The Law of Peoples with The Idea of Public Reason Revisited

by John Rawls

This book consists of two parts: “The Law of Peoples,” a major reworking of a much shorter article by the same name published in 1993, and the essay “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” first published in 1997. Taken together, they are the culmination of more than fifty years of reflection on liberalism and on some of the most pressing problems of our times by John Rawls.

“The Law of Peoples” extends the idea of a social contract to the Society of Peoples and lays out the general principles that can and should be accepted by both liberal and non-liberal societies as the standard for regulating their behavior toward one another. In particular, it draws a crucial distinction between basic human rights and the rights of each citizen of a liberal constitutional democracy. It explores the terms under which such a society may appropriately wage war against an “outlaw society” and discusses the moral grounds for rendering assistance to non-liberal societies burdened by unfavorable political and economic conditions.

“The Idea of Public Reason Revisited” explains why the constraints of public reason, a concept first discussed in Political Liberalism (1993), are ones that holders of both religious and non-religious comprehensive views can reasonably endorse. It is Rawls’s most detailed account of how a modern constitutional democracy, based on a liberal political conception, could and would be viewed as legitimate by reasonable citizens who on religious, philosophical, or moral grounds do not themselves accept a liberal comprehensive doctrine―such as that of Kant, or Mill, or Rawls’s own “Justice as Fairness,” presented in A Theory of Justice (1971).

Genres: Philosophy, Politics, Nonfiction, Law, School, International Relations, Economics

208 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1999

About the author

John Bordley Rawls was an American philosopher and a leading figure in moral and political philosophy. He held the James Bryant Conant University Professorship at Harvard. His magnum opus A Theory of Justice (1971) is now regarded as "one of the primary texts in political philosophy." His work in political philosophy, dubbed Rawlsianism, takes as its starting point the argument that "most reasonable principles of justice are those everyone would accept and agree to from a fair position." Rawls employs a number of thought experiments—including the famous veil of ignorance—to determine what constitutes a fair agreement in which "everyone is impartially situated as equals," in order to determine principles of social justice.

Rawls received both the Schock Prize for Logic and Philosophy and the National Humanities Medal in 1999, the latter presented by President Bill Clinton, in recognition of how Rawls's thought "helped a whole generation of learned Americans revive their faith in democracy itself."

Reviews

[Micah · Rating 2 out of 5]

was assigned this for a class. didn't read it but my professer failed the paper i wrote on it so i'm giving it 2 stars

[Grant · Rating 4 out of 5]

I'm somewhat surprised at the criticisms levied against Rawls concerning this publication. People should be viewing this simply as a theoretical argument concerning the rights of individuals on the international political stage. If you examine the Rome Statute, you'll undoubtedly notice that it is littered with the ideas elucidated by Rawls in this book. One could make the claim that Rawls was actually 5 years ahead of the evolution of international cooperation.

The development of the cosmopolitan ethical position (which is what Rawls is espousing here), is consistent with international agreements that have been made post-creation of the International Criminal Court (and others). I believe that people are getting too hung up on the lack of enforceability of these ideas (which is a valid concern). Not even Rawls is suggesting that these concepts can be enforced unilaterally. However, the recent development and growth of these agreements concerning human rights have just given more weight to the ideas brought forth in this book. While yes the ideas may seem somewhat redundant, the core theme remains solid and in fact is somewhat prophetic (going back to my original point).

[Claudia · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book is a comprehensive theory of international political justice. It’s a classic and deserves to be read! It expands on Kant’s concepts of Perpetual peace (1795) and his idea of foedus pacificum, here understood as the practice of agreement between people’s democratic representation and the deals that they make with other countries, in similar positions.

Rawls speaks of general rights and duties of what he considers “decent” peoples or ‘well-ordered peoples’ that the author uses interchangeably and not quite only in the sphere of State affairs, but in a transnational sense, rather than the State-to-state international relations traditional sense.

The author goes on to build his argument by relying on a set of minimum, if traditional, principles and by reiterating the importance of mutual respect and space for differences in ideals, principles and standards. These standards include military standards and concepts of just war he considers elsewhere. It also includes family law, gay marriage and abortion. The theory is fairly broad indeed.
Finally Rawls speaks of people not within the scope of the conditions he espouses, and considers them to be recognizably outlaw, or burdened by unfavourable conditions.
For all the above and much more this is a widely recommended book since its first edition in 1999. It will always figure in any list of Global Justice or Global Law. 4 stars.

[Magdelanye · Rating 4 out of 5]

It was still early days of my trip when I discovered a wonderful bookshop in Gdansk. I really did not want to get this book for practical reasons but there was no way I could pass it by.

Essentially its an attempt to put together a blueprint for a new system that will satisfy if not everyone, then most of us. JR hammers out some fairly audacious notions, like cooperation and respect and sicial justice, and puts a new spin on the legal process.


Over the next three months I chipped away at it. The writing is dense and convoluted and there are many points that require convoluted thinking on the part of the reader to grasp.

I brought the book back with me so when I have organized my notes I will have plenty of quotes, and most relevant, the chance to give this another go.

[Jake · Rating 4 out of 5]

I’ve heard Rawls referred to many times and have finally read some. Kind of a modern John Locke type thing. He philosophizes in the real world, which I like. Arguing only in ideals is fun but not useful. It is worth the read for its defense of Madison and Jefferson’s separation of church and state.

[Len · Rating 1 out of 5]

There's something funny about the distinction between 'liberal' and 'nonliberal but decent' peoples.

[Christina · Rating 3 out of 5]

I can’t believe John Rawls did an IR crossover event in this one 🥺

[Ali · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book is extension of theory of justice as fairness to international relations of peoples. This time participants of social contract in original position are not individuals but representatives of reasonable liberal peoples. Rawls argues decent hierarchical peoples will also agree with terms agreed on by representatives of liberal peoples behind veil of ignorance. Rawls also gives some clues on how well-ordered (liberal and decent) peoples will deal with outlaw states and burdened societies (“societies whose historical, social, and economic circumstances make their achieving a well-ordered regime, whether liberal or decent, difficult if not impossible”). Rawls contends that law of peoples is Utopian but a realistic one – “it could and may exist”.


There has been so much criticism of Rawls’ theory. Some people argue that it is useless and does not help to improve condition of international relations of states. I think neither law of peoples nor any other body of laws can remedy our troubled situation. Rawls describes this situation in these words:

The typical view of international relations is fundamentally the same as it was in Thucydides' day and has not been transcended in modern times, when world politics is still marked by the struggles of states for power, prestige, and wealth in a condition of global anarchy.

Rawls’ solution is to change the scene of states with evil intentions to peoples willing to offer fair terms of cooperation and ready to abide those terms if others do so. The solution Rawls proposes starts with pursuing a political conception of justice as he describes in Political Liberalism. Second part of the book is revision of one of central ideas of political liberalism, “Public Reason”. I keep thinking that not paying attention to idea of political conception of justice and not realizing its importance and immediate need to pursue it is the main reason of what Western democracies are going through.

[Josh Friedlander · Rating 1 out of 5]

Who today believes in the principle of spreading democracy through armed force? Hearing Rawls, one of liberalism's most eminent voices, talk himself into it by way of consensus through international bodies, IMF sanctions, and coalitions of "decent", "well-ordered" nations against outlaw states, brings to light the rapid changes in public politics that have passed since this book came out. Such ideas, having proved catastrophic in practice, are now seen as abhorrent and illegitimate, curiously branded both "neoliberal" and "neoconservative".

The central idea that this book adds to A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism is that a just order between nations needs more latitude than one within a nation. Liberal democracy is an ideal, but we needn't shun "decent" nations - those who don't abuse human rights, but are not liberal. (Rawls gives as an example the imaginary Muslim state of Kazanistan.) A political philosopher must be careful to avoid the statistical crime of "overfitting" - designing a model that too closely resembles her immediate surroundings, and can't be generalised. As Francis Fukuyama would know, the world in the early '90s gave off some promising signals, but reading them too closely would have been a mistake.

[Gabriela Lino]

O direito dos povos como utopia realista


Condições do caso interno

Há duas condições necessárias para que uma concepção liberal de justiça seja realista. A primeira é que deve valer – se de leis efetivas da natureza e alcançar o tipo de estabilidade que essas leis permitem, isto é, a estabilidade pelas razões certas. Ela toma as pessoas tais como são (pelas leis da natureza) e as leis constitucionais e civis tal como poderiam ser, isto é, como seriam em uma sociedade democrática razoavelmente justa e bem ordenada.
A segunda condição é que os primeiros princípios e preceitos sejam funcionais e aplicáveis a arranjos políticos e sociais em andamento.
Uma condição necessária para que uma concepção política de justiça seja utópica é que ela use ideias, princípios e conceitos (morais) para especificar uma sociedade razoável e justa. Há uma família de concepções liberais razoáveis de justiça, cada uma das quais tem os seguintes três princípios característicos:
O primeiro enumera os direitos e liberdades básicas a partir de um regime constitucional;
O segundo atribui a esses direitos, liberdades e oportunidades uma prioridade especial, especialmente no que diz respeito às exigências dos valores do bem geral e do perfeccionismo;
O terceiro assegura a todos os cidadãos os bens primários necessários para capacitá-los a fazer uso inteligente e eficaz das suas liberdades.

Os princípios dessas concepções de justiça também devem satisfazer o critério da reciprocidade.
Outra condição para uma utopia realista exige que a categoria do político contenha em si todos os elementos essenciais para uma concepção política da justiça.

Condições paralelas da sociedade dos povos

A sociedade razoavelmente justa dos povos bem ordenados é realista da mesma maneira que uma sociedade interna liberal ou decente.
O direito dos povos também é realista de uma segunda maneira: ele é funcional e pode ser aplicado a relações entre povos e a arranjos políticos cooperativos em andamento.
Um direito dos povos razoavelmente justo é utópico no sentido de que usa ideias, princípios e conceitos (morais) políticos para especificar os arranjos políticos e sociais razoavelmente certos e justos para a sociedade dos povos.
Outra condição requer que todos os elementos essenciais para uma concepção política de justiça estejam contidos na categoria do político.
A unidade de uma sociedade dos povos razoável não exige uma unidade religiosa.
O argumento a favor da tolerância, derivado da ideia do razoável, é igualmente válido na sociedade dos povos mais ampla.

Por que povos e não Estados?


Características básicas dos povos

Os povos liberais têm três características básicas: um governo constitucional razoavelmente justo, que serve os seus interesses fundamentais; cidadãos unidos por “afinidades comuns”; e, finalmente, uma natureza moral.
Ao dizer que um povo tem um governo democrático constitucional razoavelmente justo (embora não necessariamente justo por completo), quer se dizer que o governo está eficazmente sob seu controle político e eleitoral, que responde pelos seus interesses fundamentais e que os protege como especificado em uma constituição escrita ou não.

Duas posições originais


A segunda posição original como modelo

Os representantes do povo são (1) razoável e justamente situados como livres e iguais e os povos são modelados como racionais. Também os seus representantes estão (3) deliberando a respeito do tema correto, neste caso o conteúdo do direito dos povos. Além disso, (4) suas deliberações prosseguem em termos das razões certas. Finalmente, a seleção de princípios para o direito dos povos baseia – se (5) nos interesses fundamentais de um povo, dados, nesse caso, por uma concepção liberal de justiça (primeira posição original).

Interesses fundamentais dos povos

O que distingue povos e Estados é que os povos justos estão plenamente preparados para conceder justamente o mesmo respeito e o mesmo reconhecimento adequados a outros povos, como iguais. Sua igualdade, porém, não significa que não se aceitem desigualdades de certos tipos em várias instituições cooperativas entre os povos, tais como as Nações Unidas, idealmente concebidas. Esse reconhecimento de desigualdades é, antes, paralelo à aceitação, pelos cidadãos, das desigualdades funcionais sociais e econômicas na sua sociedade liberal.

Os princípios do direito dos povos


Comentários e qualificações

O principal é que povos bem – ordenados livres e independentes estão prontos a reconhecer certos princípios básicos de justiça política como governando a sua conduta. Esses princípios constituem a carta básica do Direito dos Povos.

A paz democrática e sua estabilidade


Dois tipos de estabilidade

Os povos (em oposição aos Estados) têm uma natureza moral e definida. Essa natureza inclui orgulho e senso de honra adequados; eles podem ter orgulho da sua história e das suas conquistas, como permite um patriotismo adequado. Contudo, o devido respeito que pedem é um devido respeito compatível com a igualdade de todos os povos. Os povos devem ter interesses – do contrário seriam inertes ou passivos, ou poderiam ser levados por paixões e impulsos não razoáveis e às vezes cegos. Os interesses que movem os povos são interesses razoáveis guiados por, e congruentes com, uma igualdade justa e um devido respeito por todos os povos. São esses que tornam possível a paz democrática.
A estabilidade pelas razões certas descreve uma situação na qual, no decorrer do tempo, os cidadãos adquirem um senso de justiça que os inclina a não apenas aceitar, mas agir de acordo com os princípios de justiça.

Ideia mais precisa de paz democrática

Exigências importantes para alcançar a estabilidade pelos motivos corretos:
Certa igualdade imparcial de oportunidade, especialmente na educação;
Uma distribuição de riqueza e renda que satisfaça a terceira condição do liberalismo: devem ser garantidos a todos os cidadãos os meios para todos os propósitos, necessários para que tirem vantagem inteligente e eficaz das suas liberdades básicas;
A sociedade como empregador de última instância por meio do governo geral ou local ou de outras políticas sociais e econômicas;
Assistência médica básica assegurada para todos os cidadãos;
Financiamento público das eleições e maneiras de assegurar a disponibilidade de informações pública em questões de política.


Tolerância de povos não – liberais


Significado de tolerância

Tolerar significa reconhecer essas sociedades não – liberais como membros participantes iguais, de boa reputação, na sociedade dos povos, com certos direitos e obrigações, inclusive o dever de civilidade, exigindo que ofereçam a outros povos razões para o seu atos adequados à sociedade dos povos.
As sociedades liberais devem cooperar e dar assistência a todos os povos com boa reputação. Se se exigisse que todas as sociedades fossem liberais, então a ideia de liberalismo político deixaria de expressar a devida tolerância por maneiras aceitáveis.

Extensão aos povos decentes


Observações processuais

Há cinco tipos de sociedades nacionais: a primeira delas são os povos liberais e a segunda são os povos decentes. A estrutura básica de um tipo de povo decente tem uma “hierarquia de consulta decente”, e por isso são chamados de “povos hierárquicos decentes”; o outro tipo de povo decente é simplesmente uma categoria que Rawls deixa de reserva, supondo que pode haver outros povos decentes cuja estrutura básica não se ajusta à sua descrição de hierarquia de consulta. Além disso, há, em terceiro lugar, Estados fora da lei e, em quarto, sociedades onerados por condições desfavoráveis. Finalmente, em quinto, temos sociedades que são absolutismos benevolentes: elas honram a maior parte dos direitos humanos mas, como negam aos seus membros um papel significativo nas decisões políticas, não são bem – ordenadas.

Base dos dois critérios

Um povo decente deve honrar as leis da paz; seu sistema de Direito deve ser tal que respeite os direitos humanos e imponha deveres e obrigações a todas as pessoas no seu território. Seu sistema de Direito deve assegurar uma ideia de justiça do bem comum, que leve em conta o que vê como interesses fundamentais de todos na sociedade. E, finalmente, deve haver uma crença sincera e razoável, da parte dos juízes e outros funcionários, de que a lei é realmente guiada por uma ideia de justiça do bem comum.

Hierarquia de consulta decente


Hierarquia de consulta e objetivo comum

Ainda que todas as pessoas em uma sociedade hierárquica decente não sejam consideradas como cidadãos livres e iguais, nem todos indivíduos que merecem representação igual, elas são vistas como decentes e racionais e como capazes de aprendizagem moral tal como reconhecida na sua sociedade. Como membros responsáveis da sociedade, elas podem reconhecer quando seus deveres e obrigações morais conformam – se à ideia de justiça do bem comum do povo. Cada pessoa pertence a um grupo representado por um corpo na hierarquia de consulta, e cada pessoa, participa de atividades distintas e desempenha certo papel no esquema geral de cooperação.

Direitos humanos


Papel dos direitos humanos nos direitos dos povos

Os direitos humanos são uma classe de direitos que desempenha um papel especial num direito dos povos razoável: eles restringem as razões justificadoras da guerra e põem limites à autonomia interna de um regime. Dessa maneira, refletem as duas mudanças básicas e historicamente profundas em como os poderes da soberania tem sido concebidos desde a Segunda Guerra Mundial.

A doutrina de guerra justa: o direito à guerra


O direito à guerra dos povos bem ordenados

Nenhum Estado tem direito à guerra na busca de interesses racionais, em contraste com interesses razoáveis. O direito dos povos, porém, atribui a todos os povos bem ordenados (liberais e decentes) e, na verdade, a qualquer sociedade que siga e honre um direito dos povos razoavelmente justo, o direito à guerra em autodefesa. Embora todas as sociedades bem ordenadas tenham esse direito, elas podem interpretar as suas ações de maneira diferente, dependendo de como pensam nos seus fins e propósitos.

A doutrina da guerra justa: a conduta de guerra


Princípios que restringem a conduta de guerra

Rawls expõe os seis princípios do pensamento tradicional, nesse capítulo.
O objetivo de uma guerra justa movida por um povo bem ordenado justo é uma paz justa e duradoura entre os povos e, especialmente, com seu atual inimigo.
Os povos bem ordenados não guerreiam entre si, mas apenas contra Estados não bem ordenados, cujos objetivos expansionistas ameacem a segurança e as instituições livres de regimes bem ordenados.
Na conduta de guerra, os povos bem ordenados devem distinguir claramente três grupos: os líderes e funcionários do Estado fora da lei, seus soldados, e a sua população civil.
Os povos bem ordenados devem respeitar, tanto quanto possível, os direitos humanos dos membros do outro lado, civis e soldados.
Os povos bem ordenados, pelas suas ações e proclamações, quando viável, devem prever, durante uma guerra, o tipo paz e os tipos de relações que buscam.
O raciocínio prático de meios e fins deve sempre ter um papel restrito quando se julga a adequação de uma ação ou política.


Sociedades oneradas


Condições desfavoráveis

As sociedades oneradas, embora não sejam expansionistas nem agressivas, carecem de tradições políticas e culturais, de capital humano e conhecimento técnico e, muitas vezes, dos recursos materiais e tecnológicos necessários para que sejam bem ordenadas. O objetivo de longo prazo das sociedades (relativamente) bem ordenadas deve ser o de trazer as sociedades oneradas, tal como os Estados fora da lei, para a sociedade dos povos bem ordenados.

A primeira diretriz para o dever de assistência

A primeira diretriz a considerar é a de que uma sociedade bem ordenada é a de que uma sociedade bem ordenada não precisa ser uma sociedade rica.

Segunda diretriz

Uma segunda diretriz para pensar a respeito de como executar o dever de assistência é perceber que a cultura política de uma sociedade onerada é de suma importância, e que, ao mesmo tempo, não existe nenhuma receita fácil para que os povos bem ordenados ajudem uma sociedade onerada a mudar a sua cultura política e social.

Terceira diretriz

A terceira diretriz para executar o dever de assistência é que seu objetivo seja ajudar as sociedades oneradas a serem capazes de gerir os seus próprios negócios de um modo razoável e racional e, por fim, tornarem – se membros da sociedade dos povos bem ordenados.

Sobre a justiça distributiva entre os povos


Igualdade entre os povos

Uma razão para reduzir as desigualdades em uma sociedade nacional é aliviar os sofrimentos e as dificuldades dos pobres. Contudo, isso não requer que todas as pessoas sejam iguais na riqueza. Em si, não importa quão grande a distância entre ricos e pobres possa ser. O que importa são as consequências.
A segunda razão para diminuir a distância entre ricos e pobres é que essa distância muitas vezes leva alguns cidadãos a serem estigmatizados e tratados como inferiores, e isso é injusto.
A terceira razão para considerar as desigualdades entre os povos diz respeito ao importante papel de equidade no processo político da estrutura da sociedade dos povos. No caso nacional, esse interesse é evidente no assegurar a honestidade das eleições e das oportunidades políticas de concorrer a cargo público.

Contraste com a visão cosmopolita

O direito dos povos supõe que cada sociedade tem na sua população um cabedal suficiente de capacidade humanas, dispondo de capacidades humanas, dispondo de recursos humanos potenciais para concretizar instituições justas. O fim político último da sociedade é tornar – se plenamente justa e estável pelas razões certas. Assim que esse fim é alcançado, o direito dos povos não prescreve mais nenhum alvo como, por exemplo, elevar o padrão de vida para além do que é necessário para sustentar essas instituições.
Essas observações ilustram o contraste entre o direito dos povos e uma visão cosmopolita. O interesse final de uma visão cosmopolita é o bem – estar dos indivíduos, não a justiça das sociedades.

A ideia de razão pública revista

A ideia de razão pública explicita no nível mais profundo os valores morais e políticos que devem determinar a relação de um governo democrático constitucional com os seus cidadãos e a relação destes entre si.
Ela tem cinco aspectos diferentes:
As questões políticas fundamentais às quais se aplica;
As pessoas a quem se aplica (funcionários do governo e candidatos à cargos públicos);
Seu conteúdo como dado por uma família de concepções políticas razoáveis de justiça;
A aplicação dessas concepções em discussões de normas coercitivas a serem decretadas na forma da lei legítima para um povo democrático;
A verificação pelos cidadãos de que os princípios derivados das suas concepções de justiça satisfazem o critério de reciprocidade;
O conteúdo da razão pública é dado por uma família de concepções políticas de justiça. Há muitos liberalismo e visões relacionadas e visões relacionadas e, portanto, muitas formas de razão pública manifestadas numa família de concepções políticas razoáveis. Desta, a justiça como equidade é apenas uma. A característica delimitadora dessas formas é o critério da reciprocidade, aplicado entre cidadãos livres e iguais, vistos como razoáveis e racionais.

[Simone Firpo · Rating 2 out of 5]

Premesse: ci ho provato ma per limiti miei non sono riuscito a leggerlo tutto e per capire al meglio i concetti ho letto dei riassunti su Jura Gentium quindi ho un'idea generale. Non è facile scrivere una recensione su un saggio del genere che espone concetti molto elaborati, ma ci provo. Non sono uno studente di filosofia quindi molte cose potrei averle capite male e quindi aver commesso molti errori di giudizio.
Questo testo mi è stato consigliato dal mio docente di sociologia mentre discutevamo del rapporto tra lo stato e la società civile.
Ciò che ho apprezzato è stato il suo tentativo di porre le basi per un sistema di giustizia internazionale che valorizzi i popoli ed i diritti umani universali in modo che possa integrare anche i popoli non liberali ma che rispettano i diritti umani (da lui definiti decenti). Rawls fa una distinzione tra popoli liberaldemocratici (come valori), popoli decenti (non liberali ma che rispettano i diritti umani), i paesi fuorilegge che non rispettano tali diritti e quelli che non riescono ad organizzarsi. Ma uno dei problemi è proprio il fatto che un popolo cosiddetto decente accetti di far parte di uno schema in cui ammette di essere un gradino in basso rispetto ai paesi liberali. Paradossalmente l'attuale ordine internazionale è un passo avanti rispetto a questo schema perché almeno non fa questa distinzione.
Un tema importante che menziona ma che secondo me non sviluppa abbastanza è la "guerra giusta". Rawls ammette la legittimità dell'uso della forza non solo il caso di aggressione ma anche di violazioni dei diritti umani universali che rispettano i regimi "decenti" ma che violano gli stati fuorilegge rendendolo una sorta di "teorico", mi si passi il termine, della legittimità degli interventi umanitari. Al di là di come la si pensi ogni teoria di qualunque tipo (religiosa, ideologica, strategica, fino a concetti più piccoli come ad esempio un reddito di cittadinanza) quando cerca di essere applicata prenderà sempre una strada diversa da quella prevista per via dell'imprevedibilità delle circostanze e finisce per degenerare, in questo caso ci sono le premesse per la legittimità di molti elementi dell'attuale sistema internazionale, dalla Corte Penale Internazionale alla Responsibility to Protect. Cionostante a mio parere non riesce nel suo intento di porre le basi per una solida teoria di un sistema internazionale liberale, trattando non adeguatamente molti punti importanti.

[Jacob]

I really, really like John Rawls's popularization of the 'Original position' thought experiment (supposedly credit should also go to Harsanyi and Vickrey too, so... there you go) and the solidarity-natured society that it gets us thinking about. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Origina...

In hindsight, I should've read Theory of Justice (or a detailed summary) before reading this book. It's not necessary, and this won't be the only Rawls book I read in my life, but it might have been better to come at it with that added context.

This book is basically a short treatise on how 'liberal-democratic peoples' might engage inside of their own societies in a way that allows for pluralism of thought, religion, etc. AND also how these groups ('peoples' as distinct from just calling them 'nations') might best interact with/tolerate other liberal-democratic peoples, non-democratic peoples, and 'outlaw states'. BOTH of those topics are extremely relevant today, twenty-something years after this book was published.

There's a lot here to recommend in terms of philosophical thought and it's not an intimidatingly-sized book, but there were some elements to the presentation and style that were less than smooth. It's quite academic (we get both big academic words as well as sections with decimal points...'Section 3.4'). There's also a grating amount of the use of the words 'reasonable' and 'decent'. To be fair, Rawls defines what he means by these words at the beginning, but their repetition almost made it feel as if the two words were growing increasingly ambiguous and qualitative with each iteration.

I may have been just as well off spending time on the Stanford Philosophy site summary, but after having consumed much of Rawls second-hand in others's books and lectures, I was glad to read him in his own words for the first time.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ra...

[Zarathustra Goertzel · Rating 4 out of 5]

I found The Law of Peoples quite interesting. Having read about Kant's ideas regarding reciprocity in his Categorical Imperative, it's interesting to see a 20th century philosopher taking up the torch.

From Wikipedia,
"Rawls refers to this ideal conception as a "realistic utopia": realistic because it could and may exist; utopian because it "joins reasonableness and justice with conditions enabling citizens to realize their fundamental interests."

Thus, the Law of Peoples is realistically utopian: it is an attempt to show "how reasonable citizens and peoples might live peacefully in a just world.""

What are the principles by which relations among "reasonable, well-ordered peoples" might take place peacefully (for the right reasons)?

The Difference Principle (from the Theory of Justice) asserts that a people must see to the well-being of the worst-off in a society (which will allow fair equal opportunity to flourish). This principle ties into the "original position" or "veil of ignorance" thought experiment whereby one needs to choose a sociopolitical system without knowing what one's position will be. I'm familiar with this term from the spiritual multi-incarnational cosmology woo-verse, so it's fun to see its use in the normal academic sphere 🤓

I find the following idea interesting: that reasonable principles are the ones one can expect co-selves with differing comprehensive doctrines to also agree on following.

And what does it mean if one cannot...? 🤔

I'm not sure to what degree I'd literally sign off on the principles as is (tho they ain't bad). Interesting, nonetheless.

[Renato Garín · Rating 3 out of 5]

The Law of Peoples, publicada en 1999 por el filósofo político estadounidense John Rawls, es una obra que busca extender su teoría de la justicia al ámbito internacional. A diferencia de sus trabajos anteriores, centrados principalmente en cómo diseñar instituciones justas dentro de un solo Estado, Rawls aquí se propone delinear principios que regulen las relaciones entre diferentes “pueblos” del mundo. Es importante notar que el autor utiliza el término “pueblos” en lugar de “Estados” para hacer hincapié en comunidades políticas organizadas alrededor de valores compartidos, y no únicamente en estructuras gubernamentales.

En este libro, Rawls introduce la noción de “sociedades razonables” y distingue entre sociedades liberales (que cumplen plenamente con principios de justicia y libertad) y sociedades decentes (que, aun no siendo liberales, respetan derechos humanos fundamentales y promueven un orden interno relativamente justo). Rawls sostiene que estas sociedades, al cumplir estándares mínimos de justicia, deberían ser aceptadas en la comunidad internacional y protegidas de intervenciones arbitrarias.

Otro aporte significativo de The Law of Peoples es la discusión en torno a la “obligación de asistencia” que las sociedades bien ordenadas tienen para con aquellas que enfrentan cargas onerosas (llamadas burdened societies), con el fin de ayudarlas a desarrollarse de manera autónoma y a garantizar los derechos básicos de sus ciudadanos. Rawls descarta la idea de imponer un sistema liberal universal a la fuerza, argumentando que resulta más viable articular un marco de cooperación y mutuo respeto.

[Francis Bezooyen · Rating 3 out of 5]

Ok - I should actually read this again 'cause I found it so hard to pay attention to and know that I didn't take in nearly as much of it as I should have. Maybe it's just been my state of mind at the time of reading (a good possibility) but something about the combination of reader (audiobook - he kinda puts you to sleep) and style of writing left my mind feeling like a stone skipping along the surface of a pond rather than sinking into it. I was constantly having to make my mind re-focus on the book - it was a chore.

That said, the overall vision of the book, and what details I actually gleaned from it, certainly do seem worth grappling with which is why I want to give it another go. Though, before I read it again I think I should read the two books by this author that seem to have been written as parts one and two of a trilogy of sorts, to which this one is the third installment. I believe those other two books are "A Theory of Justice" and "Political Liberalism"... I hope they make for more engaging reading.

[Nathan · Rating 2 out of 5]

John Rawls is supposed to be one of the foremost thinkers of our time, the first political scientist in some time to come up with a genuinely new concept. Unfortunately, I feel the academic world was so desperate to embrace something new that they ignored the many flaws that are embedded within the theories Rawls posited.
Rawls attempts to establish a cohesive argument for a liberal-democratic society, arguing that the plurality of opinion that exists is sustainable, and people can incorporate a respect for the majority decisions within their faith. Of course, if a person can't do that Rawls won't accept that person in his society. The underlying assumption in his theory is that liberal democratic societies are the apex of political evolution, and will not continue to evolve. Unfortunately, as history has taught us; time keeps marching on. In every society in history, regardless of political structure, power collects and solidifies. So it is with ideas

[Nathan Albright · Rating 4 out of 5]

I liked this book a lot more than I expected to, and the author deserves a lot of credit for that. To be sure, I knew going into this book that the author and I had very different political worldviews, but in reading this book I found that the author was far more savvy than he let on, even if some of his arguments were more than a little bit inconsistent [1]. It is worthwhile to state at the outset that I am not the target audience for this book. This is an author who is an avowed liberal who is writing largely to leftists in order to encourage them to treat principled and "decent" people who are nonetheless not "liberal" with respect and friendliness in order to preserve the aims of decency and human rights. Reading between the lines, a reader can infer that a great deal of the trouble in our own republic springs from the refusal of Progressives to show their political opposition and religious people in general respect and civility, and that this lack of civility on the part of leftists makes the goal of peace between civilized nations and self-defense against evildoers more fragile.

For the most part, this book is made up of various rather dry points and subpoints that is written in as legalistic a way as possible. It appears, from my vantage point, as if the author wants to make his own personal opinions appear to have the validity of something approaching international law, and so he avoids the sort of passionate personal advocacy one would expect and writes this as if he was writing a commentary on Grotius. This is a shrewd and canny decision, as the author perhaps accurately suspects that this is the sort of writing that could inflame fellow leftists and so it needs to be handled in as understated a manner as possible. Particularly daring is the author's reframing of the question of international law to be a law between peoples and not between states in recognition of the way that states tend to act in defense of their own interests and behave contrary to the wishes of their often far more peace-loving people, and that states can be roguish without their people being so, as has frequently been the case with the United States over the past few decades. This is also a shrewd decision in that it seeks to reframe the question of international law and legitimacy by freeing people of the blame of bad regimes, a theme that arises at several points in this discussion. Particularly brilliant is the author's division of regimes into five types: liberal regimes (which are not personally appealing given the assumptions the author makes for them), decent nonliberal peoples (where I would consider myself), outlaw states, peoples operating under historical burdens that make it difficult for them to be sufficiently free and equal, and hierarchical states that fail to offer sufficient consultation to their peoples but honor human rights. There is a lot in this book I would disagree with, but the book as a whole is one that I would treat respectfully and debate with in a civil fashion. Even though the book is made up of two somewhat independent essays, the last third of it taken up by an essay called "The Idea Of Public Reason Revisited," the book holds together well.

There is a great deal in this book that is particularly relevant to our contemporary political situation, although the book itself was written in the late 1990's and the edition I read came out in 2002. Of particular relevance is the way that the author strongly urges fellow leftists and self-professed liberals to show a greater degree of civility and graciousness towards less egalitarian but nonaggressive foreign regimes and even competing political coalitions within Western societies. In general, this has not been done, and the lack of civility from the left has been a major influence in the radicalization of conservative elements within societies across the West, including the United States, which has for many people (including myself personally) made it impossible to support any left of center regime under any circumstances whatsoever, despite my considerable ambivalence with populism of any kind. The author, moreover, shows some degree of internal contradiction because of the tension between his avowed principles and his political worldview, stating that any liberal regime must respect the right to life but not seeing how abortion is a fundamental denial of this right, and thus illegitimate by the author's own standards regarding human rights. To be sure, these are not minor quibbles, but at the same time this book is a reminder that if more political discourse was conducted in this fashion our society would be far better off. For that this book deserves considerable praise.

[1] For example, the author and I have the same view of immorality of Southern rebellion during the Civil War:

https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2011...

https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2016...

And, surprisingly enough, we have similar reviews about the importance of consent and consensus:

https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2011...

https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2016...

https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2012...

https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2012...

https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2016...

[Anatolii Miroshnychenko · Rating 3 out of 5]

It is interesting to how Prof. Rowls approaches legal concepts from a wider philosophical point of view. However, the key concepts used, which attribute some vague characteristics to “peoples” (“reasonable liberal peoples”, “decent peoples”, etc.) seem to me artificial, vaguely defined and therefore hardly suitable for using them as a tool in analysis and reasoning.

[Kamal Wafi · Rating 3 out of 5]

I'm a casual reader of political philosophy so to be fair I think a fair bit of this went above my head. I can compare it to John Stuart Mill and in terms of writing style JSM wins. The word reasonable must appear once for every five words.

[Ailith Twinning · Rating 1 out of 5]

A thoroughly disturbing philosophy.

[Kassandra O'Brien · Rating 4 out of 5]

An incredibly ambitious text that provides good answers to many of the questions prompted by A Theory of Justice.

[Eric Heinze · Rating 5 out of 5]

One of the standard philosophical texts for international law within the classical liberal tradition, though not without its critics!

[Ruby Donaghu · Rating 2 out of 5]

This is bullshit!

[Leandro Apostol · Rating 4 out of 5]

I suspect Rawls is one of those philosophers whom students often cite and draw ideas from without actually reading the whole of his systematic philosophy. I won't summarize his arguments here; I just wanted to say that his thought is far more systematic and flexible that any cursory glance. His normative account of foreign policy between states (Law of Peoples) and the location of justice (Public Reason), which is a distillation of his Political Liberalism, are steeped in liberal political theory - including an institutional perspective of the "political", the value of human rights and self-determination, and reciprocal justice. He knows the limits and practical implications of his "realistic utopia" and grounds his thoughts in an expansive cross-disciplinary literature and current events, although his focus on the latter is more focused on an American perspective. Specifically, his reflections on the ethics of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the post-war realities of decolonization, the socio-political transformations precipitated by Civil Rights Movement, and (notably) the development of global governance. Perhaps this book is best read as a thought experiment - valuable for further discussion and ideas - rather than a prescriptive panacea for social harmony.

Several issues:
1. I was unsure whether his peculiar integration of cultural relativism with a seemingly universalizing liberal paradigm oriented around the two "original positions" was entirely convincing. He stresses that a liberal Law of Peoples can work for non-liberal peoples ("decent consultation hierarchies"), as long as reciprocity, the veil of ignorance, and mutual commitment to certain liberal norms.

2. Can one distinguish between the ramifications of a realistic utopia and its corresponding physical forms? That is, can one engage in such a purely intellectual exercise without losing sight of the concrete problems that it purports to reform? Rawls qualifies his ideal world (societies + peoples) as a "realistic utopia" that is not meant to resemble actual political conditions. In fact, the plausibility of the "original position" rests on discerning the inherently conjectural quality of his works. However, this does not mean that his lacks any application. Thinking about ideal forms of organization given the rising cultural pluralism and decomposition of traditionally homogeneous states or "peoples" can itself facilitate deliberation over institutional reform, particularly the extent to which culturally distinct, non-liberal peoples ought to be perceived within foreign policy circles.

3. The distinction between political and non-political spheres of action are, at least, as old as Plato. Rawls conceptualizes this problem in multiple ways, evidently in his distinction between "rational" and "reasonable" action - the latter being compatible with diverse cultural settings and, therefore, appropriate for public reason. Peoples invariably conflict over rational demands of moral action, but they can certainly agree over reasonable ones. In doing so, Rawls prevents arbitrary universalism without necessarily suggesting an amoral, Hobbesian state of nature governed by self-interest. I am not sure whether this strategy is entirely successful.

[Dan · Rating 4 out of 5]

The Laws of People is an attempt to develop an international theory of justice grounded in the liberal principles developed in Rawls' theory of justice. Overall it fails to formulate a comprehensive account of international relations that would address the essential challanges humanity is currently facing. It has very little to say about global distributive justice, immigration or nuclear proliferation.

It also takes peoples rather than individuals as the ultimate moral unit of analysis, operating with a very restrictive view of human rights. Rawls' account falls short of cosmopolitan aspirations. Given its society centered perspective its distributive prescriptions are limited to a duty of assistance to burdened societies with the purpose of assisting their transition to a well-ordered state. No right of subsistence is stipulated. The duty of assistance stems not from any claim on part of humanity, but from the essential assumption of the feasibility and desirability of the liberal project of global democracy. Burdened societies are to be assisted out of a sense of long-term liberal self-interest, it is a central premise of the book that peace is the natural state of a global democratic order.

Rawls explictly places his book in the category of ideal theory rather than viewing it as a practical project, yet he is nevertheless self-limiting in his aspirations. The book stops far short of a cosmopolitan defence of human rights. Given the upfront rejection of considerations of feasibility this seems to be self-defeating.

The Law of Peoples is liable to criticism both from a cosmopolitan perspective as well as from a realist stand point. Neither does it go far enough in defending human rights, nor does it have any applicability. If anything the implementation of its principles would create further divisions and antagonism in the international system, rather than consolidate it, by drawing a strict line of separation between decent societies and the rest. The bar for decency in Rawls lies too high - no society is decent unless it allows its citizens some form of political participation.

[Kevin · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a collection of two essays, one about the framework of how societies in the international community could interact with each other, and the other on Public Reason, which we could also call public political discourse/debate.

Rawls draws a lot from his previous work and assumes that the reader will have some idea about concepts such as "justice as fairness", political liberalism, Veil of Ignorance, and more! I've had some exposure to Rawls from a college course many ages ago, and though I could have done better I felt at least with my minimal knowledge I was able to follow most of Rawls' discussion.

Rawls is not too concerned with coming up with specifics or set up the One True, Reasonable, and Right way to do things. He is instead concerned with how societies (or Peoples, as he refers to them) with different ideas of the One True, Reasonable, and Right Way to Do Things ought to interact with each other, and what concerns they should have when setting up International law. This includes what type of societies would be able to interact peacefully in a global community, what should be done with States that do not follow the Law of Peoples as set forth by this global community, and also the global community's obligations towards burdened societies.

Ultimately, I found this book instructive, in particular since it provides me with a framework through which to view the Spanish Civil War and the failure of the Second Spanish Republic. Though I doubt this is what Rawls had in mind, it is how I'm going to apply many of the ideas I encountered in this book.

[Gene · Rating 5 out of 5]

The capstone to the John Rawls series. "The Law of Peoples" forges principle from excuses of intellectual snobbery and self-righteousness. Help those who can be helped, and stop those who cannot stop themselves. This is the Grand Escalante of political philosophy applied to international relations, and essential reading for any serious student of political theory.

"A Theory of Justice" is terrible but lays the foundation, "Justice as Fairness" sets the stage, "Political Liberalism" introduces the overlapping consensus, and finally "The Law of Peoples" brings light to all of the nonsense in a beautiful, elegant logical form. This is one for the ages.

Definitions of "just" intervention for war, human rights, and international balances are delicately dissected. Learn how freedom and rights are only welcome to those who deserve it, and cherish it. Each individual is responsible for protecting the ideal. Justice comes to those who fight for it. Freedom vanishes from those who burnish it.

Live free or die!!!

[Micheal Hoffman · Rating 1 out of 5]

I love John Rawls's theory of justice as fairness, but this is not that theory. It was somewhat disappointing. It almost appears as if Rawls was attempting to write a theory to explain obligations in the international community as they are rather than writing an ideal theory of justice. In attempting to account for differences in obligations between domestic and international communities Rawls develops the second original position. Whereas the first original position was built around the concept of justice as fairness, everyone similarly situated behind the veil of ignorance, the second original position abandons that approach. Rawls still considers the representatives under the veil of ignorance, but they know they are only representing certain types of peoples ("liberal" "decent") giving them motivation for selecting certain principles and not others. It's still Rawls so you should still read it, but don't compare it to his other works.

[Soha Bayoumi · Rating 3 out of 5]

I think this book is a big failure! Rawls was tempted by this idea of applying his theory of justice on the international level, but I don't think he was successful at all in presenting a real conceptual or theoretical framework for his international justice theory. Besides there are many empirical problems with the book: especially his resort to the Ottoman Empire example. His categories of peoples were not any useful, in my opinion, especially the categories of decent peoples and benevolent absolutisms!!! Many of the definitions and conceptions he presents are artificial! His list of eight principles of justice between peoples is arbitrary: incomplete, but also redundant! The exercise is probably challenging, but I think Rawls decidedly failed it!

[Thomas Ray · Rating 1 out of 5]

According to Branko Milanovic in The Haves and Have-Nots, Rawls starts with some untrue assumptions to justify an attitude that inequality between rich and poor countries is just fine. Rawls ignores the fact that much of the inequality is due to unfair trade agreements (see Joseph Stiglitz' writings) allowing multinational corporations to take government subsidies from rich countries, to produce commodities that they then dump in poor countries' markets--destroying the agricultural economy there. We're in a global, corporatized world. The old "my country is an island" attitude no longer applies.