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The Tao of Deception: Unorthodox Warfare in Historic and Modern China by Ralph D. Sawyer
The history of China is a history of warfare. Wars have caused dynasties to collapse, fractured the thin fasade of national unity, and brought decades of alien occupation. But throughout Chinese history, its warfare has been guided by principles different from those that governed Europe. Chinese strategists followed the concept, first articulated by Sun-tzu in The Art of War , of qi (ch'i) , or unorthodox, warfare. The concept of qi involves creating tactical imbalances in order to achieve victory against even vastly superior forces. Ralph D. Sawyer, translator of The Art of War and one of America's preeminent experts on Chinese military tactics, here offers a comprehensive guide to the ancient practice of unorthodox warfare. He describes, among many other tactics, how Chinese generals have used false rumors to exploit opposing generals' distrust of their subordinates; dressed thousands of women as soldiers to create the illusion of an elite attack force; and sent word of a false surrender to lure enemy troops away from a vital escape route. The Tao of Deception is the book that military tacticians and military historians will turn to as the definitive guide to a new, yet ancient, way of thinking about strategy.
Hardcover
First published January 23, 2007
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Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews
February 28, 2018
A very large book that could be reduced by 85%.
An example:
"Exploiting Han's submissiveness, Ch'in later mounted a three-pronged attack against Wei's capital of Ta-liang under Wei Jan who served as commander in chief. Pai Ch'i , who directed the southern component, initiated the campaign in 276 by quickly seizing several border towns, prompting Chao to forcibly annex a few for self-preservation. The next year Wei Jan advanced with the Central Army and defeated a Han counter attack in which he inflicted 40000 casualties and another Wei force before capturing other cities en route to Ta-liang. The year after, Ch'i belatedly dispatched a rescue force that fared little better as the conjoined forces from Ch'i and Wei were defeated by Wei Jan north of Ta-liang suffering another 40000 casualties. Chao finally interceded by striking Wei Jan's forces encamped at Hua-yang a year later. Ch'in responded by having their armies deployed in the north and the south converge and crush the armies of Chao and Wei, reportedly slaying some 130000 troops. Pai Ch'i also pursued Wei's remnants to the Yellow River, where another 20000 perished, mostly from drowning. Wei was forced to ceded additional territory to survive."
The book is supposed to be a history of the development Chinese strategy and tactics, supposedly centered around a very wonderful special concept called ch'i on which the author spends the first chapter defining. We in the west understand this as the rather commonplace use of the unexpected in warfare, or "surprise."
The rest of the book, at least as far as I could force myself to read, is worse, with entire chapters full of one damned thing after another as in the paragraph above. Oh, and then the actual point the was slowly getting to in that paragraph was elucidated by a two page quote from someone else. Of what use then, is the author, if all that's needed is to dump big piles of undifferentiated factoids and quotes. That's just laziness. Go ghost write for Bill OReilly
An example:
"Exploiting Han's submissiveness, Ch'in later mounted a three-pronged attack against Wei's capital of Ta-liang under Wei Jan who served as commander in chief. Pai Ch'i , who directed the southern component, initiated the campaign in 276 by quickly seizing several border towns, prompting Chao to forcibly annex a few for self-preservation. The next year Wei Jan advanced with the Central Army and defeated a Han counter attack in which he inflicted 40000 casualties and another Wei force before capturing other cities en route to Ta-liang. The year after, Ch'i belatedly dispatched a rescue force that fared little better as the conjoined forces from Ch'i and Wei were defeated by Wei Jan north of Ta-liang suffering another 40000 casualties. Chao finally interceded by striking Wei Jan's forces encamped at Hua-yang a year later. Ch'in responded by having their armies deployed in the north and the south converge and crush the armies of Chao and Wei, reportedly slaying some 130000 troops. Pai Ch'i also pursued Wei's remnants to the Yellow River, where another 20000 perished, mostly from drowning. Wei was forced to ceded additional territory to survive."
The book is supposed to be a history of the development Chinese strategy and tactics, supposedly centered around a very wonderful special concept called ch'i on which the author spends the first chapter defining. We in the west understand this as the rather commonplace use of the unexpected in warfare, or "surprise."
The rest of the book, at least as far as I could force myself to read, is worse, with entire chapters full of one damned thing after another as in the paragraph above. Oh, and then the actual point the was slowly getting to in that paragraph was elucidated by a two page quote from someone else. Of what use then, is the author, if all that's needed is to dump big piles of undifferentiated factoids and quotes. That's just laziness. Go ghost write for Bill OReilly
February 13, 2021
This is one of a series of books by this author focusing on various aspects of Chinese military strategy. As such, it glides over the history and central concepts and hones in on one aspect: the unorthodox as a tool of war. The text gets a bit repetitive, but that is due to its attempt to document a single idea through the historical record.
I choose this book because I am interested in the place of Zhuge Liang in the pantheon of Chinese strategists. Sawyer claims that the historical figure was a mediocre general, but he also shows that his fictional counterpart in The Three Kingdoms was, as I thought, a master of the unorthodox.
I choose this book because I am interested in the place of Zhuge Liang in the pantheon of Chinese strategists. Sawyer claims that the historical figure was a mediocre general, but he also shows that his fictional counterpart in The Three Kingdoms was, as I thought, a master of the unorthodox.
February 10, 2019
bit of a mixed bag: LOTS of info, but narratives of campaign after campaign -- across all centuries with little helpful context or extended commentary -- get tedious quickly.
August 28, 2023
4.0 starts - David Ignatius's spy thriller is a great summer listen.
March 1, 2013
The Tao of Deception is a history of unorthodox warfare in China. The author provides a variety of historical examples from different periods of unorthodox tactics, as well as explaining how unorthodox warfare evolved. Probably the only complain I have is that he didn't focus much on Twentieth Century China and its approach to unorthodox warfare, but that may simply be due to lack of materials. This book has some valuable insights to offer not just in terms of unorthodox warfare, but also how such ideas can be applied to business, both in terms of being aware of your strengths and weaknesses, and in applying such tactics when dealing with competitors. It's a long read, but well worth it for a variety of reasons.
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June 18, 2007Just got it as a present for fathers day. More soon.
Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews