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Reason within the Bounds of Religion (PBK) by Nicholas Wolterstorff
Expanding on his 1976 study of the bearing of Christian faith on the practice of scholarship, Wolterstorff has added a substantial new section on the role of faith in the decisions scholars make about their choice of subject matter.
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First published January 1, 1976
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About the author
Nicholas Wolterstorff
84 books107 followersWolterstorff is the Noah Porter Professor Emeritus of Philosophical Theology, and Fellow of Berkeley College at Yale University. A prolific writer with wide-ranging philosophical and theological interests, he has written books on metaphysics, aesthetics, political philosophy, epistemology and theology and philosophy of religion.
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March 21, 2013
This little book came at a crucial time for me. Recommended by my thesis advisor, Mark Noll, 'way back in the early 1980s (in its first, smaller edition), it rearranged my epistemological architecture like no other book has. A pretty naive realist before, I became a critical realist instantly upon reading this persuasive, dense essay in "anti-foundationalism" (although I'm pretty sure Wolterstorff doesn't use the term "critical realism" anywhere in the book). Indeed, I became a postmodernist in that respect (ditto for "pomo" terms).
Occasionally, the book is not as clear as it might be. I even think there is a key terminological problem (note 32 speaks of "data beliefs," but I think Nick meant "data-background beliefs" there). The second edition includes a Part Two that I think is well intentioned but both conceptually and practically muddled: How in the world is the Christian scholar supposed to decide between pure research and praxis-oriented research on the basis of this discussion--the provision of guidance for which is its purpose?
Nonetheless, this is one of my "Top 10 Lifetime Books" and one of the few I have re-read several times. It is packed with wisdom and insight, and serves also as a useful introduction to the Wolterstorff oeuvre, of which I am a lifelong fan.
Occasionally, the book is not as clear as it might be. I even think there is a key terminological problem (note 32 speaks of "data beliefs," but I think Nick meant "data-background beliefs" there). The second edition includes a Part Two that I think is well intentioned but both conceptually and practically muddled: How in the world is the Christian scholar supposed to decide between pure research and praxis-oriented research on the basis of this discussion--the provision of guidance for which is its purpose?
Nonetheless, this is one of my "Top 10 Lifetime Books" and one of the few I have re-read several times. It is packed with wisdom and insight, and serves also as a useful introduction to the Wolterstorff oeuvre, of which I am a lifelong fan.
June 3, 2024
A CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHER LOOKS AT THE “CONTROL BELIEFS” OF CHRISTIANS
Nicholas Wolterstorff (born 1932) is an American philosopher and theologian who is Professor Emeritus of Philosophical Theology at Yale University; he also helped to establish the journal ‘Faith and Philosophy’ and the Society of Christian Philosophers. [NOTE: page numbers below refer to a 115-page paperback edition.]
He wrote in the Preface to this 1976 book, “The following is a tract for Christians. I welcome others to listen in. But Christians are the ones I am writing for. What I have written for them is a soliloquy of sorts. I ask what my own fundamental identity as a Christian has to do with my practice of scholarship and, more importantly, what it OUGHT to have to do with it… The general topic under consideration is religion and science… I am a philosopher, and my topic is a philosophical one… Yet I have written in the hope that persons other than philosophers will find it comprehensible and illuminating… My title is, as philosophy students may recognize, freely borrowed from Kant.”
He explains, “The Christian who is a scholar finds himself in two communities: the community of his fellow Christians and the community of his fellow scholars. Each has its own criteria for membership, its own characteristic practices, its own characteristic beliefs, its own characteristic training programs… if one who is a scholar as well as a Christian wants coherence in life… he cannot help asking, how does my membership in these two communities fit together? This is what I shall ask in the following pages. Part of my answer to this question will involve sketching out some elements of a theory of theorizing. The basic issue behind our question is that of the role of one’s Christian commitment in one’s practice of scholarship.” (Pg. 17)
He states, “the main doctrine of the foundationalist is the normative rule that a person is warranted in accepting a theory at a certain time if and only if he is then warranted in believing that that theory belongs to genuine science… But would we be justified in requiring of the foundationalist a general criterion for determining when one is and when one is not warranted in believing so-and-so? I think not. In the first place, one can be warranted (and know that one is warranted) in believing so-and-so without having a satisfactory general criterion for warranted belief. I am surely warranted in my belief that I cannot jump to the moon. Yet I have no general criterion for warranted belief. So if everything else about the foundationalist’s criterion is satisfactory we can accept and use it even though he gives us no general criterion for warranted belief.” (Pg. 31)
He observes, “as far as foundationalism is concerned, all probabilistic inductive arguments are equally untenable, for they all use a rule of inference that is neither known with certitude to be satisfactory nor known to be probably satisfactory. But this leaves us without any acceptable explanation of the relation theories bear to the foundation just in case they belong to genuine science. First it was demanded that a theory be probable with respect to the foundation. It turned out that none were.” (Pg. 36)
He notes, “only in such ‘nonempirical’ disciplines as logic and mathematics do we have genuine ‘scientia.’ For only here do we have theories derived by satisfactory rules of inference from indubitables… the Euclidian model, in which a mathematical system is constructed by beginning with self-evidently true propositions and proceeding by the use of self-evidently satisfactory rules, has been left far behind. The mathematician and the logician today begin with axioms that are far from self-evident. Then they proceed to construct deductions which they hope will not yield propositions that are self-evidently false. Along the way the air of implausibility---and or arbitrariness to avoid paradox---is very thick indeed.” (Pg. 51)
He summarizes, “On all fronts foundationalism is in bad shape… It is not the case that one is warranted in accepting some theory if and only if one is warranted in believing that it is justified by propositions knowable noninferentially and with certitude. From this it does not follow that there is no structured reality independent of our conceivings and believings… Nor does it follow that we must give up truth as the goal of theoretical inquiry… Nor does it follow that we can never know the truth… Nor does it follow that one belief is as warranted for me as another. All that follows is that theorizing is without a foundation of indubitables. Our future theories of theorizing will have to be nonfoundationalist ones.” (Pg. 52-53)
He asserts, “Unsettling as it may be for many Christians, it must be firmly said that … the Bible also does not provide us with a foundation for theorizing. Reading and interpreting the Bible is not a procedure for arriving at propositions knowable noninferentially and indubitably to be true… It has ben assumed that … human knowledge generally---must have a foundation of certitude. What better source for such certitude for the Christian than the Bible… along with reflection and experience? Thoroughly considering this matter would … take us too far afield… it is enough to show that even if this view of Scripture were correct the Bible could not provide us with a foundation for theorizing.” (Pg. 54-55)
He points out, “In weighing a theory one always brings along the whole complex of one’s beliefs. One does not strip away all but those beliefs functioning as data relative to the theory being weighed. On the contrary, one remains cloaked in belief... For one thing, there will always be a large set of beliefs such that one’s holding them is a condition of one’s accepting as data what which one does. Let us call these ‘data-background beliefs’… That which the scientist takes as data he does so because of his acceptance of an enormously complicated web of theory… it is even more important to bring to attention a second component in the cloak of beliefs… Everyone who weighs a theory has certain beliefs as to what constitutes an acceptable SORT of theory on the matter under consideration. We can call these ‘control beliefs.’” (Pg. 63)
He outlines, “My contention in what follows is that the religious beliefs of the Christian scholar ought to function as CONTROL beliefs within devising and weighing of theories. This is not the only way they ought to function…. Nor does that exhaust their function. But their functioning as control beliefs is absolutely central to the Christian scholar.” (Pg. 66)
He elaborates, “The Christian scholar ought to allow the belief-content of his authentic Christian commitment to function as control within his devising and weighing of theories. For he like everyone else ought to seek consistency, wholeness, and integrity in the body of his beliefs and commitments. Since his fundamental commitment to following Christ ought to be decisively ultimate in his life, the rest ought to be brought into harmony with it… the Christian scholar ought to reject certain theories on the ground that they conflict or do not comport well with the belief-content of this authentic commitment. And positively he ought to devise theories which comport as well as possible with… the belief-content of his authentic commitment.” (Pg. 72)
He acknowledges, “In some cases a Christian scholar and a non-Christian scholar may each justifiably accept a particular scientific theory… On the other hand, there may be less ‘shared ground’ than one might suppose at first glance… low-level theories in science often presuppose high-level theories. And it may well be… that unnoticed features of these high-level theories … make them unacceptable either to the Christian scholar or to some non-Christian scholar.” (Pg. 79)
He clarifies, “Though authentic commitment ought to function as control within our theory-devising and theory-weighing, such activities will forever bear within them the potential for inducing… revisions in our views as to what constitutes authentic commitment, and thus, revisions in our actual commitment… A question which naturally comes to mind is whether scientific developments can produce changes in one’s authentic commitment… I think the answer must be Yes… The scholar never knows in advance where his line of thought will lead him. For the Christian to undertake scholarship is to undertake a course of action that may lead him into the painful process of revising his actual Christian commitment… It may, indeed, even lead him to a point where his authentic commitment has undergone change.” (Pg. 91-93)
This book will be of great interest to those seriously studying philosophical theology.
Nicholas Wolterstorff (born 1932) is an American philosopher and theologian who is Professor Emeritus of Philosophical Theology at Yale University; he also helped to establish the journal ‘Faith and Philosophy’ and the Society of Christian Philosophers. [NOTE: page numbers below refer to a 115-page paperback edition.]
He wrote in the Preface to this 1976 book, “The following is a tract for Christians. I welcome others to listen in. But Christians are the ones I am writing for. What I have written for them is a soliloquy of sorts. I ask what my own fundamental identity as a Christian has to do with my practice of scholarship and, more importantly, what it OUGHT to have to do with it… The general topic under consideration is religion and science… I am a philosopher, and my topic is a philosophical one… Yet I have written in the hope that persons other than philosophers will find it comprehensible and illuminating… My title is, as philosophy students may recognize, freely borrowed from Kant.”
He explains, “The Christian who is a scholar finds himself in two communities: the community of his fellow Christians and the community of his fellow scholars. Each has its own criteria for membership, its own characteristic practices, its own characteristic beliefs, its own characteristic training programs… if one who is a scholar as well as a Christian wants coherence in life… he cannot help asking, how does my membership in these two communities fit together? This is what I shall ask in the following pages. Part of my answer to this question will involve sketching out some elements of a theory of theorizing. The basic issue behind our question is that of the role of one’s Christian commitment in one’s practice of scholarship.” (Pg. 17)
He states, “the main doctrine of the foundationalist is the normative rule that a person is warranted in accepting a theory at a certain time if and only if he is then warranted in believing that that theory belongs to genuine science… But would we be justified in requiring of the foundationalist a general criterion for determining when one is and when one is not warranted in believing so-and-so? I think not. In the first place, one can be warranted (and know that one is warranted) in believing so-and-so without having a satisfactory general criterion for warranted belief. I am surely warranted in my belief that I cannot jump to the moon. Yet I have no general criterion for warranted belief. So if everything else about the foundationalist’s criterion is satisfactory we can accept and use it even though he gives us no general criterion for warranted belief.” (Pg. 31)
He observes, “as far as foundationalism is concerned, all probabilistic inductive arguments are equally untenable, for they all use a rule of inference that is neither known with certitude to be satisfactory nor known to be probably satisfactory. But this leaves us without any acceptable explanation of the relation theories bear to the foundation just in case they belong to genuine science. First it was demanded that a theory be probable with respect to the foundation. It turned out that none were.” (Pg. 36)
He notes, “only in such ‘nonempirical’ disciplines as logic and mathematics do we have genuine ‘scientia.’ For only here do we have theories derived by satisfactory rules of inference from indubitables… the Euclidian model, in which a mathematical system is constructed by beginning with self-evidently true propositions and proceeding by the use of self-evidently satisfactory rules, has been left far behind. The mathematician and the logician today begin with axioms that are far from self-evident. Then they proceed to construct deductions which they hope will not yield propositions that are self-evidently false. Along the way the air of implausibility---and or arbitrariness to avoid paradox---is very thick indeed.” (Pg. 51)
He summarizes, “On all fronts foundationalism is in bad shape… It is not the case that one is warranted in accepting some theory if and only if one is warranted in believing that it is justified by propositions knowable noninferentially and with certitude. From this it does not follow that there is no structured reality independent of our conceivings and believings… Nor does it follow that we must give up truth as the goal of theoretical inquiry… Nor does it follow that we can never know the truth… Nor does it follow that one belief is as warranted for me as another. All that follows is that theorizing is without a foundation of indubitables. Our future theories of theorizing will have to be nonfoundationalist ones.” (Pg. 52-53)
He asserts, “Unsettling as it may be for many Christians, it must be firmly said that … the Bible also does not provide us with a foundation for theorizing. Reading and interpreting the Bible is not a procedure for arriving at propositions knowable noninferentially and indubitably to be true… It has ben assumed that … human knowledge generally---must have a foundation of certitude. What better source for such certitude for the Christian than the Bible… along with reflection and experience? Thoroughly considering this matter would … take us too far afield… it is enough to show that even if this view of Scripture were correct the Bible could not provide us with a foundation for theorizing.” (Pg. 54-55)
He points out, “In weighing a theory one always brings along the whole complex of one’s beliefs. One does not strip away all but those beliefs functioning as data relative to the theory being weighed. On the contrary, one remains cloaked in belief... For one thing, there will always be a large set of beliefs such that one’s holding them is a condition of one’s accepting as data what which one does. Let us call these ‘data-background beliefs’… That which the scientist takes as data he does so because of his acceptance of an enormously complicated web of theory… it is even more important to bring to attention a second component in the cloak of beliefs… Everyone who weighs a theory has certain beliefs as to what constitutes an acceptable SORT of theory on the matter under consideration. We can call these ‘control beliefs.’” (Pg. 63)
He outlines, “My contention in what follows is that the religious beliefs of the Christian scholar ought to function as CONTROL beliefs within devising and weighing of theories. This is not the only way they ought to function…. Nor does that exhaust their function. But their functioning as control beliefs is absolutely central to the Christian scholar.” (Pg. 66)
He elaborates, “The Christian scholar ought to allow the belief-content of his authentic Christian commitment to function as control within his devising and weighing of theories. For he like everyone else ought to seek consistency, wholeness, and integrity in the body of his beliefs and commitments. Since his fundamental commitment to following Christ ought to be decisively ultimate in his life, the rest ought to be brought into harmony with it… the Christian scholar ought to reject certain theories on the ground that they conflict or do not comport well with the belief-content of this authentic commitment. And positively he ought to devise theories which comport as well as possible with… the belief-content of his authentic commitment.” (Pg. 72)
He acknowledges, “In some cases a Christian scholar and a non-Christian scholar may each justifiably accept a particular scientific theory… On the other hand, there may be less ‘shared ground’ than one might suppose at first glance… low-level theories in science often presuppose high-level theories. And it may well be… that unnoticed features of these high-level theories … make them unacceptable either to the Christian scholar or to some non-Christian scholar.” (Pg. 79)
He clarifies, “Though authentic commitment ought to function as control within our theory-devising and theory-weighing, such activities will forever bear within them the potential for inducing… revisions in our views as to what constitutes authentic commitment, and thus, revisions in our actual commitment… A question which naturally comes to mind is whether scientific developments can produce changes in one’s authentic commitment… I think the answer must be Yes… The scholar never knows in advance where his line of thought will lead him. For the Christian to undertake scholarship is to undertake a course of action that may lead him into the painful process of revising his actual Christian commitment… It may, indeed, even lead him to a point where his authentic commitment has undergone change.” (Pg. 91-93)
This book will be of great interest to those seriously studying philosophical theology.
July 17, 2017
I know this book is just intended as an introduction to the the issue of Christian scholars in academia, but I really with Wolterstorff fleshed out how to use and modify control beliefs.
His argument is "that the religious beliefs of the Christian scholar ought to function as control beliefs within his devising and weighing of theories" (p. 70). Although I'm really curious WHY he believes these religious beliefs deserve the right to be control beliefs in the first place (perhaps he is working under the assumption that he needs to prove the veracity and reliability of religious beliefs?), I still understand what he's getting at, however frustrating some of his assumptions might be.
What really throws me off though is a strong assertion he makes a few chapters later: "So far I have been pressing the point that the Christian in the practice of schlolarship ought to let the belief-content of his authentic commitment function as control over his theory-weighing. My emphasis here is almost the opposite. sometimes he should allow scientific developments to induce revisions in [i]what he views as[/i] his authentic Christian commitment." (p. 94) Wolterstorff then gives the example of a revising view of a geocentric universe as a prime example of this practice. He concludes at the end of the chapter that "The scholar never fully knows in advance where his line of thought will lead him. For the Christian to undertake scholarship is to undertake a course of action that may lead him into the painful process of revising his actual Christian commitment, sorting through his beliefs, and discardig some from a position where they can any longer function as control. It may, indeed, even lead him to a point where his authentic commitment has undergone change. We are all profoundly [i]historical[/i] creatures." (pp. 96-97)
So . . . what exactly is Wolterstorff suggesting? What principle can a religious scholar use for when to "hold" and when to "fold" certain religious convictions? I'm on board with revising religious ideas in light of scientific advancements, but this suggestion is simply unhelpful without adequate elaboration.
I know I'm spending a lot of energy on just a few quotes, but these points form the bedrock of some of the author's suggestions. (and I'm also willing to admit that I may have missed some of the subtler observations in chapter 13, so please help me out if I'm misrepresenting the portions I've quotes).
---
Despite my criticism with this aspect of the essay, they are still some really great ideas developed in these concise chapters. I'm sure that any scholar with religious convictions would find it interesting and challenging.
In addition to some of the ideas about control beliefs in the first few chapters I really enjoyed Chapter 19 (which explores the various beliefs about the value of learning) and Chapter 20 (which explores how a scholar should go about selecting an area of study).
His argument is "that the religious beliefs of the Christian scholar ought to function as control beliefs within his devising and weighing of theories" (p. 70). Although I'm really curious WHY he believes these religious beliefs deserve the right to be control beliefs in the first place (perhaps he is working under the assumption that he needs to prove the veracity and reliability of religious beliefs?), I still understand what he's getting at, however frustrating some of his assumptions might be.
What really throws me off though is a strong assertion he makes a few chapters later: "So far I have been pressing the point that the Christian in the practice of schlolarship ought to let the belief-content of his authentic commitment function as control over his theory-weighing. My emphasis here is almost the opposite. sometimes he should allow scientific developments to induce revisions in [i]what he views as[/i] his authentic Christian commitment." (p. 94) Wolterstorff then gives the example of a revising view of a geocentric universe as a prime example of this practice. He concludes at the end of the chapter that "The scholar never fully knows in advance where his line of thought will lead him. For the Christian to undertake scholarship is to undertake a course of action that may lead him into the painful process of revising his actual Christian commitment, sorting through his beliefs, and discardig some from a position where they can any longer function as control. It may, indeed, even lead him to a point where his authentic commitment has undergone change. We are all profoundly [i]historical[/i] creatures." (pp. 96-97)
So . . . what exactly is Wolterstorff suggesting? What principle can a religious scholar use for when to "hold" and when to "fold" certain religious convictions? I'm on board with revising religious ideas in light of scientific advancements, but this suggestion is simply unhelpful without adequate elaboration.
I know I'm spending a lot of energy on just a few quotes, but these points form the bedrock of some of the author's suggestions. (and I'm also willing to admit that I may have missed some of the subtler observations in chapter 13, so please help me out if I'm misrepresenting the portions I've quotes).
---
Despite my criticism with this aspect of the essay, they are still some really great ideas developed in these concise chapters. I'm sure that any scholar with religious convictions would find it interesting and challenging.
In addition to some of the ideas about control beliefs in the first few chapters I really enjoyed Chapter 19 (which explores the various beliefs about the value of learning) and Chapter 20 (which explores how a scholar should go about selecting an area of study).
October 30, 2019
I first read this monograph when I was in seminary in the late 70's. It is still on my bookshelf. The title is a send-up of Kant's Religion Within the Bounds of Reason Alone. Wolterstorff aims to debunk Foundationalism by showing that reason never operates alone but always under assumptions he labels "control beliefs." Even the Bible can't save Foundationalism because we interprete the Bible with those same assumptions and beliefs that control reason and our interpretation of the world.
Want to read
February 5, 2024History phikosophy
May 7, 2014
I love finding philosophers who are also good writers. Wolterstorff is a great example. This book is a learning experience in good philosophy that is eloquent as well as articulate; in advancing a position without an adversarial attitude (a big challenge for me); and in writing a book that is "real philosophy" but also perfectly relevant to and readable by non-philosophers.
That last point means the theory he's pushing isn't worked out in as much detail as it could be. On one hand, he does a great job presenting it in less than 150 pages. On the other hand, I'm not an expert in Wolterstorff or epistemology or anything at all really, so I don't know how to judge his position. His thoughts on the interaction of faith and scholarship are very insightful and well-argued, but I don't see how they are specifically non-foundationalist insights.
I was tempted to knock this down to three stars because I very much object to his reading of Aquinas in chapter 21. Granted that Aquinas inherits a pagan and Islamic philosophical tradition that does tend toward intellectual elitism, it's pretty clear that he consciously rebels against that tendency. He does it by working within the system he inherited, and maybe that's hopeless from the start, but he still tried to do it.
That last point means the theory he's pushing isn't worked out in as much detail as it could be. On one hand, he does a great job presenting it in less than 150 pages. On the other hand, I'm not an expert in Wolterstorff or epistemology or anything at all really, so I don't know how to judge his position. His thoughts on the interaction of faith and scholarship are very insightful and well-argued, but I don't see how they are specifically non-foundationalist insights.
I was tempted to knock this down to three stars because I very much object to his reading of Aquinas in chapter 21. Granted that Aquinas inherits a pagan and Islamic philosophical tradition that does tend toward intellectual elitism, it's pretty clear that he consciously rebels against that tendency. He does it by working within the system he inherited, and maybe that's hopeless from the start, but he still tried to do it.
June 11, 2023
- All people have certain control beliefs that shape how they interpret the data they encounter. This is not wrong. Wolterstorff argues that there is no non-biased control belief we can all share.
- Christians ought to allow their Christian control beliefs to determine their theorizing. However, authentic Christian commitment often allows a variety of theories when interpreting data, so the Christian still needs to justify their particular judgements on the basis of the data.
- Our Christian beliefs are not our only control beliefs (culture, race, economic status, personality, etc.).
- While difficult, we must continually adjust what we think determines authentic Christian commitment. We have been wrong in the past, and may be so now.
- Christians ought to allow their Christian control beliefs to determine their theorizing. However, authentic Christian commitment often allows a variety of theories when interpreting data, so the Christian still needs to justify their particular judgements on the basis of the data.
- Our Christian beliefs are not our only control beliefs (culture, race, economic status, personality, etc.).
- While difficult, we must continually adjust what we think determines authentic Christian commitment. We have been wrong in the past, and may be so now.
October 27, 2007
In this little book, Wolterstorff presents a concise approach for how a Christian's core beliefs ought to relate to the "theory of theorizing". The target audience is Christians in academic fields of study. He explains the reasons for the historical demise of foundationalism (I found this to be a clear and helpful summary). But he does not conclude that now "anything goes." Rather, a Christian's (or anyone's) core-beliefs serve as a control for weighing theories. This book gets going in an interesting direction, but I was left wondering where to go next.
March 8, 2014
Reread it, and although there are no new insights, it is still a good soliloquy. (Took that word from the preface, I like it)
In grand strokes, the book deals on how ones religion should comport with ones scholarly learning. Although as such it is written for those with learning as a profession, it still contains valuable points on how Christiann faith and science go together.
In grand strokes, the book deals on how ones religion should comport with ones scholarly learning. Although as such it is written for those with learning as a profession, it still contains valuable points on how Christiann faith and science go together.
November 23, 2013
Good book but it will need to be read again. Some stuff went over my head but some was also very helpful and insightful. I enjoyed the authors bit on Christians pursing shalom in what ever context of culture and vocation that God has put them in.
April 10, 2014
A surprisingly good read. The tract size actually affords the ideas within more possibility for growth than that of larger titles. I guess I'm just perplexed that further work has not been done to expand on the many pregnant notions put forward in this deceptively unassuming text.
February 29, 2008
brilliant, scholarly, biblical, great book, but not easy reading. the author is one of America's foremost contemporary philosophers.
March 25, 2011
Clearly written, thoughtful work on epistemology.
January 22, 2014
This book is just fantastic as an introduction to how Christian commitments (and theological formulations) ought to interact with other disciplines. It's a tiny book, but I heartily recommend it.
Currently reading
March 14, 2015What a great little book.
January 9, 2017
Clear concise writing which provides a critique on several epistemological theories before taking a stand on praxis-oriented academia
January 14, 2008
over my head
June 8, 2011
An excellent, thought-provoking, discourse on the relationship of faith and reason.
April 21, 2017
Short, clear, lots of good stuff. His critique of foundationalism would seem, however, only to apply to the most stringent and strident form. A 'chastened' version might well still be viable.
Displaying 1 - 19 of 19 reviews