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Operation Black Thunder: An Eyewitness Account of Terrorism in Punjab
This book is a first-hand account of the storming of Sikh's Golden Temple in Amritsar, by India's National Security Guard Commandos, code named Operation Black Thunder.
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First published October 4, 2002
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Displaying 1 - 8 of 8 reviews
April 2, 2021
Hooter: A first hand account of the Amritsar DC handling militancy in Punjab right after Operation Blue Star in the 80s and 90s.
Sarabjit Singh shares a first hand perspective of the climate during his tenure, the events prior that led to that situation and all the players involved. He focuses on the operational aspects of Operation Black Thunder, the tantamount tension and pressure from various stakeholders in a very charged environment, dealing with probabilities at every step. He also talks of the political set up amongst the panthic committees, the central government playing its role, a series of public disappointments and how a potpourri of all of this led to the rise of militancy. He breaks out the various groups that had their own motives and how it all played out.
The book is a collection of his thoughts so isn't very fluid and does come back with repetition at times but rather than aiming for a Pulitzer, this book does well to document one of the darkest phases Punjab has had to see in it's recent history and what was the thinking behind the government machinery in trying to tackle the same.
Sarabjit Singh shares a first hand perspective of the climate during his tenure, the events prior that led to that situation and all the players involved. He focuses on the operational aspects of Operation Black Thunder, the tantamount tension and pressure from various stakeholders in a very charged environment, dealing with probabilities at every step. He also talks of the political set up amongst the panthic committees, the central government playing its role, a series of public disappointments and how a potpourri of all of this led to the rise of militancy. He breaks out the various groups that had their own motives and how it all played out.
The book is a collection of his thoughts so isn't very fluid and does come back with repetition at times but rather than aiming for a Pulitzer, this book does well to document one of the darkest phases Punjab has had to see in it's recent history and what was the thinking behind the government machinery in trying to tackle the same.
September 6, 2020
A first hand account of the post Blue Star terrorism in Punjab, by the DC of the worst affected district- Amritsar. An account detailing different waves of terrorism due to various political decisions, and countaractions by the terrorists and their handlers.
Sh. Sarabjit Singh states the story about the patriotic Punjabis who let the state machinery run amid the peak of violence- the reason why the state was able to survive through the 17 year long bloodbath that no other part of the independent India has seen. Wish no one ever gets to see in future! After reading this, you'd respect every nook and corner of Punjab and the valiant Punjabis- people who came forward to fight with their .303 against the AK47s
Sh. Sarabjit Singh states the story about the patriotic Punjabis who let the state machinery run amid the peak of violence- the reason why the state was able to survive through the 17 year long bloodbath that no other part of the independent India has seen. Wish no one ever gets to see in future! After reading this, you'd respect every nook and corner of Punjab and the valiant Punjabis- people who came forward to fight with their .303 against the AK47s
March 14, 2018
Despite its title this book is about more than just Operation Black Thunder, which was an exercise to remove Sikh militants from the Golden Temple in May 1988. Unlike the infamous Operation Blue Star in 1984, this was carried out primarily by the Punjab state police and paramilitary forces such as the CRPF and BSF and was resolved much more peacefully, with little loss of life and very little damage to the Golden Temple complex or Akal Takht, both of which suffered in the earlier Operation Blue Star. Also, in Operation Black Thunder, the temple complex wasn’t stormed as such by security forces, so much as surrounded and the militants inside forced out after a short siege. Again, unlike in 1984, the militants were much less well prepared and ideologically committed and short of supplies of food and water, which during a north Indian summer made it difficult to hold out. The author along with the DGP (Director General of Police) KPS Gill, were responsible for formulating a strategy of waiting out the militants rather than storming the temple; something for which they deserve immense credit as it avoided a political fiasco as happened in 1984. They were able to do this because of the more sensible steps taken by state administration to generate popular local support and the transparent manner in which the operation was carried out, with relatively open media access through print journalists and TV channels being informed and allowed to observe what was going on. The author credits the popular support and the disenchantment with the militant movement as the main reason why the operation was a success and why fears of a broader uprising or unrest did not occur.
The book covers the period during which the author was Divisional Commissioner for the key district of Amritsar where the Golden Temple was located for the years of 1987-1993, an unprecedented six-year tenure for a position which usually sees its occupants rotated every 1-2 years. Of course, there was little that was normal about Punjab during this period of militancy, and for most of the period it was under President’s rule, which mean that effectively appointed Governor’s from Delhi ran the state rather than elected governments. The difficulties in combating the insurgency and the challenges it presented to the local administration are well captured in this volume. The author though a religious Sikh himself, has no sympathy with the militants or the Khalistan movement, despite agreeing with many of the complaints of discriminatory treatment meted out to the Punjab by the central government. These are covered in some detail, ranging from the issue of Chandigarh not being made the state capital, to the lack of allocation of industrial licenses and the shenanigans over the distribution of water resources from the irrigation projects that spanned neighbouring states.
Two other important facets in the book are: the extremely complicated nature of the political landscape of the state during the Khalistan insurgency and the machinations of the central government. The first can be very confusing for the unfamiliar observer, especially since there were a number of different political groupings with their own agenda in the 1980s that utilised the separatist movement and political grievances of the Sikh movement to their own ends. Contrary to the projection of a straightforward battle between a bloc of extremists and the security forces; there were a number of militant groups, frequently in conflict with each other, some backed by Pakistan’s ISI, some by the intelligence services from the central government and others who were independent. Bhindrinwale’ Damdani Taksal was just one of these and not even the most violent or feared; many political groupings such as the different factions of the Akali Dal and other Sikh political organisations had their own armed factions as well. The objectives of these groups varied from an outright independent Sikh state to redressing of various grievances and a more balanced relationship with the federal government. Frequently, these objectives changed as political groups oscillated in what they ultimately wanted. One thing does stand out, is the reluctance to condemn the violence committed by many of the separatist militants by the more moderate political groups such as the Alkalis. This leads onto the second element, which is the dubious and outright nefarious role played both the central government, through the Home Ministry and Prime Minister’s office and the various central intelligence agencies. The former, as is well known by now, propped up and sponsored some militant groups and leaders like Bhindrinwale as a counter-weight to the Akalis for short term political gain, to ensure Congress control of the state; with the former then turning out to be a Frankenstein’s monster beyond the control of the centre, a process which directly led to the disaster of Operation Blue Star. The Centre also frequently undermined peace initiatives and political resolutions that could have returned normalcy to the state, again for frequently short-term political gain which didn’t even occur. Not only can the central government be accused of indulging in Machiavellian politics; their lack of knowledge about Punjabi politics and society meant that that even more damningly they were very poor at this kind of politics which almost always backfired, interfering in the functioning of the SGPC, appointing pro-militant priests and jathedars and cancelling local and state elections without proper cause fall under this rubric. The role of central intelligence services is also one of embarrassment and shame; going far beyond propping up Bhindrinwale’s faction, even after the fiasco of 1984, this continued with the support given to various militant factions such as JJ Rohde’s appointment as jathedar of the Golden Temple under the mistaken belief that he could control the militants and the sponsoring of breakaway factions from the main militant groups in the hope that these would in turn be able to combat the militancy, all proved to be ineffective and counter-productive in the long-run by undermining public belief in the central government. Many of the mistaken strategies and errors committed here were repeated on a larger scale to far more detrimental effect in Kashmir during the 1990s proving that the Indian state is slow to learn from its mistakes.
The volume is based on the personal notes of the author and hence doesn’t read as a flowing narrative and does suffer from a disjointed structure as well as repetition. It also assumes a fair degree of familiarity with Indian politics in general and Punjabi politics in particular on behalf of the reader; without which many details won’t be fully appreciated a degree of confusion caused. It’s still a valuable contribution to a key period in a troubled state.
The book covers the period during which the author was Divisional Commissioner for the key district of Amritsar where the Golden Temple was located for the years of 1987-1993, an unprecedented six-year tenure for a position which usually sees its occupants rotated every 1-2 years. Of course, there was little that was normal about Punjab during this period of militancy, and for most of the period it was under President’s rule, which mean that effectively appointed Governor’s from Delhi ran the state rather than elected governments. The difficulties in combating the insurgency and the challenges it presented to the local administration are well captured in this volume. The author though a religious Sikh himself, has no sympathy with the militants or the Khalistan movement, despite agreeing with many of the complaints of discriminatory treatment meted out to the Punjab by the central government. These are covered in some detail, ranging from the issue of Chandigarh not being made the state capital, to the lack of allocation of industrial licenses and the shenanigans over the distribution of water resources from the irrigation projects that spanned neighbouring states.
Two other important facets in the book are: the extremely complicated nature of the political landscape of the state during the Khalistan insurgency and the machinations of the central government. The first can be very confusing for the unfamiliar observer, especially since there were a number of different political groupings with their own agenda in the 1980s that utilised the separatist movement and political grievances of the Sikh movement to their own ends. Contrary to the projection of a straightforward battle between a bloc of extremists and the security forces; there were a number of militant groups, frequently in conflict with each other, some backed by Pakistan’s ISI, some by the intelligence services from the central government and others who were independent. Bhindrinwale’ Damdani Taksal was just one of these and not even the most violent or feared; many political groupings such as the different factions of the Akali Dal and other Sikh political organisations had their own armed factions as well. The objectives of these groups varied from an outright independent Sikh state to redressing of various grievances and a more balanced relationship with the federal government. Frequently, these objectives changed as political groups oscillated in what they ultimately wanted. One thing does stand out, is the reluctance to condemn the violence committed by many of the separatist militants by the more moderate political groups such as the Alkalis. This leads onto the second element, which is the dubious and outright nefarious role played both the central government, through the Home Ministry and Prime Minister’s office and the various central intelligence agencies. The former, as is well known by now, propped up and sponsored some militant groups and leaders like Bhindrinwale as a counter-weight to the Akalis for short term political gain, to ensure Congress control of the state; with the former then turning out to be a Frankenstein’s monster beyond the control of the centre, a process which directly led to the disaster of Operation Blue Star. The Centre also frequently undermined peace initiatives and political resolutions that could have returned normalcy to the state, again for frequently short-term political gain which didn’t even occur. Not only can the central government be accused of indulging in Machiavellian politics; their lack of knowledge about Punjabi politics and society meant that that even more damningly they were very poor at this kind of politics which almost always backfired, interfering in the functioning of the SGPC, appointing pro-militant priests and jathedars and cancelling local and state elections without proper cause fall under this rubric. The role of central intelligence services is also one of embarrassment and shame; going far beyond propping up Bhindrinwale’s faction, even after the fiasco of 1984, this continued with the support given to various militant factions such as JJ Rohde’s appointment as jathedar of the Golden Temple under the mistaken belief that he could control the militants and the sponsoring of breakaway factions from the main militant groups in the hope that these would in turn be able to combat the militancy, all proved to be ineffective and counter-productive in the long-run by undermining public belief in the central government. Many of the mistaken strategies and errors committed here were repeated on a larger scale to far more detrimental effect in Kashmir during the 1990s proving that the Indian state is slow to learn from its mistakes.
The volume is based on the personal notes of the author and hence doesn’t read as a flowing narrative and does suffer from a disjointed structure as well as repetition. It also assumes a fair degree of familiarity with Indian politics in general and Punjabi politics in particular on behalf of the reader; without which many details won’t be fully appreciated a degree of confusion caused. It’s still a valuable contribution to a key period in a troubled state.
December 13, 2023
Really nice book about terrorism years of Punjab. Astonishing to read how petty our political parties are. All major political parties gave more importance to their political equations than to national integrity, human lives and peace. Congress supported Bhindranwale to counter Akalis. Even after killing of Indira Gandhi, they supposedly maneuvered to make Bhindranwale's nephew a Jathedar. In later years, when they understood that they'll not come back to power at center, they freed many terrorists including one who had tried to kill Indira Gandhi who was then PM Rajiv Gandhi's mother ! Akali's gave up their authority to militants and later were so scared of them that they never condemned their mindless killings.
After death of a powerful figure, his followers have tendancy to get into violent chaos. Same thing happened after death of Bhindranwale. Punjab police did a great job of bringing peace to the state. Surprisingly, the governors and CMs functioned quite well in crisis times. Pakistan did the only thing they can do well- Spreading Terrorism. But common Sikhs were not separatists and how much ever terrorists tried, the violence could never convince them. In the end we must learn a lesson that a strong state and strong functional democratic institutions are necessary conditions for national unity in a diverse country like India.
After death of a powerful figure, his followers have tendancy to get into violent chaos. Same thing happened after death of Bhindranwale. Punjab police did a great job of bringing peace to the state. Surprisingly, the governors and CMs functioned quite well in crisis times. Pakistan did the only thing they can do well- Spreading Terrorism. But common Sikhs were not separatists and how much ever terrorists tried, the violence could never convince them. In the end we must learn a lesson that a strong state and strong functional democratic institutions are necessary conditions for national unity in a diverse country like India.
August 1, 2025
The book does carry a strong administrative viewpoint, presenting the state’s actions as rational and necessary, while often glossing over or justifying the brutality and psychological trauma suffered by civilians during that era. The portrayal of K.P.S. Gill—who remains a deeply polarizing figure—is particularly reverent. To many, especially families affected by disappearances or extrajudicial killings, he's remembered not as a savior but as the "Butcher of Punjab"
December 20, 2022
Sarabjit Singh has written a good book but:
-1 because his measure for the success of a counterinsurgency is # of militants killed
-1 because he doesn't not appropriately address the prevalence and impact of fake encounters
Would I recommend it to a friend? Yes, because it's important to hear perspectives that challenge the dominant narrative.
-1 because his measure for the success of a counterinsurgency is # of militants killed
-1 because he doesn't not appropriately address the prevalence and impact of fake encounters
Would I recommend it to a friend? Yes, because it's important to hear perspectives that challenge the dominant narrative.
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November 10, 2023Completed reading #OperationBlackThunder book by #SarabjitSingh!
A must read to understand the most crucial phase in the post-independence India.
I recommend it to those who want to know the sacrifices made by uniformed and non-uniformed sections to keep this country together.
A must read to understand the most crucial phase in the post-independence India.
I recommend it to those who want to know the sacrifices made by uniformed and non-uniformed sections to keep this country together.
February 10, 2022
A good know to know about the situation of Punjab at that time and how different circumstances were to Operation Blue Star.
Displaying 1 - 8 of 8 reviews