Locke’s account of the problem of cohesion reflects a serious difficulty in his philosophy because of the way in which he relates it to the problem of substance in his search for something that not only underlies all properties in the traditional Aristotelian sense, but also holds the constituents of matter together. Contrary to common interpretation, this book argues that Locke did not have in mind a metaphysical entity which underlies qualities. Rather, he was more inclined to think that something like a cohesive power is what functions as the “bond” that hold holds together, not only the qualities of a substance, but its individual corpuscles, and on a deeper level even the parts of the corpuscle. In order to prove this, the study seeks first to clarify the nature of qualities in Locke’s thought; then moves on to address Locke’s account of substance in its relation to the concepts of real essence and cohesion; next the problem of cohesion is examined in detail before, finally, a explanation is offered of why cohesion cannot be described in terms of an act of divine superaddition in Locke’s philosophy.