Degregori had a front-row seat on Sendero Luminoso and the violence that engulfed Peru through the 1980s. Not only was he a member of the 2003 Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and a leading liberal media 'Senderologist' during the worst of the violence, he personally knew and was a peer of Abimael Guzmán. Both of them were social sciences professors at San Cristóbal of Huamanga University in Ayacucho at the same time. But while Degregori went to Lima, and mainstream success, Guzmán went underground, becoming the ideological focus of fanatical Maoist movement which sparked a war that killed 69,000 Peruvians, most of them Quechua-speaking campesinos. This was a dirty war on all sides, but Sendero started it, and they were responsible for roughly 2/3rds of the deaths, by the accounting of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. I believe Degregori has the raw material for a really amazing book here, a kind of Andean A Bright Shining Lie. Unfortunately, this book is turgid mass of sociological theory, where a few anecdotes stand in for narrative, let alone story.
The opening chapter warns against essentializing Peru, against treating the Inca heritage of the highlands as some kind of root Pagan barbarity cast against coastal modernity and metizo hybrid confusion. So it is with greatest irony that every subsequent chapter does just that. In Degregori's analysis, Peru in the period 1945-1980 lagged regionally in material development indicators like GDP, but it excelled in providing secondary and post-secondary education. Provincial mestizos like Guzmán and the raw recruits of the Shining Path were educated, cut off from their ancestral roots, but unable to break into the true power of Lima's elite. Frustrated as a class, they were easy pickings for the sureties of 'scientific Marxism and the inevitable historical dialect of Revolution.' Even the earliest Shining Path rhetoric is drenched in blood, so it is unsurprising that they started killing in their liberated zones. First the violence was a kind of revolutionary justice, against cattle rustlers, thieves, wife beaters, etc. But as the Senderos were pushed out by the Peruvian Army, the killings escalated to include all the people who had failed the People's Revolution. Fanaticism was little match against the resources of the state, and when Guzmán was captured in 1992 in a Lima safehouse, the revolution fell apart.
It's an interesting thesis, but it's backed up with a few scanty interviews, a few quotes from the voluminous hardcore Marxist propaganda of the movement, and nothing about Guzman, or why his version of People's War was so bloody.