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No Other God, A Response to Open Theism by John M. Frame
The theological movement known as open theism is shaking the church today, challenging the doctrines of God's sovereignty, foreknowledge, and providence. This timely work clearly describes open theism and evaluates it biblically. Frame addresses questions such as How do open theists read the Bible? Is love God's most important attribute? Is God's will the ultimate explanation of everything? Do we have genuine freedom? Is God ever weak or changeable? Does God know everything in advance? Frame not only answers the objections of open theists but sharpens our understanding of the relationship between God's eternal plan and the decisions or events of our lives.
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First published October 1, 2001
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About the author
John M. Frame
91 books219 followersFor his education, Frame received degrees from Princeton University (A.B.), Westminster Theological Seminary (B.D.), Yale University (A.M. and M.Phil., though he was working on a doctorate and admits his own failure to complete his dissertation), and Belhaven College (D.D.). He has served on the faculty of Westminster Theological Seminary and was a founding faculty member of their California campus. He currently (as of 2022) teaches Apologetics and The History of Philosophy and Christian thought at Reformed Theological Seminary in Orlando, FL.
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October 16, 2025
John Frame, a contemporary conservative Reformed theologian, writes No Other God: A Response to Open Theism as an explicit critique of the theological movement and position articulated by figures such as Clark Pinnock, Gregory Boyd, Richard Rice, and others. Open theism contends for multiple doctrinal revisions pertaining to the doctrine of God, including but not limited to the elevation of God’s love as the supreme attribute of God’s being, the denial of God’s exhaustive foreknowledge and omniscience, and God’s temporality. Frame gives strong critique and positive argumentation here as follows:
In chapter one, Frame outlines the various definitions of open theism that have been provided, taking note to delineate the essential characteristics of the position from what open theists define as the “traditional” or “conventional” view (largely identified with Calvinism). Frame also notes how many open theists write with much rhetoric and emotive language as opposed to substance and clarity.
In chapter two, Frame offers a brief historical tracing of open theism as a theological movement, while also critiquing its claims to theological uniqueness and innovation. Not only is novelty typically dangerous in theology, but the claimed novelty is false. Open theist claims are demonstrably found in the theology of the Socinians, for example. Moreover, Frame deftly points out that the central tenets of open theism are just as influenced by Greek philosophy as traditional theology (a common open theist argument being that the traditional view is overly influenced by Greek philosophy), especially when it comes to the open theist’s emphasis on libertarian free will.
“Open theists insist on interpreting all biblical teachings in a manner that is consistent with libertarianism, without seriously submitting libertarianism itself to a biblical critique” (42). In his third chapter, Frame takes the theological and hermeneutical method of open theism to task, contending that 1) their appeals to logic are not properly logical appeals, 2) the theological model of “risk-taker” is a model largely foreign to Scripture itself and proves to be a constraining model upon Scripture rather than an illuminating one, and 3) the open theist appeal to a “straightforward” interpretation as opposed to an appeal to anthropomorphic language demonstrates not exegetical simplicity but rather hermeneutical unawareness of driving presuppositions that favor “straightforward” readings of specific texts over others. Frame cites Bruce Ware's critique of the open theist’s interpretation of Genesis 22, wherein Ware points out that the tenets of open theism prohibit a straightforward reading of the text just as much as the traditional theist. In short, the open theist’s hermeneutic is just as influenced by presuppositions as the traditional theist’s; the crucial issue is whether those presuppositions cohere with the overall teaching of the Bible or not.
In chapter four, Frame briefly, but effectively, argues for the arbitrariness of elevating love as the supreme attribute of God as open theists do. There is no biblical justification for it, and it violates the traditional (and biblically informed) understanding of God’s simplicity and divine attributes. God is light, just, and good just as much as he is love.
Frame’s fifth chapter offers much positive argumentation for the total and exhaustive sovereignty of God. Frame lays out nicely how Scripture clearly affirms God’s control over nature, human history, biographical history, individual decisions, sinful decisions, and salvific decisions. Significantly, Frame does “not apologize for including such a large number of Scripture passages in this chapter. Nothing is more important, especially at this point in the history of theology, than for God’s people to be firmly convinced that Scripture teaches God’s universal control over the world, and teaches it over and over again. Scripture mentions and implies this control in many different historical and doctrinal contexts and applies it to our own life with God in a great number of ways. This sheer quantity and variety of teaching on the subject is a major point of this chapter” (83). Additionally, Frame includes a small but mighty critique in the final pages of this chapter, pointing out that open theists have largely neglected to seriously engage with the passages of Scripture that most clearly teach God’s total and exhaustive control over all things, such as Lamentations 3:37–38, Romans 8:28; 9:21–24, and Ephesians 1:11.
In chapter six, Frame begins to respond to common objections of open theists to God’s sovereignty. He specifically addresses Sanders’s argument that Calvinists “make universals out of particulars” and thereby ignore immediate historical context. Frame demonstrates, however, that in Scripture one cannot separate the universals from the particulars. In the case of Isaiah 45:7, for example, the light that God creates, contra Sanders, cannot be merely political deliverance; it is political deliverance as informed by the rest of Scripture, including the creational narrative where God makes all light and all darkness. God’s sovereignty over all things grounds the political deliverance of Israel. A very significant point that Frame brings up is Sanders’s denial of God’s exhaustive control over the weather. This admission from Sanders is very important because it demonstrates that the open theist position is not limiting God’s providential control only from humans for the sake of free will. It seems that the open theist finds God’s sovereignty intrinsically objectionable to the point that the natural world must be subject to chance or some other power. Frame also responds to the common open theist assumption that human responsibility and God’s sovereignty are antithetical towards each, contending that if Scripture teaches both clearly, then our understanding of both responsibility and freedom must conform to it. Frame also responds to the open theist argument that sees election in Scripture as primarily corporate and for the sake of service, not individual and eternal. Frame demonstrates that historical and corporate election is present in Scripture, but so is individual and eternal election. Frame does not provide this argument, but I have always found the appeal to corporate election nonsensical; the corporate presupposes the individual and the individual presupposes the corporate. The two notions require each other not only to be intelligible, but also for election to be intelligible as well. Lastly, Frame briefly responds to the open theist argument that if God is always acting, then it seems impossible to distinguish God’s special acts of providence from more normative ones. Frame outlines several general criteria for distinguishing God’s mighty acts of redemption and revelation from his normative acts, all of which are thoroughly biblical.
Next, in chapter seven, Frame defends the Calvinist understanding of God’s irresistible will. He first explains the traditional distinctions for understanding God’s will and desires, such as antecedent and consequent wills in traditions that affirm libertarian free will, and decretive and preceptive wills for traditions that affirm a compatibilist understanding of free will. The latter, importantly, does not have a lesser explanation for why God desires some things but yet does not will then so: “God’s will is sometimes thwarted because he wills it to be, because he has given one of his desires precedence over another” (113). The crucial issue, however, is whether creatures can successfully resist God’s will. In short, it can be the case that a creature resists God for a time, but if God truly wills something to come to pass, no one can stop or impede his intentions. Frame clearly demonstrates that this is the Scriptural understanding of God and his will towards his creation and image bearers.
Chapter eight is perhaps the most important chapter in the book, for Frame strikes lethal blows directly at the heart of open theism: libertarian free will. In Frame’s analysis, “for the open theist, libertarian free will serves as a kind of grid, through which all other theological assertions must pass — a general criterion for testing the truth of all other doctrines. For the open theist, only those doctrines that are compatible with libertarian freedom are worthy of consideration; all others must be rejected at the outset. And typically, open theists do not argue the case (such as there is) for libertarian freedom; rather, they assume it. It is their presupposition” (119). Frame then moves on to provide a list of seventeen critical arguments against libertarianism, combining scriptural, theological, philosophical, and even legal arguments. The cumulative effect is certainly persuasive. Frame then offers positive arguments in favor of a compatibilist understanding of freedom, demonstrating that it is in much closer alignment with Scripture. Lastly, Frame briefly touches on the problem of evil, admitting that it is the greatest problem in Christianity, but still pointing out that the problem not only remains, but is actually worsened by open theism, while also providing a list of reasons for a more biblical view of the problem of evil.
In chapters nine, ten, and eleven, Frame asks the questions, “is God in time?” “Does God change?” and “does God suffer?” The open theist (and other temporalist positions) criticizes the traditional understanding of God’s atemporality, immutability, and impassibility for multiple reasons. Nicholas Wolterstorff, for example, argues that in order for an event to truly happen, it needs to be caused by an event of the same temporal nature, and therefore God must be temporal. Frame lists several arguments from multiple figures and responds to them in kind. Two striking points Frame makes is that 1) the vast majority of arguments for God’s temporality apply just as much to spatiality, but the same theologians and philosophers arguing for God’s temporality make no moves to confine God to space as they do to time; and 2) the arguments for God’s temporality are by and large philosophical arguments rather than theological or biblical. Frame points out how such a case flies in the face of another open theist argument, namely that traditional theism is born out of Greek philosophy: “Open theists complain that the arguments for divine supratemporality come from Greek philosophy, but their own arguments are philosophical…. So just as temporalists argue that supratemporalism comes from Greek philosophy, so supratemporalists can argue that temporalism comes from modern philosophy. Neither argument refutes the opposing position: it is a genetic fallacy to say that a position must be wrong because of its unworthy origin. But the fact that the temporalist position emerges from modern philosophy rather than Greek philosophy certainly confers no theological advantage to it” (149–150). One of the more important details of the open theist’s understanding of foreknowledge is how they define omniscience, namely that God knows all things that he can know. The catch is that open theists define the free choices of humans with the category of things God’s simply cannot know, akin to what exactly a square triangle is. Omniscience is therefore subtly redefined to accommodate the open theist’s favor towards libertarian free will. In addition to responding to objections, Frame offers a positive account for divine transcendence and immanence that applies to each of these chapters. God is Lord over time and God is Lord in time. These chapters are where some criticisms have been leveled at Frame from within his own conservative, Reformed theological circle. One does not have to agree with Frame’s formulations, but James Anderson’s recent article for P&R Publishing demonstrates that Frame should not be considered as a “theological mutualist.” Indeed, as Frame explicitly states, “God responds (both transcendently and imminently) only to what he has himself ordained” (183). In no way is God dependent upon his creation for his own being, knowledge, or plan. God has foreordained all things from his self-sufficient being, including his own parts in the story of his creation. This statement is found in the chapter specifically on if God suffers, but it applies to how we understand God’s relation to time, his immutability, and his emotions as well.
In chapter twelve, Frame responds to the criticisms of open theism towards God’s exhaustive foreknowledge. Frame has pointed it out before in the book, but here he makes it very clear that the expulsion of this doctrine is on the basis of maintaining libertarian free will at any theological cost. Contrary to the traditional Arminian position, libertarian free will cannot be maintained if God’s exhaustive foreknowledge is maintained as well, for if God knows that specific and all future events will certainly come to pass, then those events, which include decisions, are fixed in time. The open theist position is therefore more logically consistent than the Arminian, but at incredible theological cause (192n8). Frame rebuts common open theist arguments concisely and persuasively, demonstrating that much of the Scriptural evidence that open theist’s appeal to either is a faulty interpretation or actually proves too much (e.g., many of the examples cited by open theists of God’s “ignorance” would prove that God is just as ignorant of the present as he is of the future; perhaps even the notion of God’s creation of the rainbow as a reminder for himself implies God is also forgetful as well).
Frame’s penultimate chapter proceeds to offer the logical implications of open theism on other doctrines in the faith. He contends that open theism and the primacy it grants to libertarian free will logically necessitates diminished views of biblical inspiration, sin, redemption, assurance, heaven and hell, and guidance. Frame’s words on assurance capture the dangerous implications of open theism nicely: “because of the emphasis on libertarian freedom in open theism, it is impossible to imagine how believers could be assured of their salvation. Since God has no control of our freedom, he has no right to promise that believers will persevere. And if he did make such a promise, he would be powerless to keep it” (208).
Frame then concludes his book with words of charity and critique, thankful for the challenge of open theism towards traditional theism, forcing the traditional view to sharpen its understanding and formulation, but also “deeply saddened” that “they have denied God’s sovereign lordship over his creation” (212).
No Other God is truly a devastating critique from one of the sharpest yet most charitable minds in contemporary Reformed theology. Some of his points are more persuasive than others, and some of his theological argumentation is not without its critics either; but the sheer cumulative force of this book should give every reader the impression that open theism either must respond in full to his critique, or open theism must accept defeat and eventually wait for itself to quietly die as a small movement in church history and as a hardly viable theological, and much less orthodox, position.
In chapter one, Frame outlines the various definitions of open theism that have been provided, taking note to delineate the essential characteristics of the position from what open theists define as the “traditional” or “conventional” view (largely identified with Calvinism). Frame also notes how many open theists write with much rhetoric and emotive language as opposed to substance and clarity.
In chapter two, Frame offers a brief historical tracing of open theism as a theological movement, while also critiquing its claims to theological uniqueness and innovation. Not only is novelty typically dangerous in theology, but the claimed novelty is false. Open theist claims are demonstrably found in the theology of the Socinians, for example. Moreover, Frame deftly points out that the central tenets of open theism are just as influenced by Greek philosophy as traditional theology (a common open theist argument being that the traditional view is overly influenced by Greek philosophy), especially when it comes to the open theist’s emphasis on libertarian free will.
“Open theists insist on interpreting all biblical teachings in a manner that is consistent with libertarianism, without seriously submitting libertarianism itself to a biblical critique” (42). In his third chapter, Frame takes the theological and hermeneutical method of open theism to task, contending that 1) their appeals to logic are not properly logical appeals, 2) the theological model of “risk-taker” is a model largely foreign to Scripture itself and proves to be a constraining model upon Scripture rather than an illuminating one, and 3) the open theist appeal to a “straightforward” interpretation as opposed to an appeal to anthropomorphic language demonstrates not exegetical simplicity but rather hermeneutical unawareness of driving presuppositions that favor “straightforward” readings of specific texts over others. Frame cites Bruce Ware's critique of the open theist’s interpretation of Genesis 22, wherein Ware points out that the tenets of open theism prohibit a straightforward reading of the text just as much as the traditional theist. In short, the open theist’s hermeneutic is just as influenced by presuppositions as the traditional theist’s; the crucial issue is whether those presuppositions cohere with the overall teaching of the Bible or not.
In chapter four, Frame briefly, but effectively, argues for the arbitrariness of elevating love as the supreme attribute of God as open theists do. There is no biblical justification for it, and it violates the traditional (and biblically informed) understanding of God’s simplicity and divine attributes. God is light, just, and good just as much as he is love.
Frame’s fifth chapter offers much positive argumentation for the total and exhaustive sovereignty of God. Frame lays out nicely how Scripture clearly affirms God’s control over nature, human history, biographical history, individual decisions, sinful decisions, and salvific decisions. Significantly, Frame does “not apologize for including such a large number of Scripture passages in this chapter. Nothing is more important, especially at this point in the history of theology, than for God’s people to be firmly convinced that Scripture teaches God’s universal control over the world, and teaches it over and over again. Scripture mentions and implies this control in many different historical and doctrinal contexts and applies it to our own life with God in a great number of ways. This sheer quantity and variety of teaching on the subject is a major point of this chapter” (83). Additionally, Frame includes a small but mighty critique in the final pages of this chapter, pointing out that open theists have largely neglected to seriously engage with the passages of Scripture that most clearly teach God’s total and exhaustive control over all things, such as Lamentations 3:37–38, Romans 8:28; 9:21–24, and Ephesians 1:11.
In chapter six, Frame begins to respond to common objections of open theists to God’s sovereignty. He specifically addresses Sanders’s argument that Calvinists “make universals out of particulars” and thereby ignore immediate historical context. Frame demonstrates, however, that in Scripture one cannot separate the universals from the particulars. In the case of Isaiah 45:7, for example, the light that God creates, contra Sanders, cannot be merely political deliverance; it is political deliverance as informed by the rest of Scripture, including the creational narrative where God makes all light and all darkness. God’s sovereignty over all things grounds the political deliverance of Israel. A very significant point that Frame brings up is Sanders’s denial of God’s exhaustive control over the weather. This admission from Sanders is very important because it demonstrates that the open theist position is not limiting God’s providential control only from humans for the sake of free will. It seems that the open theist finds God’s sovereignty intrinsically objectionable to the point that the natural world must be subject to chance or some other power. Frame also responds to the common open theist assumption that human responsibility and God’s sovereignty are antithetical towards each, contending that if Scripture teaches both clearly, then our understanding of both responsibility and freedom must conform to it. Frame also responds to the open theist argument that sees election in Scripture as primarily corporate and for the sake of service, not individual and eternal. Frame demonstrates that historical and corporate election is present in Scripture, but so is individual and eternal election. Frame does not provide this argument, but I have always found the appeal to corporate election nonsensical; the corporate presupposes the individual and the individual presupposes the corporate. The two notions require each other not only to be intelligible, but also for election to be intelligible as well. Lastly, Frame briefly responds to the open theist argument that if God is always acting, then it seems impossible to distinguish God’s special acts of providence from more normative ones. Frame outlines several general criteria for distinguishing God’s mighty acts of redemption and revelation from his normative acts, all of which are thoroughly biblical.
Next, in chapter seven, Frame defends the Calvinist understanding of God’s irresistible will. He first explains the traditional distinctions for understanding God’s will and desires, such as antecedent and consequent wills in traditions that affirm libertarian free will, and decretive and preceptive wills for traditions that affirm a compatibilist understanding of free will. The latter, importantly, does not have a lesser explanation for why God desires some things but yet does not will then so: “God’s will is sometimes thwarted because he wills it to be, because he has given one of his desires precedence over another” (113). The crucial issue, however, is whether creatures can successfully resist God’s will. In short, it can be the case that a creature resists God for a time, but if God truly wills something to come to pass, no one can stop or impede his intentions. Frame clearly demonstrates that this is the Scriptural understanding of God and his will towards his creation and image bearers.
Chapter eight is perhaps the most important chapter in the book, for Frame strikes lethal blows directly at the heart of open theism: libertarian free will. In Frame’s analysis, “for the open theist, libertarian free will serves as a kind of grid, through which all other theological assertions must pass — a general criterion for testing the truth of all other doctrines. For the open theist, only those doctrines that are compatible with libertarian freedom are worthy of consideration; all others must be rejected at the outset. And typically, open theists do not argue the case (such as there is) for libertarian freedom; rather, they assume it. It is their presupposition” (119). Frame then moves on to provide a list of seventeen critical arguments against libertarianism, combining scriptural, theological, philosophical, and even legal arguments. The cumulative effect is certainly persuasive. Frame then offers positive arguments in favor of a compatibilist understanding of freedom, demonstrating that it is in much closer alignment with Scripture. Lastly, Frame briefly touches on the problem of evil, admitting that it is the greatest problem in Christianity, but still pointing out that the problem not only remains, but is actually worsened by open theism, while also providing a list of reasons for a more biblical view of the problem of evil.
In chapters nine, ten, and eleven, Frame asks the questions, “is God in time?” “Does God change?” and “does God suffer?” The open theist (and other temporalist positions) criticizes the traditional understanding of God’s atemporality, immutability, and impassibility for multiple reasons. Nicholas Wolterstorff, for example, argues that in order for an event to truly happen, it needs to be caused by an event of the same temporal nature, and therefore God must be temporal. Frame lists several arguments from multiple figures and responds to them in kind. Two striking points Frame makes is that 1) the vast majority of arguments for God’s temporality apply just as much to spatiality, but the same theologians and philosophers arguing for God’s temporality make no moves to confine God to space as they do to time; and 2) the arguments for God’s temporality are by and large philosophical arguments rather than theological or biblical. Frame points out how such a case flies in the face of another open theist argument, namely that traditional theism is born out of Greek philosophy: “Open theists complain that the arguments for divine supratemporality come from Greek philosophy, but their own arguments are philosophical…. So just as temporalists argue that supratemporalism comes from Greek philosophy, so supratemporalists can argue that temporalism comes from modern philosophy. Neither argument refutes the opposing position: it is a genetic fallacy to say that a position must be wrong because of its unworthy origin. But the fact that the temporalist position emerges from modern philosophy rather than Greek philosophy certainly confers no theological advantage to it” (149–150). One of the more important details of the open theist’s understanding of foreknowledge is how they define omniscience, namely that God knows all things that he can know. The catch is that open theists define the free choices of humans with the category of things God’s simply cannot know, akin to what exactly a square triangle is. Omniscience is therefore subtly redefined to accommodate the open theist’s favor towards libertarian free will. In addition to responding to objections, Frame offers a positive account for divine transcendence and immanence that applies to each of these chapters. God is Lord over time and God is Lord in time. These chapters are where some criticisms have been leveled at Frame from within his own conservative, Reformed theological circle. One does not have to agree with Frame’s formulations, but James Anderson’s recent article for P&R Publishing demonstrates that Frame should not be considered as a “theological mutualist.” Indeed, as Frame explicitly states, “God responds (both transcendently and imminently) only to what he has himself ordained” (183). In no way is God dependent upon his creation for his own being, knowledge, or plan. God has foreordained all things from his self-sufficient being, including his own parts in the story of his creation. This statement is found in the chapter specifically on if God suffers, but it applies to how we understand God’s relation to time, his immutability, and his emotions as well.
In chapter twelve, Frame responds to the criticisms of open theism towards God’s exhaustive foreknowledge. Frame has pointed it out before in the book, but here he makes it very clear that the expulsion of this doctrine is on the basis of maintaining libertarian free will at any theological cost. Contrary to the traditional Arminian position, libertarian free will cannot be maintained if God’s exhaustive foreknowledge is maintained as well, for if God knows that specific and all future events will certainly come to pass, then those events, which include decisions, are fixed in time. The open theist position is therefore more logically consistent than the Arminian, but at incredible theological cause (192n8). Frame rebuts common open theist arguments concisely and persuasively, demonstrating that much of the Scriptural evidence that open theist’s appeal to either is a faulty interpretation or actually proves too much (e.g., many of the examples cited by open theists of God’s “ignorance” would prove that God is just as ignorant of the present as he is of the future; perhaps even the notion of God’s creation of the rainbow as a reminder for himself implies God is also forgetful as well).
Frame’s penultimate chapter proceeds to offer the logical implications of open theism on other doctrines in the faith. He contends that open theism and the primacy it grants to libertarian free will logically necessitates diminished views of biblical inspiration, sin, redemption, assurance, heaven and hell, and guidance. Frame’s words on assurance capture the dangerous implications of open theism nicely: “because of the emphasis on libertarian freedom in open theism, it is impossible to imagine how believers could be assured of their salvation. Since God has no control of our freedom, he has no right to promise that believers will persevere. And if he did make such a promise, he would be powerless to keep it” (208).
Frame then concludes his book with words of charity and critique, thankful for the challenge of open theism towards traditional theism, forcing the traditional view to sharpen its understanding and formulation, but also “deeply saddened” that “they have denied God’s sovereign lordship over his creation” (212).
No Other God is truly a devastating critique from one of the sharpest yet most charitable minds in contemporary Reformed theology. Some of his points are more persuasive than others, and some of his theological argumentation is not without its critics either; but the sheer cumulative force of this book should give every reader the impression that open theism either must respond in full to his critique, or open theism must accept defeat and eventually wait for itself to quietly die as a small movement in church history and as a hardly viable theological, and much less orthodox, position.
June 30, 2010
As always - Frame is most excellent.
He presented his arguments against Open Theism honestly and with integrity, and yet with sufficient force to make most anyone that takes seriously the whole of God's revelation stay under the cover of biblical orthodoxy.
He presented his arguments against Open Theism honestly and with integrity, and yet with sufficient force to make most anyone that takes seriously the whole of God's revelation stay under the cover of biblical orthodoxy.
July 19, 2024
A CALVINIST APOLOGIST/THEOLOGIAN CRITIQUES "OPEN THEOLOGY"
John M. Frame (born 1939) is an American philosopher and Calvinist theologian, noted for his presuppositional apologetics; he has written many other books, such as 'Apologetics to the Glory of God: An Introduction,' 'The Doctrine of the Knowledge of God,' etc.
He wrote in the Preface to this 2001 book, "The purpose of this book is to describe and evaluate biblically the theological movement known as open theism... in my judgment, their position is deeply unbiblical, and their movement has caused division and confusion..." (Pg. 11)
He admits concerning the Problem of Evil that "There is no perfectly satisfying solution to it. Some have tried to solve it by appealing to libertarian freedom, but ... such an appeal is inadequate, since freedom in the libertarian sense is both unscriptural and destructive to moral responsibility." (Pg. 68)
Concerning John Sanders The God Who Risks: A Theology of Divine Providence, Frame agrees that God allows his will to be "thwarted" because of the nature of the creatures he has made, because of their integrity and the integrity of his plan. But he adds, "integrity is one thing, and autonomy is something else." He adds that if God brings about everything that happens, then there is no room for autonomy; "God has planned and foreordained everything that happens, so nothing takes him by surprise." (Pg. 113)
He points out that since in Heaven, we will not be free to sin, "the highest state of human existence will be a state without libertarian freedom." (Pg. 125) He responds to biblical passages that seem superficially to show God "changing his mind," and explains, God's "relenting" is based on his eternal plan, "which incorporates his appropriate responses to events in the created world." (Pg. 196)
Frame's critique is another valuable addition to this controversy.
John M. Frame (born 1939) is an American philosopher and Calvinist theologian, noted for his presuppositional apologetics; he has written many other books, such as 'Apologetics to the Glory of God: An Introduction,' 'The Doctrine of the Knowledge of God,' etc.
He wrote in the Preface to this 2001 book, "The purpose of this book is to describe and evaluate biblically the theological movement known as open theism... in my judgment, their position is deeply unbiblical, and their movement has caused division and confusion..." (Pg. 11)
He admits concerning the Problem of Evil that "There is no perfectly satisfying solution to it. Some have tried to solve it by appealing to libertarian freedom, but ... such an appeal is inadequate, since freedom in the libertarian sense is both unscriptural and destructive to moral responsibility." (Pg. 68)
Concerning John Sanders The God Who Risks: A Theology of Divine Providence, Frame agrees that God allows his will to be "thwarted" because of the nature of the creatures he has made, because of their integrity and the integrity of his plan. But he adds, "integrity is one thing, and autonomy is something else." He adds that if God brings about everything that happens, then there is no room for autonomy; "God has planned and foreordained everything that happens, so nothing takes him by surprise." (Pg. 113)
He points out that since in Heaven, we will not be free to sin, "the highest state of human existence will be a state without libertarian freedom." (Pg. 125) He responds to biblical passages that seem superficially to show God "changing his mind," and explains, God's "relenting" is based on his eternal plan, "which incorporates his appropriate responses to events in the created world." (Pg. 196)
Frame's critique is another valuable addition to this controversy.
September 17, 2024
I agree with much that Frame says, but agreement or disagreement is not the issue. Frame writes in a way that is views are the views against which all other views must be measured, as if "right theology" begins with his hermeneutics. He complete ignores natural explanations as he explains natural from a theological fundamentalist worldview. His entire argument is a refutation of something he calls libertarianism or libertarian freedom. I had not been familiar with that term and after reading his book, on which he refutes that idea on nearly every page, I still am only vaguely aware of what it is he opposes.
My biggest critique of him is his uncritical adherence to scripture which, in my opinion, reduces scripture. The trinity is not The Father, the Son, and the Bible; the Trinity is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. I don't think Frame addresses the Holy Spirit at all. For him, all theological conclusions must be verified by copious scripture references. The Bible is meant to be where we meet God. Our theological conclusions should be worked in dynamic conversations involving the Holy Spirit, the Bible, logic, traditions of Christian thought, and the Bible. So, again in my opinion, Frame's frame of reference is limited.
For that reason, I cannot rate his book very highly.
My biggest critique of him is his uncritical adherence to scripture which, in my opinion, reduces scripture. The trinity is not The Father, the Son, and the Bible; the Trinity is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. I don't think Frame addresses the Holy Spirit at all. For him, all theological conclusions must be verified by copious scripture references. The Bible is meant to be where we meet God. Our theological conclusions should be worked in dynamic conversations involving the Holy Spirit, the Bible, logic, traditions of Christian thought, and the Bible. So, again in my opinion, Frame's frame of reference is limited.
For that reason, I cannot rate his book very highly.
August 4, 2019
The strength of this book is that it is not simply against open theism, but also for classical theism. What I mean is that Frame does an excellent job of refuting open theism, while at the same time doing justice to the tenants of classical Christian theism.
Therefore, this book not only serves as an excellent introduction to the controversy over open theism, but is also a perfectly good primer to theology proper in its own right.
Therefore, this book not only serves as an excellent introduction to the controversy over open theism, but is also a perfectly good primer to theology proper in its own right.
July 2, 2024
While I agree wholeheartedly that open theism is a misleading and deadly heresy. The author holds no nuance to his own Calvinistic teachings, and even states that classic Arminians are less logically consistent than open theists, something that is blatantly ignorant in regard to historical theology. I’d seek other resources for engaging with open theism.
October 27, 2019
Another book for my research. Obviously, I like this one better because it is against open theism. But some of its claims are a bit out there for my taste - particularly that God brings about sin.
January 30, 2022
A very clear and definitive refutation of Open Theism, a heretical movement that does not proclaim the God of the Bible, but a god of their imaginations that fits their philosophical system.
July 6, 2016
An excellent discussion of Open Theism and the Sovereignty of God from a strong Calvinistic perspective. However, in my view, he has created the straw man of constant libertarian freedom to argue against in many instances. In my understanding, few open theists, and no Armenians, would argue for such freedom. What he has not answered with any clarity is the problem of sin and responsibility in a deterministic approach. He states on page 137, "what, then, is the solution to the problem of evil? I regret that I do not have a fully satisfying answer, but I will make some suggestions to put the issue into perspective." At least he is honest with this "notorious problem" (p. 68). This, however, does not detract from this thorough and biblical discussion. A great companion to Ware's book. Both are very helpful in understanding theology in general.
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