A fighter pilot who flew seventy-five combat missions in World War I, George C. Kenney was a charismatic leader who established himself as an innovative advocate of air power. As General MacArthur's air commander in the southwest Pacific during World War II, Kenney played a pivotal role in the conduct of the war, but until now his performance has remained largely unexplored. Thomas Griffith offers a critical assessment of Kenney's numerous contributions to MacArthur's war efforts. He depicts Kenney as a staunch proponent of air power's ability to shape the outcome of military engagements and a commander who shared MacArthur's strategic vision. He tells how Kenney played a key role in campaigns from New Guinea to the Philippines; adapted aircraft, doctrine, and technology to the demands of aerial warfare in the southwest Pacific; and pursued daring strategies that likely would have failed in the European theater.
A powerful review out of the importance of technical understanding, combat experience, staff involvement and the ability to do something meaningful with command.
A little dry, making it a slow read. Learned some New Stuff and had to unlearn a few things. All in all it was a different approach to the feud between the Army and the Navy.
George Kenney is a fascinating and impressive figure among the leaders of World War II in the Pacific. This book traces Kenney’s the personal and professional experiences in the interwar years that prepared him to confront the difficult operational and strategic problems of the Southwest Pacific Theater. Additionally, the author describes the airman’s growth, campaign by campaign, while serving as the senior air commander for General Douglas MacArthur, a task for which Kenney’s personality was uniquely suited.
As a tenacious believer in air power, George Kenney thought deeply about how to wage war with air assets. Arriving in the Southwest Pacific Theater as an outsider to MacArthur’s inner circle known as the “Bataan Gang,” Kenney established a strong personal and professional relationship with the theater commander and earned his trust. He rightly saw this as his first and most important task.
Kenney demonstrated vision and innovative thinking throughout his time in command in the Southwest Pacific. He adapted tactics to conditions while never veering far from his staunch belief in gaining air superiority as the first step to any campaign. Perhaps most importantly, Kenney understood that his improving his logistical capability would be decisive to enabling all other actions. Despite the low strategic priority given to the Southwest Pacific in terms of replacement aircraft and spare parts, innovative changes to how his logisticians supported his flyers allowed Kenney to keep more and more aircraft in the fight.
Overall, this is an outstanding book about a relatively unknown commander. The fact that he was able to survive - and achieve great success - without becoming an unquestioning sycophant to MacArthur is, in itself, impressive because so few who were in that famous general’s orbit managed to do so.
Great story of General George Kenney, the senior airman for the majority of the Pacific island hopping campaign. The author focuses on Kinney's role in planning and execution of the push westward, culminating with a brief discussion of his plans to support the invasion of the Japanese mainland, Operation OLYMPIC.
According to Griffith, Kenney's first challenge and the foundation upon which he owed much of his success was to establish trust between himself and MacArthur, whose faith in air power was severely diminished following his exit from the Philippines and the subsequent ineptitude (in his eyes) of Kenney's predecessor. Kenney recognized this necessity and developed a close personal and professional relationship quickly. The author also discusses Kinney's focus on improving the morale of his airmen in the theater, not an easy task given the "second fiddle" nature of the holding strategy taken in the Pacific (a result of the "Germany first" strategy of the U.S.). Kenney's installation of Walker and Whitehead, the latter his deputy and "advon" at the forward base, responsible for running day-to-day operations, combined with strong support for innovation was key to turning the 5th Air Force into a formidable fighting organization. He recognized the value of an "early win" to shore up support both up and down the chain, and achieved it (even if he may have exaggerated the outcome to an extent) during an attack on Rabaul soon after his installation as air chief.
While Kenney had some less successful outings, and his disdain for the Navy almost certainly led to less-than-optimal operations at times, the author paints a picture of his overall success as an air commander as unassailable. The periodic glimpses into his relationship with Hap Arnold, especially his strong disagreement over the employment of the new B-29s, is intriguing and leaves the reader wondering how much the vision of an independent Air Force played into the Army Air Forces Chief's calculus regarding their use. Also mentioned often is the criticality of ULTRA intelligence to many of the air operations. Further examination of how successful the air arm could have been without that intelligence would be interesting. Perhaps the most interesting insight is the author's identification of the island-hopping (some true islands, some just remote sections of larger land masses) campaign's uniquely interdependent nature between ground and air forces. The air forces prepared the way for the ground forces, the ground forces took the airfield, then the air forces moved up, secured and repaired/rebuilt the airfield, and they moved to the next objective. The operations provide a good example of air power in a supported role, something not often considered even today.
Overall, the book is a riveting retelling of Kenney's role in the Pacific campaign. His belief in the value of air power combined with flexibility in its use (he pioneered low-level bombing in the theater and supported a number of innovations on the aircraft as well as on the ground, not the least of which was a strong support for radio direction-finding equipment that was key to operations) was key to allied success there. His strategy was simple: Gain control of the air, isolate the enemy on the ground, and support friendly ground forces, in that order. More often than not, it was extremely successful.
A good, honest look at the senior U.S. Army Air Corps officer in the Southwest Pacific Theater during WWII. Griffith has listed a number of traits that make for a good leader at war--attention to logistics, motivating "people responsible for supplying and fixing the aircraft", getting decs and medals to the RIGHT people, and getting out of the office to visit your people as they do the work. The author also repeatedly comes back to General Kenney's appreciation of the intelligence rolling his way to assist in his planning and decisions--from diverse sources like the newly-deployed radar systems, coast watchers, and, especially, signals intelligence and cryptography. There are some hard-earned truths in this work--e.g., airfield construction engineers in an island-hopping campaign are a HUGE asset--that are still useful to air campaign planners today. I liked the way that Colonel Griffith didn't gloss over either his subject's candid statements about his Japanese adversary (blaming their misfortunes on "racial liabilities") or mistakes he made due to overconfidence and the stubborn parochialism he brought to any meeting with his U.S. Navy counterparts. At the end of the day, "MacArthur's Airman" is a n interesting snapshot of the type of men who built the U.S. Air Force and helped take down the Axis in the combined campaigns of the Second World War.