CLOSING WITH THE ENEMY

Modern War Studies

by DOUBLER MICHAEL D.

Closing with the Enemy picks up where D-Day leaves off. From Normandy through the "breakout" in France to the German army's last gasp in the Battle of the Bulge, Michael D. Doubler deals with the deadly business of war---closing with the enemy, fighting and winning battles, taking and holding territory. His study provides a provocative reassessment of how American GIs accomplished these dangerous and costly tasks. Doubler portrays a far more capable and successful American fighting force than previous historians---notably Russell Weigley, Martin Van Creveld, and S. L. A. Marshall---have depicted. True, the GIs weren't fully prepared or organized for a war in Europe and have often been viewed as inferior to their German opponent. But, Doubler argues, they more than compensated for this by their ability to learn quickly from mistakes, to adapt in the face of unforeseen obstacles, and to innovate new tactics on the battlefield. This adaptability, Doubler contends, was far more crucial to the American effort than we've been led to believe.

Genres: History, Military History, World War II, Military Fiction, War, Nonfiction, American History

Hardcover

First published December 1, 1994

Reviews

[Marcus · Rating 4 out of 5]

If I understand it correctly, author's purpose with this book is to counter the criticism of the performance of American troops during Western campaign of 1944-45, which apparently has become rather "popular" among military historians over last decade or so. With this goal in mind, Doubler divides his book in two parts. Its main part is dedicated to a systematic analysis of American tactics and performance in different operational and environmental settings. Following topics are dealt with in separate chapters:

combat in boccage country of Normandy
cooperation between airforce (both strategic and tactical) and land forces
offensive operations against fortified villages
urban combat
bridging and fording operations
operations against fortified positions, with special focus on operations in Huertgen forest
defensive operations during Ardennes offensive of 1944

Final two chapters are dedicated to a study of the American soldier as a fighting man and the role of the armed forces as an institution and doctrine provider.

Let me start by saying that judged on its content alone, "Closing with the enemy" is a an outstanding book. Using "typical" operations at company and battalion level, Doubler provides a very detailed and objective analysis of employed tactics, their effectiveness and explains why and how they evolved over the course of the campaign. His approach of concentrating on different "types" of combat during the campaign in separate chapters compartmentalizes the analysis into accessible chunks, making it very easy to absorb the information. It must also be said that the author is a talented writer and manages to keep his narrative consistent and fact-filled, but never boring. The "operational" part of this book was a very appreciated learning experience even for a military history buff like me.

So what about the goal set for this book; does the author manage to vindicate the performance of American soldier and the doctrine employed by U.S. armed forces during that fateful campaign of 1944-45? Well... both yes and no. He succeeds in proving that individual U.S. soldier was a courageous, innovative and resourceful fighter, able to adapt to unfamiliar or unexpected circumstances and make the best of resources at his disposal. In other words, Doubler does in my opinion prove that U.S. soldier was in no way inferior to his German counterpart.

In regard of the U.S. doctrine and philosophy... once again, this is only my personal opinion, but I found it rather ironic that this book can be quite successfully used to prove the exact opposite to what the author tries to state. Based on Doubler's own analysis, it is hard not to conclude that the U.S. doctrine was seriously flawed at the outset of the campaign and needed major revisions before it was able to cope with the challenge of German defenses. Solely the number of occasions where the author uses the phrase 'the doctrine was proven to be right, but had to be adjusted' in his narrative made it impossible for me not to get the impression that there was something seriously wrong with American preconceptions regarding the tactics and operational doctrine that would give them the victory.

Furthermore, I am somewhat surprised over what the author chooses not to deal with, considering his clearly stated objective. The most obvious issue that Doubler pretty much dodges away from is the issue of American doctrine regarding employment of armor, which in retrospect is universally regarded as fatally flawed. The only indication that there was something wrong with american ideas in this area consists of fleeting observation that the tank destroyers found 'unexpected' employment as close support infantry weapons. The author fails however to extrapolate on the issue - if he did, he would have to admit the fact that the pre-war distinction between tanks as exploitation weapons and tank destroyers as 'proper tools' for combat against enemy armor turned out to be both naive and impractical, thus rendering the tank destroyers into 'ugly ducks' of armored forces. Other topics - the conscious decision of American policy makers to disregard the need of heavy tanks, the fact that the use of strategic airpower in support of land forces was if anything an act of desperation, recognition of the 'broad offensive'-approach as a politically motivated decision that had very little to do with sound military strategy, impracticality of independent armor battalions, imbalance in structure of armored divisions and the negative effects of oversized rear echelon part of U.S. infantry divisions - should in my opinion have been given more attention and 'honest' treatment.

Perhaps most importantly, Doubler fails to explain why so many obvious 'adjustments' in U.S. doctrine weren't implemented from the outset of the campaign, but had to be learned through hard-gained experience. U.S. Army was the only one with ample time to prepare and actually draw conclusions based on actual operational experience of previous years. In my opinion it failed to do that. A perfect example of a lesson that should have been learned before the first soldier landed in France is the need of usable means of communications between tank crews and infantry units they were supposed to support. That the need for such 'tools of trade' was not realized during the two years the Army had to prepare before landing in Europe does reflect rather badly on the creators of its doctrine.

In the final analysis it can be said that 'Closing with the enemy' is a very valuable addition to the library of anyone seriously interested in history of World War II. The fact that the author only partially achieves the goal he sets out for himself at the start of his book, should in no way detract from it being an extremely informative and enjoyable read.

[Casey · Rating 5 out of 5]

A great book, providing a detailed look at how the US Army fought WWII in Western Europe, with an emphasis on the process of adaptation so necessary for victory. This is a very technical work, diving deep into both the formal written doctrine and the plethora of personal lessons learned for its primary sources. The result is a detailed topical study, across a wide variety of subjects, outlining how the Army Ground Forces were trained and conditioned to fight, and how the realities of combat necessitated tactical adaptation of this learned behavior. Along the way the reader is introduced to the many methods of innovation and adaptation, learning that it was the embrace of these processes which were the real reason for total US victories, not necessarily a material dominance or having the superior individual fighting man. Some of these concepts, such as the building of new concepts upon systems that are known to already work; keeping units intact for future missions so that the learning process isn’t interrupted; being willing to try new concepts again even if initial trials weren’t successful; the rapid collation, dissemination, and training of new doctrine that is found to work; and executing small operations solely as tests of tactical concepts rather than with the objective of achieving strategic success, can be interpolated for combat in any domain and are not just inherent to a major land force. Throughout the book one cannot but be impressed with the character and intellect of the American GIs and their tactical leadership. The ability of US Forces to adapt and overcome, even in the face of the “holy” written and inherited doctrine, brought to fruition the modern method of fluid combined arms warfare which European armies had, at their best, only theorized about. Highly recommended for anyone wanting to know how the US Army fought in WWII and how a military force can use adaptation as a force multiplier. I’m hoping I discover a similar work which outlines the Navy’s process of adaptation in WWII in the same detailed manner.

[Scott Sanders · Rating 3 out of 5]

I couldn't make it through this book and it should be about 1/3 as long as it is. The writing was extremely long winded and repetitive. The content was interesting but the same thing was restated far too many times. I felt that I read again and again facts or information that was shared earlier in the chapter or book over all. I found myself skimming for the next new topic or section because I kept re-reading the same point.
See, annoying, isn't it?

[Dachokie · Rating 4 out of 5]

Outlines US Army's Application of Tactical Ingenuity in World War II ...

The US Army's victory in Europe during the Second World War is often contributed to the luxury of it being able to rely on American industrial prowess rather than the quality of men it sent into battle. Granted, the US Army did have the benefit on an almost infinite supply of resources, but it also clearly displayed itself as a resourceful, problem-solving juggernaut that was capable of learning from its mistakes on-the-fly. Michael Doubler's CLOSING WITH THE ENEMY highlights the Army's application of tactical ingenuity to defeat a clever, lethal and increasingly desperate German military machine in 1944-45.

The United States was presented with a unique scenario upon its entry in the European theatre of battle. While most of the combatants had been fighting for years (on familiar turf), the fresh-faced and naïve US Army hadn't experienced a taste of modern combat since the First World War some twenty-five years earlier. With its tactical plans for conducting warfare rigidly based on relatively obsolete doctrine (specifically Field Manual 100-5); early failures at Kasserine Pass proved the need for a more innovative approach to fighting a modern war. While still relying heavily on FM 100-5 as a foundation, the Army implemented a more open-minded and flexible tactical approach to combat as the wars progression presents a myriad of new obstacles and dilemmas to overcome. Doubler provides clear examples of the Army's ingenuity being successfully pressed into action when facing initial disadvantages: advancing through the deadly Bocage, clearing the concrete and steel fortifications of the Siegfried Line, crossing the Rhine River, city combat and offensive and defensive operations in the Hurtgen Forest and at Bastogne. CLOSING WITH THE ENEMY illustrates the Army's impressive ability to resourcefully pool its resources to identify, adapt and overcome adverse scenarios ... even lower-ranked soldiers' ideas and opinions proved to be of value. Combined-arms, coordination between air and ground forces and common-sense adaptations (Cullin cutter for the hedgerow-busting or using bazookas to clear occupied towns) ... whatever means necessary. Readers will see how the Army's penchant for resourcefulness and flexibility allowed it to defeat a much more seasoned adversary fighting on its own turf ... an overwhelming obstacle in and of itself.

Doubler provides a great introduction to tactical/operational warfare to those wanting to learn more about the mechanics of the US Army's actions in France, Belgium and Germany during World War II. Some of the material covered is a little dry, but the author does a good job keeping the reader focused by providing examples of tactics being successfully used by smaller units. While the book title refers to how the GIs fought in Europe, its contents are specifically about the operations stemming from the Normandy landings. I was a little disappointed that the difficult advance through Italy wasn't covered. Otherwise, I felt CLOSING WITH THE ENEMY proved to be a very education and interesting read ... I finished the book with clearer understanding of how truly effective and outstanding the US Army was in World War II.

[Davina · Rating 4 out of 5]

I see somewhat less of a discussion on "How GI's fought" and more of an argument in favor of American ingenuity. The author goes through a number of very interesting examples of how the American Army learned to go beyond existing doctrine to find a true combined arms doctrine. He also speaks to the difference between the school solution and what experience had the American Army actually do in combat. I found it a most compelling argument. Certainly if the preponderance of Arms was all that mattered, then what would be true? Looking at the Bastogne fight, the 101st and other units were outnumbered, and for parts of the battle, lacked the preponderance of Air Power which had characterized the Breakout, yet they prevailed. His appendix on sources, was interesting. I noticed he excluded Stephen Ambrose, which has me wonder what he thinks of Ambrose. It was funny to listen to his argument done in very modern military jargon. I get why, but it was also somehow disconcerting. I was reminded of the purpose of doctrine, and it's limitations. I do think he did a great job in explaining how difficult it would have been to have tried to make big doctrinal shifts after the Normandy Landings, since there was no respite. Worth reading, I know I was wrapped in the narrative and didn't want to put it down. My biggest concern is whether his purpose is more to argue a point rather than give a historical perspective. Does he recognize any weaknesses in his argument. I would have liked to have seen that.

[Ryan · Rating 5 out of 5]

Great retrospective on WW2 (and specifically, Army operations in the European Theater of Operations) -- mostly focused on how the US forces learned as they went, created new strategies, overcame challenges, etc. Interesting deep dive on things like fighting in the Normandy Bocage (and how different units developed different strategies), forest fighting, combined arms, the Army's replacement system, etc. Some contrasts at the end with German and Russian solutions to similar problems.

[Jonny · Rating 3 out of 5]

It was a decent book. It's very in-depth on how we developed many of the doctrines, beliefs, and techniques we use in today's military. The author talks circles around topics for a majority of the book, and it could be cut down to half as long. It reads like a textbook, so it's definitely not an pleasurable read, but if read in the mindset of knowledge acquisition, it's great!

[Michael Morrison · Rating 3 out of 5]

Quite a specialized book, this is probably a necessary volume for anyone who wants to understand the battles of World War II, since its subtitle is "How GIs Fought the War in Europe, 1944-1945."
Researched and documented, its good for scholars and for the student of the period.

[Matt DeSabio · Rating 4 out of 5]

Specific tactical lessons learned broken down into great detail with sketches and doctrinal excerpts from the 40s.

[David Poyer · Rating 3 out of 5]

Not much new here

[Iain · Rating 2 out of 5]

This book presents an interesting dichotomy. It's replete with fascinating details of how American GIs adapted. How they really fought in Europe and their special, very American, qualities.

That having been said, the book is horribly written. The author repeats himself ad nausea, often in the same paragraph, and even in consecutive sentences. In addition, time-and-again he presents US Army doctrine, shows how flawed it was and flies in the face of his own evidence to tell us that said doctrine was essentially correct when any reader can tell it was not. Only once, with river crossings was the doctrine so incredibly asinine, so untenable in the face of modern warfare, that even Doubler can't defend it thus and so he simply omits his go-to "essentially correct" conclusion.

I was amazed to see the glowing reviews the book received, and then I realized that the book was 14 years old. When released it was revolutionary for its content and its style was forgiven. But now, many other books present the same content, and they often do it with much more readable prose. In fact, many use this book as a source. Proving perhaps that citation and not imitation is the sincerest form of flattery.

For the patient reader this book still has insights and anecdotes to offer, but it doesn't make for easy or even cohesive reading.

[Michael Dorosh · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is an invaluable resource for anyone wanting to understand how the war was fought at the lowest levels. The title itself tells you exactly what the book is going to be about. Some of the other reviews are a little revealing about the nature of perception; one fellow complained that the book fails as "easy-listening" material in audio-book form while driving in his car. Well, of course it does. It's a "how-to" book, and perhaps one of the best yet written on the subject of U.S. Army doctrine and tactics in the ETO.

For anyone looking for another rah-rah account of "how" the American G.I. won the war for no other reason than he ate white bread and cherished democracy, they are directed to multiple volumes by Stephen Ambrose. For those who are looking for technical details backed up by primary resources, this is an excellent account of the gruelling experiences of U.S. infantry and armored divisions and how they learned hard lessons, then fought through difficult conditions of terrain, weather and determined enemy opposition to apply those lessons.

A terrific book that delivers what it promises.

[Ryan · Rating 5 out of 5]

Doubler deftly explains the painful learning process of soldiers in war. "Closing With The Enemy" compares pre-War US Army doctrine with practical experience and knowledge learned on the battlefield. Examples of the types of operations outlined in the book include fighting in the Norman bocage, river assaults, and breaching the West Wall (Siegfried Line).

Historians (usually from other countries) enjoy portraying the American G.I. as lacking in collective military tradition or tactical imagination; that the U.S. contribution and advantage lay only in industrial productivity and the ability to deploy superior (though technically inferior) numbers. This book illustrates, by example, American tactical flexibility and adaptability, plus a willingness and ingenuity for the deployment of technology and armaments. Highly recommended.

[Jeff · Rating 3 out of 5]

Great in-depth look at the war and US military doctrine and its evolution, but it is dry and ponderous making it hard to hang in there until the endn especially when listening to it as an audiobook in the car. The set up is very much like a textbook with summaries at the end of the chapters, so it would be useful for officer training, but will likely boor all but the most diehard WWII fan to death.

[Bill V · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a thorough book, although a bit too technical on the actual details and tactics used to the American Army. Such detail is necessary though to illustrate that the American Army relied on more than just sheer firepower to defeat the German army.

[John · Rating 4 out of 5]

An excellent look at the way the US Army tactics developed during WWII. Probably not a book for those who don't already have a strong interest in the period, but a great read for those who do.

[Richard · Rating 5 out of 5]

Excellent study of tactical innovations during WWII.

[Tom Feltey · Rating 5 out of 5]

Incredible book that captures the lessons of combined arms warfare. A must read if you are a combat arms leader!