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Codeword Barbarossa by Barton Whaley
On June 21, 1941, Alfred Liskov, a German soldier stationed on the Russo-German border, defected to the Soviet army to reveal that the German invasion of Russia was due within a few hours. A startled Moscow sent a midnight alert to its border troops, but it was too late. Operation BARBAROSSA had begun. Thus began one of the greatest military surprises in history. Not only was Stalin completely duped, but so were all the world's intelligence services. Until now, experts and historians alike have remained mistaken as to who was fooled and how. Herein, Whaley unravels the BARBAROSSA mystery. This is a case study of the decisive role of secret intelligence, code breaking, and counter-espionage at one of the turning points of history. Whaley's solution will cause scholars to reexamine the role and causes of surprise in world affairs and will please any mystery fan.
Hardcover
First published June 29, 1973
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Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews
January 29, 2013
this ground breaking book examined the success of nazi counter intel to infect soviet, allied and axis intel by positing possible outcomes to hide the gathering of german troops on the eastern front. it wasn't enough to feign a british invasion, but necessary to lead stalin to believe hitler would offer an ultimatum for land-grab prior to invasion. whaley goes through pre-velvet revolution records and finds enough evidence to prove his exceptional theories. appended documentation 1/4 of book.
July 23, 2018
On June 21, 1941, Alfred Liskov, a German soldier stationed on the Russo-German border, defected to the Soviet army to reveal that the German invasion of Russia was due within a few hours. A startled Moscow sent a midnight alert to its border troops, but it was too late. Operation BARBAROSSA had begun. Thus began one of the greatest military surprises in history. Not only was Stalin completely duped, but so were all the world's intelligence services. Until now, experts and historians alike have remained mistaken as to who was fooled and how. Herein, Whaley unravels the BARBAROSSA mystery. This is a case study of the decisive role of secret intelligence, code breaking, and counter-espionage at one of the turning points of history. Whaley's solution will cause scholars to reexamine the role and causes of surprise in world affairs and will please any mystery fan.
April 10, 2025
This book was written by one of the leading lights in the literature on intelligence and deception. Whaley himself stated that he was largely inspired by the example set by Roberta Wohlstetter in her monograph on the surprise achieved at Pearl Harbour by the Japanese.
This book was difficult to get through, the first half of the book deals with enumerating and describing every single warning or potential warning that Stalin might have received. Some of these were wide of the mark, constituting Wohlstetter's 'noise.'
Whaley goes into the source of many of these warnings or predictions, getting sidetracked in things like the identity of the Lucy Spy Ring in Switzerland.
Immediately following upon this section is a section on who in the German Government was privy to the information on Barbarossa, and when they were told.
These sections are monotonous and excruciatingly dull. But I suppose they set the necessary backdrop to the analysis that forms the core premise of the work.
The most interesting part involves the actual surprise and deception. In a work on military deception involving many contributing authors, a few psychologists suggested that it is easier to deceive an enemy when you play upon his preconceived notions.
Here we see Hitler doing just that. Stalin was evidently convinced of two unshakeable tenets. One, that Germany would not attack Russia while England was yet undefeated. And two, that Hitler would present Russia with an ultimatum before the attack, as he had done with Poland and Czechoslovakia.
In this he deceived himself.
Whaley records a number of warnings received by Soviet intelligence, including the famous ones from Sorge and Trepper, from the German resistance around Canaris, and from the American and British Governments. Stalin dismissed a lot of these as being based on sources of no credibility, or based on deliberate attempts to provoke a war between Germany and the Soviet Union.
Another section sheds light on cryptanalysis and Whaley reveals that everyone was reading everyone else's diplomatic traffic. Much is made in popular culture of the British success with Ultra, and American success with Magic, but the surprise is that the Germans were reading everyone's communications, while everyone else was listening in on a least a few others.
This makes the idea of keeping secrets less likely, but there was also the chance of being deliberately misled. Whaley provides an example of this with Goebbels supposedly revealing, without authorisation, the imminent invasion of England. He was even 'punished' to increase the credibility of this ruse.
Prior German plans also provided great, legitimate (if unintentional) cover. Sea Lion itself provided the best, but the Germans were also able to use plans like Felix, Marita, and Sunflower to both disguise their real purpose and give them an excuse to deploy forces in Poland. As late as Mercury the Germans were claiming that the airborne assault on Crete was a rehearsal for the invasion of England.
To reinforce this impression the Germans also carried out two elaborate deceptions based on Norway and France called Shark and Harpoon, which simulated the gathering of shipping and the conducting of landing exercises to make it seem like England was the actual target. Classic misdirection.
Whaley makes it clear at the end that Stalin was not alone in being deceived. Every government was similarly misled. Though some like Churchill and Roosevelt possibly foresaw Barbarossa, the British and American Governments at large did not.
Even many Germans who had not been informed came to the conclusion that Hitler would give Stalin an ultimatum.
Indeed, part of Hitler's deception was to deliberately keep his own Foreign Ministry in the dark, not least because Ribbentrop was a staunch advocate of the Soviet-German pact that he had created and given his name to. This was a clever bit of trickery because the German diplomats could sincerely deny any intentions of attack because they had not been told of them.
Some interesting sidelights include de Gaulle's suggestion that Vichy proved stubborn over Syria because Vichy had surmised that Hitler was going to turn east, thus relieving the pressure in the west. Could Franco have known too? Was this was why Hitler's western dreams, as described by Norman Goda, went up in smoke at Hendaye and Montoire?
Another observation is that Whaley suggests Hitler's secrecy turned against him when Rommel succeeded too well in North Africa, without orders, which prompted the British reaction in the Eastern Mediterranean.
This presupposes that Hitler would not have committed himself to Greece and Crete had this not occurred, and further presumes that the Balkans actually delayed Barbarossa. This has been hotly contested since Barbarossa was launched. At any rate these make for some interesting reflexions.
As a little twist Whaley adds a bit of novelty of his own, to buttress and expand on Wohlstetter. I feel like it would be ruining the surprise to reveal it, but his conclusions are quite fascinating.
If you can slog through the tedious minutiae that characterises the first one-hundred and fifty pages of the work, it is quite worth the effort.
This book was difficult to get through, the first half of the book deals with enumerating and describing every single warning or potential warning that Stalin might have received. Some of these were wide of the mark, constituting Wohlstetter's 'noise.'
Whaley goes into the source of many of these warnings or predictions, getting sidetracked in things like the identity of the Lucy Spy Ring in Switzerland.
Immediately following upon this section is a section on who in the German Government was privy to the information on Barbarossa, and when they were told.
These sections are monotonous and excruciatingly dull. But I suppose they set the necessary backdrop to the analysis that forms the core premise of the work.
The most interesting part involves the actual surprise and deception. In a work on military deception involving many contributing authors, a few psychologists suggested that it is easier to deceive an enemy when you play upon his preconceived notions.
Here we see Hitler doing just that. Stalin was evidently convinced of two unshakeable tenets. One, that Germany would not attack Russia while England was yet undefeated. And two, that Hitler would present Russia with an ultimatum before the attack, as he had done with Poland and Czechoslovakia.
In this he deceived himself.
Whaley records a number of warnings received by Soviet intelligence, including the famous ones from Sorge and Trepper, from the German resistance around Canaris, and from the American and British Governments. Stalin dismissed a lot of these as being based on sources of no credibility, or based on deliberate attempts to provoke a war between Germany and the Soviet Union.
Another section sheds light on cryptanalysis and Whaley reveals that everyone was reading everyone else's diplomatic traffic. Much is made in popular culture of the British success with Ultra, and American success with Magic, but the surprise is that the Germans were reading everyone's communications, while everyone else was listening in on a least a few others.
This makes the idea of keeping secrets less likely, but there was also the chance of being deliberately misled. Whaley provides an example of this with Goebbels supposedly revealing, without authorisation, the imminent invasion of England. He was even 'punished' to increase the credibility of this ruse.
Prior German plans also provided great, legitimate (if unintentional) cover. Sea Lion itself provided the best, but the Germans were also able to use plans like Felix, Marita, and Sunflower to both disguise their real purpose and give them an excuse to deploy forces in Poland. As late as Mercury the Germans were claiming that the airborne assault on Crete was a rehearsal for the invasion of England.
To reinforce this impression the Germans also carried out two elaborate deceptions based on Norway and France called Shark and Harpoon, which simulated the gathering of shipping and the conducting of landing exercises to make it seem like England was the actual target. Classic misdirection.
Whaley makes it clear at the end that Stalin was not alone in being deceived. Every government was similarly misled. Though some like Churchill and Roosevelt possibly foresaw Barbarossa, the British and American Governments at large did not.
Even many Germans who had not been informed came to the conclusion that Hitler would give Stalin an ultimatum.
Indeed, part of Hitler's deception was to deliberately keep his own Foreign Ministry in the dark, not least because Ribbentrop was a staunch advocate of the Soviet-German pact that he had created and given his name to. This was a clever bit of trickery because the German diplomats could sincerely deny any intentions of attack because they had not been told of them.
Some interesting sidelights include de Gaulle's suggestion that Vichy proved stubborn over Syria because Vichy had surmised that Hitler was going to turn east, thus relieving the pressure in the west. Could Franco have known too? Was this was why Hitler's western dreams, as described by Norman Goda, went up in smoke at Hendaye and Montoire?
Another observation is that Whaley suggests Hitler's secrecy turned against him when Rommel succeeded too well in North Africa, without orders, which prompted the British reaction in the Eastern Mediterranean.
This presupposes that Hitler would not have committed himself to Greece and Crete had this not occurred, and further presumes that the Balkans actually delayed Barbarossa. This has been hotly contested since Barbarossa was launched. At any rate these make for some interesting reflexions.
As a little twist Whaley adds a bit of novelty of his own, to buttress and expand on Wohlstetter. I feel like it would be ruining the surprise to reveal it, but his conclusions are quite fascinating.
If you can slog through the tedious minutiae that characterises the first one-hundred and fifty pages of the work, it is quite worth the effort.
Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews