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The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars
Barry R. Posen explores how military doctrine takes shape and the role it plays in grand strategy-that collection of military, economic, and political means and ends with which a state attempts to achieve security. Posen isolates three crucial elements of a given strategic doctrine: its offensive, defensive, or deterrent characteristics, its integration of military resources with political aims, and the degree of military or operational innovation it contains. He then examines these components of doctrine from the perspectives of organization theory and balance of power theory, taking into account the influence of technology and geography. Looking at interwar France, Britain, and Germany, Posen challenges each theory to explain the German Blitzkrieg, the British air defense system, and the French Army's defensive doctrine often associated with the Maginot Line. This rigorous comparative study, in which the balance of power theory emerges as the more useful, not only allows us to discover important implications for the study of national strategy today, but also serves to sharpen our understanding of the origins of World War II.
288 pages, Paperback
First published September 1, 1984
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Displaying 1 - 4 of 5 reviews
September 15, 2014
Posen examines the evolution of military "doctrine" through two frameworks: organizational theory, and the balance of power. Essentially, trying to determine which theory best explains the development of military doctrine: Alison's Model I, or his Model II/III. In the process he also looks at the technological and geographic determinism to see if they have a dominant role in doctrine development.
He concludes that balance of power theory is more effective in explaining the evolution of military policies during the interwar period. Though there are invariably organizational factors that do influence military perspectives on force structure and employment, the civilian leadership have demonstrated a willingness to intervene in military policy and doctrine as part of their attempts at balancing.
The major issue that I have with this book is that he conflates "military doctrine" with "military policy," stating at he uses
My concern with this definition may be the result of the evolving meaning of "grand strategy." Posen defines it as dealing primarily with national security and as:
Whereas today it is more generally accepted as encompassing the fulfillment of broader national interest and objectives through the use of all the instruments of power. Posen's definition intentional segregates the military instrument from the political master stating that "military doctrines are in the day-to-day custody of military organizations." (p.42)
By conflating these terms he detracts from his argument. It is not surprising that the civilian leadership will intervene in military policy, as this is one of the key instruments for affecting foreign policy objectives.
In all, an interesting read that provided a few perspectives on interwar military doctrine and strategy that I was not aware of.
He concludes that balance of power theory is more effective in explaining the evolution of military policies during the interwar period. Though there are invariably organizational factors that do influence military perspectives on force structure and employment, the civilian leadership have demonstrated a willingness to intervene in military policy and doctrine as part of their attempts at balancing.
The major issue that I have with this book is that he conflates "military doctrine" with "military policy," stating at he uses
"the term "military doctrine" for the subcomponent of grand strategy that deals explicitly with military means. Two questions are important: What means shall be employed? and How shall they be employed? (p.13)
My concern with this definition may be the result of the evolving meaning of "grand strategy." Posen defines it as dealing primarily with national security and as:
a political-military means-ends chain. It encompasses foreign policy, military doctrine, and even tactics. (p.220)
Whereas today it is more generally accepted as encompassing the fulfillment of broader national interest and objectives through the use of all the instruments of power. Posen's definition intentional segregates the military instrument from the political master stating that "military doctrines are in the day-to-day custody of military organizations." (p.42)
By conflating these terms he detracts from his argument. It is not surprising that the civilian leadership will intervene in military policy, as this is one of the key instruments for affecting foreign policy objectives.
In all, an interesting read that provided a few perspectives on interwar military doctrine and strategy that I was not aware of.
May 10, 2015
In this book Mr. Posen draws heavily on "Balance of Power" and organizational theories on how military doctrine is created and implemented. Using these theories, Mr. Posen analyzes how Germany, France, and Great Britain formulated their military doctrines with the results of World War II in 1940 showing how well those military doctrines served their countries' grand strategy. Mr. Posen shows how militaries tend to keep doctrine just as they want it when civilian leadership doesn't push hard for innovations and he also shows how disastrous it can be when both civilian and military leadership fail to match their military doctrines with their overall grand strategies. Obviously, France scores low marks here as her political leaders couldn't match the two, while Britain receives the highest marks due to the push by the civilian leadership in the last years of the interwar period to innovate its military doctrine. Germany receives mixed marks because Hitler's push for highly offensive warfare ("Blitzkrieg") served Germany well against France, but poorly when it was time to deal with Britain. Although I am not fond of balance of power theories, it is hard to deny Mr. Posen's conclusions. This book could also stand a little update since it was first written in the mid-1980s. Though I doubt Mr. Posen's conclusions would change, it would be interesting to see how he might try to fit his conclusions in with how the world has changed since the end of the Cold War. Although this book has a lot of political scientist jargon, it is still a fine book that I highly recommend to anyone interested in the theories behind military doctrines and strategies.
January 24, 2019
Very dry at times, but I appreciated the look at history and inclusion of decision-making models to explain what drives thought process in national security.
May 26, 2013
Posen attempts to take a pretty big bite, one that may have been a bit more than he was prepared to chew. His goal is very ambitious. He aims to analyze the relative explanatory value of organizational theory as compared to balance of power theory by analyzing the development of military doctrine in interwar France, Britain, and Germany. He will do so by examining the degree to which each country's doctrine is offensive, defensive, or one of deterrence, then looking at the degree of integration (or disintegration) present between military doctrine and grand strategy, and finish up with a look at the innovation present in each country's military. Insofar as each theory has its own predictions to make regarding each of these three areas, he intends to compare the actual state of affairs in each to the theorized state of affairs and, to the extent that one or the other (balance of power of organizational) is a more accurate predictor, make a judgement regarding its relative value as a predictive theory. While he's at it, he will take a quick look at the impact of geography and technology on each country's doctrine.
If this were merely ambitious, it would simply be a very long book. Unfortunately, the undertaking is not so straightforward as it might seem. First of all, in some cases the theories predict similar if not completely overlapping policies. For instance, while organizational theory ostensibly predicts a military to prefer an offensive doctrine, certain circumstances in balance of power theory do as well, leaving the author (and the reader) to make extremely subjective judgement regarding which is "more" correct. Even a single theory can have more than one predicted result ("Organization theory offers contradictory predictions for the attitudes of the French Army toward offense and defense." - 137).
Additionally, and similarly, many of the observations regarding causal relationships are extremely subjective and, as admitted by the author, easily traced to more than one source. For instance, Posen attributes much of the defensiveness of French doctrine and British policies in general to lessons ingrained during World War I (106 & 144). While this is an obvious truth in both cases, its connection to and impact on either organization theory or balance of power theory (or both) is lacking. Perhaps neither theory is responsible for the policies - perhaps a blind adherence to specific experiences is. In either case, while Posen clearly acknowledges the role of history among a plethora of other potential sources of policy impact (aside from those dictated by either balance of power or organizational theories), I wasn't sufficiently convinced that they could all be set aside in order to take a clean look at the two theories on their own.
Additionally, the results are sufficiently murky and indeterminate to leave the reader wondering if splitting hairs wasn't just the necessary evil in order to privilege one theory over the other. The author admits as much in the final paragraph of the France chapter, but insists that though readers may "suggest that the two theories capture causal forces of equal power," the following chapters on Britain and Germany would be much more definitive. The final sentence in the chapter on France reads, "In comparative perspective, balance of power theory [in the Britain and Germany chapters] appears more decisive than it does in the admittedly complicated and murky case of French interwar doctrine." - 140 While they are admittedly more clearly derived than the French conclusions, Posen may have overpromised a bit.
To the extent that Posen suggests that the forces of balance of power theory are more powerful or explanatory than those of organizational theory, it comes as kind of a "duh" realization. One might expect the prospect of World War and the desire to balance power in order to counter threats to rather easily break through whatever institutional or organizational mores might otherwise guide doctrine. Organizational proclivities and institutional or parochial drivers simply aren't as important when lives are very clearly at stake. Though he sets out to compare the relative explanatory power of each theory, he ends up using each where it appears to fit best. While they are interesting insights, they feel too subjective and qualified to say much concretely about the relative value of one theory over the other. I was left with the distinct impression (and Posen appears to agree) that both theories are necessary to satisfactorily explain any of the doctrines. I may have been more satisfied had he just come right out and said it.
If this were merely ambitious, it would simply be a very long book. Unfortunately, the undertaking is not so straightforward as it might seem. First of all, in some cases the theories predict similar if not completely overlapping policies. For instance, while organizational theory ostensibly predicts a military to prefer an offensive doctrine, certain circumstances in balance of power theory do as well, leaving the author (and the reader) to make extremely subjective judgement regarding which is "more" correct. Even a single theory can have more than one predicted result ("Organization theory offers contradictory predictions for the attitudes of the French Army toward offense and defense." - 137).
Additionally, and similarly, many of the observations regarding causal relationships are extremely subjective and, as admitted by the author, easily traced to more than one source. For instance, Posen attributes much of the defensiveness of French doctrine and British policies in general to lessons ingrained during World War I (106 & 144). While this is an obvious truth in both cases, its connection to and impact on either organization theory or balance of power theory (or both) is lacking. Perhaps neither theory is responsible for the policies - perhaps a blind adherence to specific experiences is. In either case, while Posen clearly acknowledges the role of history among a plethora of other potential sources of policy impact (aside from those dictated by either balance of power or organizational theories), I wasn't sufficiently convinced that they could all be set aside in order to take a clean look at the two theories on their own.
Additionally, the results are sufficiently murky and indeterminate to leave the reader wondering if splitting hairs wasn't just the necessary evil in order to privilege one theory over the other. The author admits as much in the final paragraph of the France chapter, but insists that though readers may "suggest that the two theories capture causal forces of equal power," the following chapters on Britain and Germany would be much more definitive. The final sentence in the chapter on France reads, "In comparative perspective, balance of power theory [in the Britain and Germany chapters] appears more decisive than it does in the admittedly complicated and murky case of French interwar doctrine." - 140 While they are admittedly more clearly derived than the French conclusions, Posen may have overpromised a bit.
To the extent that Posen suggests that the forces of balance of power theory are more powerful or explanatory than those of organizational theory, it comes as kind of a "duh" realization. One might expect the prospect of World War and the desire to balance power in order to counter threats to rather easily break through whatever institutional or organizational mores might otherwise guide doctrine. Organizational proclivities and institutional or parochial drivers simply aren't as important when lives are very clearly at stake. Though he sets out to compare the relative explanatory power of each theory, he ends up using each where it appears to fit best. While they are interesting insights, they feel too subjective and qualified to say much concretely about the relative value of one theory over the other. I was left with the distinct impression (and Posen appears to agree) that both theories are necessary to satisfactorily explain any of the doctrines. I may have been more satisfied had he just come right out and said it.
Displaying 1 - 4 of 5 reviews