recognise that this book is not for everyone, but if you are a persistent bastard like me, you could be rewarded in the end.
May 24, 2020
Fact stranger than fiction, had no idea we had such control over all German spies sent over to infiltrate our country and turned so many of them back on their creators.
Basically their entire network was working against them and they had no idea. Even when we tried setting up obvious fakes for them to catch they were believed to be providing real Intel.
Their downfall was the spies were being run by agents who were more in it for themselves than for the good of the country, so didn't question what they were receiving as deeply as they should have, to our benefit.
Bonkers!
Basically their entire network was working against them and they had no idea. Even when we tried setting up obvious fakes for them to catch they were believed to be providing real Intel.
Their downfall was the spies were being run by agents who were more in it for themselves than for the good of the country, so didn't question what they were receiving as deeply as they should have, to our benefit.
Bonkers!
December 22, 2021
This is the history of the British double-cross system which was a system of feeding false information to the Germans during World War II. The British accomplished this by the means of double agents, most of whom when captured were convinced to work against the Germans. The Germans never caught on to what was happening and this intelligence triumph was unknown to the general public until the early 1970’s. J.C. Master man was an ask for Dan who was tasked with writing a report on this system only months after the war zone. This book is an adaptation of that report.
July 12, 2017
A rather dry account of the counter espionage program carried on by Britain in WWII. It was never meant to be the material of a best seller, it seems, and thus the rather amazing information is conveyed in a straightforward, mostly unadorned business-like manner. However, there are a few intermittent touches of wry humor.
March 27, 2025
Very interesting although quite short and rather dry.
But written in 1945 so topical as so soon after the events, and kept then later released in book form after permission given to the author by the government.
But written in 1945 so topical as so soon after the events, and kept then later released in book form after permission given to the author by the government.
July 9, 2025
Some of the details in this are so fucking funny, man. Like the time they needed to fake blowing up a weapons depot, but couldn’t fake it so uneventfully the papers wouldn’t pick up on it, so decided the only way was to blow it up secretly, but only *just* enough. Dudes rock.
February 28, 2017
A good explanation of how the British controlled the entire German spy network in the UK by turning them into double agents and how they made use of the double cross system.
December 26, 2021
It was good but awfully technical and sometimes hard to follow. The Pearl Harbor stuff was quite interesting.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
June 6, 2022
Seems like an important work, just not really of interest to me, but read none the less as was given to me.
May 30, 2024
Concise and well-written. Only complaint is that the author brings up interesting topics only to shut them down as he claims they are beyond the purview of the book.
September 25, 2024
DNF-d about 1/3 the way through. Too technical and dry.
January 27, 2025
Simply fantastic.
Every German agent on our shores was hoovered up and turned: brilliant.
Hats off.
Every German agent on our shores was hoovered up and turned: brilliant.
Hats off.
May 15, 2013
Dry, but compelling. Dry because it is a reprint in book form of a government report, compelling because it is a report on how the British government in World War II controlled the German spy network in England. Masterman introduces the work with thoughts on the whys and wherefores of running a double cross system-where the German spies were turned and used against Germany, rather than merely being arrested and thrown in prison-among other reasons, they could control what information Germany received from her agents; and they could use the agents as part of deceptions, such as with operation Overlord.
The most interesting part, and the part that makes up the bulk of the work, is a discussion of the actual running of the agents, year by year, starting with the creation of the Twenty Committee-twenty after the Roman numeral XX, for double-cross. The committee decided what information the agents should pass to their German handlers. Masterman gives us a report on the activities of various agents, including but not limited to, agent Garbo and agent Zigzag, both of whom had biographies written about them.
One of the appendices is a questionaire for an agent in America that included requests for information regarding military facilities in Hawaii, presumably at the behest of the Japanese. Masterman includes this because he believes that this could have given an indication to the Americans that the Japanese may have been planning to attack there.
The most interesting part, and the part that makes up the bulk of the work, is a discussion of the actual running of the agents, year by year, starting with the creation of the Twenty Committee-twenty after the Roman numeral XX, for double-cross. The committee decided what information the agents should pass to their German handlers. Masterman gives us a report on the activities of various agents, including but not limited to, agent Garbo and agent Zigzag, both of whom had biographies written about them.
One of the appendices is a questionaire for an agent in America that included requests for information regarding military facilities in Hawaii, presumably at the behest of the Japanese. Masterman includes this because he believes that this could have given an indication to the Americans that the Japanese may have been planning to attack there.
August 7, 2007
I'm fascinated by the deception campaigns of WWII. This book was written by one of the men who devised the "double-cross system," in which the British intelligence service fed misinformation to the Germans. Basically, all the German spies in Britain were captured early on in the war and subsequently controlled by the British.
The book is essentially a government report that was written, but not released until 1972. (Basically, the British were not in any particular hurry to disclose their methods, and who can blame them? A few years back when I visited Bletchley Park, the wartime decoding facility outside London, a couple of the people I spoke to there mentioned something to the effect of, "Well, it's you Yanks that let the cat out of the bag." Apparently, disclosures made in the U.S. in the 1970's of wartime operations had brought about the decision to declassify the British documents.
No Official Secrets Act here, you see. Yet.
Anyhow, getting back to the book, it's a rather dry read, being basically a report, but it still makes fascinating reading for the WWII buff.
The book is essentially a government report that was written, but not released until 1972. (Basically, the British were not in any particular hurry to disclose their methods, and who can blame them? A few years back when I visited Bletchley Park, the wartime decoding facility outside London, a couple of the people I spoke to there mentioned something to the effect of, "Well, it's you Yanks that let the cat out of the bag." Apparently, disclosures made in the U.S. in the 1970's of wartime operations had brought about the decision to declassify the British documents.
No Official Secrets Act here, you see. Yet.
Anyhow, getting back to the book, it's a rather dry read, being basically a report, but it still makes fascinating reading for the WWII buff.
October 1, 2012
Masterman, a university professor and mystery writer, was a leading member of the XX Committee--MI6's committee that ran turned German agents during World War II. As nearly as can be told, the British suborned every German agent in England and used them to funnel false information back to German spymasters while allowing the English to learn about what the Germans actually knew. Masterman's book is a reprint of his original report to the British government at the end of the war, just prior to returning to academic life. It doesn't have the pizzazz of Ben Macintyre's recent book, but it is a good read and is the product of the actual XX Committee leader himself.
January 2, 2016
Really exciting tale of WWII. Most probably true but when I visited the Imperial War Museum in London the had a display out on life in the UK during the war and it included a reward poster for a spy. I wrote them asking about the conflicting claims in the Masterman book. A member of the IWM staff said they were not free to comment at the time but would let me know at some future date....which has yet to arrive if it ever will. Still a good story that hangs together with history almost as I learned it.
March 4, 2008
This study of British counter-intelligence during the Second World War is a must read for anyone interested in the period. The author was there, and he tells the amazing tale of how the British confounded German intelligence throughout the war.
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