Pearson's Prize: Canada and the Suez Crisis by John Melady

by John Melady

In the fall of 1956, the world was on the brink of war. Egyptian President Gamel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, and Britain, France, and Israel attacked him. Russia supported Nasser, and Soviet Premier Khrushchev threatened nuclear holocaust if the United States became militarily involved. Soon, the matter became a major problem for the United Nations.Fortunately, because of the efforts of Lester Pearson, then Canada's Minister of External Affairs, the crisis was defused. Pearson proposed a U.N. peacekeeping force be sent to Egypt to separate the warring factions there and keep the peace. Because his idea was adopted, Pearson helped save the world from war. For his outstanding statesmanship, Pearson won the Nobel Prize for Peace, the only Canadian ever to do so. This book, written to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the event, is about the Suez and about Pearson's work during a tension-filled time in the twentieth century.

Genres: History, Canada, Middle East

Hardcover

First published January 1, 2006

Reviews

[Phoenix · Rating 4 out of 5]

Eden's War

Well rounded discussion of the events leading up to the Suez crisis of 1956 hi-lighting Canada's key role in formulating a distinctive resolution. Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs Lester Pearson's formulation of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) was credited at the time with defusing the mideast conflict, and, considering that the Soviets had threatened to go nuclear over potential US involvement, was deemed to have saved the world from the brink of war. (Soviet bluster also acted as a cover for the invasion of Hungary which took place on November 4th.) Pearson's diplomatic innovation was also key in transforming the vision of the UN and the image of Canada in the world to that of peacekeepers. Ironically even though UNEF was headed by Canadian General Tommy Burns, a choice approved by Nasser, the name of the regiment selected to serve, "The Queens Own Rifles" offended the Egyptians (a diplomatic faux pas because of the connection to Britain) and Canadians were initially relegated solely to administrative tasks as opposed to troops on the ground.

Melady covers the history of the canal, starting with a prior version in Ptolemaic Egypt (323-30BC), the revival of the canal under the Roman Emperor Trajan (98-117) to the modern canal built through the efforts of French developer Ferdinand de Lesseps, or alternatively through the labour of thousands of poorly paid Egyptian conscripts. The factors leading up to the crisis were adequately covered. Egyptian intelligence along with Jordan and Syria had been actively sponsoring raids of fedayeen (guerrillas) into Israel, a country who's very existence was regarded as a source of humiliation to Arab pride. On July 26 nationalized the canal while simultaneously barring Israeli shipping and blockading Israel's southern port of Eilat.

Causus belli had been established for the Israelis but the case was no so clear for England and France. British PM Eden and Egyptian President Nasser had formed a mutual dislike as early as 1955 (Ch 5). Eden regarded the canal as British property, which it was, and control of it as essential to prosperity, a carry over from the days of the Empire. This in spite of the conclusion of his advisers that the takeover was in fact legal. Melady tells us that Eden was constantly in pain and dying of liver cancer which may have contributed to his distemper. Though England maintained that the Egyptians would be incapable of running the canal, Nasser managed to disprove this by running even more traffic that the Canal Company had done the previous months, albeit all but 40 of the replacement pilots were foreigners. French motivation is less clear. Melady's explanation is that Nasser's defeat would have brought about his resignation (it didn't), which would removed Egypt's support of revolutionaries in French Algeria. Algeria achieved independence in 1962. (pp61)

I found it a clear and understandable summary of events, readable at a junior high level and up, above average but not excellent,-sometimes more impressionistic than detailed. The account of negotiations at the UN is serviceable but could have used more depth as to why Canada's solution was more readily acceptable than the Americans'. The bibliography is good but the book lacks an index. I would also caution the reader about an erroneous conclusion on page 25, and the inconsistency is obvious. Melady tells us that after Trajan the canal fell into disuse. "When western traders realized they could access the riches of India by circumnavigating Africa, canal use cease." Which doesn't follow as the author himself notes that this was first accomplished by Vasco de Gamma some 1300 years later.

[Carlos Filipe Bernardino · Rating 3 out of 5]

The book helps us understand the events surrounding the Suez and Sinai war in the 1950s during the 20th century. The description of events illuminates the lack of clarity in the combination of objectives and means on the part of the Anglo-French alliance, as well as the ineptitude of leadership on the part of British Prime Minister Anthony Eden.
The work also gives us a picture of the work and capabilities of Foreign Minister and future Canadian Prime Minister Lester Pearson in obtaining a ceasefire, implementing the first United Nations peacekeeping operation with blue helmets and negotiating with Egypt, Israel, the United Kingdom and France. Pearson would receive the Nobel Peace Prize.