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The Taste of War: World War Two and the Battle for Food
In World War Two, 19 million people died in the conflicts across the globe. Yet in those same years, more than 20 million died from starvation and malnutrition. In The Taste of War Lizzie Collingham shows how food - and its lack - was central to the war's causes and continuation. She explores how starvation was often a deliberate governmental policy, and reveals how the necessity of feeding whole countries led to Germany's invasion of Russia, Pearl Harbour, and even contributed to the decision to murder hundreds of thousands of 'useless eaters' during the Holocaust.
634 pages, Paperback
First published March 1, 2012
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About the author
Lizzie Collingham
7 books66 followersDr. Elizabeth M. Collingham is an English historian interested in linking the minutiae of daily life to the broad sweep of historical processes. Her first book, Imperial Bodies, explored the physical experience of the British raj and the way in which concerns about race and imperialism found expression in debates about physique and diet.
She studied at Sussex and Cambridge where she completed her PhD on the nabobs of the British Raj. She has lectured at Warwick University and been a reasearch fellow at Jesus College, Cambridge.
She studied at Sussex and Cambridge where she completed her PhD on the nabobs of the British Raj. She has lectured at Warwick University and been a reasearch fellow at Jesus College, Cambridge.
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September 13, 2018I don't feel able to give this book full justice after having read it once.
It is, indirectly, a statement of the radical potential of history and the understanding of history: the past was different to the present, the present is the creation of the past, the future will be different to the present. Change occurs. Heritage is the opposite of history - a cosy notion of continuity. Here Collingham looks at food cultures, indeed when we think about our selves in relation to other people differences in eating habits are dramatically obvious yet in passing we see in this book that such great and impressive cultural differences have the shallowest of roots and indeed can be quickly abandoned or clung to with anxious passion.
It is a history of the Second World War from the point of food and nutrition. How food and nutrition were drivers of policy and determiners of strategy before, during and to an extent after the war.
Looking around the world it is easy to think of food cultures as being the most distinctive markers of different countries, we are who we are because we eat such and such and not the food that they eat over there, yet the author makes clear how far common aspects of our food culture were formed during, or in the decades before WWII such as the spread of Coca Cola, frozen foods, mechanised and technological approaches to agriculture and food processing as well as food dependencies throughout the world. This is not just the case for the USA, but also for Japan, both effectively inventing national cuisines in order to both provide adequate nutrition for soldiers and more importantly to please them .
There is a lot here on the interrelation and intersection of ideology, food networks and policy, the author concentrates on Britain (and Empire), Germany, Japan, the Soviet Union and the United States...that all sounds terribly highfalutin, as this is also a book about victory gardens, how up to 40 percent of Japanese soldiers in some theatres of war spent their time growing food, or the role of works canteens in providing hot meals - even if this required factories growing their own food, particularly in the Soviet Union, - in order to keep wartime production up.
The contrasts between the countries are striking, with a determination on the part of Germany to effectively plunder occupied countries for food in order to avoid the war weariness of the First World War, Japan's strategic reliance on' fighting spirit' and a belief that effectively motivated soldiers would fight no matter how malnourished they are, or how the food demands of the USA to supply it's soldiers with meat rich diets providing more than 4000 calories daily caused tensions with all their allies, who when provided with the contrast were less than impressed with their own rations .
Cultural differences were telling, with Japanese soldiers expected to support themselves in combat zones by boiling wild grasses, the resilience of Ukrainians who had survived the created famine of 1932-33 contrasted with that of Chinese troops who despite coming from a similarly tough background failed to resist inferior numbers of Japanese soldiers.
But this is also the story of the failure of governments to appreciate the workings of existing food networks and the relative adaptability of more sophisticated to entirely unsophisticated agricultural sectors in different countries. So German policy was fixated on occupying and exploiting the Ukraine while Denmark in actuality was a far more significant source of animal proteins, Belgium proved more adaptable than much of Eastern Europe in meeting Germany's food needs and the whole of south-east Asia was thrown in to famine by the disruption caused by the Japanese advances in 1941.
Really a book that leads you to rethink much that was familiar and the light cast on the fragility of food networks and the impact on wider policy of food dependencies is extremely disturbing, ie these are so extensive and fragile that disruption can cause a disproportionate number of deaths. Both in terms of the deep roots of food supply, for example the role of Kenya in supplying the UK with green beans (even before WWII) but also the exploitation of regions through monocultures to earn cash for desired food stuffs.
An impressive book that has a lot to offer. I can hardly recommend it strongly enough to the non-fiction reader with an interest in the contemporary world and how it was made.
It is, indirectly, a statement of the radical potential of history and the understanding of history: the past was different to the present, the present is the creation of the past, the future will be different to the present. Change occurs. Heritage is the opposite of history - a cosy notion of continuity. Here Collingham looks at food cultures, indeed when we think about our selves in relation to other people differences in eating habits are dramatically obvious yet in passing we see in this book that such great and impressive cultural differences have the shallowest of roots and indeed can be quickly abandoned or clung to with anxious passion.
It is a history of the Second World War from the point of food and nutrition. How food and nutrition were drivers of policy and determiners of strategy before, during and to an extent after the war.
Looking around the world it is easy to think of food cultures as being the most distinctive markers of different countries, we are who we are because we eat such and such and not the food that they eat over there, yet the author makes clear how far common aspects of our food culture were formed during, or in the decades before WWII such as the spread of Coca Cola, frozen foods, mechanised and technological approaches to agriculture and food processing as well as food dependencies throughout the world. This is not just the case for the USA, but also for Japan, both effectively inventing national cuisines in order to both provide adequate nutrition for soldiers and more importantly to please them .
There is a lot here on the interrelation and intersection of ideology, food networks and policy, the author concentrates on Britain (and Empire), Germany, Japan, the Soviet Union and the United States...that all sounds terribly highfalutin, as this is also a book about victory gardens, how up to 40 percent of Japanese soldiers in some theatres of war spent their time growing food, or the role of works canteens in providing hot meals - even if this required factories growing their own food, particularly in the Soviet Union, - in order to keep wartime production up.
The contrasts between the countries are striking, with a determination on the part of Germany to effectively plunder occupied countries for food in order to avoid the war weariness of the First World War, Japan's strategic reliance on' fighting spirit' and a belief that effectively motivated soldiers would fight no matter how malnourished they are, or how the food demands of the USA to supply it's soldiers with meat rich diets providing more than 4000 calories daily caused tensions with all their allies, who when provided with the contrast were less than impressed with their own rations .
Cultural differences were telling, with Japanese soldiers expected to support themselves in combat zones by boiling wild grasses, the resilience of Ukrainians who had survived the created famine of 1932-33 contrasted with that of Chinese troops who despite coming from a similarly tough background failed to resist inferior numbers of Japanese soldiers.
But this is also the story of the failure of governments to appreciate the workings of existing food networks and the relative adaptability of more sophisticated to entirely unsophisticated agricultural sectors in different countries. So German policy was fixated on occupying and exploiting the Ukraine while Denmark in actuality was a far more significant source of animal proteins, Belgium proved more adaptable than much of Eastern Europe in meeting Germany's food needs and the whole of south-east Asia was thrown in to famine by the disruption caused by the Japanese advances in 1941.
Really a book that leads you to rethink much that was familiar and the light cast on the fragility of food networks and the impact on wider policy of food dependencies is extremely disturbing, ie these are so extensive and fragile that disruption can cause a disproportionate number of deaths. Both in terms of the deep roots of food supply, for example the role of Kenya in supplying the UK with green beans (even before WWII) but also the exploitation of regions through monocultures to earn cash for desired food stuffs.
An impressive book that has a lot to offer. I can hardly recommend it strongly enough to the non-fiction reader with an interest in the contemporary world and how it was made.
March 11, 2020
A unique book that provides a refreshing perspective on the role that (the provision and distribution of) food played in the Second World War
Perhaps often overlooked, but the reason for Japan and Germany to wage war was in no small part as a result from the conviction that - were Japan and Germany to survive as a nation - to demand their right being able to supply their population with enough foods. In order to survive, Germany needed to create Lebensraum in the East and Japan their version in the puppet state of Manchukuo, China.
Once war was declared, the Allies needed to secure their food as well. This was especially important for Great Britain and Russia, who saw their lifelines being cut by the U-boat peril and the invasio of their Motherland. Great Britain was able to enlarge their local production of wheat and - in no small part - depended on the United States for the imports of other foodstuffs. Russia was able to scrape by, but barely.
Germany in the meantime was only able to cover their needs by pillaging the rest of Europe and the so called Hunger Plan in which it deliberately decided to export hunger to the East, to clear the way for the expected German colonisation. In Japan, the Emperor's soldiers were expected to fight on an empty stomach.
In the end both approached didn't work. The paradox is that both Germany and Japan, after the war, were able to reach their goals peacefully anyhow, and the reasons to go to war were not needed anyway.
Perhaps often overlooked, but the reason for Japan and Germany to wage war was in no small part as a result from the conviction that - were Japan and Germany to survive as a nation - to demand their right being able to supply their population with enough foods. In order to survive, Germany needed to create Lebensraum in the East and Japan their version in the puppet state of Manchukuo, China.
Once war was declared, the Allies needed to secure their food as well. This was especially important for Great Britain and Russia, who saw their lifelines being cut by the U-boat peril and the invasio of their Motherland. Great Britain was able to enlarge their local production of wheat and - in no small part - depended on the United States for the imports of other foodstuffs. Russia was able to scrape by, but barely.
Germany in the meantime was only able to cover their needs by pillaging the rest of Europe and the so called Hunger Plan in which it deliberately decided to export hunger to the East, to clear the way for the expected German colonisation. In Japan, the Emperor's soldiers were expected to fight on an empty stomach.
In the end both approached didn't work. The paradox is that both Germany and Japan, after the war, were able to reach their goals peacefully anyhow, and the reasons to go to war were not needed anyway.
May 31, 2014
Superb. Answered many questions. Am unable to think that there could possibly be a better book on the subject of Food and WW2.
August 28, 2017
This was a fascinating read, far more so than I'd expected. I'd picked this book up hoping for some kind of history of rationing and the British wartime food drive - 'Dig for Victory' and all that. What I actually got was an incredibly well-researched, comprehensive and thoroughly interesting history of the role food played in the Second World War - its role in the origins of the war, the course of it, the ending of it, and finally the aftermath. During the course of the war more people died from starvation than in active military combat - many many more. The actual numbers are staggering - 3 million in Bengal, over 1 million in Leningrad, 300,000 in Greece, 20,000 in Holland, 2 million in Vietnam. It is estimated that over 20 million people died of starvation during the course of the war.
The author argues that it was partly the worldwide pressure for more food during the agricultural decline of the 1930s that led both Germany and Japan to begin eyeing up their neighbours as a source of food. Both countries chose to 'export' their hunger problems, occupying other countries and appropriating their food supplies in order to feed their own populations. Numerous Nazi officials are quoted as saying that every country in Europe could starve before Germans would feel want. Germany saw the Ukraine and the Soviet Union as an unlimited source of agricultural land and food, in much the same as Japan saw China.
However, she also explores how the British exported their own hunger problems, most notably to India and the African conflicts, increasing the pressure on these countries to produce more and more food to feed the Allied armies and the British civilian population. Despite all the talk we've heard over the years of rationing and deprivation during wartime, no-one in Britain was ever in any danger of starving.
And of course the overarching theme of this book is America. America was the only country to emerge from the war with its economy booming, its people better-paid and better-fed than ever before. The American Lend-Lease program arguably kept the war alive, because it is entirely possible that had the British population been exposed to the kind of deprivation that citizens in occupied Europe were experiencing morale would have collapsed. But even then the American government was prepared to leave its Allies desperately scrabbling for food before it would cut its own troops or citizens' rations, all of which were far more generous than was necessary.
Collingham concludes by arguing that it was the years of want and deprivation and the vision of healthy, well-fed GIs enjoying the fruits of American produce - Coca-Cola and chocolate - that have led to the over processed, over-packaged food we consume today that has led to so many health issues. And we may find ourselves coming full-circle at some point and having to return our diets to the old staples of bread and potatoes, as the world's food supply comes once again increasingly under pressure.
The author argues that it was partly the worldwide pressure for more food during the agricultural decline of the 1930s that led both Germany and Japan to begin eyeing up their neighbours as a source of food. Both countries chose to 'export' their hunger problems, occupying other countries and appropriating their food supplies in order to feed their own populations. Numerous Nazi officials are quoted as saying that every country in Europe could starve before Germans would feel want. Germany saw the Ukraine and the Soviet Union as an unlimited source of agricultural land and food, in much the same as Japan saw China.
However, she also explores how the British exported their own hunger problems, most notably to India and the African conflicts, increasing the pressure on these countries to produce more and more food to feed the Allied armies and the British civilian population. Despite all the talk we've heard over the years of rationing and deprivation during wartime, no-one in Britain was ever in any danger of starving.
And of course the overarching theme of this book is America. America was the only country to emerge from the war with its economy booming, its people better-paid and better-fed than ever before. The American Lend-Lease program arguably kept the war alive, because it is entirely possible that had the British population been exposed to the kind of deprivation that citizens in occupied Europe were experiencing morale would have collapsed. But even then the American government was prepared to leave its Allies desperately scrabbling for food before it would cut its own troops or citizens' rations, all of which were far more generous than was necessary.
Collingham concludes by arguing that it was the years of want and deprivation and the vision of healthy, well-fed GIs enjoying the fruits of American produce - Coca-Cola and chocolate - that have led to the over processed, over-packaged food we consume today that has led to so many health issues. And we may find ourselves coming full-circle at some point and having to return our diets to the old staples of bread and potatoes, as the world's food supply comes once again increasingly under pressure.
February 1, 2016
I couldn't decide whether to give this book one star or two; I almost decided on two stars because I did learn from it. But...she doesn't really prove her thesis. The book is repetitive and she relies far too often on "it is likely," "seems certain," or "it is possible." That isn't evidence to prove anything. Her main point was that WWII was caused by a need for food. That's true, but it isn't the only cause. The author neglects the power of a "Cause" or an ideology, or the power of fear. She also believes that WWII could have prevented if the post-war agricultural changes had happened twenty years earlier. Maybe so, but some of those changes came about because of the war...Collingham doesn't apparently believe that the Holocaust happened because Hitler hated Jews, but because he needed food and they were in the way. She makes it sound as if genocide was an accident. I am not sure she understands just how difficult it was to find food during the war, as her descriptions of the black markets and of the food supplied to the soldiers are positively mouth-watering. Based on her work, everybody had plenty to eat - therefore, there shouldn't have been a war. There are also several mistakes - claiming that the US and Great Britain did not fight together until June 1944 in North Africa, for example. Collingham is not a military historian and bungles that part of her story. She also goes off on (thankfully, short) tangents where she preaches about the mistreatment of blacks in America or the evil of introducing soft drinks to children. (True in both cases, but nothing to do with the premise of the book.) I got a strong anti-American bias from her writing. She tells us that the majority of Americans had only the "haziest" idea what they were fighting for and had no "emotional investment" in the war. Balderdash. Many of her sources are secondary sources; she uses a lot of articles, position papers, and studies by various groups (each with its own agenda) rather than primary sources or works by the most prominent (and verifiable) historians.
January 31, 2013
It is really 4 1/2 stars. This book is deep y'all. I have never thought about colonialism and what it did in terms of food access/privilege. And surprisingly, while I have thought a great deal about food in the American Civil War, I never thought about it in WW II. I just assumed that things were industrialized enough to meet the needs of most people. In fact, millions and millions starved to death...and food pathways were irrevocably changed for those that were left.
January 20, 2014
This is a fascinating book, but I’m not sure it is a book written for popular consumption (so to speak) in the United States. It is not only incredibly detailed and full of facts and figures, but moreover is somewhat critical of American food policies, taking a decidedly less sanguine view of American actions than can be found, say, in American textbooks. To me, this made the book especially valuable: I always appreciate being provided a whole new lens through which to view history. In addition, after reading many books naming the usual suspects for the motivations, strategies, tactics, and outcomes of the Second World War and the fate of its combatants, it is most enlightening to be presented with something different and intellectually compelling.
Collingham, a historian from Cambridge, seeks to uncover the important role food played in the Second World War. She avers, rightly, that this is “an often overlooked dimension to our understanding of the Second World War.” She not only wants to highlight how and why, during the war, at least 20 million people died from starvation, malnutrition, and its associated diseases, but to show just how important the demand for food was in pushing Germany and Japan into their radical solutions to the food problem. The vision of Lebensraum shared in particular by Germany and Japan, was a battle not just for land to absorb excess population, but on which to grow food and provide it for the rest of their populations.
Taking each of the combatant nations in turn, Collingham discusses their needs in terms of caloric consumption for both civilians and military, and how they coped with it. Germany, for example, did not want to risk the disaffection over hunger that plagued their country during and after World War I, and engaged in deliberate extermination by starvation of targeted groups. Polish Jews, for instance, were allotted a “derisory” 184 calories a day. The mentally ill, disabled, and Soviet prisoners of war, were put on a “starvation diet” known as “The Falthauser diet” by the “doctor” who introduced it: he argued that his method resulted in death by starvation within three months, and offered a practical solution to “the problem of disposing of these unproductive members of German society…” The Germans even set up “hunger houses” that specialized in this “diet.” As successful as this plan was, soon it seemed that even three months was taking too long, and the Germans came up with more efficient ways to eliminate what they called “useless eaters.”
Other countries experienced many deaths by starvation that were not so cold and calculating, but were nevertheless the results of misguided or cruel government policies. In Japan, sixty percent of the 1.74 million military losses were due to starvation, rather than combat. In some instances, the troops had to resort to eating their own dead comrades. Japan was isolated, but didn’t have the same resources Britain did to keep imports coming into the country.
Britain had few qualms about starving its colonies in Africa and India to feed the home country. As Collingham reports, “At least 1.5 million Bengalis died during 1943-44, when food scarcity was at its height.” Epidemics, easily killing those weakened by malnutrition, killed another 1.5-2 million. (She does attribute blame to the Indian Government was well as the Brits, but the British could have done much more about the situation had they cared as much about their “dark” subjects as their Caucasian ones.) Britain also left other nations to starve, such as Greece, where some half million civilians perished. Approximately two million starved to death in French Indochina. The parade of gruesome facts is a long one.
In the Soviet Union, citizens fell under a double whammy, as it were, being starved alternatively by Stalin and by Hitler. It is estimated between 2 and 3 million Soviet citizens died of hunger and malnutrition. (Timothy Snyder writes that between 1932 and 1942, some eleven million Soviet citizens died of starvation, first because of the policy of Soviet leaders and then because of the policy of German leaders. Timothy Snyder, “Stalin & Hitler: Mass Murder by Starvation,” NY Review of Books, June 21, 2012)
China also experienced millions of deaths from hunger, not helped by the internal struggles in the country between the Nationalists and the Communists. Collingham reports:
The perceived ineptitude and corruption of the Nationalist government contributed to the ability of the Communists to take over after the war, when they proceeded to increase the death toll from hunger exponentially. When Mao got power, he began to engage in “land reform” in earnest, which meant murdering some one million “rich” peasants in order to collectivize farms. But he didn’t need to murder most of the 30 million reputed to have died during this time; since the inept and unjust collectivization process took care of that.
In other areas after the war, the hunger problem actually increased, not only because of the disruption to planting, harvesting, and available labor because of the war. Also in 1946 a huge drought affected most of the world (except for the U.S). Thus, in Japan, for example, hundreds of thousands starved to death after the surrender, and in Germany, as Colingham points out, “the population only began to experience hunger after the war (not being able to take food from useless eaters anymore).
Eventually, in 1948, Europe began receiving aid from the U.S. via the much-vaunted Marshall Plan. Americans only finally agreed to share their abundance of food after it became clear that the threat of Communism loomed if the populations abroad were too dissatisfied with their governments. But a portion of the money given to each country had to be used not for food, but for propaganda extolling the benefits of the American way of life, including exhibitions, films, pamphlets, radio shows and concerts.
Then there were the Pacific Islands. There, during the fighting, the U.S. had leveled crops and fields to install airstrips and roads and bivouacs. At that time, they fully shared their food largesse with the natives, but after they left, the natives had nothing, and no way to replace it. They had become totally dependent on imports, but the U.S., ever conscious of courting the farm vote, would not grant them any tariff relief. So they became impoverished, hungry, and eventually addicted to the chemically-processed, high-fat, and high-sugar foods they managed to buy from the U.S. (at inflated prices). Even today, many of those areas suffer from obesity, heart disease, and diabetes.
Two other aspects of food and war receive a thorough treatment by Collingham. One is the logistics of war itself; i.e., the need to keep soldiers who are on the move fed and watered, and with enough vitamins to ward off deficiencies common in wartime. Soldiers also require more calories, since they expend a great deal of energy. The amount of food required is incredible, and the lengths to which combatants will go to get it is amazing as well. (This is of course in addition to the vast amounts of fuel, ammunition, medical supplies, etc. that also need to be transported along with the soldiers. But without sustenance, nothing else will matter.) The importance of making sure there is enough food for both soldiers and civilians, and adequate means of transport to distribute it, cannot be overemphasized. Most of the combatants simply did not think to, or feel able to, release ships and rail lines from the use of the military for conveyance of food. Also, thinking, as most combatants initially do, that the war would be short, they destroyed land and crops and animals without worrying where their next meals would come from.
Collingham also allocates some space in this book to the problems the future may bring because of the changing nature of the demand for food, both in terms of quality and quantity; the effects on the environment and resulting repercussions; and the unequal distribution of wealth and ergo food, which is bound to affect international relations.
Evaluation: I’ve long been interested in the logistics of war, and the importance of getting food and water not only to the troops but to the animals that service them. It can certainly make a difference in success or failure of an operation, particularly in the desert. (Indeed, in some areas of the world, the fight for water and/or water access is becoming as important as the battle for land used to be.)
I learned so much from this book, and strongly advocate that any scholar of war, history, or socioeconomics at least read through Part I, which contains more general information before the author goes into greater detail. It definitely added to my understanding of world affairs.
Collingham, a historian from Cambridge, seeks to uncover the important role food played in the Second World War. She avers, rightly, that this is “an often overlooked dimension to our understanding of the Second World War.” She not only wants to highlight how and why, during the war, at least 20 million people died from starvation, malnutrition, and its associated diseases, but to show just how important the demand for food was in pushing Germany and Japan into their radical solutions to the food problem. The vision of Lebensraum shared in particular by Germany and Japan, was a battle not just for land to absorb excess population, but on which to grow food and provide it for the rest of their populations.
Taking each of the combatant nations in turn, Collingham discusses their needs in terms of caloric consumption for both civilians and military, and how they coped with it. Germany, for example, did not want to risk the disaffection over hunger that plagued their country during and after World War I, and engaged in deliberate extermination by starvation of targeted groups. Polish Jews, for instance, were allotted a “derisory” 184 calories a day. The mentally ill, disabled, and Soviet prisoners of war, were put on a “starvation diet” known as “The Falthauser diet” by the “doctor” who introduced it: he argued that his method resulted in death by starvation within three months, and offered a practical solution to “the problem of disposing of these unproductive members of German society…” The Germans even set up “hunger houses” that specialized in this “diet.” As successful as this plan was, soon it seemed that even three months was taking too long, and the Germans came up with more efficient ways to eliminate what they called “useless eaters.”
Other countries experienced many deaths by starvation that were not so cold and calculating, but were nevertheless the results of misguided or cruel government policies. In Japan, sixty percent of the 1.74 million military losses were due to starvation, rather than combat. In some instances, the troops had to resort to eating their own dead comrades. Japan was isolated, but didn’t have the same resources Britain did to keep imports coming into the country.
Britain had few qualms about starving its colonies in Africa and India to feed the home country. As Collingham reports, “At least 1.5 million Bengalis died during 1943-44, when food scarcity was at its height.” Epidemics, easily killing those weakened by malnutrition, killed another 1.5-2 million. (She does attribute blame to the Indian Government was well as the Brits, but the British could have done much more about the situation had they cared as much about their “dark” subjects as their Caucasian ones.) Britain also left other nations to starve, such as Greece, where some half million civilians perished. Approximately two million starved to death in French Indochina. The parade of gruesome facts is a long one.
In the Soviet Union, citizens fell under a double whammy, as it were, being starved alternatively by Stalin and by Hitler. It is estimated between 2 and 3 million Soviet citizens died of hunger and malnutrition. (Timothy Snyder writes that between 1932 and 1942, some eleven million Soviet citizens died of starvation, first because of the policy of Soviet leaders and then because of the policy of German leaders. Timothy Snyder, “Stalin & Hitler: Mass Murder by Starvation,” NY Review of Books, June 21, 2012)
China also experienced millions of deaths from hunger, not helped by the internal struggles in the country between the Nationalists and the Communists. Collingham reports:
Two million Nationalist soldiers died and at least 15 million civilians, 85 per cent of them peasants, and virtually all of them the victims of deprivation and starvation.”
The perceived ineptitude and corruption of the Nationalist government contributed to the ability of the Communists to take over after the war, when they proceeded to increase the death toll from hunger exponentially. When Mao got power, he began to engage in “land reform” in earnest, which meant murdering some one million “rich” peasants in order to collectivize farms. But he didn’t need to murder most of the 30 million reputed to have died during this time; since the inept and unjust collectivization process took care of that.
In other areas after the war, the hunger problem actually increased, not only because of the disruption to planting, harvesting, and available labor because of the war. Also in 1946 a huge drought affected most of the world (except for the U.S). Thus, in Japan, for example, hundreds of thousands starved to death after the surrender, and in Germany, as Colingham points out, “the population only began to experience hunger after the war (not being able to take food from useless eaters anymore).
Eventually, in 1948, Europe began receiving aid from the U.S. via the much-vaunted Marshall Plan. Americans only finally agreed to share their abundance of food after it became clear that the threat of Communism loomed if the populations abroad were too dissatisfied with their governments. But a portion of the money given to each country had to be used not for food, but for propaganda extolling the benefits of the American way of life, including exhibitions, films, pamphlets, radio shows and concerts.
Then there were the Pacific Islands. There, during the fighting, the U.S. had leveled crops and fields to install airstrips and roads and bivouacs. At that time, they fully shared their food largesse with the natives, but after they left, the natives had nothing, and no way to replace it. They had become totally dependent on imports, but the U.S., ever conscious of courting the farm vote, would not grant them any tariff relief. So they became impoverished, hungry, and eventually addicted to the chemically-processed, high-fat, and high-sugar foods they managed to buy from the U.S. (at inflated prices). Even today, many of those areas suffer from obesity, heart disease, and diabetes.
Two other aspects of food and war receive a thorough treatment by Collingham. One is the logistics of war itself; i.e., the need to keep soldiers who are on the move fed and watered, and with enough vitamins to ward off deficiencies common in wartime. Soldiers also require more calories, since they expend a great deal of energy. The amount of food required is incredible, and the lengths to which combatants will go to get it is amazing as well. (This is of course in addition to the vast amounts of fuel, ammunition, medical supplies, etc. that also need to be transported along with the soldiers. But without sustenance, nothing else will matter.) The importance of making sure there is enough food for both soldiers and civilians, and adequate means of transport to distribute it, cannot be overemphasized. Most of the combatants simply did not think to, or feel able to, release ships and rail lines from the use of the military for conveyance of food. Also, thinking, as most combatants initially do, that the war would be short, they destroyed land and crops and animals without worrying where their next meals would come from.
Collingham also allocates some space in this book to the problems the future may bring because of the changing nature of the demand for food, both in terms of quality and quantity; the effects on the environment and resulting repercussions; and the unequal distribution of wealth and ergo food, which is bound to affect international relations.
Evaluation: I’ve long been interested in the logistics of war, and the importance of getting food and water not only to the troops but to the animals that service them. It can certainly make a difference in success or failure of an operation, particularly in the desert. (Indeed, in some areas of the world, the fight for water and/or water access is becoming as important as the battle for land used to be.)
I learned so much from this book, and strongly advocate that any scholar of war, history, or socioeconomics at least read through Part I, which contains more general information before the author goes into greater detail. It definitely added to my understanding of world affairs.
April 4, 2022
A history of food - its production, design, and distribution - during the Second World War. Collingham draws from academic monographs and memoirs in English and German, but directs her book towards a general reader.
Collingham focuses on the food situation and food security (or food insecurity) of the Allied and Axis powers. With the notable exception of the United States, all of the major belligerents were dependent on foreign trade and food imports. The war disrupted all of those, and both Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan in the years leading up to the war focused on a strategy of improving domestic production and territorial expansion to guarantee their own resources.
With the looming prospect of shortages, countries had to distribute scarce food supplies. The British opted to ensure an austere but stable standard of living for the mainland population, at the cost of depriving the colonies and in cases leading to total catastrophe, as in Bengal. Germany opted to starve the civilian populations of the territories it occupied, and Japan continued to import food from China, Korea, and other occupied territories until that was made impossible due to the Allied naval blockade.
The Soviets endured years of harsh rationing after the loss of rich farmlands in Ukraine and Belarus, and scarce food stocks went to industrial workers and the army over rural populations. Without imports from abroad, notably from the United States, the situations of both the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union would have been measurably worse. Yet it is worth noting that even in the most desperate years of famine and starvation, the lack of food did not on its own bring about surrender.
Collingham closes the book with a summary of the postwar food situation, and the interplay between the situation of farmers in the United States and global aid requirements - not only from the Marshall Plan in Europe, but also feeding the population of Japan, which itself was near starvation.
One factor that I might have liked - but the book was already thick with information as is - was the situation of the few remaining neutral countries, and how their populations were able to make it through the fluctuation in food prices, if any. But that is a personal wish - this book presents a serious and essential topic and presents it well to an interested audience and that is what I had hoped for.
Collingham focuses on the food situation and food security (or food insecurity) of the Allied and Axis powers. With the notable exception of the United States, all of the major belligerents were dependent on foreign trade and food imports. The war disrupted all of those, and both Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan in the years leading up to the war focused on a strategy of improving domestic production and territorial expansion to guarantee their own resources.
With the looming prospect of shortages, countries had to distribute scarce food supplies. The British opted to ensure an austere but stable standard of living for the mainland population, at the cost of depriving the colonies and in cases leading to total catastrophe, as in Bengal. Germany opted to starve the civilian populations of the territories it occupied, and Japan continued to import food from China, Korea, and other occupied territories until that was made impossible due to the Allied naval blockade.
The Soviets endured years of harsh rationing after the loss of rich farmlands in Ukraine and Belarus, and scarce food stocks went to industrial workers and the army over rural populations. Without imports from abroad, notably from the United States, the situations of both the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union would have been measurably worse. Yet it is worth noting that even in the most desperate years of famine and starvation, the lack of food did not on its own bring about surrender.
Collingham closes the book with a summary of the postwar food situation, and the interplay between the situation of farmers in the United States and global aid requirements - not only from the Marshall Plan in Europe, but also feeding the population of Japan, which itself was near starvation.
One factor that I might have liked - but the book was already thick with information as is - was the situation of the few remaining neutral countries, and how their populations were able to make it through the fluctuation in food prices, if any. But that is a personal wish - this book presents a serious and essential topic and presents it well to an interested audience and that is what I had hoped for.
October 10, 2018
Engaging and richly detailed, a fine exploration on the role food played in World War II for all of the major powers at the time.
August 23, 2020
This is a wide-ranging history of food and food policy during the second world war. It offers a strong reminder that, despite the enormous scale of violence in this conflict, the resulting famines killed even more people. And it describes how different government tried (or not) to cope with the challenge of finding adequate food for civilians and soldiers.
Food shortages and famines during the war can be attributed to a range of causes, which as usual had the worst results when they occurred together. The war created front lines that acted as blocks to trade, separating food producers from food consumers, starving one group while saddling another with rotting surpluses. This was often worsened by the ruthless confiscation of transport, especially shipping, to meet military demands and compensate for the loss of shipping to enemy action elsewhere. The confiscation of food by armies that lived off the land robbed the local population of their food supply. And finally, starvation was used deliberately as a weapon of war or of genocide.
The British famously joked that the American GIs were "overpaid, overfed, oversexed and over here." The second part of that claim may have had some merit, given that the standard American military ration contained 4300 calories, rising (theoretically) to over 4700 for soldiers on the front line. The US government gave a high priority to feeding its soldiers, even at the expense of allied civilians. But it had to resources to do both that and supply its allies with food through lend-lease, which probably saved the life of many Russians.
In stark contrast, the Japanese government had to resort to declaring isolated garrisons "self-sufficient", which too often meant that its soldiers had to try to survive on wild grasses and leaves. Collingham cites the startling statistic that 60% of the 1.74 million deaths in the Japanese military were not due to enemy fire, but to starvation, malnutrition, and associated diseases. On Guadalcanal or New Guinea, the fraction of death to starvation was probably much higher than that. As for Japanese civilians in the homeland, from 1944 they were on the verge of famine.
Notoriously, Nazi regime tried to supply its soldiers in the East by confiscating the food supplies of the Ukraine, coldly calculating that millions of Soviet citizens would starve as a result. Its occupation of some of the richest agricultural regions of the USSR resulted in serious food shortages also in the areas if failed to conquer. Nevertheless, due to its brutal inefficiency and callous mismanagement, it largely failed to achieve its goals.
The “wartime socialism” adopted by the British government, with a flexible management of internal food production and imports, actually managed to improve the quality of the food eaten by much its civilian population through its rationing program. But it was unimaginative in its food it supply to soldiers, and was also guilty of callously exporting hunger to its colonies, causing famines in India.
The author makes some fascinating, if brief, forays into food science and food technology. When we think of wartime technology advances, we usually think of aircraft and tanks, radar and breakthroughs in cryptanalysis, and nuclear weapons. But a lot of research also went towards the production, preservation and distribution of food, with increasing attention for the need to provide soldiers and civilians with a balanced diet. Some of this went into the production and advocacy of extremely dubious substitute foods, a few of them clearly harmful and revolting — notably the German “invention” of a “sausage” made from industrial waste, destined for consumption by concentration camp inmates, many of whom died as a result. Some innovations were ingenious expedients, such as the Australian technique of sprouting peas in tins that soldiers could carry on their belts, the shoots providing necessary vitamins, or the Russian habit of making infusions from pine needles, for the same reason. But a lot of the industrial effort when intro canning, drying, and packaging - in the hot and humid South Pacific, improvements in storage technology reduced wastage from over 40% to 13.6%.
Collingham tells the story of a complex interaction between geography, natural resources, agricultural and nutitrional science, politics, and military action. Her book is rich in information, well structured and well written.
Food shortages and famines during the war can be attributed to a range of causes, which as usual had the worst results when they occurred together. The war created front lines that acted as blocks to trade, separating food producers from food consumers, starving one group while saddling another with rotting surpluses. This was often worsened by the ruthless confiscation of transport, especially shipping, to meet military demands and compensate for the loss of shipping to enemy action elsewhere. The confiscation of food by armies that lived off the land robbed the local population of their food supply. And finally, starvation was used deliberately as a weapon of war or of genocide.
The British famously joked that the American GIs were "overpaid, overfed, oversexed and over here." The second part of that claim may have had some merit, given that the standard American military ration contained 4300 calories, rising (theoretically) to over 4700 for soldiers on the front line. The US government gave a high priority to feeding its soldiers, even at the expense of allied civilians. But it had to resources to do both that and supply its allies with food through lend-lease, which probably saved the life of many Russians.
In stark contrast, the Japanese government had to resort to declaring isolated garrisons "self-sufficient", which too often meant that its soldiers had to try to survive on wild grasses and leaves. Collingham cites the startling statistic that 60% of the 1.74 million deaths in the Japanese military were not due to enemy fire, but to starvation, malnutrition, and associated diseases. On Guadalcanal or New Guinea, the fraction of death to starvation was probably much higher than that. As for Japanese civilians in the homeland, from 1944 they were on the verge of famine.
Notoriously, Nazi regime tried to supply its soldiers in the East by confiscating the food supplies of the Ukraine, coldly calculating that millions of Soviet citizens would starve as a result. Its occupation of some of the richest agricultural regions of the USSR resulted in serious food shortages also in the areas if failed to conquer. Nevertheless, due to its brutal inefficiency and callous mismanagement, it largely failed to achieve its goals.
The “wartime socialism” adopted by the British government, with a flexible management of internal food production and imports, actually managed to improve the quality of the food eaten by much its civilian population through its rationing program. But it was unimaginative in its food it supply to soldiers, and was also guilty of callously exporting hunger to its colonies, causing famines in India.
The author makes some fascinating, if brief, forays into food science and food technology. When we think of wartime technology advances, we usually think of aircraft and tanks, radar and breakthroughs in cryptanalysis, and nuclear weapons. But a lot of research also went towards the production, preservation and distribution of food, with increasing attention for the need to provide soldiers and civilians with a balanced diet. Some of this went into the production and advocacy of extremely dubious substitute foods, a few of them clearly harmful and revolting — notably the German “invention” of a “sausage” made from industrial waste, destined for consumption by concentration camp inmates, many of whom died as a result. Some innovations were ingenious expedients, such as the Australian technique of sprouting peas in tins that soldiers could carry on their belts, the shoots providing necessary vitamins, or the Russian habit of making infusions from pine needles, for the same reason. But a lot of the industrial effort when intro canning, drying, and packaging - in the hot and humid South Pacific, improvements in storage technology reduced wastage from over 40% to 13.6%.
Collingham tells the story of a complex interaction between geography, natural resources, agricultural and nutitrional science, politics, and military action. Her book is rich in information, well structured and well written.
October 1, 2017
Impeccably and thoroughly researched analysis on the global food network back in the 1940s and how it impacted the war (as well as how each country was impacted due to what side of the production chain they were on). Really fascinating to see how all these things that always seem to come second in talks of WWII are so crucial to how things played out, as well as how each country faired post-war.
The book is over 600pages and densely packed with information, so it's not something you would read in one sitting (if you're actually interested in remembering/processing any of it). But lots of good information for anyone doing research on the topic or with a general interest on the matter.
The book is over 600pages and densely packed with information, so it's not something you would read in one sitting (if you're actually interested in remembering/processing any of it). But lots of good information for anyone doing research on the topic or with a general interest on the matter.
August 6, 2022
Hooboy. I had to put this down for several lengthy stints because hearing about people in what is now Ukraine being deliberately starved to death in WWII was more than a bit stressful under current circumstances. It was also a more technically challenging read than some of Collingham's others - lots of details of percentages and tonnages. Ultimately fascinating though. There tends to be a slightly glib "Oh British food is rubbish because of the war" so it's extremely interesting to see just how much the current food scene owes globally to the extreme deprivation + technological innovation + capitalism of that period.
She ends on a note of optimism which at the moment I think is somewhat misplaced but there you go. Vote well, vote often, vote with an eye on the planet's future.
She ends on a note of optimism which at the moment I think is somewhat misplaced but there you go. Vote well, vote often, vote with an eye on the planet's future.
February 25, 2013
I grew up surrounded by World War II. It falls under my dad's "dad-worthy" list of interests, neighbored by the American Civil War and hockey. His father was a soldier who served in Operation Torch in North Africa and Sicily, which is undoubtedly the genesis of my father's (and an entire generation's) interest.
Most of the books he reads aren't the big-picture, military strategy type, adorned with ominous, swooping arrows radiating from, and finally pointing toward, the heart of the Nazi empire. Rather, he tends towards stories of soldiers on the ground. "The Forgotten Soldier" is, incidentally, one of the most unforgettable books of the genre. In it, a young German soldier is shipped off to Russia, and his memoir tracks the devolution of optimism to drudgery to terror to a man living in hell, the only spoiler being that he obviously lived to write the book. Those stories, not the football formations of aerial maps, are what make a war.
This book continues in that vein of individual stories, albeit viewed through the perspective of food and bolstered with governmental food strategies for both the Axis and Allies. Both Germany and Japan had imperialist dreams, and they looked to America for their model: a central population bounded by endless farmland to grow food and drive industrial production. Hence, the invasion of Eastern Europe and China.
But the simple plan of "invade, take food, and farm more food" was, in retrospect, not very simple. Crop yields were low, the conscripted farmers were unfamiliar with the terrain, and the act of removing people from their homeland is not so easy. The mismanagement of food resources had a grave effect on Japanese and German soldiers, who were essentially told to live off the land. That did not work, and essentially represented an over-expansion of empire: neither nation could maintain the long supply lines to the Pacific Islands and Russia, respectively.
While soldiers had it rough, civilians at home and colonial subjects had it worse, and worst of all, slave laborers in Nazi munitions plants were placed on a starvation diet. The book is filled with accounts of the monotony of living off the same, sparse foods day in and day out, and the hellscape of impoverished Russia, the neglected Bengal colony of Britain, and famine-stricken Greece.
Britain and the United States, however, got through the war relatively painlessly. This is not to minimize Britain's hardship, which had to introduce rationing and creatively reconfigure its usage of imports due to German U-Boat traffic. Despite some discomfort, British citizens were pretty well fed, especially compared with the Japanese and Russians. And the US was barely affected. Rationing was introduced, but not in such a way as to limit the choice of consumers. In fact, because the US had no emotional stake in the war (goodness of the world notwithstanding, its borders were never threatened), the suburban dream was sold to troops and the public as the end goal of the conflict. This freedom to spend one's way out of hardship continued after the war, and affected aid efforts overseas.
This book is, to me, a true "People's History" of World War II. The story is told from all sides and at all levels of management. It feels complete, but without endless jargon or unnecessary exposition. I felt awful for the horrors suffered in, well, pretty much everywhere that wasn't populated by Anglos. And, naturally, I'm cynical about the United States' role in the world economy following. A chance to provide plenty of food to struggling nations was squandered in the name of plenty and surplus, while Europe had to dig out of the rubble. Yes, the Marshall Plan and Berlin Airlift were things, but it seems like the United States could have done so much more. Alas.
Five stars, because I look at World War II, as well as food policy and war in general, in an entirely new light.
Most of the books he reads aren't the big-picture, military strategy type, adorned with ominous, swooping arrows radiating from, and finally pointing toward, the heart of the Nazi empire. Rather, he tends towards stories of soldiers on the ground. "The Forgotten Soldier" is, incidentally, one of the most unforgettable books of the genre. In it, a young German soldier is shipped off to Russia, and his memoir tracks the devolution of optimism to drudgery to terror to a man living in hell, the only spoiler being that he obviously lived to write the book. Those stories, not the football formations of aerial maps, are what make a war.
This book continues in that vein of individual stories, albeit viewed through the perspective of food and bolstered with governmental food strategies for both the Axis and Allies. Both Germany and Japan had imperialist dreams, and they looked to America for their model: a central population bounded by endless farmland to grow food and drive industrial production. Hence, the invasion of Eastern Europe and China.
But the simple plan of "invade, take food, and farm more food" was, in retrospect, not very simple. Crop yields were low, the conscripted farmers were unfamiliar with the terrain, and the act of removing people from their homeland is not so easy. The mismanagement of food resources had a grave effect on Japanese and German soldiers, who were essentially told to live off the land. That did not work, and essentially represented an over-expansion of empire: neither nation could maintain the long supply lines to the Pacific Islands and Russia, respectively.
While soldiers had it rough, civilians at home and colonial subjects had it worse, and worst of all, slave laborers in Nazi munitions plants were placed on a starvation diet. The book is filled with accounts of the monotony of living off the same, sparse foods day in and day out, and the hellscape of impoverished Russia, the neglected Bengal colony of Britain, and famine-stricken Greece.
Britain and the United States, however, got through the war relatively painlessly. This is not to minimize Britain's hardship, which had to introduce rationing and creatively reconfigure its usage of imports due to German U-Boat traffic. Despite some discomfort, British citizens were pretty well fed, especially compared with the Japanese and Russians. And the US was barely affected. Rationing was introduced, but not in such a way as to limit the choice of consumers. In fact, because the US had no emotional stake in the war (goodness of the world notwithstanding, its borders were never threatened), the suburban dream was sold to troops and the public as the end goal of the conflict. This freedom to spend one's way out of hardship continued after the war, and affected aid efforts overseas.
This book is, to me, a true "People's History" of World War II. The story is told from all sides and at all levels of management. It feels complete, but without endless jargon or unnecessary exposition. I felt awful for the horrors suffered in, well, pretty much everywhere that wasn't populated by Anglos. And, naturally, I'm cynical about the United States' role in the world economy following. A chance to provide plenty of food to struggling nations was squandered in the name of plenty and surplus, while Europe had to dig out of the rubble. Yes, the Marshall Plan and Berlin Airlift were things, but it seems like the United States could have done so much more. Alas.
Five stars, because I look at World War II, as well as food policy and war in general, in an entirely new light.
June 27, 2022
本書從一開始發布出版資訊，即已引起我的注意，因為它要說明的主題，是極其重要但又常常被忽略的：如何維繫糧食安全。畢竟，沒有彈藥槍械，還可以拿石頭打仗，沒有吃的，士兵就得餓死。一戰後期，德軍雖然還有戰力，但不論是民間還是後勤都已經沒有充足的物資可供繼續作戰，士氣已經無以維繫。這個經驗成為納粹後來在茲念茲的心魔，視之為執政的基石。而能不能在戰時確保糧食無虞也是一種國力的體現，實際上在二戰期間能夠真正做到的國家屈指可數。作者在這部作品中討論的，就是幾個主要參戰國在面臨這個問題時的困境，還有它們如何應對處置。它涉及的層面很廣，從工業實力、飲食習慣、營養科學到種族大屠殺等，都跟這息息相關。
而在整個二戰之中，真正能夠在糧食安全上確保無虞的只有美國，其他國家都是以犧牲某部分為代價來鞏固。以下從左至右表示從各參戰國在這問題上的程度，從最富裕到最貧乏：
美國>>>英國(包括澳、紐、加)>德國=英帝國(殖民地部分)>>蘇聯=日本>中國
而作者針對這幾個國家的方針做了個簡介：
美國：資本主義人人可以吃牛排的富裕社會(老子可以關上門來爽不要來煩我)
英國：公平正義的福利制度(共體時艱啦)
德國：日耳曼至上國家社會主義(死道友不死貧道)
日本：大東亞共榮圈(通通都替天皇賣命，不包括我)
蘇聯：共產主義烏托邦(餓死事小，黨國亡事大)
中國：三民主義萬萬歲！？(其實作者沒提是我加的)
美利堅帝國的富裕
大蕭條也在美國產生了影響，但隨著戰爭爆發，情勢就改觀了。因為二三零年代的經濟衰退，城市人口負擔不起農村產品，導致當地也是赤貧依舊。但戰爭拯救了美國農民。政府保證以高於市場的價格收購，並鼓勵與計畫開發，動員市場的力量引領生產，不但足以養活自己國家的平民與士兵，甚至能大量以租借法案出口到英國、蘇聯乃至中國。而跟英國、德國或蘇聯這些喜歡管制經濟的國家不同，即便有點左的羅斯福也還是放任市場調節，華盛頓把需求單開出來，讓全國企業各自施展本事來爭奪訂單，戰爭結束時，美國非常順利的把民生為主的工業產能全面轉向軍工，而且翻了一倍的產能。每個企業家都賺的口袋麥可麥可，同樣受益的還有農工階級，薪資上漲了，高價收購農產品，都讓他們能夠過上以前不敢奢望的「中產生活」。乃至有位婦女在公車上忍不住說：「希望戰爭能在我存夠錢買冰箱後才結束。」隔壁的老翁忍不住拿雨傘敲了一下她的頭。
不過美國婦女多少還是有點抱怨，因為把戰爭物資列為第一優先，所以有些食材受到了管制，但對於她們的影響，頂多就是從每天三杯咖啡到一杯咖啡的差別，或者「買不到好牛排」。這要是給英、德、日、蘇等國的婦女聽到，估計白眼都翻到天上去了。
至於農民，他們提出法案要求確保人力不至於過度流向都市或者被徵招，他們接受了女性，甚至，他們還接受了德國戰俘！農民們表示：「這些人很溫順，雖然手腳沒有本地人俐落，但是很聽話，非常好用。」而這些遠走他鄉的軍人也殘酷的發現，打敗他們的敵國的農民一天吃的東西比他們祖國一週能吃到的都好，各種美食都是他們難以覓得的。1945年，當美國政府決定遣返戰俘時，居然引起了農民強烈的抗議.....
這次的榮景促使農民的生活急速好轉，各種現代化讓許多人甚至感覺不適應。而戰時的人力缺乏也促使人們努力的開發機械化，更加奠定了美國農業的先進性。
美國是唯一在二戰中還能充分供應農產品並努力提升產量甚至超過需求的國家。德軍士兵發現這點的時候肯定非常絕望。
其實，美國政府是極不願意讓戰爭影響到他們的國民，因為要說服他們參加這場「別人的渾水」並不容易，例如那些受到徵召的男性公民，基本上都認為「國家欠我的，所以我的福利一點也不能少」。因此，軍方高層對於士兵的伙食等是絕對不敢妥協，後勤單位努力的研發了「營養均衡」的罐頭食品，卻因為口感而被棄若敝屣，搞到最後只好盡量讓野戰廚房能夠隨軍行動。澳洲友軍總愛開玩笑的說：「美軍第一波攻勢是海軍陸戰隊，第二波是冷凍貨櫃。」全世界只有這個國家可以打這種富有人家的仗。
除此之外，美軍所到之處，也都給當地造成了影響。
例如澳洲，其實這個國家默默的為太平洋作戰貢獻了兵力跟物資，美軍充分的後勤補給有絕大多數都是他們的支持，甚至不惜犧牲本地人的福祉(本地婦女總是抱怨買不到肉類，乃至冰淇淋)。其實，澳洲的農業產出並不足以應付戰爭的需求，迫使美國不得不派出專家前往指導，而這也直接的促成了本地的技術成長。除此之外，食物的保存也是個問題，為了應付軍用罐頭等物品所需，也都迫使澳洲食品工業技術急速改良，而這是和平時期不可能達成的速度，這都是戰爭帶來的正面效影。
另外一個受到影響的是太平洋諸島，美軍進駐帶來了大量的物資，他們慷慨地跟居民分享食物，卻改變了他們的飲食習慣，例如小朋友，在喝多了可口可樂(美國軟實力的一個證明)跟冰淇淋等甜食後，大量的蛀牙成為嚴重困擾。而且當地為了配合軍隊或者是接受慣了美國支援後改變的經濟與生活，在隨著戰爭需求消失而被拋棄後，紛紛產生適應不良：「回不去了」。
大家一起來養英格蘭
大不列顛人民是二戰參戰國中少數沒餓到的。
主要是戰前政府即以大力改善糧食生產的境況，主食小麥的進口量透國大量的鼓勵農民重新種植從兩百萬噸降到一百萬左右(人力方面則利用戰俘來解決。據說德國人風評極佳，英國農民也稱讚他們非常「敬業」，不像義大利「不給甜頭不會認真工作」。)，其餘食物則從其他盟邦或者貿易夥伴中獲取。例如：漁獲從冰島、肥料從加拿大、起司等乳製品從紐西蘭、肉類從澳洲、阿根廷，其餘則由美國提供。由於英國在戰時拉高了的需求，大部分都振興了這些國家的農業。冰島的漁業本來在經歷二三零年代已經奄奄一息，藉著大量出口(某種程度上都算傾銷了)給英格蘭，他們從負債國家轉變成盈餘，奠定了之後半個世紀的富裕。南美的阿根廷在二十世紀上半葉能列入高收入國家，也是拜大量出口肉類給英國所賜。
戰爭也發明了很多奇怪的食物，給人們留下「恐怖」的記憶。例如「蛋粉」，據說用這種玩意煮出來的「荷包蛋」做成三明治會把底下的吐司給弄得濕濕的，口感非常之噁......許多經歷過戰時的英國人，小時候都沒吃過香蕉，倒是看過「香蕉粉」。
英國沒辦法像德國那樣去影響國民的飲食習慣，只能在戰爭爆發後才開始透過宣傳調整。但還是面臨兩個問題：如何妥善分配糧食跟營養不均衡。前一個狀況是非常嚴重甚至可能影響戰爭成敗，英國政府絲毫不敢大意的審慎處理，畢竟他們不像德國可以忽視民怨，而這會影響民心士氣。邱吉爾政府確實也做到了很大程度的公平，前線士兵得到優先分配，原本貧困的人們也獲得關照，上層階級也被限制了需求，這在英國這種積習難改的階級社會是非常難得的，這種「戰時社會主義」一直維持到戰後很長一段時間，最終成為英國社會福利制度的濫觴。至於營養不均衡的問題，不論是在民間還是在軍中都有。因為食材的缺乏，當然政府優先傾向給予容易種植的作物如馬鈴薯，但長期偏食的結果是可想而知的。在軍中，罐頭肉跟硬餅乾導致便秘，對士兵來說苦不堪言，而且英國軍民對於食物的口感也時有抱怨。所以政府最終不得不聘請營養師跟飯店主廚等大師來研究改善伙食，盡可能做到味覺跟營養的同時照顧。這種經驗也都成為戰後對營養學的關注與提倡。
不過值得一提的是，當英國士兵在抱怨伙食導致的營養不良時，來自印度的士兵卻因此而「增胖」，過得更滋潤，真是無比諷刺。另外，如果紅軍弟兄聽到英國士兵還在抱怨下午茶很糟糕，肯定會大搖其頭，痛斥他們難怪會不堪一擊吧。
而帝國沒有餓到大不列顛人民的成就是怎麼達成的呢？，當然是以其他殖民地的福祉為代價囉。
失去緬甸糧倉後，印度陷入恐慌，上層大量收購糧食，商人見機哄抬囤積，孟加拉發生災害，殖民政府亂成一團毫無作為，各地都出現餓死的窮苦大眾。即使出現慈善團體也無濟於事，因為他們也買不到糧食或者力有未逮。直到1943年韋弗爾子爵接手總督，開始派遣軍隊協助運糧賑災，並實施中央管制計畫，才略有緩解。但印度依然缺乏食物，韋弗爾向倫敦請求協助，但邱吉爾對印度有強烈的歧視與偏見，以「戰區更有需要」加以拒絕，甚至說：「母國都在受難了，沒道理他們不該同甘共苦，而且甘地都還沒死呢。」但是英國本土可沒有飢荒，印度卻是死了百萬人。不過羅斯福也沒好到哪去，他收到了韋弗爾的訊息後也只是轉給聯席會議，並無作為。
大英帝國的威信比起被日軍擊敗的打擊，這次飢荒才是真正導致一落千丈的主因，印度開始發出獨立時，邱吉爾依然認為這是殖民地的「忘恩負義」。不過戰後，由於獨立運動的開始以及猶太屠殺的曝光，注意力被轉移，飢荒逐漸被人忘記，那些冤魂就只能在歷史書的某個角落留下短短幾行文字。
同樣受害的還有太平洋、非洲的各殖民地。他們被要求無視於經濟環境與市場，改去生產戰時特需，儘管短期內確實獲得了利益，可在戰爭結束後，就變成了包袱。單一產品轉型不易，也沒有規劃與指導，最終這些地方即使獨立之後也依然經濟凋疲，政治動盪。而且付出這種代價，同盟國也依然以航運力有未逮，沒有給予真正應得的報酬，他們在戰時都是缺乏糧食跟長期營養不良的一群。
集中力量辦大事唯一「成功」的在戰略要地中東，儘管這邊一度因為隆美爾的勝利進軍而情勢告急，但同盟國還是成功利用船運為武器，並集中物資與調派管制政策，迫使伊拉克、黎巴嫩等某些「對軸心國有好感」的人不敢妄動，最終放棄野心。但這只是因為這裡的重要性才獲得青睞。
德國種族政策的荒謬
戰時的英、德兩國其實都做了一件同樣的事情：將飢餓輸出給本國以外的不幸人民。
納粹從一開始就在農業部長巴克跟戈林的計畫下，奠定了「餓也不能餓著德國人」的基本方針，他們企圖奪取東歐的農地，然後移民去開墾以獲取德國的「生存空間」，即糧食的自給自足。這種政策既簡單又粗暴：向佔領地人民掠奪，「處分」多餘的「米蟲」來節流。但是，剛佔領烏克蘭時，接手的民政官員發現當地居民歡迎德軍的到來，當下，負責的長官也認為應該要將這裡變成替德國生產糧食的附庸國，好過於原本的滅絕計畫，但是希特勒跟戈林聽不進去。而當他們殺雞取卵之後的代價就是再也找不到糧食，原本企圖速戰速決，就食於敵的計畫破產。而就事實上，他們從烏克蘭掠奪的食物確實減輕了德國本土農民的負擔。
但本書作者批判這是個愚蠢的，違反經濟學與人性的失敗政策。她認為東歐的農業其實發展水平不高，經過戰爭的破壞尚未能恢復，而派去的德國殖民水土不服又遭到游擊隊騷擾，根本不能達到計畫中所要的需求。反觀西歐，本來就有基礎的農業建設，只要給予新的技術支持，並賦予誘因，完全是可以達到德國要的那種目標(先不論道德問題)。舉例，因丹麥被視為雅利安同胞，所以沒有受到什麼干涉，於是佔領政府釋出誘因讓農民可以努力生產，小小的土地不但自給自足還能供應德國一定的肉品與油脂。隔壁的荷蘭跟比利時也差不多，他們受到的干預較少，儘管多少有點營養不均，但至少沒有飢餓。法國受到大量的壓榨，但農村居民基本上可以對佔領軍瞞天過海，戰前簡單的飲食習慣讓他們可以自給自足，許多人的回憶中他們被戰爭影響的範圍是非常的少。對烏克蘭農民來說，諷刺的地方在於，某些比較富饒地區的人，只要能夠躲避開效率低下的德國警政追緝，私自植種，反而日子過得比在蘇聯集體農場時滋潤。而作者認為，這些農民如果有足夠誘因，完全是可以輸出多餘食糧。
至於德國本土也是各種讓經濟學家目瞪口呆的荒謬。納粹將大量的俘虜運來補充缺乏的農工，他們發現農民對待這些人「跟自己人一樣」，讓他們同桌共食，得到相同的飲食水平，感到非常「震怒」，因為這違背了他們的種族政策，不得不祭出罰則禁止。但一位德國農莊女主人坦承：「讓這些人吃飽喝足不用監督他們也會努力工作，我又何必自討苦吃？」甚至是，許多農村都可以達到自給自足的目標，在戰爭期間大部分他們過的日子都相對都市城鎮居民好太多了。而這些被迫工作的農工也其實吃的比留在祖國的同胞營養。
換句話說，納粹因為其種族主義意識形態，採取殺雞取卵的掠奪而不是誘因式的鼓勵生產，斷送了原本真正「自給自足」的可能性。
另外一個諷刺點在於，戰後，許多德國人民受訪時都認為納粹比起讓他們餓肚子的盟軍有效率多了，但他們完全不知道，這是以東歐無數的冤魂為代價的。
PS：納粹德國早在戰前就利用營養學來調整國民的飲食習慣，讓他們吃一些不可口但是足以維繫健康跟飽足感，又方便取得的食物。雖然戈培爾強調國家社會主義上下一心「共體時艱」，但納粹黨本身並沒有他想像中的那樣「純潔」。事實上德國民間流傳的笑話即已說明：「想要打贏戰爭？除非戈林穿得下戈培爾的褲子。」
確實，這位空軍元帥是宣傳部長的眼中釘，肉中刺。他的奢華跟享受口腹之慾已經公然挑釁戈培爾在茲念茲想維繫的形象，以至於他不惜派人去砸戈林的餐廳，鬧出了一場元帥派空軍保護自己特權的醜陋戲碼。說起來，戈培爾本人在食慾上倒確實言行一致，而希特勒也是出名的素食主義者，非常簡單，唯一弱點大概就愛好甜食巧克力吧，但這以他的地位來說根本無足掛齒。
戰鬥民族的真正力量
俄國的農業從未真正的現代化，大部分時間機械農具都很匱乏，這並不意外，畢竟就連西歐很多大國也都還沒踏上這進程。(除了美國，但它也是在戰時才因為需求而加快步伐)
但是蘇聯的集體化農場惡化了生產效率。強制壓低農業價格以振興工業，奪走了大量的產出致使農民即便努力工作倒頭來還是要餓肚子，剝奪誘因。結果就是農民有餘力也把糧食私藏，最終還是導致城市供應不足，得實行配給制。戰爭期間更加導致這種狀況惡化，大量的男丁被抽調去工廠或者入伍，至剩下老弱婦孺，根本無力收割農產品。
但說來諷刺的，恰好是因為集體化農場，才讓蘇聯至少沒有在大量農耕地被德國奪走後崩潰，因為國家可以藉此，逼迫農民工作，掌控生產數量與有效分配，保住了最低限度的數字。但作者說，或許是天佑俄羅斯，戰爭期間的天候有利於生產，要是1946年後造成大飢荒的惡劣天氣提前到來，世事就難說了。
而俄國農民被暱稱為「戰鬥的民族」，個人認為其真正「實力」應該是其在各種糧食匱乏的情況下還能找出可以維持生存的神奇技能。他們能在荒郊野嶺找出勉強可食用的野草，把凍壞的馬鈴薯「重製」成煎餅，在各種惡劣環境中活了下來(德軍發現烏克蘭農民把他們埋葬的馬挖出來吃，非常震驚與噁心)。任何觀看本書的讀者面臨那種境況早就已經升天了。
而導致蘇聯一開始兵敗如山倒的其中一個原因，補給的無能也是重大的因素。大部分時間，紅軍士兵都沒辦法取得應有的作戰物資，從槍械彈藥到衣服甚至最重要的食物都是如此。會有這樣的慘況除了運輸體系的失敗外，實際上也是因為蘇聯的糧食產量本身就沒辦法負擔起這樣的供給，可悲的農民除了要「優先給城市工業市民」，還要給紅軍。但不管怎麼分配，這些人都是要餓肚子。(別擔心，餓不著那些高層，史達林依然滋潤滋潤。) 戰時的俄羅斯人民或許可以跟島國的日本民眾分享各種「食材試吃」的心得，他們恐怕已經把自己周遭所有可以食用的東西都吃個精光了吧。
所以，美國的租借法案中，糧食可能稍微緩解了俄國人民的飢餓。當這個「過太爽」的米帝人民還在為了「吃不到牛排」而憤怒時，一名隨著運輸部隊去了蘇聯的軍官卻從船上看到蘇聯人民飢腸轆轆，不惜冒著生命危險去翻撿美國人丟出來廚餘，而大感震驚。而許多紅軍老兵，一定都對美國提供的午餐肉感到滿意。
蘇聯高層利用共產主義的集體犧牲奉獻精神洗腦人民忍受這種待遇，「不惜一切代價」保衛國土，但其實他們大多數心知肚明那個「代價」並不包括高層菁英；只是現實殘忍的地方在於，納粹對待他們的態度是連基本的生存權都要剝奪，迫使這些人不得不為此而戰。他們捍衛的不是蘇聯政權，是自己的命運。
德國人如果裝模作樣，讓俄羅斯人能過上點像樣的生活，可能戰爭都不用打就可以讓蘇聯崩潰。當然，這是「違反人設」的無意義假想，因為納粹恰好就是為了剝奪這點而前來侵略的。
PS：話又說回來，但德國人民其實又普遍過得比蘇聯人太多，以至於紅軍反攻敵國之後發現這個境況感到非常不解與憤怒，大肆地掠奪與搶劫，不過考慮到納粹在東線幹的暴行，其實只是剛好而已。
強將不差餓兵？
日本雖然沒有像納粹那樣計畫性的屠殺，但是他們的無能卻也造就了對其帝國內人民同等的傷害。
這個海上帝國在戰爭期間犯下的失誤很多，最嚴重的之一，莫過於他們沒有維持有效的航運跟護航機制。當美國潛艇發揮出高效的獵殺行動時，其海運數量跌了足足六成。日本的主食稻米有三分之二可以從國內產出，但是同等重要的鹽、糖與大豆等則須從朝鮮、台灣與滿州進口，這些都在禁運中受到了極大的影響。此外，由於日本可耕種土地少與相對貧瘠，欠缺肥料的情況下產量日漸減少。而政府因為戰爭需求，大量的用低價徵收更加使農民欠缺動力生產，45年戰爭結束時，儘管飢荒已經開始，卻有大量土地是荒蕪的。
這是一種共通的現象。人類因為利益而勞作，貿易則可以提供一種分工讓大家各取所需。日本雖然一度擁有龐大的帝國，卻仍嚴重的匱乏，就是因為破壞了這簡單的經濟原則。
首先，他們居然認為各地應該要自給自足，要求全部的占領地都要自行生產足夠的糧食，然而整個東南亞過去都是依賴像南緬甸這樣肥沃的耕地提供的稻米，日本人徵收了運輸用的車輛，殺害了維繫交易的華商，破壞了這個機制，他們在馬來亞、越南，都製造了飢荒。而日本人的各種強制徵收，也讓農民失去了動力耕種，他們在本國的錯誤也輸出到了其帝國。
而日軍也算是奇葩了，孫子兵法說：「三軍未發，糧草先行。」結果他們卻是訓練農民出身的士兵要忍人所不能忍，用最低耗糧來打仗。出兵時總讓帶最少的糧，然後企圖「就食於敵」。兵法上來說確實有這種做法，但一開始就把能順利從敵人手上拿到補給就未免太過了。可是日軍上層似乎真的是這麼盤算。太平洋戰爭初期，英軍準備不足，節節敗退時的確留下不少物資便宜了日軍，但等到中後期，或者是澳軍，就會撤走物資跟學會破壞，於是天皇的士兵們就要開始餓肚子了。特別是美軍潛艇大肆破壞，而聯合艦隊無法運補的時候。作者引用的資料，日軍死亡士兵有六成是因為飢餓生病而非戰死！！那些被留在孤島上的，往往把當地所有能吃的都掏空，甚至連公廁裡面的蛆都可以！！有位戰俘對盟軍說：「當他見到指揮官拿走高級的食物，卻命他們吃馬鈴薯時，就決定投降了。」
本土的人民其實也沒好到哪裡去。他們在戰時的經歷，幾乎可以編成一部「各式可用食材大全」了。作者引用一位女營養學教授的回憶，她記得小時吃過一種「海素麵」，遍訪許多人打聽終於知道製作法為「海草加稻草」後，她依樣畫葫蘆地做出來，感想是：「如此難以下嚥的，為何以前覺得美味？只能說真的餓壞了。」
然而即便如此，1945年的那個夏天，昭和天皇等高層依然要等到兩顆原子彈投下之後，才願意死心的投降。
人命之於彼等何價？
戰爭期間有能力確保糧食無虞的國家不多，主要是美國。其他國家基本上都是把飢餓輸出給境外不幸的人民，英國也不例外。而無法這麼做的國家，蘇聯勉強撐過了，中國的國民黨就成為導致在內戰中潰敗的原因。確實，蔣介石的政府之無能，導致其對農民的重壓與暴政，顯得讓後人讀史會有一種不知「有沒有比日軍仁慈」的感觸。共產黨其實也做了差不多的事情，只是他們因為處於弱勢也不是首當其衝的，所以比較能夠不用被逼得太撕破臉，也就相對不招憎恨。
這場大戰對二十世紀各國的社會都產生了重大的改變，西歐跟美國的農村都遭到了削弱。因為需求促使農業科技急速發展，加上大量的人口外移往工業區，從此不再需要過往那種數量的勞力，而這個階級的政治影響也大幅下降。作者指出，說來諷刺的，最終解決日本跟德國戰前的那種糧食危機憂患意識的，恰好是他們當時主政者最反對的：「美國援助與資本主義市場供需法則」。
不管怎樣，在這場全球大戰中，至少有兩千萬人的死亡，不是因為戰爭直接引起，他們絕大多數都是死於饑餓。在今天這個經歷過農業革命，人們把肥胖當作重大健康問題的年代，或許絕大多數人們很難想像僅僅在百年前，飢荒是很容易發生的。但也不得不承認的是，恰好是因為這場戰爭，促成了人們對於改善生產技術的投資力道，各種保存食物的罐頭技術，關注飲食均衡的營養學，造就了後人的幸福。殘酷點來說，當初德國對那些不幸的人做的飢餓研究報告，也都促成醫學上的進步。
這都是從正面的角度去思考，但其實活活餓死是非常受罪的，那些不幸遭難的亡魂在警告著我們這些後人切莫大��。農業革命雖然造就了富裕，但它不是沒有副作用的，各種災害汙染，還有今天過度全球化，如果貿易交通中斷，造成的影響可能十分重大。在Google上搜尋一下「糧食危機」這個關鍵字，就可以看到許多資料，作者莉琪‧科林漢(Lizze Collingham)也再三告誡我們不可鬆懈。本書是她在台灣第二本引進的作品，個人覺得這個主題非常值得一看，儘管作者寫得有點囉嗦。翻譯沒啥太大問題，除了一小段作者可能累了：
頁：293 第三行起
「直到1941年年底，他們意外發現這項封鎖行動的漏洞。一個中國走私集團向日軍購買汽油、衣物與藥品。反之，日軍將鎢與錫賣給對方，用以製造日本軍備。」
文意不通，查原文：
Until late 1941 the blockade was surprisingly porous. An organized ring of Chinese smugglers bought gasoline, cloth and medicines from the Japanese army. In return they sold them tungsten and tin for the manufacture of Japanese arms.
應該是：他們意外發現這項封鎖行動的漏洞。一個中國走私集團向日軍購買汽油、衣物與藥品。作為回報，他們向對方出售鎢和錫，用於製造日本的武器。
向大家推薦。
看完請務必好好珍惜食物。
而在整個二戰之中，真正能夠在糧食安全上確保無虞的只有美國，其他國家都是以犧牲某部分為代價來鞏固。以下從左至右表示從各參戰國在這問題上的程度，從最富裕到最貧乏：
美國>>>英國(包括澳、紐、加)>德國=英帝國(殖民地部分)>>蘇聯=日本>中國
而作者針對這幾個國家的方針做了個簡介：
美國：資本主義人人可以吃牛排的富裕社會(老子可以關上門來爽不要來煩我)
英國：公平正義的福利制度(共體時艱啦)
德國：日耳曼至上國家社會主義(死道友不死貧道)
日本：大東亞共榮圈(通通都替天皇賣命，不包括我)
蘇聯：共產主義烏托邦(餓死事小，黨國亡事大)
中國：三民主義萬萬歲！？(其實作者沒提是我加的)
美利堅帝國的富裕
大蕭條也在美國產生了影響，但隨著戰爭爆發，情勢就改觀了。因為二三零年代的經濟衰退，城市人口負擔不起農村產品，導致當地也是赤貧依舊。但戰爭拯救了美國農民。政府保證以高於市場的價格收購，並鼓勵與計畫開發，動員市場的力量引領生產，不但足以養活自己國家的平民與士兵，甚至能大量以租借法案出口到英國、蘇聯乃至中國。而跟英國、德國或蘇聯這些喜歡管制經濟的國家不同，即便有點左的羅斯福也還是放任市場調節，華盛頓把需求單開出來，讓全國企業各自施展本事來爭奪訂單，戰爭結束時，美國非常順利的把民生為主的工業產能全面轉向軍工，而且翻了一倍的產能。每個企業家都賺的口袋麥可麥可，同樣受益的還有農工階級，薪資上漲了，高價收購農產品，都讓他們能夠過上以前不敢奢望的「中產生活」。乃至有位婦女在公車上忍不住說：「希望戰爭能在我存夠錢買冰箱後才結束。」隔壁的老翁忍不住拿雨傘敲了一下她的頭。
不過美國婦女多少還是有點抱怨，因為把戰爭物資列為第一優先，所以有些食材受到了管制，但對於她們的影響，頂多就是從每天三杯咖啡到一杯咖啡的差別，或者「買不到好牛排」。這要是給英、德、日、蘇等國的婦女聽到，估計白眼都翻到天上去了。
至於農民，他們提出法案要求確保人力不至於過度流向都市或者被徵招，他們接受了女性，甚至，他們還接受了德國戰俘！農民們表示：「這些人很溫順，雖然手腳沒有本地人俐落，但是很聽話，非常好用。」而這些遠走他鄉的軍人也殘酷的發現，打敗他們的敵國的農民一天吃的東西比他們祖國一週能吃到的都好，各種美食都是他們難以覓得的。1945年，當美國政府決定遣返戰俘時，居然引起了農民強烈的抗議.....
這次的榮景促使農民的生活急速好轉，各種現代化讓許多人甚至感覺不適應。而戰時的人力缺乏也促使人們努力的開發機械化，更加奠定了美國農業的先進性。
美國是唯一在二戰中還能充分供應農產品並努力提升產量甚至超過需求的國家。德軍士兵發現這點的時候肯定非常絕望。
其實，美國政府是極不願意讓戰爭影響到他們的國民，因為要說服他們參加這場「別人的渾水」並不容易，例如那些受到徵召的男性公民，基本上都認為「國家欠我的，所以我的福利一點也不能少」。因此，軍方高層對於士兵的伙食等是絕對不敢妥協，後勤單位努力的研發了「營養均衡」的罐頭食品，卻因為口感而被棄若敝屣，搞到最後只好盡量讓野戰廚房能夠隨軍行動。澳洲友軍總愛開玩笑的說：「美軍第一波攻勢是海軍陸戰隊，第二波是冷凍貨櫃。」全世界只有這個國家可以打這種富有人家的仗。
除此之外，美軍所到之處，也都給當地造成了影響。
例如澳洲，其實這個國家默默的為太平洋作戰貢獻了兵力跟物資，美軍充分的後勤補給有絕大多數都是他們的支持，甚至不惜犧牲本地人的福祉(本地婦女總是抱怨買不到肉類，乃至冰淇淋)。其實，澳洲的農業產出並不足以應付戰爭的需求，迫使美國不得不派出專家前往指導，而這也直接的促成了本地的技術成長。除此之外，食物的保存也是個問題，為了應付軍用罐頭等物品所需，也都迫使澳洲食品工業技術急速改良，而這是和平時期不可能達成的速度，這都是戰爭帶來的正面效影。
另外一個受到影響的是太平洋諸島，美軍進駐帶來了大量的物資，他們慷慨地跟居民分享食物，卻改變了他們的飲食習慣，例如小朋友，在喝多了可口可樂(美國軟實力的一個證明)跟冰淇淋等甜食後，大量的蛀牙成為嚴重困擾。而且當地為了配合軍隊或者是接受慣了美國支援後改變的經濟與生活，在隨著戰爭需求消失而被拋棄後，紛紛產生適應不良：「回不去了」。
大家一起來養英格蘭
大不列顛人民是二戰參戰國中少數沒餓到的。
主要是戰前政府即以大力改善糧食生產的境況，主食小麥的進口量透國大量的鼓勵農民重新種植從兩百萬噸降到一百萬左右(人力方面則利用戰俘來解決。據說德國人風評極佳，英國農民也稱讚他們非常「敬業」，不像義大利「不給甜頭不會認真工作」。)，其餘食物則從其他盟邦或者貿易夥伴中獲取。例如：漁獲從冰島、肥料從加拿大、起司等乳製品從紐西蘭、肉類從澳洲、阿根廷，其餘則由美國提供。由於英國在戰時拉高了的需求，大部分都振興了這些國家的農業。冰島的漁業本來在經歷二三零年代已經奄奄一息，藉著大量出口(某種程度上都算傾銷了)給英格蘭，他們從負債國家轉變成盈餘，奠定了之後半個世紀的富裕。南美的阿根廷在二十世紀上半葉能列入高收入國家，也是拜大量出口肉類給英國所賜。
戰爭也發明了很多奇怪的食物，給人們留下「恐怖」的記憶。例如「蛋粉」，據說用這種玩意煮出來的「荷包蛋」做成三明治會把底下的吐司給弄得濕濕的，口感非常之噁......許多經歷過戰時的英國人，小時候都沒吃過香蕉，倒是看過「香蕉粉」。
英國沒辦法像德國那樣去影響國民的飲食習慣，只能在戰爭爆發後才開始透過宣傳調整。但還是面臨兩個問題：如何妥善分配糧食跟營養不均衡。前一個狀況是非常嚴重甚至可能影響戰爭成敗，英國政府絲毫不敢大意的審慎處理，畢竟他們不像德國可以忽視民怨，而這會影響民心士氣。邱吉爾政府確實也做到了很大程度的公平，前線士兵得到優先分配，原本貧困的人們也獲得關照，上層階級也被限制了需求，這在英國這種積習難改的階級社會是非常難得的，這種「戰時社會主義」一直維持到戰後很長一段時間，最終成為英國社會福利制度的濫觴。至於營養不均衡的問題，不論是在民間還是在軍中都有。因為食材的缺乏，當然政府優先傾向給予容易種植的作物如馬鈴薯，但長期偏食的結果是可想而知的。在軍中，罐頭肉跟硬餅乾導致便秘，對士兵來說苦不堪言，而且英國軍民對於食物的口感也時有抱怨。所以政府最終不得不聘請營養師跟飯店主廚等大師來研究改善伙食，盡可能做到味覺跟營養的同時照顧。這種經驗也都成為戰後對營養學的關注與提倡。
不過值得一提的是，當英國士兵在抱怨伙食導致的營養不良時，來自印度的士兵卻因此而「增胖」，過得更滋潤，真是無比諷刺。另外，如果紅軍弟兄聽到英國士兵還在抱怨下午茶很糟糕，肯定會大搖其頭，痛斥他們難怪會不堪一擊吧。
而帝國沒有餓到大不列顛人民的成就是怎麼達成的呢？，當然是以其他殖民地的福祉為代價囉。
失去緬甸糧倉後，印度陷入恐慌，上層大量收購糧食，商人見機哄抬囤積，孟加拉發生災害，殖民政府亂成一團毫無作為，各地都出現餓死的窮苦大眾。即使出現慈善團體也無濟於事，因為他們也買不到糧食或者力有未逮。直到1943年韋弗爾子爵接手總督，開始派遣軍隊協助運糧賑災，並實施中央管制計畫，才略有緩解。但印度依然缺乏食物，韋弗爾向倫敦請求協助，但邱吉爾對印度有強烈的歧視與偏見，以「戰區更有需要」加以拒絕，甚至說：「母國都在受難了，沒道理他們不該同甘共苦，而且甘地都還沒死呢。」但是英國本土可沒有飢荒，印度卻是死了百萬人。不過羅斯福也沒好到哪去，他收到了韋弗爾的訊息後也只是轉給聯席會議，並無作為。
大英帝國的威信比起被日軍擊敗的打擊，這次飢荒才是真正導致一落千丈的主因，印度開始發出獨立時，邱吉爾依然認為這是殖民地的「忘恩負義」。不過戰後，由於獨立運動的開始以及猶太屠殺的曝光，注意力被轉移，飢荒逐漸被人忘記，那些冤魂就只能在歷史書的某個角落留下短短幾行文字。
同樣受害的還有太平洋、非洲的各殖民地。他們被要求無視於經濟環境與市場，改去生產戰時特需，儘管短期內確實獲得了利益，可在戰爭結束後，就變成了包袱。單一產品轉型不易，也沒有規劃與指導，最終這些地方即使獨立之後也依然經濟凋疲，政治動盪。而且付出這種代價，同盟國也依然以航運力有未逮，沒有給予真正應得的報酬，他們在戰時都是缺乏糧食跟長期營養不良的一群。
集中力量辦大事唯一「成功」的在戰略要地中東，儘管這邊一度因為隆美爾的勝利進軍而情勢告急，但同盟國還是成功利用船運為武器，並集中物資與調派管制政策，迫使伊拉克、黎巴嫩等某些「對軸心國有好感」的人不敢妄動，最終放棄野心。但這只是因為這裡的重要性才獲得青睞。
德國種族政策的荒謬
戰時的英、德兩國其實都做了一件同樣的事情：將飢餓輸出給本國以外的不幸人民。
納粹從一開始就在農業部長巴克跟戈林的計畫下，奠定了「餓也不能餓著德國人」的基本方針，他們企圖奪取東歐的農地，然後移民去開墾以獲取德國的「生存空間」，即糧食的自給自足。這種政策既簡單又粗暴：向佔領地人民掠奪，「處分」多餘的「米蟲」來節流。但是，剛佔領烏克蘭時，接手的民政官員發現當地居民歡迎德軍的到來，當下，負責的長官也認為應該要將這裡變成替德國生產糧食的附庸國，好過於原本的滅絕計畫，但是希特勒跟戈林聽不進去。而當他們殺雞取卵之後的代價就是再也找不到糧食，原本企圖速戰速決，就食於敵的計畫破產。而就事實上，他們從烏克蘭掠奪的食物確實減輕了德國本土農民的負擔。
但本書作者批判這是個愚蠢的，違反經濟學與人性的失敗政策。她認為東歐的農業其實發展水平不高，經過戰爭的破壞尚未能恢復，而派去的德國殖民水土不服又遭到游擊隊騷擾，根本不能達到計畫中所要的需求。反觀西歐，本來就有基礎的農業建設，只要給予新的技術支持，並賦予誘因，完全是可以達到德國要的那種目標(先不論道德問題)。舉例，因丹麥被視為雅利安同胞，所以沒有受到什麼干涉，於是佔領政府釋出誘因讓農民可以努力生產，小小的土地不但自給自足還能供應德國一定的肉品與油脂。隔壁的荷蘭跟比利時也差不多，他們受到的干預較少，儘管多少有點營養不均，但至少沒有飢餓。法國受到大量的壓榨，但農村居民基本上可以對佔領軍瞞天過海，戰前簡單的飲食習慣讓他們可以自給自足，許多人的回憶中他們被戰爭影響的範圍是非常的少。對烏克蘭農民來說，諷刺的地方在於，某些比較富饒地區的人，只要能夠躲避開效率低下的德國警政追緝，私自植種，反而日子過得比在蘇聯集體農場時滋潤。而作者認為，這些農民如果有足夠誘因，完全是可以輸出多餘食糧。
至於德國本土也是各種讓經濟學家目瞪口呆的荒謬。納粹將大量的俘虜運來補充缺乏的農工，他們發現農民對待這些人「跟自己人一樣」，讓他們同桌共食，得到相同的飲食水平，感到非常「震怒」，因為這違背了他們的種族政策，不得不祭出罰則禁止。但一位德國農莊女主人坦承：「讓這些人吃飽喝足不用監督他們也會努力工作，我又何必自討苦吃？」甚至是，許多農村都可以達到自給自足的目標，在戰爭期間大部分他們過的日子都相對都市城鎮居民好太多了。而這些被迫工作的農工也其實吃的比留在祖國的同胞營養。
換句話說，納粹因為其種族主義意識形態，採取殺雞取卵的掠奪而不是誘因式的鼓勵生產，斷送了原本真正「自給自足」的可能性。
另外一個諷刺點在於，戰後，許多德國人民受訪時都認為納粹比起讓他們餓肚子的盟軍有效率多了，但他們完全不知道，這是以東歐無數的冤魂為代價的。
PS：納粹德國早在戰前就利用營養學來調整國民的飲食習慣，讓他們吃一些不可口但是足以維繫健康跟飽足感，又方便取得的食物。雖然戈培爾強調國家社會主義上下一心「共體時艱」，但納粹黨本身並沒有他想像中的那樣「純潔」。事實上德國民間流傳的笑話即已說明：「想要打贏戰爭？除非戈林穿得下戈培爾的褲子。」
確實，這位空軍元帥是宣傳部長的眼中釘，肉中刺。他的奢華跟享受口腹之慾已經公然挑釁戈培爾在茲念茲想維繫的形象，以至於他不惜派人去砸戈林的餐廳，鬧出了一場元帥派空軍保護自己特權的醜陋戲碼。說起來，戈培爾本人在食慾上倒確實言行一致，而希特勒也是出名的素食主義者，非常簡單，唯一弱點大概就愛好甜食巧克力吧，但這以他的地位來說根本無足掛齒。
戰鬥民族的真正力量
俄國的農業從未真正的現代化，大部分時間機械農具都很匱乏，這並不意外，畢竟就連西歐很多大國也都還沒踏上這進程。(除了美國，但它也是在戰時才因為需求而加快步伐)
但是蘇聯的集體化農場惡化了生產效率。強制壓低農業價格以振興工業，奪走了大量的產出致使農民即便努力工作倒頭來還是要餓肚子，剝奪誘因。結果就是農民有餘力也把糧食私藏，最終還是導致城市供應不足，得實行配給制。戰爭期間更加導致這種狀況惡化，大量的男丁被抽調去工廠或者入伍，至剩下老弱婦孺，根本無力收割農產品。
但說來諷刺的，恰好是因為集體化農場，才讓蘇聯至少沒有在大量農耕地被德國奪走後崩潰，因為國家可以藉此，逼迫農民工作，掌控生產數量與有效分配，保住了最低限度的數字。但作者說，或許是天佑俄羅斯，戰爭期間的天候有利於生產，要是1946年後造成大飢荒的惡劣天氣提前到來，世事就難說了。
而俄國農民被暱稱為「戰鬥的民族」，個人認為其真正「實力」應該是其在各種糧食匱乏的情況下還能找出可以維持生存的神奇技能。他們能在荒郊野嶺找出勉強可食用的野草，把凍壞的馬鈴薯「重製」成煎餅，在各種惡劣環境中活了下來(德軍發現烏克蘭農民把他們埋葬的馬挖出來吃，非常震驚與噁心)。任何觀看本書的讀者面臨那種境況早就已經升天了。
而導致蘇聯一開始兵敗如山倒的其中一個原因，補給的無能也是重大的因素。大部分時間，紅軍士兵都沒辦法取得應有的作戰物資，從槍械彈藥到衣服甚至最重要的食物都是如此。會有這樣的慘況除了運輸體系的失敗外，實際上也是因為蘇聯的糧食產量本身就沒辦法負擔起這樣的供給，可悲的農民除了要「優先給城市工業市民」，還要給紅軍。但不管怎麼分配，這些人都是要餓肚子。(別擔心，餓不著那些高層，史達林依然滋潤滋潤。) 戰時的俄羅斯人民或許可以跟島國的日本民眾分享各種「食材試吃」的心得，他們恐怕已經把自己周遭所有可以食用的東西都吃個精光了吧。
所以，美國的租借法案中，糧食可能稍微緩解了俄國人民的飢餓。當這個「過太爽」的米帝人民還在為了「吃不到牛排」而憤怒時，一名隨著運輸部隊去了蘇聯的軍官卻從船上看到蘇聯人民飢腸轆轆，不惜冒著生命危險去翻撿美國人丟出來廚餘，而大感震驚。而許多紅軍老兵，一定都對美國提供的午餐肉感到滿意。
蘇聯高層利用共產主義的集體犧牲奉獻精神洗腦人民忍受這種待遇，「不惜一切代價」保衛國土，但其實他們大多數心知肚明那個「代價」並不包括高層菁英；只是現實殘忍的地方在於，納粹對待他們的態度是連基本的生存權都要剝奪，迫使這些人不得不為此而戰。他們捍衛的不是蘇聯政權，是自己的命運。
德國人如果裝模作樣，讓俄羅斯人能過上點像樣的生活，可能戰爭都不用打就可以讓蘇聯崩潰。當然，這是「違反人設」的無意義假想，因為納粹恰好就是為了剝奪這點而前來侵略的。
PS：話又說回來，但德國人民其實又普遍過得比蘇聯人太多，以至於紅軍反攻敵國之後發現這個境況感到非常不解與憤怒，大肆地掠奪與搶劫，不過考慮到納粹在東線幹的暴行，其實只是剛好而已。
強將不差餓兵？
日本雖然沒有像納粹那樣計畫性的屠殺，但是他們的無能卻也造就了對其帝國內人民同等的傷害。
這個海上帝國在戰爭期間犯下的失誤很多，最嚴重的之一，莫過於他們沒有維持有效的航運跟護航機制。當美國潛艇發揮出高效的獵殺行動時，其海運數量跌了足足六成。日本的主食稻米有三分之二可以從國內產出，但是同等重要的鹽、糖與大豆等則須從朝鮮、台灣與滿州進口，這些都在禁運中受到了極大的影響。此外，由於日本可耕種土地少與相對貧瘠，欠缺肥料的情況下產量日漸減少。而政府因為戰爭需求，大量的用低價徵收更加使農民欠缺動力生產，45年戰爭結束時，儘管飢荒已經開始，卻有大量土地是荒蕪的。
這是一種共通的現象。人類因為利益而勞作，貿易則可以提供一種分工讓大家各取所需。日本雖然一度擁有龐大的帝國，卻仍嚴重的匱乏，就是因為破壞了這簡單的經濟原則。
首先，他們居然認為各地應該要自給自足，要求全部的占領地都要自行生產足夠的糧食，然而整個東南亞過去都是依賴像南緬甸這樣肥沃的耕地提供的稻米，日本人徵收了運輸用的車輛，殺害了維繫交易的華商，破壞了這個機制，他們在馬來亞、越南，都製造了飢荒。而日本人的各種強制徵收，也讓農民失去了動力耕種，他們在本國的錯誤也輸出到了其帝國。
而日軍也算是奇葩了，孫子兵法說：「三軍未發，糧草先行。」結果他們卻是訓練農民出身的士兵要忍人所不能忍，用最低耗糧來打仗。出兵時總讓帶最少的糧，然後企圖「就食於敵」。兵法上來說確實有這種做法，但一開始就把能順利從敵人手上拿到補給就未免太過了。可是日軍上層似乎真的是這麼盤算。太平洋戰爭初期，英軍準備不足，節節敗退時的確留下不少物資便宜了日軍，但等到中後期，或者是澳軍，就會撤走物資跟學會破壞，於是天皇的士兵們就要開始餓肚子了。特別是美軍潛艇大肆破壞，而聯合艦隊無法運補的時候。作者引用的資料，日軍死亡士兵有六成是因為飢餓生病而非戰死！！那些被留在孤島上的，往往把當地所有能吃的都掏空，甚至連公廁裡面的蛆都可以！！有位戰俘對盟軍說：「當他見到指揮官拿走高級的食物，卻命他們吃馬鈴薯時，就決定投降了。」
本土的人民其實也沒好到哪裡去。他們在戰時的經歷，幾乎可以編成一部「各式可用食材大全」了。作者引用一位女營養學教授的回憶，她記得小時吃過一種「海素麵」，遍訪許多人打聽終於知道製作法為「海草加稻草」後，她依樣畫葫蘆地做出來，感想是：「如此難以下嚥的，為何以前覺得美味？只能說真的餓壞了。」
然而即便如此，1945年的那個夏天，昭和天皇等高層依然要等到兩顆原子彈投下之後，才願意死心的投降。
人命之於彼等何價？
戰爭期間有能力確保糧食無虞的國家不多，主要是美國。其他國家基本上都是把飢餓輸出給境外不幸的人民，英國也不例外。而無法這麼做的國家，蘇聯勉強撐過了，中國的國民黨就成為導致在內戰中潰敗的原因。確實，蔣介石的政府之無能，導致其對農民的重壓與暴政，顯得讓後人讀史會有一種不知「有沒有比日軍仁慈」的感觸。共產黨其實也做了差不多的事情，只是他們因為處於弱勢也不是首當其衝的，所以比較能夠不用被逼得太撕破臉，也就相對不招憎恨。
這場大戰對二十世紀各國的社會都產生了重大的改變，西歐跟美國的農村都遭到了削弱。因為需求促使農業科技急速發展，加上大量的人口外移往工業區，從此不再需要過往那種數量的勞力，而這個階級的政治影響也大幅下降。作者指出，說來諷刺的，最終解決日本跟德國戰前的那種糧食危機憂患意識的，恰好是他們當時主政者最反對的：「美國援助與資本主義市場供需法則」。
不管怎樣，在這場全球大戰中，至少有兩千萬人的死亡，不是因為戰爭直接引起，他們絕大多數都是死於饑餓。在今天這個經歷過農業革命，人們把肥胖當作重大健康問題的年代，或許絕大多數人們很難想像僅僅在百年前，飢荒是很容易發生的。但也不得不承認的是，恰好是因為這場戰爭，促成了人們對於改善生產技術的投資力道，各種保存食物的罐頭技術，關注飲食均衡的營養學，造就了後人的幸福。殘酷點來說，當初德國對那些不幸的人做的飢餓研究報告，也都促成醫學上的進步。
這都是從正面的角度去思考，但其實活活餓死是非常受罪的，那些不幸遭難的亡魂在警告著我們這些後人切莫大��。農業革命雖然造就了富裕，但它不是沒有副作用的，各種災害汙染，還有今天過度全球化，如果貿易交通中斷，造成的影響可能十分重大。在Google上搜尋一下「糧食危機」這個關鍵字，就可以看到許多資料，作者莉琪‧科林漢(Lizze Collingham)也再三告誡我們不可鬆懈。本書是她在台灣第二本引進的作品，個人覺得這個主題非常值得一看，儘管作者寫得有點囉嗦。翻譯沒啥太大問題，除了一小段作者可能累了：
頁：293 第三行起
「直到1941年年底，他們意外發現這項封鎖行動的漏洞。一個中國走私集團向日軍購買汽油、衣物與藥品。反之，日軍將鎢與錫賣給對方，用以製造日本軍備。」
文意不通，查原文：
Until late 1941 the blockade was surprisingly porous. An organized ring of Chinese smugglers bought gasoline, cloth and medicines from the Japanese army. In return they sold them tungsten and tin for the manufacture of Japanese arms.
應該是：他們意外發現這項封鎖行動的漏洞。一個中國走私集團向日軍購買汽油、衣物與藥品。作為回報，他們向對方出售鎢和錫，用於製造日本的武器。
向大家推薦。
看完請務必好好珍惜食物。
March 12, 2021
I wasn't into the writing style on this, but the argument underpinning the book as a whole and the evidence Collingham brings to bear are both powerful and will infuse how you think about the use of war as a political enterprise. We know about geography and war: Lebensraum and MacKinder's Heartland Theory and the theories of mountainous terrain and civil wars. Collingham, though, brings it all down to the weaponization of appeals to one of the most basic needs - food, and all that food requires in terms of space, and all it represents in terms of autonomy, and how it can be used to foment "othering," and translate into a truly dog-eat-dog world, and justify atrocity. I'm writing this review today as news of China's push to become food independent hits the media; as fear of mass starvation in Yemen and Tigray is reported on; as sanctions and boycotts interrupt the global movement of food for political reasons. Collingham focuses on one war and two countries' rationales, but her observations resonate well beyond.
April 2, 2013
Extraordinary. I can't believe I voluntarily read a 500-page economic history, let alone that I remained absorbed start to finish. And I can't remember reading a book that so completely changed my ideas about a historical era with which I thought I was pretty familiar. To paraphrase the T of W review in the Guardian, it turns out WWII wasn't about bad ideas, or, at least, the bad ideas were secondary. For the most part it was about the control of access to and distribution of resources- in particular, food- in a skewed global market. Hunger was a primary motivation and a devastating weapon in the conflict. We hear fairly frequently about the millions who died in the death camps, but I had absolutely no idea about the tens of millions who perished from starvation and famine-related disease during the war and its buildup in Manchuria, the Ukraine, Indochina, Greece, and Bengal. I knew Stalin had starved his own people, but Churchill's callous willingness to sacrifice the brown subjects of Empire to the interests of "this Island," while not exactly shocking, was news to me and doesn't exactly jibe with the irascible-but-lovable lion of the usual wartime hagiographies. Collingham's argument explains seemingly irrational behavior like Japanese banzai charges and the bizarre Nazi commitment of precious resources late in the war to the fulfillment of the Final Solution.
T of W is exhaustive (there are 65 pages of notes and a 40-page bibliography) without being exhausting. There were a few stylistic oddities and British-isms I stumbled over, e.g. 'impact' as a noun, repeated reference to American governmental 'ministries' and using 'pressurize' when an American would say 'pressure," but, for the most part the prose is lucid and authoritative while tastefully self-effacing. To begin with, I thought that the title was unfortunate and redolent of a lifestyle magazine and I assumed it was forced on Collingham by her editors. But I eventually came to find it evocative, making me think in a directly sensual way about the way food and the lack of it was experienced by the people under examination. For some, the taste of war was watery, weevilly gruel or the ground cattle rectums that comprised the only animal protein available in the Warsaw ghetto. For others, it might be the steak and onions and strawberry ice cream that Australians were astonished to find routinely fed to American soldiers. In the final section of the book, Collingham outlines how the war transformed the habits and appetites of various populations and the structures of postwar societies. The British welfare state, American preference for bland homogenized food and the epidemics of obesity and diabetes among Pacific Islanders were all direct results, Collingham says, of WWII.
I can't recommend this enough.
T of W is exhaustive (there are 65 pages of notes and a 40-page bibliography) without being exhausting. There were a few stylistic oddities and British-isms I stumbled over, e.g. 'impact' as a noun, repeated reference to American governmental 'ministries' and using 'pressurize' when an American would say 'pressure," but, for the most part the prose is lucid and authoritative while tastefully self-effacing. To begin with, I thought that the title was unfortunate and redolent of a lifestyle magazine and I assumed it was forced on Collingham by her editors. But I eventually came to find it evocative, making me think in a directly sensual way about the way food and the lack of it was experienced by the people under examination. For some, the taste of war was watery, weevilly gruel or the ground cattle rectums that comprised the only animal protein available in the Warsaw ghetto. For others, it might be the steak and onions and strawberry ice cream that Australians were astonished to find routinely fed to American soldiers. In the final section of the book, Collingham outlines how the war transformed the habits and appetites of various populations and the structures of postwar societies. The British welfare state, American preference for bland homogenized food and the epidemics of obesity and diabetes among Pacific Islanders were all direct results, Collingham says, of WWII.
I can't recommend this enough.
November 10, 2023
This book belongs to a group of books and ideas on the importance of food and the food system in politics and war. If you like World War II history and are interested in food systems – I think you will like this book. Collingham makes a very strong argument that much of the strategy and many of the decisions throughout the war were based on considerations related to food. There is no doubt that food availability had huge impacts on the morale of both citizens and soldiers. I think she does a great job also of looking at the key considerations that the major countries in the war were taking into account. Interestingly, you see the same kinds of considerations today with respect to the way the most powerful countries use food policy and international relations tools to affect the global food system. Not to say that these are always enlightened policies, for example the US subsidies are mostly driven by special interest groups. I think this book is timely in the context of the Arab Spring and recent popular protests. Many have persuasively argued that these conflicts are linked to food availability or food prices. The lesson for any government is that if you do not get your food policy right, you may be jeopardizing anything else you want to do, and your own survival.
April 7, 2016
You read a book on role of Petrol in WWII and it will convince you that it was single most important factor in the final outcome of war, you read about weapons, manpower, strategy or anything for that matter and they will convince you the same. This book on the other hand doesn't claim so. what is does is explain the role of food in warfare, be it combat unit's morale or civilian population. This book doesn't boast that food decided who won and who lost war. What this book does is explain how different nation's view of food as a tool to fight better than opponent lead to vastly different impact on the morale of people and overall development of food in the world.
Book talks at great length about different food policies lead to different situation for people in wide spheres of food, but it also talks about how this changed the world of food as it used to exist. Lots of new technologies and land were incorporate din the farming, food habits of people got changed dramatically in majority of cases and quality and quantity of food came to be seen as symbol of a country's ability to govern its citizens well in peacetime and in time of war.
All this changed perception of America in the wider world and defined how the world would define freedom from now on.
Book talks at great length about different food policies lead to different situation for people in wide spheres of food, but it also talks about how this changed the world of food as it used to exist. Lots of new technologies and land were incorporate din the farming, food habits of people got changed dramatically in majority of cases and quality and quantity of food came to be seen as symbol of a country's ability to govern its citizens well in peacetime and in time of war.
All this changed perception of America in the wider world and defined how the world would define freedom from now on.
October 5, 2015
Too many facts and numbers, not enough personal history. I felt myself wanting to skip page after page of things like "x tons of this, x tons of that were shipped to country x" or "people in country x should've had 3000 calories but only got 1500, people in country y should have had 3500 calories but only got 1100"...it was like, yawn, important to know but I can't really remember any compelling stories that described what life was like for people starving? The book touches on life during and immediately following WWII, and having recently read both "A Woman in Berlin" - about a woman living in postwar Berlin - and "Unbroken" - about a U.S. soldier in a Japanese POW camp - I felt I learned more about the 'battle for food' from these two personal histories than I did from this book about this specific topic.
October 16, 2016
I was expecting recipes that did not use eggs, sugar, oil, etc. These are the things my mother talked about as being hard to come by during WWII. This was a much bigger look at food and war. Almost every continent (not Antarctica) and many, many countries were discussed. Not only the intended but the unintended consequences of the policies of the many governments are quantified as well as described. The surprise to me was how mild the effects were on the US and the way US policy at that time reflected American attitudes then and has figured in our current world outlook. The author is very even-handed and makes no judgements but I saw a sharp contrast between the US and the UK approachs and did not feel as proud of the US as I expected.
Read
May 18, 2013I don't quite know hot to review this. There is just such a wealth of information about everything, and from such a novel and yet totally obvious perspective. Just really, really good. Hopefully i'll come up with a longer review once i've thought about it a bit.
October 18, 2012
Fascinating. The affect of food, or lack of, on war. Using as examples all the major theatres of conflict, the author shows how calories were a huge factor in the outcome of World War II. Beautifully researched and written.
September 7, 2025
#Binge Reviewing my previous Reads #Food History
Lizzie Collingham’s The Taste of War is one of those rare histories that makes you rethink everything you thought you knew about World War II. We tend to picture the war in terms of armies, ideologies, tanks, and treaties, but Collingham reminds us that behind every front line, every battle, and every political decision, there was food—or more often, the lack of it. The book is a monumental study of how food production, distribution, scarcity, and hunger shaped the conduct of the war and the fate of millions.
At its heart, The Taste of War argues that WWII was not only fought with bullets and bombs but with bread, rice, potatoes, and rations. Hitler’s obsession with Lebensraum was rooted in securing agricultural land to feed Germany. Japan’s expansion into Asia was driven by hunger for rice and resources. Britain’s survival hinged on its ability to import food across submarine-infested seas. The United States, with its unparalleled agricultural capacity, became the “breadbasket of democracy”. Food wasn’t incidental—it was strategy.
Collingham doesn’t shy away from the human cost. She places the global famine of the 1940s on equal footing with the Holocaust as one of the defining atrocities of the war. Civilians bore the brunt: Chinese peasants starved as Japanese armies stripped the land; millions of Bengalis died in the 1943 famine, exacerbated by British policy; Soviet citizens endured siege-induced starvation; and in occupied Europe, rations often fell to levels insufficient for survival. Food was weaponised, withheld, and manipulated. It was both a tool of control and a means of extermination.
Yet the book isn’t only about suffering—it also illuminates resilience. Collingham explores how rationing systems, particularly in Britain, managed to keep populations fed and relatively healthy under enormous strain. She delves into the science of nutrition that blossomed under wartime necessity, reshaping how governments thought about food security. She even sprinkles in the small, human details—ersatz coffee made from acorns, creative uses of Spam, and the rise of soy as a protein substitute—that bring texture to this massive narrative.
Stylistically, Collingham is rigorous but never dry. She writes with clarity and moral urgency, weaving military, political, and social history into one sweeping story. It’s a book that makes you stop and realise: wars are not just about who had the best weapons, but also about who could keep their people fed.
Reading The Taste of War is a sobering reminder that food is power. It underscores that hunger kills silently, often more efficiently than bombs, and that the politics of food security remain urgent today. Collingham leaves you thinking about how modern conflicts, climate change, and global trade still revolve around the same elemental struggle: who eats, and who doesn’t.
Final Verdict? Essential reading if you want to understand WWII beyond the battlefields. Collingham’s lens—clear, humane, unflinching—makes food history as dramatic, devastating, and illuminating as any military campaign.
Lizzie Collingham’s The Taste of War is one of those rare histories that makes you rethink everything you thought you knew about World War II. We tend to picture the war in terms of armies, ideologies, tanks, and treaties, but Collingham reminds us that behind every front line, every battle, and every political decision, there was food—or more often, the lack of it. The book is a monumental study of how food production, distribution, scarcity, and hunger shaped the conduct of the war and the fate of millions.
At its heart, The Taste of War argues that WWII was not only fought with bullets and bombs but with bread, rice, potatoes, and rations. Hitler’s obsession with Lebensraum was rooted in securing agricultural land to feed Germany. Japan’s expansion into Asia was driven by hunger for rice and resources. Britain’s survival hinged on its ability to import food across submarine-infested seas. The United States, with its unparalleled agricultural capacity, became the “breadbasket of democracy”. Food wasn’t incidental—it was strategy.
Collingham doesn’t shy away from the human cost. She places the global famine of the 1940s on equal footing with the Holocaust as one of the defining atrocities of the war. Civilians bore the brunt: Chinese peasants starved as Japanese armies stripped the land; millions of Bengalis died in the 1943 famine, exacerbated by British policy; Soviet citizens endured siege-induced starvation; and in occupied Europe, rations often fell to levels insufficient for survival. Food was weaponised, withheld, and manipulated. It was both a tool of control and a means of extermination.
Yet the book isn’t only about suffering—it also illuminates resilience. Collingham explores how rationing systems, particularly in Britain, managed to keep populations fed and relatively healthy under enormous strain. She delves into the science of nutrition that blossomed under wartime necessity, reshaping how governments thought about food security. She even sprinkles in the small, human details—ersatz coffee made from acorns, creative uses of Spam, and the rise of soy as a protein substitute—that bring texture to this massive narrative.
Stylistically, Collingham is rigorous but never dry. She writes with clarity and moral urgency, weaving military, political, and social history into one sweeping story. It’s a book that makes you stop and realise: wars are not just about who had the best weapons, but also about who could keep their people fed.
Reading The Taste of War is a sobering reminder that food is power. It underscores that hunger kills silently, often more efficiently than bombs, and that the politics of food security remain urgent today. Collingham leaves you thinking about how modern conflicts, climate change, and global trade still revolve around the same elemental struggle: who eats, and who doesn’t.
Final Verdict? Essential reading if you want to understand WWII beyond the battlefields. Collingham’s lens—clear, humane, unflinching—makes food history as dramatic, devastating, and illuminating as any military campaign.
April 12, 2025
After reading and ADORING The Biscuit: The History of a Very British Indulgence, I was very interested in reading the author's other food-focused works. This one looks at the role food played in World War II, in regards to military supplies, civilian welfare, shortages, resource sharing and morale.
It's broadly split into three parts:
The first, 'The Engine of War', provides a general background to German and Japanese attitudes to food provisions within their growing empires, with particular attention to how they planned to treat their occupied lands.
The second section, 'The Battle for Food', takes each of the main combative nations of the war in turn and details their strategies for feeding their armies and civilians during the war. The countries are taken from most successful in this regard, to least successful, so you get a view as to how a well-strategised and organised country handled the shortages and difficulties, and it gradually gets worse so you can clearly see where other nations were less fortunate or just more ruthless.
The final section, 'The Politics of Food', again takes the combative nations one-by-one and explores the driving forces of their decision-making, and the effects these decisions had against the general populations of their nations. This time we go from worst to best, so you really see the privations of the Japanese soldiers, under-prepared and eating leaves, and get to compare right up to the American abundances.
It's a biiiig book. 500 pages of Bible-thin paper in microscopic font so it took a long time to get through, but it never got stale (unlike the British bread rations am I right hah hah hah). It's well-researched, too. 100 of its 600 pages are notes, references and bibliography. Pretty thorough stuff.
I really enjoyed this. Facsinating throughout, and very well written.
It's broadly split into three parts:
The first, 'The Engine of War', provides a general background to German and Japanese attitudes to food provisions within their growing empires, with particular attention to how they planned to treat their occupied lands.
The second section, 'The Battle for Food', takes each of the main combative nations of the war in turn and details their strategies for feeding their armies and civilians during the war. The countries are taken from most successful in this regard, to least successful, so you get a view as to how a well-strategised and organised country handled the shortages and difficulties, and it gradually gets worse so you can clearly see where other nations were less fortunate or just more ruthless.
The final section, 'The Politics of Food', again takes the combative nations one-by-one and explores the driving forces of their decision-making, and the effects these decisions had against the general populations of their nations. This time we go from worst to best, so you really see the privations of the Japanese soldiers, under-prepared and eating leaves, and get to compare right up to the American abundances.
It's a biiiig book. 500 pages of Bible-thin paper in microscopic font so it took a long time to get through, but it never got stale (unlike the British bread rations am I right hah hah hah). It's well-researched, too. 100 of its 600 pages are notes, references and bibliography. Pretty thorough stuff.
I really enjoyed this. Facsinating throughout, and very well written.
September 25, 2025
There's a great deal of interesting information here, but this book needed more editing desperately. I have never encountered a more repetitive history book in my life. If you read it, get used to the anecdotes you read because you will reread those anecdotes time and time again throughout the book, to the point I kept thinking I had forgotten my place and was rereading earlier content.
Beyond that issue, the book meanders off topic to areas somewhat removed from the food problem into general world war 2 history, which I didn't need and felt took away from the book's focus. The book also jumps between countries in a seemingly random fashion, and these two issues may drive a reader mad as it has driven me.
It's unfortunate, because as I said there are parts that are very interesting and well written, particularly the chapter on the Bengal Famine, but it feels like you have to fight the book (and the author's repetitions) in order to enjoy it. In between telling you for the eighth time in the exact same words for example how Britain and Germany exported hunger to their colonies but the Soviet Union and China put the burden on their peasants, there's interesting data and individual stories about hunger and surviving that I really enjoyed reading about. I'd recommend this only if you're very interested in the topic, and you're prepared for the disorganization of the book
Beyond that issue, the book meanders off topic to areas somewhat removed from the food problem into general world war 2 history, which I didn't need and felt took away from the book's focus. The book also jumps between countries in a seemingly random fashion, and these two issues may drive a reader mad as it has driven me.
It's unfortunate, because as I said there are parts that are very interesting and well written, particularly the chapter on the Bengal Famine, but it feels like you have to fight the book (and the author's repetitions) in order to enjoy it. In between telling you for the eighth time in the exact same words for example how Britain and Germany exported hunger to their colonies but the Soviet Union and China put the burden on their peasants, there's interesting data and individual stories about hunger and surviving that I really enjoyed reading about. I'd recommend this only if you're very interested in the topic, and you're prepared for the disorganization of the book
December 16, 2024
A fantastic book that looks at the Second World War through the lens of food. Both civilians and soldiers are considered as well as the leadership, both military and political, and how the food ended up where it did. The broad approach did lend to some repetition at times, but it was not distracting.
Collingham focuses mainly on five of the belligerent participants (Germany, Japan, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States) but also highlights the impact of food on their empires and other locations such as the Pacific islands which was a nice touch. It's a long read, but it never felt like a slog. In fact the later chapters that focus on the ground-level, individual experiences with food in Britain and the United States expose opportunities for deeper and more regional research. The concluding chapter also does a nice job of linking the impact of the war with how the world interacted with food during the Cold War. At times, Collingham's political opinions leaked through, but overall this was fairly balanced in the end.
Collingham focuses mainly on five of the belligerent participants (Germany, Japan, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States) but also highlights the impact of food on their empires and other locations such as the Pacific islands which was a nice touch. It's a long read, but it never felt like a slog. In fact the later chapters that focus on the ground-level, individual experiences with food in Britain and the United States expose opportunities for deeper and more regional research. The concluding chapter also does a nice job of linking the impact of the war with how the world interacted with food during the Cold War. At times, Collingham's political opinions leaked through, but overall this was fairly balanced in the end.
August 14, 2017
The book is really good and emotional. It takes place on the past of 1940 in Dunkirk. It's about the English and French armies being allies and trying to defend them selves from some Nazi air strikes. The plot is about that the English need to transfer at least 30,000 man of the beach of Dunkirk to London in England.One of the best quotes in the book are these one's: "we fight for the one's who have fallen", "we fight for the survival of our men",and "we fight for hope and victory for our country and nation", "united we are stronger".
My rateing for this book is a 5 star as how the plot is amazing and the story fits in perfectly.
My rateing for this book is a 5 star as how the plot is amazing and the story fits in perfectly.
June 20, 2020
I first thought this was going to be a book about how Paris cafes dealt with Nazi occupation. Because I love France and am fascinated with WW2, I checked it out.
I was very wrong in what I thought it was about, but I was intrigued by the history of all the counties and regions affected by the War. I came away with an appreciation for what made people go to war, how governments deal with essential logistics (food) and how different countries and their cultures influenced the food, what soldiers ate (if they ate at all) and public support.
The book was much more than that, but it was a really great history of food in WW2.
I was very wrong in what I thought it was about, but I was intrigued by the history of all the counties and regions affected by the War. I came away with an appreciation for what made people go to war, how governments deal with essential logistics (food) and how different countries and their cultures influenced the food, what soldiers ate (if they ate at all) and public support.
The book was much more than that, but it was a really great history of food in WW2.
September 2, 2022
I started this book last year, but didn’t get round to finishing it. With everything going on in Ukraine right now (and the impact the war is having on food), I thought it would be worth picking up again.
This book provides a really interesting insight into the role of food, agriculture and trade during WWII. In some places it felt a bit repetitive and long, but overall I really enjoyed learning about this important part of the war and how our modern food system was shaped by what happened. Some truly shocking statistics and stories, would have liked to read more about the Dutch Hunger Winter.
This book provides a really interesting insight into the role of food, agriculture and trade during WWII. In some places it felt a bit repetitive and long, but overall I really enjoyed learning about this important part of the war and how our modern food system was shaped by what happened. Some truly shocking statistics and stories, would have liked to read more about the Dutch Hunger Winter.
November 4, 2020
It was super interesting to learn how much the food supply factored into different countries' reasons for entering the war and affected the outcome of the war. It's tragic to see how many people were malnourished, starving, and purposely starved to death for the sake of war. The writing was a bit choppy and a bit slow at times. I also didn't love all of Collingham's negative statements about the role of nutritionists in all of it (although some seem fair), particularly her view that "nutritional science (has gained) an authority which it does not deserve."
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