Radical Embodied Cognitive Science

by Anthony Chemero

A proposal for a new way to do cognitive science argues that cognition should be described in terms of agent-environment dynamics rather than computation and representation.   While philosophers of mind have been arguing over the status of mental representations in cognitive science, cognitive scientists have been quietly engaged in studying perception, action, and cognition without explaining them in terms of mental representation. In this book, Anthony Chemero describes this nonrepresentational approach (which he terms radical embodied cognitive science), puts it in historical and conceptual context, and applies it to traditional problems in the philosophy of mind. Radical embodied cognitive science is a direct descendant of the American naturalist psychology of William James and John Dewey, and follows them in viewing perception and cognition to be understandable only in terms of action in the environment. Chemero argues that cognition should be described in terms of agent-environment dynamics rather than in terms of computation and representation. After outlining this orientation to cognition, Chemero proposes a dynamical systems theory, which would explain things dynamically and without reference to representation. He also advances a background Gibsonian ecological psychology, “shored up” and clarified. Chemero then looks at some traditional philosophical problems (reductionism, epistemological skepticism, metaphysical realism, consciousness) through the lens of radical embodied cognitive science and concludes that the comparative ease with which it resolves these problems, combined with its empirical promise, makes this approach to cognitive science a rewarding one. “Jerry Fodor is my favorite philosopher,” Chemero writes in his preface, adding, “I think that Jerry Fodor is wrong about nearly everything.” With this book, Chemero explains nonrepresentational, dynamical, ecological cognitive science as clearly and as rigorously as Jerry Fodor explained computational cognitive science in his classic work The Language of Thought.

Genres: Philosophy, Science, Psychology, Nonfiction, Neuroscience

272 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 2009

Reviews

[Vincent Tijms · Rating 4 out of 5]

Some quick comments on this excellent book:

* The case for antirepresentationalism did not get to me. Then again, I'd say that a retinal activation is already a representation (even according to the definition Chemero offers). The fact that cognitive maps have been succesfully decoded from hippocampal place cell information shows just to what extent such representations are maintained in the brain. I am not sure whether direct perception can explain this.

* The dynamic system models are put forward as being not merely descriptive of cognitive systems, but revealing as to their nature. The fact that the same equations apply to widely different systems should already give pause. I don't think they argue against representations in any way - it's just the the representations are not explicitly there in the model. Not looking at steady state dynamical coupling, but looking at the spread of oscillatory coupling (which requires an admittedly high temporal resolution) would reveal time constants on the order of neural processing, I'm sure. This process of coupling uses representations - at least in the sense of the word that I would use as a neuroscientist. We know this not through the dynamic systems model that hides the variables, but through mechanistic work on brain processing. Compare this to the transfer of oscillations through direct physical coupling, where it's molecular collisions carrying phase information: http://salt.uaa.alaska.edu/dept/metro...

* Direct perception of temporal derivatives like tau (or of tau, even) seems impossible without some form of memory, as physical events exist at specific points in time. Using an oscillatory model with momentum could solve some of this (and I would not object to anyone claiming such an echo is not a representation, although one could argue in favor of such a view), but only up to a certain point. Memory is a huge problem for direct perception, I would say. Chemero sidesteps this point by looking away from representations that are causally uncoupled, arguing that he best make his point for the more general case of representationalism. However, there's nothing general about focusing on the existence of representations that are still coupled to the mind through sensory input

* Affordances truly offer a better way of doing behavioral science. I think even the radical reductionists from this book would admit they need to know their behavioral science - looking at this in terms of affordances could prove very fruitful. Not because they are perceived directly (they could just as well be computationally derived) but because they allow for a sophisticated behavioral setup and, while behavioral scientists can do without the brain, cognitive neuroscientists can't do without behavior.

I think there are some more points, but I will leave it at that. Hopefully, I will be able to write a clearer review soon.

RECS is a fascinating read for anyone who takes cognitive science seriously. Even if you do not agree with the main points made in the book, it will still open your mind to considering the field from a different perspective, which is only healthy when setting up and interpreting experiments. The book makes clear how the dynamic systems model can offer a way of approaching cognition from a different perspective, opens the way for extraneural cognition to be taken seriously (which I think is really necessary at this point) and forces the reader to think deep and hard about representations.

Do leave a comment if you'd like to discuss this title!

[Alina · Rating 4 out of 5]

Chemero grounds embodied cognition empirically in dynamical systems theory and Gibson's ecological psychology. Moreover, he defends embodied cognition from the threat of irrealism by evoking Hacking's entity realism as the proper kind of scientific realism that can fittingly describe embodied cognition. I found his summaries of the major attempts to make ecological psychology a mature scientific field very useful, and his criticisms of these attempts and new reconceptualization of ecological psychology were convincing. He also summaries the major achievements of scientists who have used dynamical systems theory to model human and other animal behaviors. Readers looking for such mathematical and empirical grounding of embodied cognition will be satisfied.

Overall, I love how Chemero can so neatly tie together the mathematical equations of dynamical systems theory all with the romantic metaphysics of Gibson's ecological psychology. It makes the latter more compelling, so much so that at the end, he can make the controversial claim that perception is identical with experience without it seeming controversial at all. However, I am disappointed that he claims that dynamical systems and ecological psychology can account for the "representation-hungry" activities of language, memory, planning, etc. but fails to elaborate on this claim with arguments, empirical or conceptual. The furthest he goes is to present empirical studies on dynamic systems that are capable of extreme decoupling, but he doesn't show how these systems could account for those representation-hungry activities. To me, how the phenomenological landscape of memory, imagination, and creativity works is the most fascinating question of all, and that is the precise question Chemero leaves unaddressed.

[Ted Stark · Rating 4 out of 5]

Good introduction to recent thinking in cognitive science and the nature of consciousness and perception. I could understand most of it and enjoyed Chemero's style. I would like to hear him speak one day.

[Daniel Martínez · Rating 5 out of 5]

El cap 1y el 9 son verdaderamente buenos. Una bueno intro a la ciencia cognitiva desde el enfoque ecológico. Su teoría de los affordances no me convence del todo, pero el libro en general es bastante bueno.

[C · Rating 2 out of 5]

I have almost no background in cognitive science, and philosophy of mind. I read some Descartes and some Spinoza, does that make me an expert?

But something about this book strikes me as wholly false. It seems to be that Chemero is 1) conflating CONSCIOUSNESS with BEHAVIOR, as if the two are interchangeable. 2) He's ignoring ontologically stratified levels of explanation. Or, in less philosophically loaded terms, science is stratified: Physics begets Chemistry, which begets Biology, which begets... And Chemero is committed to reductionism. Meaning if a lower level can predict the behavior of a higher level, than the higher level is no longer adequate for an explaining consciousness. Even if that's true that we no longer need a higher level PREDICTION, it doesn't follow that we no longer need a higher level EXPLANATION.

Example (this is not true about me):It may be true that given my atomic structure, I was always destined to get nauseous at cocktail parties. And knowing where all my atoms are at one point in time will help predict when they'll be in a nauseous position at a cocktail party. But this doesn't explain what it is about the cocktail parties that invokes this degree of anxiety in me which leads to nausea. That requires a 'higher' level explanation, and as a philosopher, and someone with a conscious ailment, that secondary explanation isn't less important because of the predictive power of the previous
explanation.

There's other issues with this book, but to be frank if it was titled Radical Embodied Behavioral Science, I'd give it 5 stars and say "i agree 100%", but cognitive science? We'd all be taken aback if Stephen Hawking came out with a book called "Radical Sociology" and proceeded to do physics.

[Tom · Rating 4 out of 5]

Interesting argument about the role of representation in computationalist explanations of cognition. Introduction to the modeling of cognition with dynamical systems theory. Introduction to Gibson's ecological psychology and his notion of affordances. Not as imaginative or engaging regarding re-conceptualizing cognition as a shared activity between the agent/environment as Andy Clark's work, but it seems like most of the people who read this book would already be familiar with Clark, so the author didn't feel like he needed to do much convincing on that front. In fact, he repeatedly states that he doesn't think Clark goes far enough, and that his so-called "representation-hungry" problems can be explained without representation.

[Geoffreyjen · Rating 4 out of 5]

An excellent book that portrays a current of modern research and thought concerned with a more "radical" reading of embodied cognition than that adopted by much of current scholarship on the subject. What I like about the radical approach is that the assertions are stronger and hence more easily addressed, either in terms of proofs or disproofs, than the middle ground of other embodied cognition approaches such as that of Clarke. Also the stronger statements make for a particularly clear treatment of a subject that can sometimes get quite murky. Recommended for those concerned with the embodied cognition program.

[Grig O' · Rating 4 out of 5]

As a cognitive science neophyte I can say I really enjoyed this book... what can I say, I'm a sucker for anything with "radical" in the title :)

A lean, well-written book that makes a strong case for the many aspects of cognition that can be explained in a direct, embodied way, without involving representations. How far this paradigm can be taken remains to be seen, but so far it seems like a fruitful direction. It's done a great job of opening me up to the subject and I intend to keep reading.

[Virginia MD · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a very thought provoking book.