Soviet-American Relations, Vol. 2: The Decision to Intervene, 1917-1920

Soviet-American Relations #2

by George F. Kennan

In 1918 the U.S. government decided to involve itself with the Russian Revolution by sending troops to Siberia. This book re-creates that unhappily memorable storythe arrival of British marines at Murmansk, the diplomatic maneuvering, the growing Russian hostility, the uprising of Czechoslovak troops in central Siberia which threatened to overturn the Bolsheviks, the acquisitive ambitions of the Japanese in Manchuria, and finally the decision by President Wilson to intervene with American troops. Of this period Kennan writes, "Never, surely, in the history of American diplomacy, has so much been paid for so little."

Genres: History, American History, Russia, Russian History, Politics, World War I, War

513 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1958

About the author

From Wikipedia:

George Frost Kennan (February 16, 1904 – March 17, 2005) was an American advisor, diplomat, political scientist, and historian, best known as "the father of containment" and as a key figure in the emergence of the Cold War. He later wrote standard histories of the relations between Russia and the Western powers.

In the late 1940s, his writings inspired the Truman Doctrine and the U.S. foreign policy of "containing" the Soviet Union, thrusting him into a lifelong role as a leading authority on the Cold War. His "Long Telegram" from Moscow in 1946, and the subsequent 1947 article "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" argued that the Soviet regime was inherently expansionist and that its influence had to be "contained" in areas of vital strategic importance to the United States. These texts quickly emerged as foundational texts of the Cold War, expressing the Truman administration's new anti-Soviet Union policy. Kennan also played a leading role in the development of definitive Cold War programs and institutions, most notably the Marshall Plan.

Shortly after the diploma had been enshrined as official U.S. policy, Kennan began to criticize the policies that he had seemingly helped launch. By mid-1948, he was convinced that the situation in Western Europe had improved to the point where negotiations could be initiated with Moscow. The suggestion did not resonate within the Truman administration, and Kennan's influence was increasingly marginalized—particularly after Dean Acheson was appointed Secretary of State in 1949. As U.S. Cold War strategy assumed a more aggressive and militaristic tone, Kennan bemoaned what he called a misinterpretation of his thinking.

In 1950, Kennan left the Department of State, except for two brief ambassadorial stints in Moscow and Yugoslavia, and became a leading realist critic of U.S. foreign policy. He continued to be a leading thinker in international affairs as a faculty member of the Institute for Advanced Study from 1956 until his death at age 101 in March 2005.

Reviews

[Stefania Dzhanamova · Rating 3 out of 5]

The second volume of George Kennan’s Soviet-American Relations begins in early 1918 and covers the little known American invasion of Russia.

The Bolsheviks had settled on a truce with Germany. Since, during the war, Russia’s former allies – Great Britain, France, Japan, and the USA – had supplied her with large quantities of munitions and raw materials, which were still stocked in Vladivostok and Archangel, a possible German seizure of those supplies was feared, and the Italians and French suggested allied troops to be positioned there as a precaution.

At first, President Wilson opposed intervention, and this was enough to restrain the allies. However, a combination of events spurred them on to approach Wilson again, and this time he acceded.

One of those events was the Red Guards’ attack on the Czechoslovak Legion at Irkutsk. The Czechs, dreaming of independence, had fought alongside Russia in the war and had no intentions to sign peace with Germany, but couldn’t continue to fight on Russian territory. They hoped to reach Vladivostok and leave the country by sea, but the Bolsheviks demanded they surrender and hindered their passage along the Trans-Siberian Railway. However, the Czechs, joined by local anti-communist forces, fought back and captured the railway.

Roughly at the same time, the “informal” ambassador, Raymond Robins, was recalled from Petrograd, and his pro-Bolshevik agitations and schemes fell behind.

Meanwhile, the Bolsheviks signed the Brest-Litovsk treaty, officially leaving the war; Japan landed troops in Vladivostok. The communists also murdered the Tzar.

All of this contributed to Woodrow Wilson’s decision to intervene. The problem was – as Kennan argues – that
the President not only did not coordinate his decision with the Allies, the US government or the US Ambassador to Russia, but also gave the dispatched troops very ambiguous orders. For example, he warned them against meddling into Russia’s internal conflicts, but told them to support the Czechs (who were in open conflict with Russia).

In this volume, George F. Kennan creates an insightful account of Woodrow Wilson’s flawed policy towards Soviet Russia, which, although not widely known in the USA, was remembered by the Bolsheviks as armed interference in their country’s domestic affairs.

“Decision to Intervene” is a well-written, in-depth analysis, which, in my opinion, will greatly contribute to the reader’s understanding of the difficult Soviet-American relations that continued up to the fall of the USSR.


*3,5 stars

[Herb Hastings · Rating 5 out of 5]

Excellent book covering the run up to, and the aftermath of the ill fated US and Allied invasion of Soviet Russia at the end of The Great War. Average Americans have no idea that this occurred while the Russians were still angry about it up to the fall of the Soviet Union.

The Allies, still fearful of Germany, even late in 1918, talked themselves into this "intervention". They believed that the Bolsheviki were tools of the Germans and needed to be overthrown and Russia forced back into the alliance against the Kaiser. Miscommunication, and a lack of ability to comprehend that the Soviets were serious about world revolution and not the tools of any capitalist state, led to awful decisions being made.
Since the Germans war machine collapsed before this invasion took hold and the Soviets were not ousted from power, this event poisoned the relationship between the Soviet Union and the West and accomplished nothing.

This book gives a great foundation to build an understanding of much of the history of the Twentieth Century.

[Joel Dickey · Rating 4 out of 5]

Solid and balanced analysis

[David Hill · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is the second book of a planned trilogy of Soviet-American relations from 1917-1920. The third book was never written. This volume covers the time frame of roughly March 1918 to October 1918.

Both the scale and scope of this volume are greater than the first volume. There are quite a few more major characters and they move across a much more vast area. The problems of miscommunication and misunderstanding had a serious impact on Soviet-American relations that lasted (at least) until the Second World War. Kennan sums it up in one line: "never, surely, in the history of American diplomacy has so much been paid for so little."

Words that may apply to current times:
"The reasons for this failure of American statesmanship lay in such things as ... the congenital shallowness, philosophical and intellectual, of the approach to world problems that bubbled up from the fermentations of official Washington and the pervasive dilettantism in the execution of American policy."

As the title says, the book covers the decision to intervene. We don't learn what our troops did there, other than a few bits of foreshadowing. The curious reader is left to seek out the story of the missing third volume on our own. Careful study of this book's bibliography provides some suggestions.