Intelligence and U.S. Foreign Policy: Iraq, 9/11, and Misguided Reform

by Paul R. Pillar

A career of nearly three decades with the CIA and the National Intelligence Council showed Paul R. Pillar that intelligence reforms, especially measures enacted since 9/11, can be deeply misguided. They often miss the sources that underwrite failed policy and misperceive our ability to read outside influences. They also misconceive the intelligence-policy relationship and promote changes that weaken intelligence-gathering operations.

In this book, Pillar confronts the intelligence myths Americans have come to rely on to explain national tragedies, including the belief that intelligence drives major national security decisions and can be fixed to avoid future failures. Pillar believes these assumptions waste critical resources and create harmful policies, diverting attention away from smarter reform, and they keep Americans from recognizing the limits of obtainable knowledge.

Pillar revisits U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War and highlights the small role intelligence played in those decisions, and he demonstrates the negligible effect that America's most notorious intelligence failures had on U.S. policy and interests. He then reviews in detail the events of 9/11 and the 2003 invasion of Iraq, condemning the 9/11 commission and the George W. Bush administration for their portrayals of the role of intelligence. Pillar offers an original approach to better informing U.S. policy, which involves insulating intelligence management from politicization and reducing the politically appointed layer in the executive branch to combat slanted perceptions of foreign threats. Pillar concludes with principles for adapting foreign policy to inevitable uncertainties.

Genres: Politics

432 pages, Hardcover

First published September 27, 2011

Reviews

[Joseph Stieb · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book veers between good and excellent depending on the chapter. Pillar is an ex-CIA analyst with extensive experience in counterterrorism. He puts forth a number of theses in this books and sheds some interesting light. A big point of the book is defending intelligence agencies from politicized criticism for national security failings. He makes a compelling argument that the IQ War should not be understood primarily as an intelligence failure for 2 reasons. 1. The intelligence agencies actually put forth quite hedged, nuanced analyses of what SH might have had. It was the claims of Bush admin officials and other war boosters that went far beyond the intelligence to claim that SH definitely had these programs (part of a host of manipulations and self-inflicted delusions). Pillar admits that intelligence nevertheless overestimated what SH had but didn't oversell the case like Bush did.

2. Pillar argues convincingly that the Bush team was so fixated on war with IQ and convinced of IQ's WMD/terrorism threat that they really weren't interested in what the intelligence agencies had to say. Here's a basic but crucial point: the intelligence agencies never came to Bush pre or post 911 and said "SH is making huge WMD strides/connections to terrorism, we need to ramp up the policy big time." The push came from ideologically driven policy-makers who actually saw intelligence personnel (with their nuance and skepticism) as opponents in the rush to war rather than sources of info on which to make a decision. Pillar shows in later chapters that this model (from the last half of the previous sentence) is hardly ever the case in policy making. Needless to say, this book doesn't exactly make me want to sign up for the CIA anytime soon.

In general, this book is a defense of intelligence agencies against political detractors. Pillar shows that the 9/11 Commission Report is actually quite politicized. It tries to pin the blame solely on intelligence, ignoring many steps they made to better comprehend the AQ threat and prod policy-makers into taking action. He mocks many of the Commission's criticisms, like the idea of "failing to connect the dots," as hopelessly simplistic portraits of the actual challenges of intelligence work. He shows that the 9/11 Commission Report was as much a matter of national catharsis as it was generating actual productive change. Intelligence agencies are an easy target for politicians because most Americans don't really know what they do, don't admire them like the military, and the intelligence personnel themselves have an ethos of non-partisan surface that inhibits them from fighting back. Lastly, Pillar makes a strong case for actual reforms that might really help intelligence agencies, including reducing the number of political appointees in all foreign policy agents that form a screen of ideology and partisanship between the intelligence agencies and the big-time decision makers. I thought this was an interesting way in which our political system has become not just too politicized but too democratized (for more, see Fareed Zakaria excellent book "The Future of Freedom.")

If this book were more concise and punchy (maybe 300 instead of 360 if some of the middle chapter were put on a diet), I would recommend it highly to general readers in intelligence and foreign policy. Given its actual length and density, I'd say it would be best for more patient and involved researchers.

[Sean Loveland · Rating 5 out of 5]

What a great book! Mr. Pillar uses in-depth research to show his readers the flaws associated with the relationships between policy and intelligence. It opened my eyes to a lot of the inner workings I was largely unfamiliar with. He stresses educating oneself to understand what goes on behind the scenes with commission reporters and how to read between the lines. This was one of the best books I've ever read.

[Hershel · Rating 2 out of 5]

Interesting but repetitive and too long. Didn't bother finishing.