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Enter the Dragon: China's Undeclared War Against the U.S. in Korea, 1950-51
China and Korea 1950-51.
335 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 1988
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About the author
Russell Spurr
9 books3 followersRussell Spurr was based in Hong Kong for more than 20 years as the China and Far East correspondent for the London Daily Express and ABC Radio Network, and the chief correspondent and deputy editor of the Far Eastern Economic Review.
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Displaying 1 - 12 of 12 reviews
March 25, 2018
A good history of China’s initial involvement in the war.
Spurr mostly focuses on the experiences of a few soldiers in a single Chinese division near the frontline, first at the Yalu and then toward Seoul. He does a great job covering the experience of China’s advisers to the North Korean army in during the start of the war, the politics behind Chinese intervention, the reluctance behind China’s decision to intervene, the chaos of battle, the shoddy intelligence picture, the hardships endured, and the courage displayed. He is equally critical of MacArthur and Mao, although he does doa great job describing how the Chinese were able to move so many men into Korea undetected with such a poor transportation system in place. Particularly vivid are the experience of Chinese officers seeing their men literally freeze to death.
Some more context would have helped. There are also a few minor errors here and there; Ridgway is called Deputy Chief of Staff for Eighth Army (not the whole Army?) It’s sometimes a little hard to keep track of Spurr’s viewpoint vs. that of the Chinese veterans he interviewed. The pictures are often of poor quality. Also, Spurr includes a lot of dialogue in the book, much of which seems like an imaginative recreation.
A fast-paced, well-written work overall.
Spurr mostly focuses on the experiences of a few soldiers in a single Chinese division near the frontline, first at the Yalu and then toward Seoul. He does a great job covering the experience of China’s advisers to the North Korean army in during the start of the war, the politics behind Chinese intervention, the reluctance behind China’s decision to intervene, the chaos of battle, the shoddy intelligence picture, the hardships endured, and the courage displayed. He is equally critical of MacArthur and Mao, although he does doa great job describing how the Chinese were able to move so many men into Korea undetected with such a poor transportation system in place. Particularly vivid are the experience of Chinese officers seeing their men literally freeze to death.
Some more context would have helped. There are also a few minor errors here and there; Ridgway is called Deputy Chief of Staff for Eighth Army (not the whole Army?) It’s sometimes a little hard to keep track of Spurr’s viewpoint vs. that of the Chinese veterans he interviewed. The pictures are often of poor quality. Also, Spurr includes a lot of dialogue in the book, much of which seems like an imaginative recreation.
A fast-paced, well-written work overall.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
March 19, 2018
Well-written, deeply engrossing account of the early period of the Korean War. Spurr follows the action largely from the North Korean and Chinese side, focusing on Chinese observers with the NK forces at the siege of the Pusan Perimeter and then following a Chinese special operations unit ("the Sharp Swords") from the Chinese entry into the war until the Chinese advance came up against Matthew Ridgway's defensive lines.
There are powerful images here--- a Chinese observer at Pusan listening to his NK hosts discuss their plans and realising that the siege is going to fail; Mao and his entourage on a visit to Moscow, wondering if Stalin's honour guards are there to arrest them; an ex-KMT general lost in a blizzard finding a column of Chinese infantry frozen to death on the march; the Chinese realising how vulnerable the American advance guard is as the US Army approaches the Yalu; Ridgway's firepower coming down on the Chinese and on the Sharp Swords south of Seoul. Spurr is a fine descriptive writer, and he tells a vivid story, based on interviews with the Chinese survivors. Well done, well worth reading.
There are powerful images here--- a Chinese observer at Pusan listening to his NK hosts discuss their plans and realising that the siege is going to fail; Mao and his entourage on a visit to Moscow, wondering if Stalin's honour guards are there to arrest them; an ex-KMT general lost in a blizzard finding a column of Chinese infantry frozen to death on the march; the Chinese realising how vulnerable the American advance guard is as the US Army approaches the Yalu; Ridgway's firepower coming down on the Chinese and on the Sharp Swords south of Seoul. Spurr is a fine descriptive writer, and he tells a vivid story, based on interviews with the Chinese survivors. Well done, well worth reading.
July 4, 2018
A unique perspective on the Korean war, this book examines it in detail from the Chinese side.
China really cannot be faulted for taking part in the Korean war. They told, warned and warned the "UN" to not go too far north in Korea but they were ignored.
The stories told in this book are incredibly detailed and really show the Korean war in a way few other authors have ever done.
A terrific edition to any serious Korean War library.
My Rating: 5 stars
This review first appeared: https://www.nnlightsbookheaven.com/si...
China really cannot be faulted for taking part in the Korean war. They told, warned and warned the "UN" to not go too far north in Korea but they were ignored.
The stories told in this book are incredibly detailed and really show the Korean war in a way few other authors have ever done.
A terrific edition to any serious Korean War library.
My Rating: 5 stars
This review first appeared: https://www.nnlightsbookheaven.com/si...
April 14, 2018
Russel Spurr was a British-Australian journalist who spent most of his life reporting from East Asia (20 years in Hong Kong), during which time he made many trips to China and Taiwan and interviewed multiple veterans of the Chinese intervention in Korea to write what was probably the first book covering the Korean war from the Chinese perspective (published in 1988). The book (Enter the Dragon. China’s undeclared war against the US in Korea 1950-51) provides a great introduction to the “other side” of the Korean conflict. Writing in journalistic style, he freely recreates conversations and scenes that obviously rely on accounts of survivors as well as his own imagination, but that does not mean he has not done his research. He knows his history and the bare facts are always accurate. And whatever the book lacks in typical military history details, it more than makes up in the form of vivid anecdotes that really bring the war to life.
Far too many Western accounts of the war portray the Chinese as some kind of undifferentiated mass of “Reds” who come across the mountains in human waves and overwhelm the Americans by sheer force of numbers, getting tens of thousands of their own robot soldiers killed in the process. This is very misleading, and the most valuable contribution of Spurr’s book is to put such caricatures to rest. The Chinese intervention in Korea was well planned and methodical. Lacking modern weapons and logistical support, the PLA nonetheless was an organized force, with high morale, great elan and some excellent leaders. Marshal Peng Dehuai had already made his mark in the Chinese civil war, and thanks to interviews with some of his staff officers, Spurr is able to provide a detailed picture of his leadership and initiative in Korea. Badly equipped and lacking all modern amenities, he (and the Chinese leadership in general) were still determined not to allow the Americans to conquer all of Korea. They knew their own weaknesses and compensated for them by using vast networks of coolies to carry supplies, by using captured supplies, by marching great distances on foot along mountain tracks to surprise the enemy, and by attacking at night to nullify America’s superior firepower and total domination of the air. They studied their opposite leaders and were well aware of MacArthur’s island hopping exploits in the second world war (when the North Koreans failed to break into the Pusan pocket, Chinese staff officers fully expected MacArthur to go for a bold amphibious landing, the only question was where).
While they frequently had a cartoonish view of the GIs as uniformly soft and easily scared, their view of their American adversaries was much more realistic than the cartoonish view the Americans had of the “Chinese coolies”. In fact, the Chinese do seem to have tried to signal that total destruction of North Korea would not be allowed, and they hoped that the Americans would understand these signals. Unfortunately, the Americans (and in particular, MacArthur) were not mentally ready to see the Chinese as a respectable power with its own interests (somewhat understandable, given recent Chinese history), while the Chinese, for all their material backwardness, saw themselves as a great civilization, and were determined to be respected as one. The first phase of their counter-attack in Korea was well planned, brilliantly executed and led to the most humiliating retreat in US military history. These were not “meat-grinder” operations in which tens of thousands of Chinese died in human wave assaults, they were a series of well executed attacks that completely unbalanced the US forces and induced such defeatism that the US not only retreated from its positions near the Chinese borders, but did not even try to hold a line around Pyongyang (something they could have done, if they had been better led).
Ultimately, General Matthew Ridgeway arrived to take charge of the demoralized American troops and reversed their losses, retaking Seoul and fighting the Chinese to a standstill at the 38th parallel. In this phase, the Chinese did suffer horrendous casualties (and North Korea was bombed into the stone age), but by then Marshal Peng and his troops had made their point: Chinese core interests (as defined by the Chinese) would be defended, no matter what the cost.
The book is full of fascinating anecdotes, but the one that will forever stay in my mind is of Colonel Wong passing through the frozen wastes of North Korea at the height of winter and being surprised by the site of dozens and then hundreds of snowmen scattered across the land; until his North Korean driver tells him that these are Chinese coolies and soldiers who froze to death in the arctic cold and have been covered by snow. The other is his description of the last days of the great Marshal Peng Dehuai. Marshal Peng, a straight shooting peasant revolutionary, made the fatal mistake of questioning Mao’s actions during the Great Leap Forward. For this, he was removed from his posts, arrested and then repeatedly beaten in the course of 130 brutal interrogations until he died under torture after many years of imprisonment.
The other notable point in the book is that even when completely down and out, and certainly as soon as they were even a little bit back on their feet, the North Koreans deferred to no one. Even though it was the Chinese who were doing almost all the fighting at that point, the North Koreans insisted on maintaining appearances (the Chinese as their guests, the North Koreans as the primary actors in the war) and today the gigantic Korean war museum in Pyongyang has only one picture showing Chinese volunteers crossing the Yalu, everything else is Korean.
Spurr has the war correspondents disdain for the senior brass of his own army and has a special dislike for MacArthur, so he may be a little unfair when it comes to the supreme commander, but overall this is a fair and balanced book and one that fills a real gap in histories of the Korean war. In a way, Spurr was lucky he got into China to research this when the Chinese were repudiating the Cultural revolution and Maoism and his interlocutors were able to talk to him relatively freely. That degree of openness may not be possible now. It is possible that other researchers have dug up material that was not available to Spurr when he wrote this book in the 1980s, but I am not aware of another (English language) book that presents the Chinese side in this manner. Definitely worth reading.
Far too many Western accounts of the war portray the Chinese as some kind of undifferentiated mass of “Reds” who come across the mountains in human waves and overwhelm the Americans by sheer force of numbers, getting tens of thousands of their own robot soldiers killed in the process. This is very misleading, and the most valuable contribution of Spurr’s book is to put such caricatures to rest. The Chinese intervention in Korea was well planned and methodical. Lacking modern weapons and logistical support, the PLA nonetheless was an organized force, with high morale, great elan and some excellent leaders. Marshal Peng Dehuai had already made his mark in the Chinese civil war, and thanks to interviews with some of his staff officers, Spurr is able to provide a detailed picture of his leadership and initiative in Korea. Badly equipped and lacking all modern amenities, he (and the Chinese leadership in general) were still determined not to allow the Americans to conquer all of Korea. They knew their own weaknesses and compensated for them by using vast networks of coolies to carry supplies, by using captured supplies, by marching great distances on foot along mountain tracks to surprise the enemy, and by attacking at night to nullify America’s superior firepower and total domination of the air. They studied their opposite leaders and were well aware of MacArthur’s island hopping exploits in the second world war (when the North Koreans failed to break into the Pusan pocket, Chinese staff officers fully expected MacArthur to go for a bold amphibious landing, the only question was where).
While they frequently had a cartoonish view of the GIs as uniformly soft and easily scared, their view of their American adversaries was much more realistic than the cartoonish view the Americans had of the “Chinese coolies”. In fact, the Chinese do seem to have tried to signal that total destruction of North Korea would not be allowed, and they hoped that the Americans would understand these signals. Unfortunately, the Americans (and in particular, MacArthur) were not mentally ready to see the Chinese as a respectable power with its own interests (somewhat understandable, given recent Chinese history), while the Chinese, for all their material backwardness, saw themselves as a great civilization, and were determined to be respected as one. The first phase of their counter-attack in Korea was well planned, brilliantly executed and led to the most humiliating retreat in US military history. These were not “meat-grinder” operations in which tens of thousands of Chinese died in human wave assaults, they were a series of well executed attacks that completely unbalanced the US forces and induced such defeatism that the US not only retreated from its positions near the Chinese borders, but did not even try to hold a line around Pyongyang (something they could have done, if they had been better led).
Ultimately, General Matthew Ridgeway arrived to take charge of the demoralized American troops and reversed their losses, retaking Seoul and fighting the Chinese to a standstill at the 38th parallel. In this phase, the Chinese did suffer horrendous casualties (and North Korea was bombed into the stone age), but by then Marshal Peng and his troops had made their point: Chinese core interests (as defined by the Chinese) would be defended, no matter what the cost.
The book is full of fascinating anecdotes, but the one that will forever stay in my mind is of Colonel Wong passing through the frozen wastes of North Korea at the height of winter and being surprised by the site of dozens and then hundreds of snowmen scattered across the land; until his North Korean driver tells him that these are Chinese coolies and soldiers who froze to death in the arctic cold and have been covered by snow. The other is his description of the last days of the great Marshal Peng Dehuai. Marshal Peng, a straight shooting peasant revolutionary, made the fatal mistake of questioning Mao’s actions during the Great Leap Forward. For this, he was removed from his posts, arrested and then repeatedly beaten in the course of 130 brutal interrogations until he died under torture after many years of imprisonment.
The other notable point in the book is that even when completely down and out, and certainly as soon as they were even a little bit back on their feet, the North Koreans deferred to no one. Even though it was the Chinese who were doing almost all the fighting at that point, the North Koreans insisted on maintaining appearances (the Chinese as their guests, the North Koreans as the primary actors in the war) and today the gigantic Korean war museum in Pyongyang has only one picture showing Chinese volunteers crossing the Yalu, everything else is Korean.
Spurr has the war correspondents disdain for the senior brass of his own army and has a special dislike for MacArthur, so he may be a little unfair when it comes to the supreme commander, but overall this is a fair and balanced book and one that fills a real gap in histories of the Korean war. In a way, Spurr was lucky he got into China to research this when the Chinese were repudiating the Cultural revolution and Maoism and his interlocutors were able to talk to him relatively freely. That degree of openness may not be possible now. It is possible that other researchers have dug up material that was not available to Spurr when he wrote this book in the 1980s, but I am not aware of another (English language) book that presents the Chinese side in this manner. Definitely worth reading.
October 28, 2012
This was an excellently written book. Spurr is not a historian but rather a journalist, having covered the Korean War on the ground; as such the book is not written in an academic tone though Spurr did do his research. The book is written primarily from the viewpoint of the Chinese who did the fighting against the American, South Korean, British and Turkish forces. He was able to get interviews with them by traveling to Taiwan where many had been expatriated to following the war. (Alluding to the victories later won by the UN forces led by the American General Matt Ridgeway.) As such the book reads almost like a novel as Spurr relies heavily on the accounts of the interviewed Chinese themselves to tell the tale though he does throw in his own analysis at times.
Certainly the book opens the door to who is almost always the faceless mass of the 'Red' foe in most Korean War history's. Just for this alone the book is worth the cost. The Chinese were EXCELLENT soldiers with fantastic junior leadership, great morale, elan and the will to press their victories home to the fullest advantage. (Something the American forces pre-Ridgeway were not willing to do.) Also the book sheds a little light on who should be considered one of the better commanders of the 20th century: Peng Dehuai. It was Peng who led the Chinese forces to victory over the UN forces in what still stands as the greatest defeat (outside of the fall of the Philippines) the US Army has ever suffered. Someone else who comes off well in the narrative, though only towards the end of the book, is General Matt Ridgeway who was clearly able to whip the UN forces into shape and with the mantra of 'find them, fix them, fight them, finish them!' was able to grind the Chinese Army down in a series of battles that retook Seoul for the last time and forced the war into a stalemate.
The book showcases just how much MacArthur failed as a commander by ignoring the intelligence that practically screamed that the Chinese really were coming. (Although to be fair, Spurr alludes early on that he doesn't like MacArthur so this may color the narrative) Also he showcases the near ineptness of the US forces outside of the Marines pre-Ridgeway. In one memorable scene US tanks are in support of a South Korean attack on a position that proves to be held by Chinese rather than North Korean forces near the Yalu River. The US tankers panic at the slightest bit of fire and hold back, separating themselves from the South Korean infantry. When the Chinese hammer the South Koreans and force them to retreat the US tankers panic thinking their under attack and fire into the poor South Koreans. Previously having fought bravely and well the South Koreans throw down their weapons and leave the field...not out of panic however, but out of disgust at all the hell they've been put through. The ineptness of their own allies being the final straw.
The North Koreans too come across mixed. Although their military officers who fought at the front are respected and at times able to impress their Chinese counterparts, for the most part the Chinese are off put by the customs of their Korean Communist brethren and all but insulted by the actions of the Kim dynasty who downplay to the point of obscurity the Chinese contribution. (Ironic seeing as how after China's intervention the vast majority of Communist forces would be Chinese while the North Koreans would play at best a minor role in the war following the winter of 1950.) At the end of the book Spurr relates a story of a visitor to the official North Korean museum of the war. The displays for the North Koreans are vast, while there is only one single, small, picture of Chinese troops crossing the Yalu over a bridge into North Korea. When asked the guide merely replied 'Oh yes, the Chinese helped some too...'
Although you have to have read up on the Korean War to put the story in its proper context (and realize that it only tells the story of the initial Chinese intervention and not their whole part in the war)this is a very good book and opens one's eyes to the humanity of the other side of the hill during the Korean War. Very recommended.
Certainly the book opens the door to who is almost always the faceless mass of the 'Red' foe in most Korean War history's. Just for this alone the book is worth the cost. The Chinese were EXCELLENT soldiers with fantastic junior leadership, great morale, elan and the will to press their victories home to the fullest advantage. (Something the American forces pre-Ridgeway were not willing to do.) Also the book sheds a little light on who should be considered one of the better commanders of the 20th century: Peng Dehuai. It was Peng who led the Chinese forces to victory over the UN forces in what still stands as the greatest defeat (outside of the fall of the Philippines) the US Army has ever suffered. Someone else who comes off well in the narrative, though only towards the end of the book, is General Matt Ridgeway who was clearly able to whip the UN forces into shape and with the mantra of 'find them, fix them, fight them, finish them!' was able to grind the Chinese Army down in a series of battles that retook Seoul for the last time and forced the war into a stalemate.
The book showcases just how much MacArthur failed as a commander by ignoring the intelligence that practically screamed that the Chinese really were coming. (Although to be fair, Spurr alludes early on that he doesn't like MacArthur so this may color the narrative) Also he showcases the near ineptness of the US forces outside of the Marines pre-Ridgeway. In one memorable scene US tanks are in support of a South Korean attack on a position that proves to be held by Chinese rather than North Korean forces near the Yalu River. The US tankers panic at the slightest bit of fire and hold back, separating themselves from the South Korean infantry. When the Chinese hammer the South Koreans and force them to retreat the US tankers panic thinking their under attack and fire into the poor South Koreans. Previously having fought bravely and well the South Koreans throw down their weapons and leave the field...not out of panic however, but out of disgust at all the hell they've been put through. The ineptness of their own allies being the final straw.
The North Koreans too come across mixed. Although their military officers who fought at the front are respected and at times able to impress their Chinese counterparts, for the most part the Chinese are off put by the customs of their Korean Communist brethren and all but insulted by the actions of the Kim dynasty who downplay to the point of obscurity the Chinese contribution. (Ironic seeing as how after China's intervention the vast majority of Communist forces would be Chinese while the North Koreans would play at best a minor role in the war following the winter of 1950.) At the end of the book Spurr relates a story of a visitor to the official North Korean museum of the war. The displays for the North Koreans are vast, while there is only one single, small, picture of Chinese troops crossing the Yalu over a bridge into North Korea. When asked the guide merely replied 'Oh yes, the Chinese helped some too...'
Although you have to have read up on the Korean War to put the story in its proper context (and realize that it only tells the story of the initial Chinese intervention and not their whole part in the war)this is a very good book and opens one's eyes to the humanity of the other side of the hill during the Korean War. Very recommended.
July 21, 2020
I thoroughly enjoyed this book as it presented these early years of the war from the Chinese perspective. All in all this seemed to have been a war driven by hubris on all sides at varying times - The North Koreans for starting the war and then being allowed by the Chinese to save face by acting like they pushed America back, the Americans (MacArthur) for driving north to the Yalu and inciting the Chinese, followed by the Chinese attempt to push the US (and South Koreans) out of Korea entirely once they felt they had an "easy" time of pushing the US south of the 38th parallel. Tough, tough war for the soldiers on all sides who bore the brunt of the miscalculations of the decision-makers.
May 2, 2025
Very well researched and written presenting China's entry into the Korean War from their perspective. Based on interviews and official records Spurr explores the reasons for the Chinese entrance into the war at a relatively late stage. The UN advance to the Yalu was a threat to the new nations sovereignty and had to be countered. The lack of readiness of the Chinese Army was glaring. Their strategy was to overwhelm their enemy with the one thing they had in abundance - manpower. The many shortcomings in weapons, training, and logistics was obvious and proved to be their downfall.
June 6, 2022
Excellent narrative on the Korean War from the Chinese perspective.
April 8, 2012
Written more as a journalistic account than a scholarly work, Russell Spur’s book stands as an important backdrop to today’s situation on the Korean Peninsula. With the succession from Kim Jong-il to his son Kim Jong-eun, an economy habitually tittering on the edge of near collapse, and an impoverished, oppressed population, there is growing concern about the stability and longevity of the North Korean regime. Would a collapse precipitate a Republic of Korea-led intervention, which would certainly require U.S. participation, and very likely pull in U.S. military forces? If the answer to that question is yes, the next question is then – what would North Korea’s northern neighbor and patron, China, do? Would they stand by and let a long-standing socialist ally go by the wayside like what happen to the former Soviet Union’s backed Warsaw Pact states, giving a regional and global competitor, the U.S., direct assess to it northeastern border through its South Korean treaty partner? If Beijing’s response is counter-intervention, then Spurr’s book still holds potential important lessons concerning Chinese will and means to project its growing power into the fray. It should be noted that with the People’s Liberation Army modernizing at an almost frenetic pace, their capability to intervene is improving with each passing year. Washington and the U.S. military’s command in Japan terribly misread the Chinese leadership’s red-lines in 1950. Let us only hope that we have a better understanding today, and that our vision is not blinded, but we are prepared to negotiate such a crisis with eyes wide open.
October 16, 2011
This account of the results of the entry of China into the Korean War is noteworthy in that it was based on Chinese sources, including interview material. As such, it was a valuable addition to the literature when it appeared in 1988.
May 18, 2013
Not a scholarly history but still gave me insights into modern Chinese history I never had.
Displaying 1 - 12 of 12 reviews