Tassafaronga was the last of a series of fiercely-fought sea battles around Savo Island during the Guadalcanal campaign in World War II. With the Japanese Navy deemed by many allied sailors inferior to United States forces, the night battles should have been easily won. On November 30, 1942, Admiral Carleton Wright, the American commander, was well-prepared and found the enemy exactly where he expected them to be. He was determined to avoid the mistakes of the previous night battles. As the torpedoes of his leading destroyers hit the water and the guns of his five cruisers roared out, he had every reason to be confident of victory. It soon became apparent, however, that the enemy had been severely underestimated. Their training, weapons, and reliance on optics proved to be excellent. The U.S. Navy's reliance on new radar technology and faulty torpedoes proved devastating. Within minutes, four of Wright's five cruisers were knocked out of action, one of which still lies in the depths of Ironbottom Sound. Little has been written about this deadly night battle, but Captain Crenshaw, a gunnery officer on one of the destroyers during that fateful night, has written a detailed tactical analysis of the engagement. The Battle of Tassafaronga is illustrated with thirty photographs, ship track charts and a list of sources.
For several years I have been fascinated by the series of naval battles fought off Guadalcanal. The US Navy just kept losing until the Japanese withdrew. Seems strange.
This book adds a detailed chapter to that story, describing the final battle of the series. I appreciated that it was told from both the US and Japanese perspective, and that the author was a participant in the battle.
If you're interested in this part of WW2 history, this book will be informative and interesting. The discussion of the development of the Japanese Long Lance torpedo and the way it shaped Japanese strategy and tactics was news to me.
Even though the original book came out in the 1990s this monograph still has value, if only because it was written by a participant in the actual battle, who then took the trouble to hunt down the documentation to analyze what he experienced. Having read this you might want to then read Douglas Ford's "The Elusive Enemy," which examines how United States Naval Intelligence had such a poor understanding of the Imperial Japanese Navy, a question that haunted Crenshaw.
This slim volume describes the mostly-forgotten defeat of the US Navy by the Imperial Japanese Navy off Tassafaronga Point on Guadalcanal on November 30, 1942. The Americans had 1 heavy cruiser sunk and 3 more badly damaged, all by the torpedoes launched by the opposing force of Japanese destroyers, who lost just 1 ship of their force. The book describes the background to the battle, both strategic and tactical, how it was viewed by both sides, the conclusions drawn by the US Pacific Fleet commanders, and the technical issues involved in the Japanese victory and the American defeat. Following the battle, the American commanders reported that they had scored many fatal hits on the enemy ships (which wasn't true) and this lead Admiral Nimitz to focus on a lack of training as the primary cause of the debacle. By in large, that defeat cannot be attributed to faulty tactics or leadership but rather to errors in judgement in the design and use of the weapons available to the Americans, i.e.: their torpedoes and gunnery equipment, and how the Japanese developed the world's deadliest torpedoes and put them to good use. Frankly, the technical arrogance of the men responsible for US Navy torpedo design before and during the first half of the was unbelievable. A fine addition to our knowledge of naval tactics in World War II in the Pacific, and a not-so-subtle warning to the technical designer of weapons today.