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On Being in the World (Routledge Revivals): Wittgenstein and Heidegger on Seeing Aspects by Stephen Mulhall
This study aims to cast new light on a neglected but important area of Wittgenstein's philosophy, and to reveal its pertinence to the central concerns of contemporary analytic philosophy. Its starting point is the belief that Wittgenstein's seemingly unsystematic remarks on seeing aspects of pictures and words, are in fact focused on a phenomenon which he labels "continuous aspect perception". This focus not only confers unity upon his treatment of the topic, but also connects that treatment with fundamental questions in the philosophy of psychology (taking issue with Davidsonian approaches to these matters, for example). By setting seeing aspects within this interpretative framework, the author seeks to demonstrate parallels between Wittgenstein's interest, and concerns at the heart of Heidegger's "Being and Time". This work strives to show that Wittgenstein's investigation of aspect perception is designed to illuminate much more than a bizarre type of visual experience. It highlights what is distinctively "human" about human behaviour in relation to things in the world, and elements which distinguish human practical activity from that of automata.
- GenresPhilosophy
Paperback
First published December 31, 1990
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June 19, 202118 June 2021
“We might imagine, for example, that a particular pattern of eyeball movements is correlated with the perception of a given aspect, and that it is possible for such movements to jump from one pattern to another, and sometimes to alternate – thus producing the sense of paradox outlined above. The very fact that such explanations much be imagined, however, shows that they can reveal nothing about the concept under examination: we have an existing practice of using the relevant concept and this practice makes no use of knowledge of whatever physiological phenomena may be correlated with the experience our concepts picks out.” (p.7. Bold added.)
The imagination lies in the correlation. For it is through the jump from the presumably physiological level to the conceptual one that makes physiological “explanation” utterly futile, if not risible. Why do physiologists find it so hard to use the word “is” as in “this physiological process or pattern is (without any qualification) this concept”? The instinctive choice of word gives it away. (Interesting examples can also be found in such contemporary philosophers as Fred Dretske [2009] p.104.)
19 June 2021
“Historians tell me that the ancients had even more bizzare conceptions of how we see things. They were wrong about how we see, but they weren't committing logical howlers.They just didn't know, as we now know, how we obtain information about distant objects and events.” (Drestke 2009, 111.)
“As long as X is differentiated from its background and surroundings in the relevant way, the experience embodies information about the relative size, shape, position, and movement of X.” (ibid, 111.)
How do perceptible objects at atomic level bear information when perceived by us and how are we supposed to differentiate, decode and distinguish the things that we see? What exactly is this information?
“In speaking of sensory systems in the way that I have, as systems responsible for the delivery of information, it should be emphasized that the term “information” is being used here in the way we speak of light (from a star) as carrying information about the chemical constitution of the star or the way the height of a mercury column (in a thermometer) carries information about the temperature.” (ibid, 110.)
Does this analogy work? There is in fact more, without explaining anything:
“What is important about these internal events, insofar as we are interested in the difference between seeing X and hearing X, is their intrinsic properties — how they code the information about X.” (ibid, 112.)
“All one gets is a bloated concept of seeing. Seeing objects is a way of getting information about them. What makes it seeing (rather than, say, hearing) is the intrinsic character of those events occurring in us that carry the information. What makes it X (rather than Y) that we see is that the information these internal events carry is information about X (rather than Y).” (ibid, 112.)
“We might imagine, for example, that a particular pattern of eyeball movements is correlated with the perception of a given aspect, and that it is possible for such movements to jump from one pattern to another, and sometimes to alternate – thus producing the sense of paradox outlined above. The very fact that such explanations much be imagined, however, shows that they can reveal nothing about the concept under examination: we have an existing practice of using the relevant concept and this practice makes no use of knowledge of whatever physiological phenomena may be correlated with the experience our concepts picks out.” (p.7. Bold added.)
The imagination lies in the correlation. For it is through the jump from the presumably physiological level to the conceptual one that makes physiological “explanation” utterly futile, if not risible. Why do physiologists find it so hard to use the word “is” as in “this physiological process or pattern is (without any qualification) this concept”? The instinctive choice of word gives it away. (Interesting examples can also be found in such contemporary philosophers as Fred Dretske [2009] p.104.)
19 June 2021
“Historians tell me that the ancients had even more bizzare conceptions of how we see things. They were wrong about how we see, but they weren't committing logical howlers.They just didn't know, as we now know, how we obtain information about distant objects and events.” (Drestke 2009, 111.)
“As long as X is differentiated from its background and surroundings in the relevant way, the experience embodies information about the relative size, shape, position, and movement of X.” (ibid, 111.)
How do perceptible objects at atomic level bear information when perceived by us and how are we supposed to differentiate, decode and distinguish the things that we see? What exactly is this information?
“In speaking of sensory systems in the way that I have, as systems responsible for the delivery of information, it should be emphasized that the term “information” is being used here in the way we speak of light (from a star) as carrying information about the chemical constitution of the star or the way the height of a mercury column (in a thermometer) carries information about the temperature.” (ibid, 110.)
Does this analogy work? There is in fact more, without explaining anything:
“What is important about these internal events, insofar as we are interested in the difference between seeing X and hearing X, is their intrinsic properties — how they code the information about X.” (ibid, 112.)
“All one gets is a bloated concept of seeing. Seeing objects is a way of getting information about them. What makes it seeing (rather than, say, hearing) is the intrinsic character of those events occurring in us that carry the information. What makes it X (rather than Y) that we see is that the information these internal events carry is information about X (rather than Y).” (ibid, 112.)
January 10, 2021
I don't think it does a good enough job engaging with the Davidsonian/analytic conception of perception it opposes -- explaining why such a picture is compelling, what it is trying to get at, etc -- and is a bit too eager to assimilate disparate parts of Heid/Witt. That being said, many of the connections it draws are fruitful, and I think the general interpretation of LW on seeing-as, and recognition of its importance to him, are on the right track.
August 11, 2022
Brilliant. I wish I had read this years ago. Rekindled my interest in Wittgenstein
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