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The Politics of Command: Factions and Ideas in Confederate Strategy
Clean and unmarked pages./Good; Book in VG condition, but DJ is Good. Several large tears that have been "repaired" with tape on front panel of DJ; other smaller tears and chips along edges, but DJ is now protected by Brodart plastic covering. Name of previous owner in red ink on front half-title page.
- GenresAmerican Civil War
Hardcover
First published December 12, 1973
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Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews
January 9, 2025
If you are a fan of Jefferson Davis, this is not the book for you. If your persuasions lean toward the South, this is not the book for you. If finding fault with Confederate strategy bothers you, this is not the book for you. Otherwise, all other readers should enjoy the book. As I said, the book is vitriolic towards Davis and the Confederacy in general. The author goes into some detail about Napoleonic tactics, but it isn't boring. Overall, a worthy effort and worth checking out.
March 17, 2021
There are a few people at least who will read this book and miss what I think is the worth and enjoyment of a work like this. There are some people who will read this book or one like it and think that the Confederacy fell because it was a house divided, to borrow that biblical and Abraham Lincoln quote. And it is certainly true that there were divisions within the Confederacy that the author explores, differences that were inherent in the strategic situation of the South as well as the squabbles that tend to be pretty inevitable when one is dealing with very scarce military resources and very different priorities and perspectives. What is detailed in this particular book is a somewhat detailed look at some of those divisions within the Confederacy, none of which the author entirely endorses and which reflect the institutional politics of the Confederate States of America. The lack of formal parties and party discipline within the Confederacy meant that the factions that existed combined personal grievances as well as different perspectives and tended to add a sharp and bitter edge to the disagreements that existed. And, unfortunately, Jefferson Davis does not appear to have been as savvy a coalition builder as Abraham Lincoln was, to the great detriment of his cause.
This book is a bit more than 200 pages long and contains various chapters that serve to help the reader understand the nature of political factions within the Confederate political and military establishment. The authors begin with acknowledgments and an introduction. After that comes a look at the European inheritance that came especially from Jomini and the writing after the French Revolution that Americans, including rebels, inherited (1). After that comes a look at the role of Robert E. Lee and the strategy of the Civil War, which was especially heavily influenced by his own Virginian background as well as the fact that he spent most of the war dealing with the concerns of Virginia as well as its logistical connections to the Carolinas (2). This is followed by a discussion of the western concentration bloc, which the authors view as being particularly important (3) as a counterweight to Lee's focus on Virginia. This is followed by Davis' role as general-in-chief as well as the importance of troop and logistical support within the Departmental system of the Confederacy (4). This is then followed by chapters on the ghost of Beauregard (5) as well as the politics of command (6). The main content of the book is followed by an appendix on prewar connections between Confederate leaders as well as simplified diagrams that show the connection between Civil War and Napoleonic warfare, as well as a bibliographical essay and an index.
Despite the fact that I am not very sympathetic to the cause of the Confederacy, there is much interest in the way that different factions and ideas influenced the Confederacy, as these differences have endured even to the present-day when it comes to how the Confederacy is remembered. In particular, the hostility between Davis and who the authors refer to as the Western Concentration Bloc hardened into bitterly hostile battles in essays and memoirs that paint the picture of the Confederacy as a hotbed of overly sensitive and prickly people with fragile egos and an inability to get along with others, even those who would be considered as natural allies. I think that the authors manage to do a good job at discussing the reasons why these divisions existed and point to the complexity of the connections that existed among Confederate leaders, ties of kinship, friendship, as well as political patronage going back decades into the military, Congress, as well as local politics. These are elements that students of the Civil War do not always consider but they help us to be a bit more favorable to the authors' thesis than may be the case without that context.
This book is a bit more than 200 pages long and contains various chapters that serve to help the reader understand the nature of political factions within the Confederate political and military establishment. The authors begin with acknowledgments and an introduction. After that comes a look at the European inheritance that came especially from Jomini and the writing after the French Revolution that Americans, including rebels, inherited (1). After that comes a look at the role of Robert E. Lee and the strategy of the Civil War, which was especially heavily influenced by his own Virginian background as well as the fact that he spent most of the war dealing with the concerns of Virginia as well as its logistical connections to the Carolinas (2). This is followed by a discussion of the western concentration bloc, which the authors view as being particularly important (3) as a counterweight to Lee's focus on Virginia. This is followed by Davis' role as general-in-chief as well as the importance of troop and logistical support within the Departmental system of the Confederacy (4). This is then followed by chapters on the ghost of Beauregard (5) as well as the politics of command (6). The main content of the book is followed by an appendix on prewar connections between Confederate leaders as well as simplified diagrams that show the connection between Civil War and Napoleonic warfare, as well as a bibliographical essay and an index.
Despite the fact that I am not very sympathetic to the cause of the Confederacy, there is much interest in the way that different factions and ideas influenced the Confederacy, as these differences have endured even to the present-day when it comes to how the Confederacy is remembered. In particular, the hostility between Davis and who the authors refer to as the Western Concentration Bloc hardened into bitterly hostile battles in essays and memoirs that paint the picture of the Confederacy as a hotbed of overly sensitive and prickly people with fragile egos and an inability to get along with others, even those who would be considered as natural allies. I think that the authors manage to do a good job at discussing the reasons why these divisions existed and point to the complexity of the connections that existed among Confederate leaders, ties of kinship, friendship, as well as political patronage going back decades into the military, Congress, as well as local politics. These are elements that students of the Civil War do not always consider but they help us to be a bit more favorable to the authors' thesis than may be the case without that context.
March 12, 2021
The book is a bit all over the place, repetitive, and error ridden. On the plus side, it offers a good discussion of the ideas of Napoleon and Jomini and their application to the Civil War, particularly in discussing Beauregard. The western concentration bloc is an interesting idea, only undermined by repetitive discussions. They do not take it too far, pointing out it was diffuse. The analysis of Davis as commander is spot on, of Lee less so since he becomes a kind of villain with his Virginia first idea. However, Lee's obsession with Virginia is reduced to his localism instead of looking into why the Union forces there were more than double those in any other field army. One might say Lincoln and Stanton had a Virginia first obsession and Lee was merely reacting to that. As to Lee's advice on the west always being reduced to how it would influence Virginia, while mostly true, he did offer advice in early 1862 for an attack on Shiloh. Virginia was not even mentioned.
All in all, one is better off reading How the North Won, where the ideas are better presented and discussed without Connelly's anti-Lee bias.
All in all, one is better off reading How the North Won, where the ideas are better presented and discussed without Connelly's anti-Lee bias.
November 29, 2021
I liked the information in the book and I learned more about the various family, political, military, and other connections that existed within the Confederate army during the Civil War. I teach on leadership and the information presented in the book provided background material that helped me gain a greater understanding of the decision-making process within the Confederate army, and it allowed me to contrast that with the Union army.
December 27, 2009
This book outlines the divided decision making structure of the Confederate States of America in terms of development of a coherent military strategy. The authors observe that it was not simply a matter of personal conflicts and anti-Jefferson Davis sentiments. As they say (Page x): "[The infighting:] involved a continuing debate over basic war policy, particularly the Confederacy's proper strategic course."
Who were the key actors and their perspectives? President Jefferson Davis, from his experience in the Mexican War and from his tour as Secretary of War, felt that he had relevant insights.
There was also Robert E. Lee, who had a vision--but whose vision tended to be limited to the east and--specifically--Virginia. While Davis did not automatically accept Lee's views, he did respect his judgment greatly.
Then, the generals. . . . Beauregard was a key figure in the view that a Western strategy was important. Allied with him? Braxton Bragg, Joseph Johnston, and James Longstreet. Of course, there were also disagreements among these figures (witness Bragg versus Longstreet at Chattanooga). A guiding vision here was Beauregard's understanding of Jomini/Napoleon views of strategy.
Then, the political leaders, such as Wigfall, Miles, Pickens, Harris, and so on.
The bottom line? There were various perspectives on grand strategy and little coherence. President Davis, needless to say, had a difficult task. This book does a nice job of outlining the competing perspectives and the difficulty of developing a final, coherent policy.
Who were the key actors and their perspectives? President Jefferson Davis, from his experience in the Mexican War and from his tour as Secretary of War, felt that he had relevant insights.
There was also Robert E. Lee, who had a vision--but whose vision tended to be limited to the east and--specifically--Virginia. While Davis did not automatically accept Lee's views, he did respect his judgment greatly.
Then, the generals. . . . Beauregard was a key figure in the view that a Western strategy was important. Allied with him? Braxton Bragg, Joseph Johnston, and James Longstreet. Of course, there were also disagreements among these figures (witness Bragg versus Longstreet at Chattanooga). A guiding vision here was Beauregard's understanding of Jomini/Napoleon views of strategy.
Then, the political leaders, such as Wigfall, Miles, Pickens, Harris, and so on.
The bottom line? There were various perspectives on grand strategy and little coherence. President Davis, needless to say, had a difficult task. This book does a nice job of outlining the competing perspectives and the difficulty of developing a final, coherent policy.
Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews