[ Truth and the Absence of Fact [ TRUTH AND THE ABSENCE OF FACT BY Field, Hartry ( Author ) Jul-12-2001[ TRUTH AND THE ABSENCE OF FACT [ TRUTH AND THE ABSENCE OF FACT BY FIELD, HARTRY ( AUTHOR ) JUL-12-2001 ] By Field, Hartry ( Author )Jul-12-2001 Hard...
Hartry Field presents a selection of thirteen essays on a set of related topics at the foundations of philosophy; one essay is previously unpublished, and eight are accompanied by substantial new postscripts. Five of the essays are primarily about truth, meaning, and propositional attitudes, five are primarily about semantic indeterminacy and other kinds of 'factual defectiveness' in our discourse, and three are primarily about issues concerning objectivity, especially in mathematics and in epistemology. The essays on truth, meaning, and the attitudes show a development from a form of correspondence theory of truth and meaning to a more deflationist perspective. The next set of papers argue that a place must be made in semantics for the idea that there are questions about which there is no fact of the matter, and address the difficulties involved in making sense of this, both within a correspondence theory of truth and meaning, and within a deflationary theory. Two papers argue that there are questions in mathematics about which there is no fact of the mattter, and draw out implications of this for the nature of mathematics. And the final paper argues for a view of epistemology in which it is not a purely fact-stating enterprise. This influential work by a key figure in contemporary philosophy will reward the attention of any philosopher interested in language, epistemology, or mathematics.
HARTRY FIELD (B.A., Wisconsin; M.A., Ph. D. Harvard), Silver Professor of Philosophy, specializes in metaphysics, philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of logic, and philosophy of science. He has had fellowships from the National Science Foundation, the National Endowment for the Humanities, and the Guggenheim Foundation. He is the author of Science Without Numbers (Blackwell 1980), which won the Lakatos Prize, of Realism, Mathematics and Modality (Blackwell 1989), and of Truth and the Absence of Fact (Oxford 2001). Current interests include objectivity and indeterminacy, a priori knowledge, causation, and the semantic and set-theoretic paradoxes.
The book provides a thought-provoking exploration of truth, particularly focusing on its manifestations within mathematics and epistemology. Field challenges the traditional idea of universal objectivity, suggesting instead that truth is dependent on context. His critique extends to the uncertainties and paradoxes inherent in mathematical reasoning, questioning the assumption of absolute objectivity in our pursuit of knowledge. I found the book's presentation to be compelling, with meticulously crafted arguments that adeptly navigate complex ideas. Field's clear writing makes intricate philosophical concepts accessible, rendering this work a valuable contribution to ongoing discussions in philosophy.