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On Metaphysics
Book by Chisholm, Roderick M.
- GenresPhilosophyMetaphysics
Unknown Binding
First published June 30, 1989
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About the author
Roderick M. Chisholm
43 books12 followersRoderick Milton Chisholm was an American philosopher known for his work on epistemology, metaphysics, free will, value theory, and the philosophy of perception. He was often called "the philosopher's philosopher.
Chisholm graduated from Brown University in 1938 and received his Ph.D. at Harvard University in 1942 under Clarence Irving Lewis and Donald C. Williams. He was drafted into the United States Army in July 1942 and did basic training at Fort McClellan in Alabama. Chisholm administered psychological tests in Boston and New Haven. In 1943 he married Eleanor Parker, whom he had met as an undergraduate at Brown. He spent his academic career at Brown University and served as president of the Metaphysical Society of America in 1973.
Chisholm trained many distinguished philosophers, including Selmer Bringsjord, Fred Feldman, Keith Lehrer, James Francis Ross, Richard Taylor, and Dean Zimmerman. He also had a significant influence on many colleagues, including Jaegwon Kim and Ernest Sosa.
Chisholm graduated from Brown University in 1938 and received his Ph.D. at Harvard University in 1942 under Clarence Irving Lewis and Donald C. Williams. He was drafted into the United States Army in July 1942 and did basic training at Fort McClellan in Alabama. Chisholm administered psychological tests in Boston and New Haven. In 1943 he married Eleanor Parker, whom he had met as an undergraduate at Brown. He spent his academic career at Brown University and served as president of the Metaphysical Society of America in 1973.
Chisholm trained many distinguished philosophers, including Selmer Bringsjord, Fred Feldman, Keith Lehrer, James Francis Ross, Richard Taylor, and Dean Zimmerman. He also had a significant influence on many colleagues, including Jaegwon Kim and Ernest Sosa.
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March 26, 2016
Chisholm covers the basic categories in what is known as the standard Western, realist metaphysical model. Some of the essays are rather technical (giving rise to the legendary "Chisholming") but they are all erudite and worthwhile. Here are some of his conclusions:
RC defends free-will as agent causation: if a man is responsible for some particular deed, then an event, or set of events will be caused, not by other events, but by that man himself (Chisholm 6).
*He gives a fine presentation of the Ship of Theseus problem, noting that materialist models have more difficulty in accounting for identity through change. Ship of Theseus Problem: Parts of the ship (S₁)are being changed out at intervals, yet is it the same ship? When does it become a different ship? What if the parts of the old ship are gradually being used to build a new ship (S₂).
He gives a good discussion of Parts, Wholes, and Boundaries. for any whole x, if x has y as one of its parts, then y is part of x in every possible world in which x exists (66) AND A part of a thing is a constituent which is not a boundary (83). We need the idea of boundaries as a description of physical continuity.
Problem for process philosophy: no one has ever devoted any philosophical toil showing how to reduce substances to processes (94).
He ends with several good essays noting, among other things, the nature of properties and with a substantial treatment of the mind-body problem. Chisholm does not distinguish between universals as abstract objects and universals as particulars. As a being of another thing, a state is not an ens per se. States are ontologically dependent on things of which they are states.
Conclusion:
How does this compare with other metaphysics texts? It is more difficult than Peter Van Inwagen, though he gives more substantial treatments (even if he isn't as good a writer as PVI). On the other hand, it is more accessible than Michael Loux's work.
RC defends free-will as agent causation: if a man is responsible for some particular deed, then an event, or set of events will be caused, not by other events, but by that man himself (Chisholm 6).
*He gives a fine presentation of the Ship of Theseus problem, noting that materialist models have more difficulty in accounting for identity through change. Ship of Theseus Problem: Parts of the ship (S₁)are being changed out at intervals, yet is it the same ship? When does it become a different ship? What if the parts of the old ship are gradually being used to build a new ship (S₂).
He gives a good discussion of Parts, Wholes, and Boundaries. for any whole x, if x has y as one of its parts, then y is part of x in every possible world in which x exists (66) AND A part of a thing is a constituent which is not a boundary (83). We need the idea of boundaries as a description of physical continuity.
Problem for process philosophy: no one has ever devoted any philosophical toil showing how to reduce substances to processes (94).
He ends with several good essays noting, among other things, the nature of properties and with a substantial treatment of the mind-body problem. Chisholm does not distinguish between universals as abstract objects and universals as particulars. As a being of another thing, a state is not an ens per se. States are ontologically dependent on things of which they are states.
Conclusion:
How does this compare with other metaphysics texts? It is more difficult than Peter Van Inwagen, though he gives more substantial treatments (even if he isn't as good a writer as PVI). On the other hand, it is more accessible than Michael Loux's work.
July 8, 2024
A “PHILOSOPHER OF PHILOSOPHERS” EXAMINES SEVERAL TOPICS
Roderick Milton Chisholm (1916 -1999) was an American philosopher who taught at Brown University.
He wrote in the Introduction to this 1989 book, “Two assumptions about the nature of metaphysics are presupposed by this book… One assumption is that the problems of philosophy are extraordinarily difficult and can be solved only by the reasonable application of what Russell called ‘honest toil.’ The other is the view of Leibniz and Brentano, according to which reflection on the self and on what it is to think provides us with the key to understanding the fundamental categories of reality. The categories discussed here are: substance and attribute; part and whole; identity, persistence, and change; boundaries and limits; coming into being and passing away; reference and the nature of the psychological; and the self.”
He notes, “In saying that certain uses of languages are ‘loose and popular’ rather than ‘strict and philosophical,’ we are not suggesting that those uses are incorrect. Indeed, they may be said to be correct; for it is the loose and popular interpretation rather than the strict and philosophical one that gives the standard of correctness (at any rate, in the loose and popular sense of ‘correct’).” (Pg. 30)
He acknowledges, “The points I have just made are typically philosophical. I know they will bring forth two quite different reactions. One reaction will be: ‘But why insist upon what is trivial and obvious?’ And the other reaction will be: ‘What you say is obviously false.’ As long as there are people who react in the second way… it is worthwhile to insist upon what is obvious, even if it is trivial… Of course there may be philosophers or there may be people practicing medicine who don’t think there are any persons. And this means, if they are consistent, that they don’t believe with respect to themselves that they ever came into being or that they will ever pass away. For people who so really believe that, I have no message---except to urge them to think again.” (Pg. 51)
He states, “So where does this leave us with respect to the moral problems that are involve in causing someone to cease to be? Surely it is right, sometimes, to terminate a pregnancy or to disconnect a life-sustaining device. Doubtless such acts always call for an excuse. But let’s not pretend that, when we perform them, probably we are not causing anyone else to cease to be. Let’s have the courage to face the moral facts of the matter: occasionally it IS right for one person to annihilate another.” (Pg. 60)
He notes, “I do have doubts as to whether there is a special problem concerning the relation between THE MIND and the body… Now in saying this… I do not mean that there is not PERSON-body problem. If we use ‘person’ to designate such entities as you and me, then there is no question but that there ARE such things as persons. And obvious there is no question but that there ARE such things as our bodies. There IS a problem about the relation between THOSE entities… But I want to urge that we multiply problems beyond necessity if we suppose, that IN ADDITION to the person-body problem, there is ALSO a mind-body problem. If … ‘mind’ is taken to designate some individual thing which is OTHER than the person… then there is no reason to suppose that there is such a thing as the mind; and … then there is no problem about how it may be related to the body.” (Pg. 119)
This book will be of some interest to those seriously studying modern analytic philosophy.
Roderick Milton Chisholm (1916 -1999) was an American philosopher who taught at Brown University.
He wrote in the Introduction to this 1989 book, “Two assumptions about the nature of metaphysics are presupposed by this book… One assumption is that the problems of philosophy are extraordinarily difficult and can be solved only by the reasonable application of what Russell called ‘honest toil.’ The other is the view of Leibniz and Brentano, according to which reflection on the self and on what it is to think provides us with the key to understanding the fundamental categories of reality. The categories discussed here are: substance and attribute; part and whole; identity, persistence, and change; boundaries and limits; coming into being and passing away; reference and the nature of the psychological; and the self.”
He notes, “In saying that certain uses of languages are ‘loose and popular’ rather than ‘strict and philosophical,’ we are not suggesting that those uses are incorrect. Indeed, they may be said to be correct; for it is the loose and popular interpretation rather than the strict and philosophical one that gives the standard of correctness (at any rate, in the loose and popular sense of ‘correct’).” (Pg. 30)
He acknowledges, “The points I have just made are typically philosophical. I know they will bring forth two quite different reactions. One reaction will be: ‘But why insist upon what is trivial and obvious?’ And the other reaction will be: ‘What you say is obviously false.’ As long as there are people who react in the second way… it is worthwhile to insist upon what is obvious, even if it is trivial… Of course there may be philosophers or there may be people practicing medicine who don’t think there are any persons. And this means, if they are consistent, that they don’t believe with respect to themselves that they ever came into being or that they will ever pass away. For people who so really believe that, I have no message---except to urge them to think again.” (Pg. 51)
He states, “So where does this leave us with respect to the moral problems that are involve in causing someone to cease to be? Surely it is right, sometimes, to terminate a pregnancy or to disconnect a life-sustaining device. Doubtless such acts always call for an excuse. But let’s not pretend that, when we perform them, probably we are not causing anyone else to cease to be. Let’s have the courage to face the moral facts of the matter: occasionally it IS right for one person to annihilate another.” (Pg. 60)
He notes, “I do have doubts as to whether there is a special problem concerning the relation between THE MIND and the body… Now in saying this… I do not mean that there is not PERSON-body problem. If we use ‘person’ to designate such entities as you and me, then there is no question but that there ARE such things as persons. And obvious there is no question but that there ARE such things as our bodies. There IS a problem about the relation between THOSE entities… But I want to urge that we multiply problems beyond necessity if we suppose, that IN ADDITION to the person-body problem, there is ALSO a mind-body problem. If … ‘mind’ is taken to designate some individual thing which is OTHER than the person… then there is no reason to suppose that there is such a thing as the mind; and … then there is no problem about how it may be related to the body.” (Pg. 119)
This book will be of some interest to those seriously studying modern analytic philosophy.
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews