By Carl H. Builder - The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis

by Carl H. Builder

Why was the Navy ready to clear the skies over the Persian Gulf, yet surprised by the mines laid under it? Why is it that the Army is always prepared for war in Europe, but was caught off guard in Korea and Vietname? And why is the Air Force indifferent to "Star Wars"? In The Masks of War Carl H. Builder asks what motives lie behind the puzzling and often contradictory behavior of America's militay forces. The answer, he finds, has little to do with what party controls the White House or who writes the budget. Far more powerful-and glacially resistant to change-are the entrenched institutions and distinct "personalities" of the three armed services themselves. The Masks of War explains why things sometimes go wrong for the American military. It also explains why things will always go wrong for the military reformers. Changes in the military's strategic thinking have come only in the wake of full-blown disaster-Pearl Harbor, for instance. Today's nuclear world can't afford such lessons.

Genres: Military Fiction, Nonfiction, War, History, Politics, Leadership, Grad School

Paperback

First published February 1, 1989

Reviews

[Rich · Rating 2 out of 5]

There are some very good aspects of and some very bad aspects of Carl Builder's The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis. For one, I do concur with the author's argument that the services do in fact have an inherent identity. To suggest otherwise is to convince oneself of a doe-eyed naivete that does not belong in military service. And although, at points, the author is loathe to explain too much in detail with regards to such, the inherent identity of the services prioritizes what at their core they must retain in order to do what they are meant to do. This is especially useful when considering things like joint roles, missions, and functions, or perhaps even the paradox of our nation's "four air forces." One should also keep in mind that the work suffers in the current context from its dated publication at the end of the Cold War, but this is not an impassible obstacle.

Placing its dated context aside, some of the most egregious aspects of this work is its over-emphasis upon interservice agreements (most especially the Key West Agreement, as many in the U.S. Army are prone), and its tendency to swing between caricature of the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy while creating an air of hagiography in his description of the U.S. Army.

Towards the overemphasis on the Key West Agreement (or any other joint agreement for that matter), I would suggest that a reader consider the in-depth study of James Kurtz and John Crerar in their report titled, "Military Roles and Missions: Past Revisions and Future Prospects." In this lengthy, but cogent report, Kurtz and Crerar highlight that in many of the cases where there is a perceived slight by one service towards another (e.g. where the Army has/does critique[d] the Air Force's lack of tactical airpower, and both have criticized the Navy for its neglect of antisubmarine or countermine warfare) it is not the service agreement to blame, but rather a legal imperative: chiefly, the National Security Act of 1947 and Goldwater-Nichols Act with subsequent addendum/revision, or even almost every single military funding bill these days, et cetera. Which really speaks the truth: that no service (say the Air Force, for example), in any binding manner, can compel another other service (say the Army as hypothetical) to do anything it does not want to. But Congressional Act can, or to a lesser extent, Presidential fiat can, and to an even lesser extent, Secretary of Defense directive can. It is within the remainder of the grey areas that interservice agreements resultant in trade-offs mutually conducive to the services in some form or fashion. You get the idea.

Towards the idea that Builder commits hagiography, if you're predisposed to the idea that that the U.S. Army is exceptional in its dedication to serving the country's needs not just above and beyond that of the other services, but rather in a completely altruistic manner, then the author will provide you with ample reassurance by repeatedly stating the land service is alone "the nation's handyman" and "the nation's loyal military servant." What is probably most grating to this reader in the oft-repeated "most loyal military servant," is that he does so with such weak proof. He spends little to no time whatsoever in describing why this is so! So while the author is painting caricature of the Air Force and Navy, sometimes in blatant ways and at other times quite accurately (you're left to figure out which, or take him at his word), the Army is described as generally and exquisitely free of worshiping any unpretentious preoccupations other than "Duty, Honor, and Country." To put a finer point upon it, the author aims to create "an empathetic understanding" of our military institutions, but it is none too subtle about where his sympathies lie, and that gets in the way.

All that said, the idea of the Army, Navy, and Air Force services as institutions demonstrating "distinct and enduring personalities" is a healthy one; even if Builder lacks the clarity to adequately (or correctly in some places) communicate what exactly the personalities are in a truly empathetic manner. Ultimately, this is most helpful towards an outcome of creating joint understanding, if the reader can sort the wheat from the chaff, so to speak. It is here that the author is also correct by suggesting that "Possibly the best hope for change in the American military institutions--and the one that ultimately motivates this book--is through a better understanding of institutions by those within them and by those who must deal with them."

If institutions have identities and personalities, as they have been characterized here, then perhaps, like people, they may be changed by something other than constraints or trauma. If those who are members of an institution and those who deal with institutions understand why the institution behaves the way it does, then the ways of modifying that behavior equals or exceeds the number of people who have that understanding, for each can take actions, even if only for one's self, that will contribute eventually to change.... When we or those around us understand a certain kind of behavior, that behavior is likely to become modified.... The awareness, the understanding of behavior induces change.... Undesirable behavior is often cooperatively induced... [And], if both sides to that cooperative game become fully aware of what they are doing, and know that the other side also knows what is going on, they will generally both want to change that behavior. Likewise, much of the services' pretensions about altruism in the cause of national security are supported by cooperative behavior: Both the public and the services want to believe it, even if it mostly is not so, and behave accordingly. If we can deal with these institutions in the light of their personalities, we shall be looking past the masks they have used too long to hide their legitimate, but less noble, motivations and interests: the masks of war.

Recommended reading, however with significant caveat that the reader should not rely upon Builder alone to educate themselves as to what the identity of a service may be, but rather, might be better informed by any number of widely acclaimed works, as for instance, Colin Gray's Modern Strategy. My implication here, which is to say my understanding of Gray, is that these priorities are a result of the specific nature of the domain that each service primarily operates within.

[Andrew Carr · Rating 4 out of 5]

It's easy to be cynical about military services. Their budgets keep going up, their rhetoric about threats never seems to change even as wars end, and they seem to either want to fight the last war, or very different wars from those in different uniforms just a few office doors down. Yet this would be a mistake.

Carl Builder, in The Masks of War, argues that in order to understand how a military develops strategy, undertakes analysis and pursues public funding, we need to understand how they see themselves. What are the kinds of wars they expect to fight, what are the primary motivations and desires within their services, what groups within the services dominate the leadership, and how do they relate to the nation at large.

Builder argues there are distinct 'masks of war' that each service holds which shape how they answer these questions. The Air Force loves technology - the technology of flight - and so anything that improves their ability to fly better is affirmed. The Navy has the strongest sense of institution. Tradition and independence distinguish their approach, utterly confident in their value to the nation. The Army is the loyal servant, it goes where needed, and while starting to grow in its love of toys, is still more focused on personnel excellence. In turn, the airforce has the best analysts, army focuses most on what it needs to stay in the fight, the Navy resents the intrustion.

These 'masks' are of course, somewhat crude interpretations. Services change over time (this book was written in 1989) and differ between each country (Builder, a RAND analyst writes exclusively about the United States military). Yet there is enough seriousness and yet sensitivity to create a compelling picture here. Builder has a closer affinity with the Army, yet also raises some very significant questions about their role and identity over the long term.

Most importantly, this is not a cynical book. Builder argues there is nothing illegitimate or untoward about institutions having distinct interests, even while remaining loyal within a hierachy and wider nation. We should want our services to have a distinct sense about who they are, what they can do, and how they think we should fight. To be an advisor, you have to have a sense of self. Even if, as that advice feeds into debates over strategy, budgets or capability, we also need them to be flexible and willing to compromise and do what's best for the nation.

Builder's approach can be applied to a variety of organisations. He asks incisive questions, that with adaption can widely travel. As I learn more, I have come to realise how important organisational elements are for understanding the choices of nations. Builder's is therefore an insightful text and it is easy to understand why it remains popular over 30 years since it was published.

[David · Rating 4 out of 5]

A useful--if somewhat dated--look at the US services' institutional perspectives, self-images, and long-standing concerns and equities. It's a classic for a reason, and it is interesting to read a book written in 1989 which got so much right about the way the Defense Department would head between the 1990s to today--all while missing the collapse of the Soviet Union, which would occur shortly after this book's publication!

Certainly not a necessary read for everyone, but a good one for career military professionals working on Combatant Command, Service, or Joint staffs, as well as for academics curious about how services shape the defense enterprise.

[Dan Etue · Rating 3 out of 5]

Dated but accurate. It would be interesting to recommission this study.

[Jonathan Z. · Rating 4 out of 5]

The author personifies military branches, gives them personalities, and highlights how branches lie to Congress to get what they want.

[Angela · Rating 3 out of 5]

Good book to read if you want to learn about service (Army, Navy, Air Force) identities within the U.S. military.

[Barry Hunte · Rating 4 out of 5]

A good war strategy read

[Leo · Rating 4 out of 5]

Decades later the observations about the services still hold true.