The Myth of Morality (Cambridge Studies in Philosophy) 1st edition by Joyce, Richard (2002) Hardcover

by Richard Joyce

Richard Joyce argues in this study that moral discourse is hopelessly flawed. At the heart of ordinary moral judgments is a notion of moral inescapability, or practical authority, which, upon investigation, cannot be reasonably defended. He asserts, moreover, that natural selection is to blame, in that it has provided us with a tendency to invest the world with values that it does not contain, and demands that it does not make. This original and innovative book will appeal to readers interested in the problems of moral philosophy.

Genres: Philosophy, Nonfiction

Unknown Binding

First published January 1, 2001

Reviews

[Kevin K · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book argues for the doctrine of moral nihilism – i.e., that there are no objective moral obligations. It does this by examining the peculiar "inescapability" or "authority" which such obligations have. Consider a classic moral prohibition like "thou shalt not steal." We take it that this injunction has special force and applies to all people, regardless of various excuses they might have. For example, if a person says they don't subscribe to that morality mumbo-jumbo, or that it's certain they can steal and get away with it scot-free, or that stealing serves their desires and interests, we don't retract the prohibition and say "Oh sorry, you're right. In your case the prohibition against stealing doesn't apply." The basic idea is that moral obligations require that we do (or not do) X, regardless of whether it serves our desires or interests.

But this leads to trouble. If I must not steal, no matter what my desires are, then there should be a good reason why. Of course, you could say that the reason is the moral rule itself (i.e., "thou shalt not steal") but that's an appeal to authority, not a "real" reason. You could say: "If everyone started stealing, society would collapse." But that reason isn't inescapable because it assumes that the subject doesn't want society to collapse (i.e., the rule is dependent on the subject's desires). Or you might say: "The person you steal from will be unhappy." But that too appeals to the subject's desires (i.e., the desire to keep others happy). It seems no matter what argument we come up with to establish an inescapable reason to not steal, it always depends on the subject's desires, and can be shirked by some miscreant with unusual desires. So the question becomes: Is it even possible for a person to have a reason to do X, regardless of whether X serves his desires? This is the central question that Joyce's book sets out to answer, and his answer is "No." There are no inescapable "real" reasons. Morality is a fiction, or, as Joyce puts it, a "well-entrenched bluff."

Why would human beings have such entrenched beliefs in a fiction like morality? Joyce's answer is that morality played a useful role in the evolution of human society. It helped (and still does help) groups of people to organize themselves and cooperate. In other words, morality (like the related notion of God, perhaps?) is not entrenched because it is true, but because it is extremely useful.

The final section attempts to save the baby and discard the bath water: how do we eliminate our false beliefs in morality, and yet still maintain the practical benefits that morality provides to our societies? Joyce suggests a stance called "fictionalism" – where we recognize, in critical contexts, that morality is false, and otherwise "make believe" it is real in order to retain the benefits. I must admit the idea is strange, but it does have certain attractions. In the real world, I think much of what passes as "morality" is actually "make believe" morality aimed at advancing cynical/sectarian interests. Fictionalism isn't so much something we should shoot for; in many cases it's what we actually do. Fictionalism is also interesting because it harks back to Plato's Republic, where the citizenry is indoctrinated with "noble lies" to make them a stronger and more cohesive society. (A contrary approach among moral nihilists is "abolitionism," which calls for false moral thinking to be eliminated rather than preserved through "make believe" as in Joyce's fictionalism. A good example is The Moral Society: Its Structure and Effects.)

This is not an easy book. The arguments and terminology Joyce deploys are fairly complex, and I had to read the book twice (and take a few pages of notes) to understand it clearly. But the rewards are well worth it. It's hard to find a rigorously argued book that makes as subversive a claim as this one.

[Paul · Rating 2 out of 5]

A bit difficult to read at points as it is analytic philosophy and philosophers in that tradition can take a long time trying to justify their points logically. The book has some useful points in response to a very specific conception of morality. For information about origins of morality and a better account of what morality is, I recommend Patricia Churchland's book Conscience: The Origins of Moral Intuition.

[Stephen Cranney · Rating 5 out of 5]

Very bold.

[Ron Hins]

It's a difficult read to follow grammatically but in general it points to a fictionalism stance on moral reasoning and the moral error theory is supported pretty well.

[jeremiah]

Williams, in Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, did it better.