How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qa'ida by Martin C. Libicki

by Seth G. Jones

All terrorist groups eventually end. But how do they end? The evidence since 1968 indicates that most groups have ended because (1) they joined the political process (43 percent) or (2) local police and intelligence agencies arrested or killed key members (40 percent). Military force has rarely been the primary reason for the end of terrorist groups, and few groups within this time frame have achieved victory. This has significant implications for dealing with al Qa?ida and suggests fundamentally rethinking post-9/11 U.S. counterterrorism Policymakers need to understand where to prioritize their efforts with limited resources and attention. The authors report that religious terrorist groups take longer to eliminate than other groups and rarely achieve their objectives. The largest groups achieve their goals more often and last longer than the smallest ones do. Finally, groups from upper-income countries are more likely to be left-wing or nationalist and less likely to have religion as their motivation. The authors conclude that policing and intelligence, rather than military force, should form the backbone of U.S. efforts against al Qa?ida. And U.S. policymakers should end the use of the phrase ?war on terrorism? since there is no battlefield solution to defeating al Qa?ida.

Genres: History, Politics, Nonfiction

Paperback

First published November 17, 2004

Reviews

[Jonathan · Rating 3 out of 5]

This RAND report examines 648 terrorist groups that have been active between 1968 and 2006. The authors want to answer a pressing question: what makes terrorists stop being terrorists? The authors conclude that military force is the least effective way to end terrorism. In fact, terrorist groups are more likely to disband because they achieve their goals (10% of the time) than because a primarily military strategy has defeated them (7%). When a political solution (43%) is not possible, the most effective way to end terrorism is through effective policing and intelligence (40%).

The authors argue that the "war on terror" is an ill-advised concept. America's military strategy has not diminished al Qaida's global strength at all; al Qaida carried out more attacks in the five years after 9/11 than in the five years prior. In fact, the invasion of Iraq in 2003 may actually have prevented the US from capturing al Qaida's core leadership in Central Asia. The "war on terror" also glorifies terrorists, diverts US resources from more effective policing and intelligence tactics, and turns local Muslims against the United States. (The authors show that local support is crucial to success. The near-disappearance of al Qaida from Iraq's al Anbar province, they say, is due not to increased US troop strength but to the rise of an indigenous police force, recruited mostly from militias.)

The RAND Corporation is hardly a peacenik stronghold. It is virtually an arm of the Defense Department. This study tells me little I did not already know, but I welcome it as additional evidence that the Bush administration has weakened America's national security.

[Ana Omelete · Rating 4 out of 5]

Interesting study about counterterrorism tactics, supported by several resources, graphics. It shows the difference between the use of the military and the use of police and criminal intelligence.

[Eray Mutlu · Rating 3 out of 5]

In "How Terrorist Groups End," Seth G. Jones invites readers to reconsider conventional notions surrounding counterterrorism. The author's analysis challenges prevailing assumptions, asserting that military victories rarely lead to the demise of terrorist groups. Instead, Jones contends that the majority conclude through a shift toward nonviolent strategies and political engagement or through the effective actions of local law enforcement.

Jones compellingly argues for a fundamental reevaluation of post-9/11 U.S. counterterrorism strategies. Policymakers are urged to prioritize efforts based on limited resources, with a focus on addressing root causes and understanding the motivations behind terrorism.

A noteworthy aspect of the book is its exploration of the relationship between poverty and the prolonged existence of terrorist groups. Jones challenges assumptions by delving into the correlation between economic conditions and the longevity of these organizations. Additionally, the differentiation between terrorist group outcomes in upper-income countries, where political motivations often prevail, enriches the analysis.

While "How Terrorist Groups End" offers a comprehensive overview of various factors influencing the conclusion of terrorist organizations, it could benefit from more in-depth case studies and specific prescriptions for counterterrorism strategies.

In conclusion, Seth G. Jones' "How Terrorist Groups End" serves as an informative resource for those interested in the dynamics of counterterrorism. The book challenges preconceptions and provides a nuanced perspective on the complex issue of terrorism.

[Anna · Rating 5 out of 5]

Jak se bodujou odborný publikace?

- i když je vojenský způsob účinnej obecně jen v 7 %, u takhle velkejch organizací (Al Káida, IS) jsou v podstatě nevyhnutelný
- ale kombinace víc způsobů boje (odříznout finanční zdroje, intelligence, policing...)
- podpora místních autorit, tajných služeb, armád a policií spíš než přímý zapojení zahraničních složek (leave no footprint)
- přestat používat pojem war on terror, používat counterterrorism
- musim víc nastudovat o občanský válce v El Salvadoru