An assessment of the philosophical arguments on the issues surrounding civil disobedience. The contributions include classic essays from Rawls, Raz and Singer.
Hugo Adam Bedau was the Austin B. Fletcher Professor of Philosophy, Emeritus, at Tufts University, and is best known for his work on capital punishment. He has been called a "leading anti-death-penalty scholar" by Stuart Taylor Jr., who has quoted Bedau as saying "I'll let the criminal justice system execute all the McVeighs they can capture, provided they'd sentence to prison all the people who are not like Timothy McVeigh."
This is a great edited volume for those interested in learning more about civil disobedience than the typical story one get's in high school. From historical texts like Crito, Thoreau, and MLKJ, to contemporary works that challenge the common held notions of civil disobedience, Bedau covers a nice range of texts. One should keep in mind that there's been a lot of progress in the discipline since this was published though, and this book should by no means be taken as a good example of the most up to date research on civil disobedience.
This book needs a new edition with a non early-90s textbook cover. It's like the Norton Anthology of Civil Disobedience. You could teach a class. You got'cher primary sources (your Platos, your Thoreaus, your MLKs) and then you have a bunch of analysis trying to reconcile the different views and form new definitions. Plus it's fun to see John Rawls get torn to shreds in the last few essays, but it becomes redundant and keeps this from being 5 stars.
The book starts with Crito, which is a good example of why it's so dangerous to make ancient (or really any) philosophy sacrosanct. Too often these revered philosophers proceed from a priori arguments that are, really, surprisingly reductive. To wit: With a dome like that, Socrates, how could you be so obtuse?
One of the more disconcerting arguments made here is that in order to qualify as civil disobedience, one must submit to the authorities after breaking the law. I get the appeal of an absolute martyr, but let's not get crazy. At least one writer, Brian Smart, addressed this carefully:
" . . . the Rawlsian argument is that voluntary submission to the legal consequences of one's act is evidence of sincerity in the protest; the onus is on the civil disobedient to distinguish himself from a 'mere' criminal. However, there are other ways of establishing sincerity: a man might publicly break the law against taking cannabis but elude the police and seek asylum abroad where he attacks his home country's legislation through publications and filmed interviews distributed in the home country. He may have no intention of returning until amnesty is granted: why should unwillingness to suffer imprisonment for the breaking of a (to him) repressive law automatically impugn his honesty?"
Why, indeed. Yet the Rawlsian view is rampant today in stories regarding a certain fugitive whistleblower. They, like Rawls, define civil disobedience so narrowly as to strip it of any possible application, and I call disingenuous bullshit. You simply can't claim to support whistleblowing and then deny its utility in the face of extreme constitutional violations.
But that brings me to something Rawls got right:
"If those who perpetrate injustice can be clearly identified and isolated from the larger community, the convictions of the greater part of society may be of sufficient weight. Or if the contending parties are roughly equal, the sentiment of justice of those not engaged can be the deciding factor. In any case, should circumstances of this kind not obtain, the wisdom of civil disobedience is highly problematic. For unless one can appeal to the sense of justice of the larger society, the majority may simply be aroused to more repressive measures if the calculation of advantages points in this direction. Courts should take into account the civilly disobedient nature of the protester’s act, and the fact that it is justifiable (or may seem so) by the political principles underlying the constitution, and on these grounds reduce and in some cases suspend the legal sanction. Yet quite the opposite may happen when the necessary background is lacking. We have to recognize then that justifiable civil disobedience is normally a reasonable and effective form of dissent only in a society regulated to some considerable degree by a sense of justice."
In other words: If you call people's attention to a violation and they are intellectually incapable of grappling with it and/or resent the newfound knowledge, watch out.
This volume contains essays on all the main issues regarding civil disobedience including whether or not it requires non-violence and accepting punishment. If you're interested in civil disobedience this collection will give you a great overview of both past and contemporary scholarship on the issue.