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Determinism or Free Will
Cohen, Chapman
- GenresNonfictionPhilosophy
126 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 1919
18 people are currently reading
62 people want to read
About the author
Chapman Cohen
84 books12 followersChapman Cohen (1 September 1868 – 4 February 1954) was a leading English atheist and secularist writer and lecturer.
Chapman Cohen was the elder son of Enoch Cohen, a Jewish confectioner, and his wife, Deborah (née Barnett). He attended a local elementary school but was otherwise self-educated. He had read Spinoza, Locke, Hume, Berkeley, and Plato by the time he was eighteen.
Cohen recalled that he had "little religion at home and none at school", as he was withdrawn from Religious Instruction classes.
Cohen and his wife had two children; a son (who entered the medical profession) and a daughter, who died at the age of 29.
On his death, The Times printed a short obituary of Cohen, which said:
"He was the author of many books setting forth the freethought philosophy of life, which had a large sale, and he was outstanding as a forthright, witty and courteous debater and lecturer."
Cohen moved to London in 1889, and soon became involved in the secularist movement. Cohen commented that,
"My introduction to the platform of the National Secular Society was quite accidental. I had heard none of its speakers, read none of its publications, except an occasional glance at Bradlaugh's National Reformer. I knew there was a Freethought movement afoot, but that was about all."
Cohen relates that in the Summer of 1889 he was walking in Victoria Park when he came across a crowd listening to a Christian speaker:
"the speaker was opposed by an old gentleman – at least he seemed old to me – who suffered from an impediment in his speech. The lecturer in replying spent part of his time in mimicking the old gentleman's speech. After he had 'replied,' the lecturer asked for more opposition. Mainly because of his treatment of the old man I accepted the invitation."
He spoke against the same lecturer – at their invitation – a few weeks later. Shortly afterwards he was invited to speak the local branch of the National Secular Society. After a year of lecturing for the freethought cause, he joined the NSS.
He was a popular lecturer for the Society, at his peak delivering over 200 lectures a year. He was elected a vice-president of the NSS in 1895.
In 1897 Cohen began contributing weekly articles to G. W. Foote's Freethinker, having previously written accounts of his lecture tours. In 1898 he became assistant editor of The Freethinker, and after Foote's death in 1915 he was appointed editor. Cohen had written for other freethought journals before joining The Freethinker, and had edited The Truthseeker, owned by J.W. Gott. Cohen also succeeded Foote as President of the National Secular Society.
Chapman Cohen was the elder son of Enoch Cohen, a Jewish confectioner, and his wife, Deborah (née Barnett). He attended a local elementary school but was otherwise self-educated. He had read Spinoza, Locke, Hume, Berkeley, and Plato by the time he was eighteen.
Cohen recalled that he had "little religion at home and none at school", as he was withdrawn from Religious Instruction classes.
Cohen and his wife had two children; a son (who entered the medical profession) and a daughter, who died at the age of 29.
On his death, The Times printed a short obituary of Cohen, which said:
"He was the author of many books setting forth the freethought philosophy of life, which had a large sale, and he was outstanding as a forthright, witty and courteous debater and lecturer."
Cohen moved to London in 1889, and soon became involved in the secularist movement. Cohen commented that,
"My introduction to the platform of the National Secular Society was quite accidental. I had heard none of its speakers, read none of its publications, except an occasional glance at Bradlaugh's National Reformer. I knew there was a Freethought movement afoot, but that was about all."
Cohen relates that in the Summer of 1889 he was walking in Victoria Park when he came across a crowd listening to a Christian speaker:
"the speaker was opposed by an old gentleman – at least he seemed old to me – who suffered from an impediment in his speech. The lecturer in replying spent part of his time in mimicking the old gentleman's speech. After he had 'replied,' the lecturer asked for more opposition. Mainly because of his treatment of the old man I accepted the invitation."
He spoke against the same lecturer – at their invitation – a few weeks later. Shortly afterwards he was invited to speak the local branch of the National Secular Society. After a year of lecturing for the freethought cause, he joined the NSS.
He was a popular lecturer for the Society, at his peak delivering over 200 lectures a year. He was elected a vice-president of the NSS in 1895.
In 1897 Cohen began contributing weekly articles to G. W. Foote's Freethinker, having previously written accounts of his lecture tours. In 1898 he became assistant editor of The Freethinker, and after Foote's death in 1915 he was appointed editor. Cohen had written for other freethought journals before joining The Freethinker, and had edited The Truthseeker, owned by J.W. Gott. Cohen also succeeded Foote as President of the National Secular Society.
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January 25, 2014
Determinists will doubtlessly relish this work by Chapman Cohen written circa 1919; however, I was not persuaded by his arguments however articulately he presented them. I did appreciate that he refused to accept that 'free-will' is an illusion - an absurd claim made by many modern day adherents. In order to explain how our everyday concepts of freedom, responsibility, accountability, justice, and morality can be understood in light of the fact that all behaviors have no other possibility than what occurs, he was compelled to redefine all of these terms in such a way that they were stripped of their ordinary meaning.
Determinism seems to me to be nothing other than an example of the adage, "If the only tool one has is a hammer, then every problem looks like a nail." I have no difficulty accepting the fact that, in the main, physical objects generally obey the laws of cause and effect. What I cannot fathom is how such an explanation, known only to apply in that limited context, can possibly be extended to mental phenomena (e.g., images, ideas, thoughts, concepts), especially when science has such an incomplete understanding of how the brain works. The application of Newtonian physics to mental processes is not only unwarranted, doing so requires the abandonment of every notion humans have about their agency (e.g., heroism, loyalty, fairness) and that of their fellow beings on the planet.
Even if it were true, which cannot be so, determinism is a theory that explains nothing and offers no practical utility to humanity. I have yet to read one single benefit that accrues to people from an admission that everything that they think and do could not have been altered by any prior intention, plan, goal, or desire on their part. It is easy to see why many determinists stand by the "illusion" argument because these sensations we have about our agency, if false, can only be explained by some nasty trickery played on the species by evolution - and for what purpose exactly?! To that question, we are left in abject darkness.
Determinists find it difficult to grasp a simple concept: to believe in 'free-will' does not require postulating a reality in which there are no constraints or influences upon human thoughts and actions such as motives, education, environment, emotions, instincts, and perceived consequences. It does maintain that, notwithstanding the myriad influences that are present, the mind CAN still make choices in an independent and unfettered manner. Such decisions are made by ordinary people every minute of every day. Determinists, conversely, would have us believe in absolute causality, but we should immediately rule against it on that basis alone because there has never been observed in reality anything that is absolute. Freedom in the indetermistic 'free-will' sense is a relative concept; as such, it operates within a reality we know and understand vs. some hypothesized theoretical ideal state that does not and cannot exist except in language.
Determinism seems to me to be nothing other than an example of the adage, "If the only tool one has is a hammer, then every problem looks like a nail." I have no difficulty accepting the fact that, in the main, physical objects generally obey the laws of cause and effect. What I cannot fathom is how such an explanation, known only to apply in that limited context, can possibly be extended to mental phenomena (e.g., images, ideas, thoughts, concepts), especially when science has such an incomplete understanding of how the brain works. The application of Newtonian physics to mental processes is not only unwarranted, doing so requires the abandonment of every notion humans have about their agency (e.g., heroism, loyalty, fairness) and that of their fellow beings on the planet.
Even if it were true, which cannot be so, determinism is a theory that explains nothing and offers no practical utility to humanity. I have yet to read one single benefit that accrues to people from an admission that everything that they think and do could not have been altered by any prior intention, plan, goal, or desire on their part. It is easy to see why many determinists stand by the "illusion" argument because these sensations we have about our agency, if false, can only be explained by some nasty trickery played on the species by evolution - and for what purpose exactly?! To that question, we are left in abject darkness.
Determinists find it difficult to grasp a simple concept: to believe in 'free-will' does not require postulating a reality in which there are no constraints or influences upon human thoughts and actions such as motives, education, environment, emotions, instincts, and perceived consequences. It does maintain that, notwithstanding the myriad influences that are present, the mind CAN still make choices in an independent and unfettered manner. Such decisions are made by ordinary people every minute of every day. Determinists, conversely, would have us believe in absolute causality, but we should immediately rule against it on that basis alone because there has never been observed in reality anything that is absolute. Freedom in the indetermistic 'free-will' sense is a relative concept; as such, it operates within a reality we know and understand vs. some hypothesized theoretical ideal state that does not and cannot exist except in language.
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