Jeane Duane Kirkpatrick, née Jordan and writing as Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, was an American ambassador and an ardent anticommunist. After serving as Ronald Reagan's foreign policy adviser in his 1980 campaign and later in his Cabinet, the longtime Democrat-turned-Republican was nominated as the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations and became the first woman to hold this position.
She is famous for her "Kirkpatrick Doctrine," which advocated U.S. support of anticommunist governments around the world, including authoritarian dictatorships, if they went along with Washington's aims—believing they could be led into democracy by example. She wrote, "Traditional authoritarian governments are less repressive than revolutionary autocracies."
Kirkpatrick served on Reagan's Cabinet on the National Security Council, Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Defense Policy Review Board, and chaired the Secretary of Defense Commission on Fail Safe and Risk reduction of the Nuclear Command and Control System.
Jeane Kirkpatrick is a foreign policy expert that represented the United States at the UN during the peak of the Cold War conflict during the Reagan administration. In her book, Dictatorships and Double Standards, she highlights several examples of failures of US foreign policy as well as gives insight to the political atmosphere, and the state the world is in now. The advice that stuck out the most to me was her advice she gave on how to handle dictators.
The book is wealth on knowledge and her opinions on the foreign policy of the United States is more relevant now then ever due to the recent Arab Spring which overthrew several American supported leaders. I agree that the American media can be easily swayed to support an attractive, sexy revolution that fights against an ageing American supported dictatorship without thinking past the revolution. It validates the fears that me and many other conservatives had during the Arab Spring. The fear that the Arab Spring would not yield democracy, but instead another dictatorship worse then before. When Kirkpatrick was reflecting on America’s obsessions with change, she said “The American commitment to ‘change’ in the abstract ends up by aligning us tacitly with Soviet clients and irresponsible extremists like Ayatollah Khomeini or, in the end, Yasir Arafat” (pg. 41). I learned a lot about how connect the all of the world is to each other and how the media plays into the hands of revolutionist and manipulates the world perception of all political figures. I feel that the world has started to shrink smaller everyday as each conflict has become understandable, thanks to this book.
Published in 1982, this compilation of essays address the consequences of appeasement of tyrants by 'good intentioned' U.S. foreign policy makers. When their policies fail, as they always do and as they must, Kirkpatrick illustrates that those policy wonks are never critically introspective. They remain convinced their, predictably wrongheaded decisions will work and thus double down as they move to their next project. In the process, Kirkpatrick explains why totalitarian governments have wide and enduring appeal. Perhaps the book's greatest appeal is Kirkpatrick's college lecture quality discussion of our own political foundations. Great read and timeless. Though published almost 40 years ago, Kirkpatrick's book with very few alterations could have been written anytime after 2008 to present. A great legacy to a great Conservative American intellectual. RIP, Ambassador Kirkpatrick.
A clear thinking, strong, articulate voice for conservatism. This book is a compilation of of Kirkpatrick speeches and writings. As such, the reader is treated to multiple, enlightened arguments she made in favor of Conservatism.
This book is referenced multiple times in "Rise of the Vulcans" as the foundation used by Bush's war cabinet when it came to foreign policy. This treatise is dense and took a fair bit of focus to muck my way through it. The foreign policy part raises some interesting ideological questions (eg when thinking of foreign policy, how much does a country need to insert its own needs for national security, etc. versus the effort placed on working with or helping foreign nations. Some of the arguments boiled down, time and again, to Carter was an idiot without much factual support. However, the majority of the arguments were thought out quite well. The domestic affairs part was much less concrete and could have been summarized in several pages by aggregating the final paragraphs from each section.